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Abstract
The Oulipo is known primarily for the use of formal constraints in writing. The
constraint is an arbitrary application of rigorously defined formal demands (often
drawn from mathematics) in the process of literary or poetic composition. The group
was founded in 1960, and their remit was limited to the formulation of constraints
rather than literary texts. There is thus no literary theory proposed by the Oulipo, and
little in the way of critical interpretation of their methods in terms of its wider sig-
nificance to the condition of art in the period of their emergence. Their approach is
often counterposed to the Surrealists: where the Surrealist response to the conditions
of rationalised modernity attempted to explore the unconscious, the non-rational and
chance, the Oulipo’s use of constraints is consciously determined and resists the pas-
sivity of chance. The counter-model to the Surrealists for the Oulipo is the mathemati-
cal collective Nicolas Bourbaki. Bourbaki’s rigorously abstract axiomatic mathematics
provides the formal prototype of the most abstracted rationality for the Oulipo to use as
compositional structures. The Oulipo also bear an ambivalent relation to structuralism,
but where structuralism tends towards a descriptive identification of ‘deep structures’
of signification, the Oulipo instead deploy structures as historically-specific composi-
tional material.
This thesis proposes to read the practice of the Oulipo as a production of the ‘new’
through a form of construction as ‘craft’ that is itself receptive to critical interpreta-
tion. It contends that the Oulipo can be seen to offer a distinctive trajectory among the
various responses to what Adorno identifies as a crisis of art’s autonomy in the latter
half of the twentieth century; in other words, that they pursue an alternative mod-
ernism. I argue that the Oulipo’s use of arbitrary rigidified logical structures in literary
composition is categorially alien to the latter’s concept, and thus that it forms a kind
of resistant material which must be worked with. This model of skilled engagement
recalls, in self-consciously paradoxical ways, the outmoded concept of craft which
provides an alternative to, on the one hand, the post-romantic idea of artistic freedom,
and on the other, full subsumption by technological procedure, maintaining a refracted
instrumentality in the logic of method that yet resists pre-determination.
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Introduction
In 1962, Raymond Queneau took part in a series of interviews with Georges Char-
bonnier. Among other things, he discusses in these sessions the work of the Oulipo,
the group he had founded two years earlier with the scientist Franc¸ois Le Lionnais,
dedicated to producing, as Queneau describes, ‘re`gles, lois, possibilite´s, formes, struc-
tures, etc., tout un arsenal dans lequel le poe`te ira choisir a` partir du moment ou` il aura
envie de sortir de ce qu’on appelle l’inspiration.’1 [‘Rules, laws, possibilities, forms,
structures, etc., an arsenal from which the poet will choose, the moment he wants to
get away from what is called inspiration.’] At the end of the final interview, Queneau
is pushed by Charbonnier to elaborate on the meaning of such ‘constraints’. Queneau
responds:
R. Q.—L’intention de l’Oulipo, c’est de proposer des structures nouvelles.
C’est tout. Maintenant, vous pouvez penser, vous, que cela ame`nera autre
chose. Le sens meˆme de l’Oulipo, c’est de donner des structures vides, de
proposer des structures vides.
G. C.—Alors, je pose le question: est-ce possible?
1Raymond Queneau, Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), pp.154.
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R. Q.—Probablement.2
[R. Q.—The intention of the Oulipo is to propose new structures. That’s
all. Now, you may think that will bring about something else. The very
meaning of the Oulipo is to give empty structures, to propose empty struc-
tures.
G. C.—So, I ask the question, is that possible?
R. Q.—Probably.]
Several important things can be drawn from this exchange regarding the nature of
the Oulipo: first, that they aim to break with the post-romantic commonplace of ‘inspi-
ration’; second, that they mean to innovate, to propose new structures; third, that their
methodology implies a kind of formality that bears no a priori immanent relation to
literary sources or consequences (these are empty structures, deeply redolent of mathe-
matical formalism, and of the scientific structuralism of the era); and, fourth, that such
empty structures may not necessarily be possible. The last point is a typically Quenel-
lian equivocation,3 one that indicates a circumspection towards doctrine that is very
characteristic of the Oulipo (most obviously in their relationship to structuralist the-
ory, but also in their opposition to the stridency of Bretonian Surrealism). The group’s
theoretical circumspection is often cited as the main reason for their longevity, but it is
also the reason why they have remained resistant to incorporation in the standard nar-
ratives of twentieth-century modernism, despite their responsiveness to the conditions
of the time, and their distinctly modernist aspiration to pursue the new. The refusal
2Ibid., pp.154–5.
3See also, for example, Queneau’s claim in the first interview that ‘quand j’e´nonce une assertion,
je m’aperc¸ois tout de suite que l’assertion contraire est a` peu pre`s aussi inte´ressante, a` un point ou` cela
devient presque superstitieux chez moi.’ Ibid., p.12. [‘When I make an assertion, I immediately see that
the contrary assertion is roughly as interesting, to a point where that becomes nearly superstitious for
me.’]
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to set out a doctrine is perhaps also what allows them to combine apparently opposed
concepts in the practice of writing: constraint versus potential (or freedom); litera-
ture versus science (most specifically mathematics); tradition versus the new; and the
end-work versus its process.
The Oulipo was founded in 1960, the idea of Queneau, an established writer and
general secretary at Gallimard, and Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, a chemical engineer and
mathematician. The other original members were Noe¨l Arnaud, Jacques Bens, Claude
Berge, Jacques Duchateau, Latis, Jean Lescure, Jean Queval and Albert-Marie Schmidt.
Later famous members include Italo Calvino, Harry Mathews, Georges Perec and
Jacques Roubaud. Marcel Duchamp was also inducted as a ‘foreign correspondent’
but was never a fully active member. The group still exists, and has met monthly
since its founding.4 In the first decade or so, their individual members produced and
published a number of Oulipian works, but the group itself remained, voluntarily, in
relative obscurity until the publication of their first group book, La Litte´rature poten-
tielle,5 in 1973, a collection of short exercises, descriptions of constraints and some
theoretical pieces. Since 1974, they have published regular editions of their own Bib-
liothe`que Oulipienne series, dedicated to exemplifying new constraints, and in more
recent years they have held monthly ‘jeudis’, at which they present their work publicly.
The use of constraints in writing is probably the most commonly given character-
isation of the Oulipo’s work, along with the paradigmatic example, Georges Perec’s
4The comptes rendus for the meetings from 1960–63 are published as Jacques Bens, ed., Gene`se de
L’Oulipo 1960–1963 (Bordeaux: Le Castor Astral, 2005). Scans of the typed minutes from 1960–2010
can be found online at: Fonds Oulipo . Dossiers mensuels de re´union (1960-2010),https://gallica.
bnf.fr/services/engine/search/sru?operation=searchRetrieve&version=1.2&query=
%28dc.title%20all%20%22Fonds%20Oulipo%22%29 (accessed August 24, 2019).
5Oulipo, La litte´rature potentielle (Paris: Gallimard, folio essais, 1973).
INTRODUCTION 4
lipogrammatic text La Disparition (A Void). Constraint is typically thought of as a
formally imposed restriction of the available materials or conditions of literary pro-
duction, most obviously at the level of linguistic structures—in La Disparition, the
prohibition of the letter E—but the term is quite broad. Thus devices such as the li-
pogram, the palindrome and others demanding a reduced set of letters, or demands
on those letters’ organisation, may be seen as low level constraints; higher levels of
constraint may operate at the level of the word, sentence, paragraph and so on. Fur-
thermore, semantic or thematic constraints make narratological demands, such as the
‘schedule of obligations’ used by Perec in the composition of his La vie mode d’emploi
(Life a Users Manual)6 or the semantic squares used to structure the narrative(s) of
Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveller.7 It is an approach to literary, or more
broadly, artistic production that seems at odds with modern art’s demand to be a realm
of freedom in the face of the unfreedom of an administered society. From Expression-
ism to Surrealism and beyond, one response to this predicament for art in the twentieth
century has been to seek resistance in the irrational. Oulipian procedure would, on the
contrary, seem to impose an excess of the rational, a determination that would suggest
a closure of possibilities. Yet this is done in the name of potential.
The Oulipo’s concern with what they term potential literature is inscribed in their
name: Ou–Li–Po—Ouvroir de litte´rature potentielle—workshop of potential litera-
ture. Potential, for the Oulipo, is distinct from the literary work. Queneau again:
L’association du mot ‘litte´rature’ et du mot ‘potentielle’ . . . je crois que,
la`, il ne faut pas comprendre ‘potentielle’ comme un attribut de´signant
6See p.95ff in this thesis.
7See p.184ff in this thesis.
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une certaine espe`ce de ‘litte´rature’ . . . au fond il s’agit peut-eˆtre moins de
litte´rature proprement dite que de fournir des formes au bon usage qu’on
peut faire de la litte´rature.8
[The association of the word ‘literature’ and the word ‘potential’ . . . I
think that, there, one must not understand ‘potential’ as an attribute des-
ignating a certain type of ‘literature’ . . . fundamentally, it is perhaps less
a matter of literature properly speaking, but the furnishing of forms that
literature can make good use of.]
Potential is, thus, the possibility for such work to come about, and the limitation of
the Oulipo’s remit to potential is thus to offer materials for the eventual production of
literature or poetry—as Queneau continues, ‘de structures nouvelles . . . qui, ensuite,
pourrant eˆtre utilise´es par les e´crivains de la fac¸on qui leur plaira.’9 [‘New structures
which can then be used by writers in whatever way they please.’] What the work
on potential does not prescribe is what these eventual works should be: there is no
Oulipian theory of literature as such. This means that potential has something of the
logic of instrumentality, but without its specifying its end or eventual actualisation in
advance.
If there are questions raised by the combination of constraint and potential, any
uneasiness is made more stark when the primary method of constraint is considered:
that is, the imposition of mathematical form in literary composition. Mathematics is
the language of modern science, which is to say that modern science is built on the
assumption that its object is, if not mathematical in itself, at least functionally math-
8Queneau, Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, pp.139–40.
9Ibid., p.140.
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ematisable. That literature could be made the object of a science was of course not
an alien concept in 1960, particularly considering structuralist—and earlier Russian
formalist—moves to offer a scientific treatment of it. Writing in 1967, Queneau states
not only that literature can be subject to scientific treatment, but that it must in order
to maintain relevance in modernity: ‘ “science” has incorporated the social sciences.
Literature, if it survives, cannot ignore this fact.’10 Yet clearly a lot depends on what
exactly is being subjected to scientific treatment: literature as an object, or literary
production as an activity. In structuralist discourse, an attempt is made to treat lit-
erature in terms drawn from a more general model of descriptive science. What is
perhaps more problematic for the status of literature as such is that any similar sci-
entific preparation should in some sense offer a prescriptive programme for litera-
ture: that is, a formula for how it could be produced. In the same article, Queneau
states that ‘[the Oulipo’s] aim could be described as the foundation of a new kind of
rhetoric, a new rhetoric which, nowadays, could not possibly do without mathemat-
ics,’11 but there remains a mismatch in the established conceptual constitution of these
domains—mathematics and literature—even if it is in the process of an upheaval. This
is made clearer where the axiomatic and deductive aspects of mathematics are brought
to the fore, as in Jacques Roubaud’s description of constraints:
Constraints are presented in explicit and systematic form and can be no-
tated in the language of mathematical logic. Oulipian texts thus become
the literary consequences of these axioms, according to the rules of deduc-
tion (which for their part can of course be only partially formalised) that
10Raymond Queneau, ‘Science and Literature,’ Times Literary Supplement, no. 3422 (September 28,
1967): p.864.
11Ibid., p.864.
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transform them into an analogy of the series of theorems, corollaries, and
scholia with which a mathematical text is constructed.12
It is thus perhaps unsurprising that Roubaud should also acknowledge that ‘math-
ematics [is] arguably in fundamental opposition to poetry.’13 The point is that for lit-
erature to be produced by something akin to a mathematical deduction would seem
to shift it from the realm of a critically responsive practice, to one that it is entirely
subordinated to the dominant logic of modern society.
Yet Oulipian practice is not ultimately about automatism, despite the introduction
of certain kinds of mechanism. That is, there is not, in Oulipian work, a reaction
against the artistic subject but rather a reconsideration of it. Reactions against the
strict sovereignty of the ‘creative’ individual are found in numerous forms during the
twentieth century. Schoenberg’s shift from free atonality to the 12-tone technique
(and to ‘total serialism’ in its wake) suggested an objectivisation of the compositional
process—although, as Schoenberg insisted, it still demanded a composer. The use of
aleatory methods in the work of John Cage, Fluxus and others attempted to displace the
artistic subject and artistic ends grounded there (although even anti-art gestures here
still appeal to a higher conceptual condition than mere empirical practice).14 The nou-
veau roman aimed to release the text from established novelistic notions of character,
12Jacques Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ in Oulipo Compendium, ed. Harry Math-
ews and Alastair Brotchie, trans. Harry Mathews (London: Atlas Press, 2005), pp.41–2. Compare also
Jacques Jouet’s formulation: ‘the constraint is the problem; the text the solution. If you will, the con-
straint is the enunciation of an enigma, and the text is the answer.’ Jacques Jouet, ‘With (and Without)
Constraints,’ trans. R. Lapidus, SubStance, no. 96 (2001): p.4.
13Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.41.
14‘By emphasising the composer’s intellectual capacity rather than facility for rhythm, melody or
harmony, Cage also raised the composer as thinker even higher above composers devoted to the craft
of producing musical works.’ Larry Shiner, The Invention of Art: A Cultural History (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2001), p.293.
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story or commitment, the values of significant, subjective or conventionally humanistic
forms of writing and instead attempted a textual flatness or objectivity, closer to ‘sci-
entific’ description.15 Finally, structuralist or poststructuralist theorists of the period
wrote of the dissolution of the writing subject, or its co-origination with the text itself,
most famously in essays by Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault.16
With the Oulipo however, there is instead something of a heightening of the subjec-
tive element, inasmuch as it is the subject that works. Thus, any kind of subject-object
opposition in the conditions of literary production that would have its objective pole
dismissed in the name of ‘inspiration’ is brought back by Oulipian methods into a con-
stitutive tension. In fact, there is an appeal to an older, artisanal model of work here,
and thus an equivocation between modern and (the recollection of) certain pre-modern
categories of artistic production. Mathematical logic—in its applications in science
and technology, and above all the nascent digital technology of the early years of the
Oulipo, and its pervasion of the human sciences and social administrative structures,
would seem to constitute the most advanced productive developments of the time, and
thus would offer the context to which a properly modernist art would need to be re-
sponsive. As Theodor Adorno states, ‘only the most advanced art of any period has any
chance against the decay wrought by time.’17 Yet the Oulipian response to mathemat-
ics (and to mathematically-informed scientific structure more generally) is to model it
15‘The visual or descriptive adjective, the word that contents itself with measuring, locating, limiting,
defining, indicates a difficult but most likely direction for a new art of the novel.’ Alain Robbe-Grillet,
For a New Novel: Essays on Fiction, trans. Richard Howard (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1989), p.24.
16See Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author,’ in Image Music Text, ed. and trans. Stephen Heath
(London: Fontana Press, 1977) and Michel Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’ In The Foucault Reader, ed.
Paul Rabinow, trans. Josue´ V. Harari (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986).
17Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Bloomsbury, 2013),
p.55.
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as a resistant material in a process akin to what is now an effectively obsolete mode
of production—and one that is thus also typically counterposed to art in its modern
sense—that is, craft. This accords with the artisanal implications of the Ouvroir, or
workshop, in their name.
The artisanal context—of the preparation of (formal) material to be worked—is
then the limited domain of Oulipian practice, rather than end-works. This again pro-
vokes a point of ambivalence about what exactly is to be appraised critically: the
method or the work? To consider the work and the method together always subordi-
nates the method to the work (and the ‘success’ thereof) and disregards the specific
focus of Oulipian procedure; it tends towards a theory of literature as such, which,
as has been stated already, is neither the Oulipo’s productive, nor my interpretative,
intention. To consider the method in isolation, however, makes it de facto a work
in itself—akin perhaps to the status of the ‘idea’ in conceptualism—but thereby also
discards its distinguishing status as method as such. This is the quandary that faces a
critical interpretation of the method-as-such of a group dedicated to potential literature.
This focus on method as such, on the question of how works are written, or how
methods or materials for works are prepared, has dominated writing on the Oulipo,
which is reasonable enough since it is the group’s declared remit, and their most dis-
tinctive characteristic,18 but it has not been much interpreted critically in modernist
terms. As well as overviews of the history of the group, or descriptions of particular de-
18An exception to this is Marc Lapprand’s Poe´tique de l’Oulipo, in which he asserts that it is reason-
able, by this stage (1998) to consider that there is such a thing as ‘Oulipian literature’ which is readable
as such: ‘c’est la lisibilite´ du texte oulipien qui sera invoque´e.’ Marc Lapprand, Poe´tique de l’Oulipo
(Amsterdam: Faux Titre, 1998), p.16. [‘It is the readability of the Oulipian text which will be invoked.’]
Also, Herve´ Le Tellier contends that there is particular mode of Oulipian reception given by what he
calls an ‘aesthetic of complicity’: see Herve´ Le Tellier, Esthe´tique de L’Oulipo (Bordeaux: Le Castor
Astral, 2006).
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vices, the tendency in such texts has been towards isolated technical or de-historicised
questions. Jacques Bens notes that ‘Queneau’s theoretical texts are not numerous, and
generally confine themselves to discreet and modest technical considerations’19 and
this assessment could well be applied to the Oulipo’s theoretical writings as a whole.
In terms of texts, material in English has so far been relatively limited, although
this situation may now be changing. All That is Evident is Suspect, a useful collec-
tion of recently translated Oulipian writings—both theory and works—has recently
appeared, although in anglophone studies, the most useful single volume of writing by
Oulipians themselves remains Warren Motte’s 1986 Oulipo Primer.20 More recently,
issues of gender representation of the group have become more prominent, including
questions about the possibility of an inherent gendering of the concept of constraint.21
At the time of writing, the most recent English-language contribution to the literature
on the Oulipo is Dennis Duncan’s The Oulipo and Modern Thought, which offers use-
ful contextualisation of the Oulipo’s emergence in terms of the group’s own awareness
of structuralism, Surrealism and Wittgensteinian/Quinean linguistic philosophy. How-
19Jacques Bens, ‘Queneau Oulipian,’ in Oulipo: A Primer of Potential Literature, ed. and trans.
Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998), p.67.
20Ian Monk and Daniel Levin Becker, eds., All That is Evident is Suspect: Readings from the Oulipo
1963-2018, trans. Ian Monk (San Francisco: McSweeney’s, 2018).Warren Motte, ed.,Oulipo: A Primer
of Potential Literature (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998). Both these collections draw material
from Oulipo, La litte´rature potentielle and Oulipo, Atlas de litte´rature potentielle (Paris: Gallimard,
folio essais, 1981), as well as the long-running Bibliothe`que oulipienne series (which mainly presents
work on new constraints). Other invaluable resources are Oulipo, Oulipo Compendium, 2nd ed., ed.
Harry Mathews and Alastair Brotchie (London: Atlas Press, 2005) and Oulipo, Oulipo Laboratory:
Texts from the Bibliothe`que Oulipienne, trans. Harry Mathews and Iain White (London: Atlas Press,
1995). Another single volume collection of essays on the Oulipo in English is G. N. Forester and M.
J. Nicholls, eds., Verbivoracious Festschrift Volume Six: The Oulipo (Singapore: Verbivoracious Press,
2017).
21See the two essays in Lauren Elkin and Scott Esposito, The End of Oulipo? An Attempt to Exhaust
a Movement (Winchester: Zero Books, 2013), and the texts drawn from the 2005 ‘noulipo’ conference
in Christine Wertheim and Matias Viegener, eds., The Noulipian Analects (Los Angeles: Les Figues
Press, 2007).
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ever, the interpretation of the group as critically responsive to the social formations of
modernity still remains unaddressed. In particular—and this is the concern that frames
my thesis—there is no critical appraisal of Oulipian method as such in the specific
context of modernist art’s response to the social conditions of the latter half of the
twentieth century, and the question of whether such a category is still sustainable in
these conditions. This context is addressed in Adorno’s art-theoretical works, particu-
larly his Aesthetic Theory, and it is this theoretical framework, broadly speaking, that
informs the analysis here. The broad issue at stake in this, therefore, is, how far Oulip-
ian methodology can be read as a critical response to the increasing rationalisation and
instrumentality of society in modernity, one that is reflective of these forms, but also
offers something new, not by overt resistance to the rational but by its incorporation
into ‘art’ or ‘literature’ in a way that is at once both parodic and respectful.
In my consideration of this response, as I have already indicated, the crossing
of mathematics and literature in Oulipian practice is central, but this assertion does
however require a caveat. This formulation is frequently stated by Oulipians them-
selves and is very apparent in some Oulipian approaches and works—take, for exam-
ple, Franc¸ois Le Lionnais’s Boıˆte a ide´es,22 a list of dozens of proposed mathematical
operations that they may investigate (set operations, geometrical relations, transforma-
tions and so on)—but it is not a universal designation of the nature of constraint, nor
of Oulipian writing more generally. Other constraints have a strictly formal approach
that is less apparently mathematical, such as the use of homophonic translation, used
most famously by the Oulipian anticipatory plagiarist Raymond Roussel. And some
constraints appear quite divergent from the kind of formalism that appears as a strict
22Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, ‘Boıˆte a` ide´es,’ in La litte´rature potentielle (Paris: Gallimard, folio essais,
1973).
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abstraction of the direct material of writing – letters, words, sentences, narrative pat-
terns, themes and so on. For example Jacques Roubaud’s Great Fire of London project
is subject to constraints about the time of day and his physical surroundings as he at-
tempts to transcribe his memories, with each passage then debarred from revisions. (It
should be noted that Roubaud, as perhaps the group’s foremost mathematician, is also
the author many intricately mathematically constrained works.) Consider also in this
regard Jacques Jouet’sMetro poems, whose constraint is that the poem must be written
on the Paris Metro, each stanza corresponding to each metro line travelled, and each
line of the poem composed between stops and then written while the train is stopped. (I
offer this as a non-mathematical constraint, but it has in fact been formalised in graph
theory by Pierre Rosenstiehl, as a prescriptive structure for a ‘complete’ metro poem,
covering the entire Paris Metro network.23)
Nonetheless, while the thesis of mathematical-literary combination may not di-
rectly describe all activities of the Oulipo, and thus should not be used as a single
formalised schema for interpreting them, it does at the same time offer an indication
of what is at stake in Oulipian production; that is, leaving aside any definitive account
of the Oulipo’s activities—of which, incidentally, the group are notoriously wary—it
is nevertheless possible to identify something distinctive in the crossing of mathemat-
ics and literature, as an alternative strand of modernist literary development. There is,
in the introduction of mathematics, both an engagement with—rather than resistance
to—the rigidity of the rational forms that instrumentally condition modern society, but
at the same time a diversion of them into something socially useless, effectively an
23Pierre Rosenstiehl, ‘Frieze of the Paris Metro,’ in All That is Evident is Suspect: Readings from
the Oulipo 1963-2018, ed. Ian Monk and Daniel Levin Becker, trans. Ian Monk (San Francisco: Mc-
Sweeney’s, 2018).
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ironic universality. In this sense, scientificity is respected in its form, but parodied in
its use.
It is in this respect that the categories of Adorno’s aesthetics become useful. Adorno’s
concern is with what drives, and what constitutes, art in modern capitalist society—
how art both resists and yet whose resistance is demanded by that society—and thus
what art can reveal critically about its conditions of possibility, its pursuit of the new,
and whether it inevitably dissolves itself in that pursuit. The Oulipian project, I hope
to show, is responsive to the same social predicament, yet indicates a different devel-
opment out of the nominalistic fate of art that Adorno describes. That is, if art, by
Adorno’s reckoning, in its self-consciously constructed attempt to individuate itself
in the pursuit of the new, loses its mediation by universals, and thereby dissolves its
meaning, then Oulipian work offers a parallel structure of coherence, even while the
dominance of its formal mechanism is resisted.
The particular value of drawing on Adorno here is his acute diagnosis of the con-
dition of modern art in the second half of the twentieth century as a situation in which
art’s autonomy—its freedom in the face of the ‘perennial unfreedom of the whole’,24
which is still, in however complicated a fashion, the territory in which art may claim
its distinctiveness—is increasingly impinged upon not just by the dominance of the
capitalist social formation and its incorporation of art’s ‘tradition’, but by art’s own, in-
creasingly constructed, attempts to avoid the same. Adorno’s outlook, however, tends
towards pessimism: art’s progressive self-dissolution by means of its attempts to sus-
tain itself. The development of this thesis will require, in this sense, a broadening of
the scope of possibility for an artistic project beyond the restricted thread of Adorno’s
24Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.1.
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own account of modernism. Adorno sees a singular social context for art, and thus
a singular trajectory of art in response to it. If Adorno’s own reading of the course
of modern art is, as others have argued, too totalising or one-dimensional,25 if artistic
material as the ‘total social development’ is too narrowly defined—that is, as Peter
Bu¨rger puts it, if Adorno ‘can recognise only one material in a given epoch,’26—then
I would like to pursue a way out of this which uses broadly Adornian concepts, but
is not insistent on the same totalising account of modernity’s social situation as that
found in Aesthetic Theory or in his writings on the ‘culture industry’. I thus propose
to situate the Oulipo—by virtue of their distinctive engagement with rigidified rational
forms, and their deployment of an outmoded productive model—in terms of what Pe-
ter Osborne describes as ‘a “richer, more variegated” modernism, the course of which
cannot be prejudged, but the state of which may none the less be judged historically
according to the broad philosophical criteria of Adorno’s aesthetics.’27
The opening line of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory states that ‘it is self-evident that
nothing concerning art is self-evident anymore.’28 And it is the social and historical
complexity of art, as a concept, or set of concepts, not so much substantive as constel-
latory, that allows us to address particular questions without these being subsumptively
contained within an essentialist framework of what art ‘is’. If art has taken on a certain
‘synthesis’ in modernity, this is part of its historical development, formed in relation
to its changing social situation, rather than to any essential core: art identifies itself by
25See, for example, Peter Osborne, ‘Adorno and the Metaphysics of Modernism: The Problem of
a “Postmodern” Art,’ in The Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin, ed. Andrew Benjamin
(London: Routledge, 1991) and David Cunningham, ‘A Time for Dissonance and Noise,’ Angelaki 8,
no. 1 (2003): 61–74.
26Cited in Osborne, ‘Adorno and the Metaphysics of Modernism,’ p.44.
27Ibid., p.45.
28Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.1.
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negation, that is, in terms of what it resists. As Adorno puts it: ‘over and above their
empty classificatory concept, we have only negatively unified the arts . . . they all repel
empirical reality.’29
In very general terms then, this thesis does not seek to address the productive ques-
tions of Oulipian practice in what follows as instances of a theoretical development
that Adorno himself laid out (nor, for that matter, as counter-examples), but rather ad-
dresses the particularity of Oulipian questions in relation to a broadly Adornian critical
apparatus, in such a way as, reflectively, to adapt that critical apparatus—particularly
as it concerns the concept of ‘modernism’—in light of the questions raised by the
Oulipo as they develop. To put this another way, the conceptual problems that Adorno
traces through the condition of modern art can usefully inform the way in which start-
ing points for an Oulipian analysis are formulated. Thus, in particular, we might ad-
dress the question of ‘the new’ and its relation to tradition, as it is explored in Adorno’s
writings, in the Oulipo’s demand for structural novelty in productive methods in pur-
suit of ‘potential’. The modernist directive for individuation that pushes towards what
Adorno terms construction can similarly shed light on the Oulipian insistence on con-
scious technique and structures, the engagement of artistic or literary material in the
widest sense (that is, including the social, thematic and conceptual as well as the phys-
ical), and the use of arbitrary or ‘external’ structures (particularly mathematical struc-
tures). At the same time, as I have already noted, these very formulations serve to offer
a challenge to the unilinearity of Adorno’s own analysis of artistic modernism and so
productively to complicate it.
29Adorno,Gesammelte Schriften, 10.1, p.448, cited and translated in Stewart Martin, ‘Literature and
the Modern System of the Arts: Sources of Criticism in Adorno,’ in Adorno and Literature, ed. David
Cunningham and Nigel Mapp (London: Continuum, 2006), p.21.
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Critical engagement with artworks might be characterised (no doubt rather too
simplistically) in terms of their production and reception. (Of course, certain forms,
notably composed music, will additionally have a reproductive or performative as-
pect.) Of these different aspects, this thesis is primarily engaged with the first—that
of production: that is, the sources, conditions, materials, subjective and objective ele-
ments and processes of construction. The question of Oulipian practice addresses the
making of work rather than the work itself, or more precisely, they address the making
of methods, structures and processes for use in the making of work. This is in line with
the concept of ‘potential’ set out earlier and is attested to by many Oulipians in their
own characterisation of the group’s activities. For example, Harry Mathews states in
an interview that ‘what happens in the Oulipo is we invent or rediscover or analyse
constrictive forms. The books happen outside, independently. . . . The Oulipo is not
about written works. It’s about procedures.’30 Similarly Jacques Roubaud declares that
‘as a group, the Oulipo does not count the creation of literary works among its primary
aims.’31
The focus on process rather than result raises the question of how Oulipian prac-
tice is to be critically interpreted: as a mode of production where the end is simply
placed outside the scope of enquiry; or as a critical engagement of a process whose
end is contained within a still wider process—productive activity for the sake of the
greater productivity of literature as such, even if the literary ends remain undefined.
In either case the question is raised of how this is to be addressed further by a crit-
ical appraisal, that is, what is the relation between this inner logic of compositional
30Harry Mathews, An Interview by Alexander Laurence, 1989, http://portable- infinite.
blogspot.co.uk/2014/06/harry-mathews-interview.html (accessed August 20, 2019).
31Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.39.
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process and conditions that give rise to it? Adorno considers the artwork itself as the
refracted objectivation of the forces and conditions of its production—social, indus-
trial and technological conditions, the circumstances of existing artworks: material in
the widest sense, also including the subjective element—which thereby takes on an in-
dividual quasi-subjectivity in itself. The work is not merely the vehicle for a subjective
intention, not simply the actualisation of subjective spirit. This again relates it to what
Adorno describes as its linguistic character in that language is not the pure expression
of a speaking subject. In Adorno’s own words: ‘art’s linguistic quality gives rise to
reflection over what speaks in art; this is its veritable subject, not the individual who
makes it or the one who receives it.’32 In this sense, ‘artworks are alive in that they
speak in a fashion that is denied to natural objects and the subjects who make them.’33
Thus, the artwork bears a relation to the social conditions of its production, one that
is not simply one of thematic representation, but that is mimetically reflective of these
conditions. The artwork’s critical relation to its conditions is one that stems from a
tension between its adoption of advanced forms of the contemporaneous technological
society and its resistance to them. Adorno writes:
The substantive element of artistic modernism draws its power from the
fact that the most advanced procedures of material production and organ-
isation are not limited to the sphere in which they originate. In a manner
scarcely analysed yet by sociology, they radiate out into areas of life far
removed from them, deep into the zones of subjective experience, which
does not notice this and guards the sanctity of its reserves.34
32Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.227.
33Ibid., p.5.
34Ibid., p.46.
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In this sense, art is capable of a critical reflection of society in a way that unmedi-
atedly discursive representation is not.
Considering the more specifically Oulipian question of process from such a per-
spective then, how can such a process, which is apparently instrumental if considered
in terms of means-end rationality, but which rejects its ‘end’ as the focus of enquiry,
reflect back upon the conditions that have given rise to it in the way that an artwork,
understood in the more usual sense, can? It is at the level of a second order reflec-
tion on the ‘radiating out’ of the ‘procedures of material production’ that an answer
to this question presents itself, at the same time as it engenders a paradox by dis-
placing the primacy of that which renders it secondary. While reflection on the work
produced in such circumstances would give rise to the critical appraisal of these con-
ditions beyond the intended voice of the author as ‘creator’, the very deliberateness
of constructive processes attempts to make rationally determinable such conditions of
production. The completion of such an attempt would render the result uninteresting
in the terms in which Adorno considers the artwork. However, inasmuch as this is an
attempt rather than a result, a tendency that manifests itself with an apparent perversity
of purpose, a tension is retained in the process that prompts a critical reflection of, and
upon, instrumental reason itself. The terms of the enquiry into Oulipian methods pur-
sued within this thesis thus take shape as a critical assessment of production, artistic
or otherwise, and of its rationalisation.
The demand for this focus on production is not incidental. If there is a critical re-
ception that is at stake in this analysis, it is not primarily the reception of ‘works’ but
of the mode of their making. This is not an arbitrary theoretical conceit but a reflec-
tion demanded by the Oulipian process of written production. As already stated, it is
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an explicit aim of the Oulipo that their object of enquiry is method itself, a distinction
which is vital to the particularity of their practice (and which—importantly—distances
them from structuralist analyses). But it is also important given a situation of rational,
totalising theoretical-explanatory order: the expanding ambition of structuralism is the
key symptom of this in the period after the second world war, and where what came to
be called ‘poststructuralist’ developments worked through the inherent contradictions
in that order, Oulipism takes a different approach, to step back and use the forms in
defiance of their avowed theoretical determinability. That is, such practice demands a
reflection on skill or technique at a subjective level and on their relation to condition-
ing and conditioned structures: rules, constraints and their social determinants in the
objective sense. As I will try to show in what follows, this offers, by my reckoning,
the most fruitful critical interpretation of Oulipian work, as opposed to a focus on the
kind of gestures that may present themselves discursively in final works or be interpre-
tatively drawn from these. For while the latter are not necessarily uninteresting, they
are, ultimately, not so specifically Oulipian.
It is significant, in this regard, that the Oulipo choose to describe themselves as
an Ouvroir, which is usually translated as ‘workshop.’ Although ‘ouvroir’ has a more
particular set of social implications than are suggested by the English term—including
a certain modesty and charitableness, though these implications are not without some
mischievous implication—it is, like the English ‘workshop’, a designation more res-
onant of craft production than high aesthetic aspiration. This, at least, has been the
case since the nineteenth century, broadly speaking, when these two concepts—art and
craft—came to be definitionally opposed. Yet such concepts are of course, historically,
not stable: their separation has taken place over the course of many centuries, and it is
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only in the romantic or post-romantic era that the idea of a unified ‘art’ in the singular
has opposed itself to the more instrumental ‘craft’.35 Thus the Oulipian ‘workshop’,
while often working with decidedly modern materials in the form of mathematical
analytic structures and computational processes (at least in principle)—processes that
more generally align with the highly instrumentally rationalist social conditions of
modernity—also implies resonances with older modes of artistic production that seem
to roll back on the constitutive separation of artistic and instrumental logic after the
eighteenth century.
Nonetheless, while Oulipian methods most obviously appear as a rebuff to the
modern romantic conceit of the rationally unaccountable but sovereign creative genius
(seen most clearly in their antipathy to the ‘psychic automatism’ of the Surrealists,
as discussed in my first chapter), they were similarly wary of what, in terms of a
subject-object binary, would appear to be its opposite, that of a pure mechanisation of
writing, or ‘mechanical automatism.’ As Jean Queval states at an early meeting, ‘la
notion de hasard est de´licate. Il ne faudrait pas substituer a` l’automatisme psychique
des surre´alistes un automatisme me´canique ou` le hasard aurait autant de part.’36 [‘The
notion of chance is tricky. We should not substitute mechanical automatism for the psy-
chic automatism of the Surrealists, where chance would play as much of a part.’] What
connects these two points of resistance is the notion of automatism—an involuntary
aspect in the artwork, which links to a further point of negation for the Oulipo: their
‘anti-chance’ stance, which can be taken as a refusal of Surrealist objective chance,
but also of the aleatory operations of more contemporary figures at the time when
35The historicisation of the concepts here is covered in chapter 4.
36Bens, Gene`se de L’Oulipo, p.146.
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these principles were declared, such as John Cage.37 What emerges here is the insis-
tence on the deliberateness imposed on productive activity that is itself modelled on
wider social instrumentalised productive activity, and yet is abstracted from the work
in question’s own purpose, or indeed any external purpose for the work—a literary
end, say—beyond that of solving a mathematical ‘problem’.
With this restriction to method, the actualised work towards which method might
usually be directed (and by which it might be defined) is displaced as the objective
centre of interest. It may be necessary as part of the determination of what is meant by
producing to have, at least in principle, an artwork as ‘product’: without an object, the
process of production either loses meaning as production, or becomes the object itself
(which is a paradoxical situation towards which Oulipian work may be seen to tend).
But, as we have seen, the concern of the Oulipo in itself and in its work is process. Ab-
stracted from the socially-oppositional ‘aesthetic’ definition of the art object, method
then becomes a technical challenge, and is constructed as such. Hence, the degree to
which the Oulipo typically prize the difficulty of their constraints—indeed, one of the
most persistent characterisations of the group as a whole is that of Raymond Queneau:
‘OuLiPiens: rats qui ont a` construire le labyrinthe dont ils se proposent de sortir.’38
[‘Oulipians: rats who construct the labyrinth from which they plan to escape.’]
It is this focus on the difficulty of producing something, and the skill required to do
so, that recalls the concept of craft. Since the emergence of the modern system of the
arts along with modern capitalism, craft has been, if not disdained, at least restricted to
37Alison James also suggests that the Oulipo may also have had in mind as here certain experi-
ments in probabilistic language generation carried out by Max Bense’s Stuttgart school. Alison James,
Constraining Chance: Georges Perec and the Oulipo (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009),
p.118.
38Bens, Gene`se de L’Oulipo, p.49.
INTRODUCTION 22
a definitive negation of the artwork as a form of productive activity subordinate to het-
eronomous purposes, as well as being an outmoded form of manufacture where the di-
vision of labour now rules in commodity production. Adorno points out that the loss of
specificity of individual arts in the universal of ‘art’ since the eighteenth century is de-
rived from its negation of usefulness, its autonomy. While craft, as Larry Shiner notes,
has been re-assessed by or re-incorporated into ‘fine art’ by various artists or move-
ments of the twentieth century, from the Arts and Crafts movement to the Bauhaus, it
is still understood within the framework of their basic separation, and does not subvert
the prevalent understanding of the aesthetic superiority of art as such.39 It is of course
not possible to reconstruct, as Adorno emphasised, a once-existing unified concept of,
say, art as techne¯, that has since split apart. Nonetheless, there are interesting histor-
ical triggers for a re-assessment of the technicality or skill of artistic production that
can be found in older concepts of craft, or of specific arts or productive activities that
can now be seen through rather different lenses: from inspiration as problem-solving,
to the workshops of the renaissance and before, and even back to antiquity where the
Greek techne¯ or Roman ars have meanings that are more aligned with technical skill
than those denoted by the term ‘art’ in the modern sense.
It is common to think of craft primarily in terms of purposive skill with physical
material—as in handicrafts or ‘applied arts’ such as textiles, ceramics, glassware and
so on, where individual sensuous materials tend to be the defining characteristic of
individual crafts—but to approach a modern re-thinking of craft, it is necessary not
simply to pluck manual processes out of history, but to consider more reflectively what
39See, for example, the observations by Shiner, that attempts to rehabilitate craft in the latter half
of the twentieth century have not overturned the hierarchy that privileges art, merely subverting the
empirically ‘useful’ aspect of craft production, with the aim of claiming the status of art. Shiner, The
Invention of Art, p.277–8.
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‘artistic materials’ may mean in the present moment. Adorno gives us just such a
conception—defining ‘materials’ in a way that incorporates the sensuous material of
construction: colours, tones and textures, but also linguistic forms, concepts, thematic
elements and even the categories of rational thought: all are the socially formed con-
tingencies. Adorno’s category of material in this sense ‘is not natural material even if
it appears so to artists; rather, it is thoroughly historical.’40 That is to say, even the idea
of a material emancipated from historical contingency is still related negatively to the
tradition it is thought to break with. It is thus, in line with its imperative to ‘make it
new’, a constitutive demand for art in modernity that it draws on the most advanced
materials. For Oulipian practice in particular, this wider concept of materials can
be seen, most significantly, to draw in conceptual or methodological formations of an
increasingly mathematised society—scientific dominance and the rise of information
systems: the kind of quantitative analytical logic of modernity that would otherwise
seem to lie ‘outside’ of art.
These conditions—and most particularly their crystallisation in the modern con-
cept of science—are also those behind structuralism. In certain respects the latter
is the Oulipo’s nearest conceptual cousin, but there is also a clear distinction of ori-
entation. Structuralism can be seen as the manifestation in the human sciences of
a scientific tendency stretching back at least to Galileo’s mathematisation of nature.
This ‘disenchantment’ of nature, a common theme of critical engagement since early
German Romanticism, leads to the displacement of theological certainties by some-
thing akin to a faith in rational certainties; that is, the insistence that the world itself
is logically structured, and thus that the logic of science—and more fundamentally
40Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.203.
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the language of mathematics—is understood as a structure to be discovered. The vis-
ibility of this structure’s historical contingency then slips further away. The Oulipian
approach, rather than offering a direct critical confrontation with this logic, is a de-
ployment of its excess, such that, inasmuch as it is then used, the absurdity of its total
applicability may, I argue in what follows, become more apparent. These themes are
developed in more detail in chapters 2 and 3.
The rational engagement with the conditions of artistic production recalls Adorno’s
thinking on construction, which is particularly pertinent given its role in the context of
experimentation. For Adorno, ‘productive artists are objectively compelled to exper-
iment’41 But for Adorno, this does not mean simply for the artist subjectively to try
something different to see if it meets some establish criterion of success. Rather, this
is the subjective response to the violence of objective change, and thus that the artis-
tic subject, if true to their own conditions, can only be seen to experiment inasmuch
as the results are unforeseen. Adorno writes: ‘the concept of construction, which is
fundamental to modern art, always implied the primacy of constructive methods over
subjective imagination. Construction necessitates solutions that the imagining ear or
eye does not immediately encompass or know in full detail.’42 For Adorno, the new
is not to be abstractly posited in itself; the sense of the new is always in dialectical
relation with tradition. At certain points this even takes on a distinct similarity to the
combinatorial analyses of structuralism, and indeed, the combinatorial methods of the
Oulipo. So, for example, Adorno writes in Aesthetic Theory: ‘the relation to the new
is modelled on a child at the piano searching for a chord never previously heard. This
chord, however, was always there: the possible combinations are limited and actually
41Ibid., p.33.
42Ibid., p.33.
INTRODUCTION 25
everything that can be played on it is implicitly given in the keyboard.’43 It is not, how-
ever, a combinatorial analysis that is at stake in Adorno’s thinking here, but the attempt
to see in the new the subjective reaction to objective conditions, rather than simply a
subjective positing. Where this touches on Oulipian practice is in the fact that, for the
latter, the new is similarly a reaction to distinctly modern forms (and where it differs is
that the Oulipo mediate this with distinctly outmoded forms). What is refused in both
cases is the idea of any kind of unmediated fount of novelty, of the kind most often
valorised by the avant-gardes.
Construction, Adorno states, is ‘currently the only possible form that the ratio-
nal element in the artwork can take.’ It is ‘the extension of subjective domination.’44
Construction is the tendency of art’s self-consciousness and what Adorno describes
as its nominalistic (or individualistic) isolation—that is its progressive refusal of the
universals that render it socially meaningful—and in its deliberation a drive towards
an inner coherence that avoids the accidental. In Oulipian practice, and in their use
of combinatorial mathematics, Oulipian innovation is similarly derived from a finite
domain, the permutations of whose elements retain a logical coherence given by math-
ematical ‘universality’. Mathematics, an apparently extra-artistic form, is brought in
to the artistic material as an act of ‘subjective domination’. Thus ‘construction wants
to make itself into something real sui generis, even though it borrows the very purity
of its principles from external technical functional forms.’45
At the same time, the historical resonances of the Oulipo’s ‘workshop’ and the
sense of construction as craft production might be taken to represent a repudiation or
43Ibid., p.44.
44Ibid., pp.77–8.
45Ibid., p.78.
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just plain rejection of the privileged status of the autonomous artwork in modernity,
such that the Oulipo risks being outmoded, from Adorno’s perspective, in the face of
the movement of art in capitalist modernity that is positioned as such by its demand
to be progressive or innovative. If, as Adorno argues, art ‘desperately negates the
closed confines of the ever-same,’ operating as the ‘shock that lets nothing inherited
go unchallenged,’46 then there can be no comfortable return to traditional forms or
methods: ‘modern art cannot be an aberration susceptible to correction by returning to
foundations that no longer do or should exist.’47 The danger in the Oulipo might then
be that the set of productive approaches that come under this artisanal designation is
allied with an older conception of the practice of writing as something perfectible—
perfectible because there are ideals of form that can be approached asymptotically: an
ahistorical, perhaps even theological tendency. The Oulipo might be accused, in this
sense, of insufficiently questioning a static idea of ‘tradition’, or worse yet, because
of their disengagement from theoretical concerns regarding the work as such, their
work might be seen as too amenable to adoption as an escape from, or consolation
under, social modernity, a form of uselessness as a comfort rather than a challenge to
technological-rational conditions. If, as I believe, a case can thus be made for their
work being critically responsive to a culture of dominant rationality, a deeper mimetic
relation to it must be uncovered to see whether, and in what ways, Oulipian practice
can in fact operate as such a form of critique. It is that I attempt throughout what
follows.
The development of the concept of the autonomous artwork during the course of
the nineteenth century gave rise to the idea of art as entirely abstracted from wider so-
46Ibid., p.32.
47Ibid., p.32.
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cial means and ends. But this ‘autonomy’ itself only became a necessity for art under
the conditions of emergent capitalist modernity. As Peter Bu¨rger notes, ‘the autonomy
of art is a category of bourgeois society. It permits the description of art’s detachment
from the context of practical life as a historical development.’ And yet, ‘the category
“autonomy” does not permit the understanding of its referent as one that developed
historically. The relative dissociation of the work of art from the praxis of life in bour-
geois society thus becomes transformed into the (erroneous) idea that the work of art is
totally independent of society.’48 The emergence of avant-gardemovements in the early
twentieth century was, according to Bu¨rger, a negation of the ideological category of
autonomy in this (erroneous) sense. The Dadaist presentation of the objet trouve´ and
later developments in Surrealism presented ‘anti-art’ as a protest against the institu-
tionalisation of art, and the social ineffectuality of autonomous artworks. The Oulipo,
and in particular Raymond Queneau, had historical links to the Surrealists, and the
influence of the latter perhaps remains broadly visible in a certain perversity of spirit
(though clearly less outrageously in the case of the Oulipo). Nonetheless, for reasons I
will discuss further in chapter 1, they also determinedly declare their opposition to Sur-
realist theory, most directly in terms of psychic automatism and objective chance (and
also more implicitly in their refusal to declare a political-theoretical stance). Crucially,
Surrealist irrationality appears to be the antithesis of Oulipian construction. While, as
Adorno points out, the Surrealists were ‘an attack on violence, authority and obscuran-
tism,’ whose ‘irrationality alienated,’49 they also risked, on this account, uncritically
elevating irrationality as a universal trans-historical principle rather than revealing the
underlying irrationality of the (historical) social order as such. Thus the condition of
48Peter Bu¨rger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1984), p.46.
49Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.75.
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montage (exemplary of avant-gardes), ‘which reached its acme in surrealism,’ is, for
Adorno, ‘powerless . . . insofar as it is unable to explode the individual elements’;
it is to be criticised as ‘a complaisant irrationalism, for adaptation to material that is
delivered ready-made from outside the work.’50 The Oulipo’s counter to automatism
and irrationalism, which has something in common with Adorno in this respect, is the
subject of chapter 1.
Adorno’s criticism of art’s attempted use of irrationality is that it attempts the un-
mediated rejection of rationality in the artwork, ‘which would peremptorily condemn it
as untruth in the face of the entanglement of all human activity in the social totality.’51
And yet, the extra-rational is nevertheless necessary to art for it to persist as more than
blunt empirical objectivity. Art is thus ‘a refuge for mimetic comportment.’52 The aims
of rationality, Adorno tells us, are not accessible to rationality itself. It is here instead
that the artwork holds out the possibility of truth in modernity:
Capitalist society hides and disavows this irrationality [of its aims], and
in contrast to this, art represents truth in a double sense; it maintains the
image of its aim, which has been obscured by rationality, and it convicts
the status quo of its irrationality and absurdity.53
Art then, for Adorno, reveals (at least potentially) what rationality cannot show
of itself, what cannot be determinedly denoted. It is capable of this because it is
50Ibid., p.77. See also Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Looking Back on Surrealism,’ in Notes to Literature,
Vol. I, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)
51Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, pp.74–5.
52Ibid., p.73.
53Ibid., p.73.
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constituted by this tension between its rational and mimetic poles—mimesis here being
‘the nonconceptual affinity of the subjectively produced with its unposited other.’54
Given that the critical potential of art thus comes from the mutual dependence and
irreconcilability of its mimetic refraction and discursive rationality, it is easier to see
how we might construct an argument that Oulipian practice bears a critical relation to
its conditions of production in mimetic terms. This possibility is opened up, I suggest,
in particular with their incorporation of mathematical or scientific-structural forms as
resistant material, which can be interpreted as a reflection back on the domination of
nature and humanity. From this perspective, the Oulipian project thus functions as
critique of rationalised society, most obviously in their use of mathematics.
Significantly, while Adorno’s own thinking often predicts art’s likely destruction
when it accommodates itself to mathematics, there are also hints that he finds routes—
if not escapes from the fate of art—that art may take, in a reformed relation to this
other. Such indications would tend to contradict the more dominant thrust of his nar-
row modernism. Regarding the question of construction, an inevitable development
in the spirit of artistic nominalism, Adorno finds a dead end: ‘in construction the
dynamic reverses completely into the static: the constructed work stands still. Nomi-
nalism’s progress thus reaches its own limit.’55 However, in a later passage, a certain
ambivalence regarding artistic construction is detectable. As he states:
Construction is equally able to codify the resignation of the weakened
subject and to make absolute alienation the sole concern of art—which
once wanted the opposite—as it is able to anticipate a reconciled condi-
54Ibid., p.74.
55Ibid., pp.302–3.
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tion that would itself be situated beyond static and dynamic. The many
interrelations with technocracy give reason to suspect that the principle of
construction remains aesthetically obedient to the administered world; but
it may terminate in a yet unknown aesthetic form, whose rational organi-
sation might point to the abolition of all categories of administration along
with their reflexes in art.56
The ambivalence of the principle of construction is, I argue, the space in which
the Oulipian project operates: the excessive, unnecessary use of mathematical logic
in the construction of literary work (or more properly the construction of the means
of construction of literary work, which places the endeavour a step back from the
demand of a specifically artistic productivity) drives so far as to render it pointless in
terms of the immanent demands of an end-work, but thereby socially critical of the
instrumentality of means-ends rationality.
Mathematics has of course become the language of the physical sciences, which
are prized for their rigour and self-consistency, and their technological application.
Mathematics is in this way the touchstone for claims of objectivity in any given dis-
cipline, as is observable in the twentieth-century mathematisation of social sciences
such as psychology or economics. Cybernetics and computational thinking, which the
Oulipo, initially at least, declare an interest in applying to literature, also develop a
mechanised model of control systems, one that is reflected back onto human rational-
ity itself, and indeed one that has been developing significantly since the early days of
computing and which is very apparent now in the resurgence of interest in ‘artificial
intelligence’. It is striking however, that despite the early interest in computation—for
56Ibid., p.305.
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example Queneau’s statement that they ‘regret having no access to machines’57 and
various essays touching on computational process—such an approach is never fully
exploited by the Oulipo. Take for example, Paul Fournel’s ‘Computer and Writer’, in
which the main categories of research are given as ‘Aided Reading’ and ‘Aided Cre-
ation’. There is no displacement of the subjects of reading or writing. Consider also
Le Lionnais’s ‘Poe`mes Algol’, which offers a variation on the meaning of writing po-
etry with a programming language (ALGOL), that is, rather than writing a programme
which produces poetry, Le Lionnais here writes poetry with the restricted vocabulary
of ALGOL’s reserved words: begin, goto, if, then, next, real, etc. As Le Lionnais notes,
drily, ALGOL ‘est assez bien adapte´ aux mathe´matiques. Il se characte´rise par un vo-
cabulaire tre`s reduit.’58 [‘. . . is quite well adapted to mathematics. It is characterised
by a very reduced vocabulary.’]
If, then, the Oulipian project in some respects appears as a mechanisation of literary
production, it yet holds back from the full renunciation of subjectivity in what would
be ‘mechanical automatism’. Rather it maintains the mediated relationship between
the human subject and the technical work (as process), in a fashion which brings both
into question. The ‘arbitrary’ aspect of these technical methods, which have no need
for their use, at once posits a non-reason as the end, or holds back from an end, and
draws attention to the instrumentalisation of reason more generally as it is detached
from critical engagement with the social purposes to which it is put.
57Raymond Queneau, ‘Potential Literature,’ in Oulipo: A Primer of Potential Literature, ed. and
trans. Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998), p.51.
58Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, ‘Ivresse algolique,’ in La litte´rature potentielle (Paris: Gallimard, folio es-
sais, 1973), p.215. Note that the Poe`mes Algol appear in French, but there is no French version of
ALGOL; thus the vocabulary list is also translated, and takes on a different semantic flexibility. The
entry in the Oulipo Compendium then distances this even further with translations back into English
that no longer respect the restrictions of ALGOL’s reserved words.
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Since the dawn of Romanticism, the status of the artwork has increasingly been
based on its individuation in relation to universals, both social and historical, those
‘givens’ of tradition that have been incorporated by the dominance of the commodity
form. This marks a shift from earlier valorisations of art. That is, in modernity, the art-
work no longer claims its status in relation to universals or genre types of classicism,
but must continually define itself against such universals. Classical (or neoclassical)
art is governed by ideal forms, established in antiquity: universal genres of tragedy,
comedy, epic and so on.59 However, with aesthetic modernism, the ‘measurement’ of
artworks in terms of generic universals gives way to a ‘directive’ for the artwork to-
wards individuation in opposition to those genres, a valorisation of freedom ushered in
by the early German Romantics: as Friedrich Schlegel writes, ‘all the classical poetical
genres have now become ridiculous in their rigid purity.’60 This directive, which be-
comes, somewhat paradoxically, a universalising tendency itself in the sense in which
it identifies the essential quality of art, tends towards an absolute heterogeneity. Yet,
as Adorno writes, from this perspective:
The sole path of success that remains open to artworks is also that of their
progressive impossibility. If recourse to the pregiven universality of genres
has long been of no avail, the radically particular work verges on contin-
gency and absolute indifference, and no intermediary provides for com-
promise.61
59Despite that, according to Adorno, art qua art has always directed itself towards the specific: ‘from
time immemorial, art has sought to rescue the special; progressive particularisation was immanent to it.’
Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.275.
60Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Critical Fragments,’ in Philosophical Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), §60.
61Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.277.
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Here lies the path of art’s self-dissolution, by Adorno’s account: such individuation
‘terminates in a literal facticity, and this is irreconcilable with art.’62 This nominalis-
tic, anti-generic drive of the artwork is also tied to its increasing rationalisation, in the
construction of artworks intended to become more consciously disruptive of the settled
norms of their predecessors (for example, in musical terms, to embrace and use disso-
nance as a disruption of tonality). The work becomes more critically self-reflexive in
its construction, more focused on its individual newness and resistant to the familiarity
of existing cultural objects as well as to the wider demands of the social context. In
other words the mimetic aspect of art itself stands in danger of becoming rationalised
as an ‘end’, and thus the tension that gives art’s critical relation to reality, its possibility
of a truth content, may dissolve into fully rational accountability.
For Adorno, the inevitable direction of autonomous art’s drive for individuation
results, then, in its self-dissolution and in fact pushes artistic production either to-
wards meaninglessness, or back into the heteronomous condition from which it aimed
to escape. As Peter Osborne puts it, ‘the destruction of tradition is at the same time
a destruction of the stability of the interpretative community which weakens its re-
sistance to purely commercial criteria of evaluation.’63 In this perhaps final stage of
modernist art, Adorno sees that, with the absence of defining universals, ‘dissonance
bears all too closely on its contrary, reconciliation; it . . . prefers to join forces with
reified consciousness.’64 The question that follows, for an analysis of the Oulipo, is
to what extent does Oulipian practice conform to the preceding diagnosis in Adorno’s
sense? Are their rational, constructive mechanisms ‘joining forces’ with reified con-
62Ibid., p.300.
63Osborne, ‘Adorno and the Metaphysics of Modernism,’ p.42.
64Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.19.
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sciousness? If so, can this provide a different conception of the literary work beyond
the modernist demand for individuation? Or if not, can the dissolution of the dialectic
of rationality and mimesis be held off by a heightened rationality of construction itself?
Is it, in other words, possible to recover from the ‘unilinearity’ of Adorno’s theoretical
prescription, and against the restrictive pessimism of Adorno himself concerning art’s
futures, the possibility of a wider conception of artistic materials and methods, even
while the broad categorial framework of his aesthetic theory is retained?
The answer to this may be sought not merely in the rationality of the Oulipo’s
constructive means, but more particularly, I argue, in the mathematisation of rational
forms as material, and—most especially, from the perspective of Adorno’s account
of modern art’s necessary resistance to ‘the pregiven universality of genres’—their
arbitrary application. That is to say, there is no reason immanent to the work itself for
a novel or poem to be structured or re-structured, at a high level of narrative elements,
or a lower level of sentence structures, according to permutations given by Mathews’s
algorithm, or an eodermdrome,65 not least because the methods used are developed
independently of such an end-conditioning work. Neither is there any explicit socially
determined reason for this application in each particular case (even if in the wider
situation, of course, this is arguably interpretable as a necessary response—though
clearly not the only one—to a crisis of autonomous art). The work is thus granted
access to a universal ‘outside’ itself (for example, its legitimacy in terms of a universal
mathematical or logical structure) that gives a meaning beyond ‘literal facticity’, on the
65Mathews’s algorithm is a procedure that can be applied to anything that can be symbolically rep-
resented as a matrix of entities, such that a series of prescribed horizontal and vertical shifts lead to an
alternative order without reference to the elements’ signification. Harry Mathews, ‘Mathews’s Algo-
rithm,’ in Oulipo: A Primer of Potential Literature, ed. and trans. Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey
Archive Press, 1998). For more details on the eodermdrome, see chapter 2.
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one hand, or absolute commodity capture, on the other. Both the immanent purpose
of the artwork and the exterior purpose of the external conditioning form are thus
subverted by their conjunction in order to render the activity, effectively, ‘useless’ in
conventional terms.
Of course such claims to arbitrariness need to be questioned—what does this ac-
tually mean? The arbitrariness of components of artworks or their organisation, after
all, is usually the basis for their negative assessment by Adorno. Indeed, he frequently
aligns arbitrariness with a contingency or lack of meaning that is alien to art. For
example, Adorno states that ‘artworks are alive in that they speak in a fashion that
is denied to natural objects and the subjects who make them. They speak by virtue
of the communication of everything particular in them. Thus they come into contrast
with the arbitrariness of what simply exists.’66 Art exists by virtue of its immanent
tensions, and therein, for Adorno, lies its meaning. The arbitrary is thus the neutrality
of the empirical or the unmediated contingency of social labour. Where this arbitrary
intrudes into the work, it is, by Adorno’s consideration, a flattening of the significance
of the work because of its formal indifference to the content of the work.
However, this concept of arbitrariness, while it less commonly appears in state-
ments of definition of Oulipian work, is in fact a highly significant—and, I would
argue, critically ineliminable—characteristic of the Oulipian constraint; that is, the ap-
plication of formal structures in the production of work that have no logical connection
prior to their conjunction. The logic of the constraint is thus a simple externality in
terms of social or artistic logic, yet it is brought in by subjective volition. There is no
need for it, in terms of the work; but it is not, however, aleatory. Indeed, this is one
66Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.19, my emphasis.
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fundamental difference between the Oulipo’s processes and the aleatory practices of
certain other artists or schools of the same period, and the substantive justification of
their ‘anti-chance’ declarations. The constraint form is rigorous, and it is chosen, in an
act that does not attempt to defuse authorial agency per se.
Adorno himself acknowledges the presence of mathematical reason in artworks,
but does so with a strong note of caution:
The affiliation with mathematics that art established in the age of its dawn-
ing emancipation and that today, in the age of the dissolution of its id-
ioms, once again emerges as predominant, marked art’s emergent self-
consciousness from its dimension of logical consistency. Indeed, on the
basis of its formalism, mathematics is itself aconceptual; its signs are not
signs of something, and it no more formulates existential judgments than
does art; its aesthetic quality has often been noted. Of course, art deceives
itself when, encouraged or intimidated by science, it hypostatises its di-
mension of logical consistency and directly equates its own forms with
those of mathematics, unconcerned that its forms are always opposed to
those of the latter.67
Art is produced with a certain logic—if only by virtue of the fact of its being
made—and thus logical form, Adorno contends, is part of the dynamic of the work.
The danger is that it becomes a mere formula for the work, as Adorno feared was the
case with the 12-tone system. On the face of it, Oulipian practice would defy this warn-
ing. But again, arbitrariness of application renders the situationmore complicated. The
67Ibid., pp.187–8.
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conceptualisation of the work’s forms in terms of mathematics is, as I have argued, if
anything, performed with an excess of mathematical reason in Oulipian forms. That
is, the imposition of mathematical logic is so wilful as to take rationalisation of the
constructive process away from the logic of ends, producing an instrumentality that
is instrumental to the point of pointlessness (the self-contained logic of mathematics,
irrelevantly applied). It is an excess of rational means that here subverts the instru-
mentalisation of the constructive process, one that is arguably fostered in the very
‘aconceptuality’ of mathematical form that Adorno acknowledges.
That the Oulipian use of mathematics that I consider here is characterised primar-
ily by its perversity is not unacknowledged by certain Oulipians. To mathematise
language and literature is inherently problematic, not least because mathematics is
not a semiological system in the same way as ‘natural’ language. That is, there is
no polysemy, no ambivalence, no issue of translation. In fact, the conceptual condi-
tion of natural languages is a topic of some interest to certain Oulipians and a line
of interpretation that is certainly fruitful, namely that there is an excess of meaning
over signification (which is the condition of possibility of the ‘process’ of one of the
Oulipo’s greatest ‘anticipatory plagiarists’, Raymond Roussel) as well as the lack of
a universal or trans-linguistic signified.68 As I discuss in chapter 2, one of the cen-
tral influences on the Oulipo’s thinking of mathematics is the group known as Nicolas
Bourbaki. Bourbaki’s project to reduce the totality of contemporary mathematics to
a set of core axioms in set theory was impossibly ambitious (both in actuality, as it
turned out, and probably also in principle). It is thus that Jacques Roubaud describes
68Harry Mathews has written on this: see Harry Mathews, ‘Translation and the Oulipo: The Case
of the Persevering Maltese,’ in The Case of the Persevering Maltese: Collected Essays (Champaign:
Dalkey Archive Press, 2003). There is also an analysis of this aspect of Oulipism in Dennis Duncan,
The Oulipo and Modern Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), especially chapter 5.
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the Oulipo as ‘a homage to Bourbaki and an imitation of Bourbaki,’ but also ‘a parody
of Bourbaki, even a profanation of Bourbaki.’69
In his ‘History of the Lipogram,’ Georges Perec writes: ‘Exclusively preoccupied
with its great capitals (Work, Style, Inspiration, World-Vision, Fundamental Options,
Genius, Creation, etc.), literary history seems deliberately to ignore writing as practice,
as work, as play.’70 His sentiment here reflects the Oulipo’s desire to de-mystify the
process of writing and with it discard or at least reframe such often inadequately ques-
tioned (post-)romantic concepts as inspiration, genius and creation. It is not simply
that the Oulipo are ‘anti-inspiration’ (as might appear to be the case in their critique of
Surrealism, discussed in the first chapter), and indeed there are different strands among
Oulipians concerning quite what ‘inspiration’ means or how it should be reconsidered:
radical formalism, imitator formalism and rational inspiration, to use Chris Andrews’s
formulation.71 Rather, what emerges more generally for the Oulipians is that any post-
romantic notion of a sovereign author in general as the unique and unaccountable giver
of spirit to a work is to be radically displaced, de-mystified.
In this sense, the Oulipo can be seen to share with Adorno the conception of an
(implicitly) mediated relation of subject and object in artistic construction. Adorno
complains, ‘the concept of genius is false because works are not creations and humans
are not creators.’72 That is, the concept of genius—inherited from Kant, by way of
Romanticism—claims absolute originality, which human subjectivity, with its dialec-
69Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.38.
70Georges Perec, ‘History of the Lipogram,’ in Oulipo: A Primer of Potential Literature, ed. and
trans. Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998), p.98.
71See Chris Andrews, ‘Inspiration and the Oulipo,’ Studies in 20th and 21st Century Literature 29,
no. 1 (2005): 9–28.
72Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.232.
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tical mediation by the objective, cannot own, and ‘thus spawns the ideology of the
organic and unconscious artwork, which flows into the murky current of irrational-
ism.’73 Adorno does not of course reject the subjective altogether in the construction
of the artwork, and even retains the possibility of the concept of genius, inasmuch
as may be ‘stripped away from its crude equation with the creative subject.’74 But in
asking ‘what speaks in art?’ Adorno makes clear that it is not simply the ‘lyrical “I”’
of poetic subjectivity that gives a voice to the work. Indeed the ‘individual who pro-
duces it is an element of reality like others,’ but this ‘intervening individual subject is
scarcely more than a limiting value, something minimal required by the artwork for its
crystallisation.’75
What Oulipian practice shares with Adornian theory here, then, is the understand-
ing of art as having developed beyond the concept of a sovereign genius, unaccount-
able to rationality, whose spirit animates the artwork with what is essential to it. The
working through of a constructive principle in art, which develops out of the inadequa-
cies of resistance that trouble the purely subjective spirit, is then inextricably bound
to, though in tension with (its plurality is irreducible), its material specificity. In this
sense, art has moved beyond the older, romantic unity based in the subjective alone to
a mediation of the subjective principle and objective materials. As Adorno states:
Every work possesses materials that are distinct from the subject, proce-
dures that are derived from the materials of art, as well as from human
subjectivity. Its truth content is not exhausted by subjectivity but owes
its existence to the process of objectification. That process does indeed
73Ibid., p.232.
74Ibid., p.232.
75Ibid., p.228.
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require the subject as an executor, but points beyond it to that objective
other.76
Oulipian practice would seem, at the very least, to confirm the dialectical media-
tion of both subjective and objective elements in the construction of the literary work
and the concept of potential as lying not just in the unaccountable subject, but in the
relationship with artistic material. However, while Adorno insists on the techne¯ of
making, he is emphatic in refusing any retrieval of a ‘pre-modern’ notion of craft—the
tension inherent in the artwork is not simply resolved by recourse to an older concept
of technique that did not hold that same tension. He writes that ‘an art from which the
last trace of that ether—the simple fact that someone is an artist—has been expunged
simply dries up into philistine handicraft.’77 Craft is necessarily deprecated as art’s
other here, in line with the division of the modern concept of art. Craft production
retains only the status of commodity production, of decorative, comforting objects.
We might then ask whether Oulipian practice diverges from this general separa-
tion? Is there is a redemption of craft or something akin to it (at least the ‘craft’
of writing) in such a way that, escaping Adorno’s blanket refusal, it critically ques-
tions instrumentalisation by directly engaging in (a kind of) instrumentalisation? The
application of excessively rationalised forms to writing, the apparent perversity of ar-
bitrarily mathematising literary structures as ‘problems’ to be solved (the Oulipo’s
Bourbakisation of literature), offers a rethinking of purpose in craft, for modernity,
rather than simply a resistance to it.
76Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Art and the Arts,’ in Can One Live After Auschwitz?: A Philosophical
Reader, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003),
p.375.
77Ibid., p.376, my emphasis.
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Perhaps the clearest alignment with mathematics in the plurality of arts comes,
in this respect, with music. Music is in fact central to Adorno’s thinking of art, the
topic of his greatest expertise. It is thus that many of his texts touch revealingly on the
meaning of mathematical form in art, through its incorporation into music, particularly
with Adorno’s criticisms of serialism.
‘Musicians are usually truants from maths classes; it would be a terrible fate for
them to end up in the hands of the maths teacher after all.’78 Music, for Adorno, is
not alien to organisation, but, crucially, its organising principle must be immanently
derived—that is, it must be organic with regard to the musical material, rather than
externally imposed. ‘The more completely the work is organised, the more eloquent it
is, since the idea of complete organisation refers to the content of the organic and not to
mathematical necessity. In its pure form the latter is always a compositional defect.’79
It is in relation to the mediation of composition and material which serialism lacks that
Adorno famously proposes the development of an ‘informal music’, one that does not
have recourse to an imposed external order, but is responsive to the logic of its material,
and yet is fully in control of its processes, holding these aspects in tension. Through
this Adorno anticipated a musical freedom. ‘Only music which is in control of itself
would be in control of its own freedom from every compulsion, even its own.’80
The association of freedom with control is clearly very sympathetic to the Oulip-
ian view, but Oulipian methods also diverge strongly from Adorno’s conception of
an informal compositional practice, in their embrace of mathematical form, precisely
78Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ in Quasi Una Fantasia: Essays on Modern
Music, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Verso, 1998), p.269.
79Ibid., p.308.
80Ibid., p.318.
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because of its arbitrariness (and ‘non-immanence’) with regard to its material applica-
tion. For Adorno, the ‘forms which are external or abstract or which confront [music]
in an inflexible way’ must be discarded, but it is just these qualities of externality,
abstraction and inflexibility that characterise the Oulipian constraint.
As the above hopefully makes clear, the interpretation of Oulipian practice that
I offer in this thesis is thus based on the particular historical circumstances of the
group’s emergence; that is, in Adorno’s terms, a crisis of art’s autonomy in a society
that is increasingly dominated by rational and technological forms. Adorno writes in
Aesthetic Theory that ‘art must go beyond its own concept in order to remain faithful
to that concept.’81 If this statement is to be taken in full seriousness, it does of course
run the risk of exceeding the intention that utters it. And in fact this is, ultimately,
what I hope to achieve. The thesis that follows does so through the consideration of
Adorno’s critical categories but necessarily, therefore, without respecting the implicit
(and sometimes explicit) boundaries that he places on the legitimate immanence of
artistic materials and of art’s concept, and thus what would ‘go beyond’ it in remaining
‘faithful’ to it.
Overall, the thesis contends that the Oulipo can be seen to offer a distinctive tra-
jectory among the various responses to what Adorno identifies as a crisis of art’s au-
tonomy in the latter half of the twentieth century; in other words, that they pursue
an alternative modernism. I argue that the Oulipo’s use of arbitrary rigidified logical
structures in literary composition is categorially alien to the latter’s concept, and thus
that it forms a kind of resistant material which must be worked with. The thesis pro-
ceeds, in its first three chapters, by way of comparative studies of the major artistic and
81Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.40.
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intellectual currents that inform the Oulipo’s development in twentieth-century France,
seeking to draw out the Oulipo’s distinctiveness by way of its differences and overlaps
with other responses to modernity’s rationalising and abstracting forms. The first chap-
ter explores the Oulipo’s relation to Surrealism, which is on the whole, one of oppo-
sition. Surrealist automatism, irrationality and the reliance on chance is countered by
Oulipian ‘voluntary literature’ of rationally-informed constraint, and yet they are both
responsive, I argue, to modernity in the need to find or construct the new. The second
chapter explores the importance to the Oulipo of the work of Nicolas Bourbaki, which
provides a counter-model to that of the Surrealists: that of the most abstract axiomatic
mathematics, which is the prototype for the emptiness of constraint structures in terms
of immanent literary meaning. Chapter three discusses the concept of structure used
by the Oulipo and how this differs from that developed by their contemporaries in
French structuralism and the modern development of universal science as a pattern for
use rather than containment by description. In the fourth chapter, considered in light
of the Adornian account of art’s modernity outlined above, and developing the am-
bivalent relations to the Oulipo’s intellectual contemporaries described in the previous
three chapters, I explore the group’s refiguring of an artisanal approach to literary pro-
duction. Craft is retrieved here, from its outmoded status, as an approach to making
that serves, for the Oulipo, as an unusual model of engagement with the most ‘ad-
vanced’ formal materials, one that side-steps their universalising tendency. Finally, in
the epilogue I consider whether, given the Oulipo’s more recent manifestations and its
developing legacy, but despite its longevity, the group’s critical moment has passed.
1. Surrealism, Chance and Rationality
With its refusal of social and ethical proprieties, and of the reign of an industrially
rationalised civilisation and its norms, Surrealism undertook to transform the world by
recourse to the liberated imagination. In the wake of a war whose scale of destruction
was, if anything, facilitated by the products of that civilisation, and whose artistic
products tended only to offer consolation, they demanded a more radical settlement
than the mere shifting of national borders. Their project was not intended merely in
the service of a detached aesthetic pleasure, but rather towards a metaphysical (and
indeed social) revolution, towards a greater reality. By recourse to dreams, semi- or
un-consciousness states and the provocation of automatism, the Surrealists aimed to
transcend the comfortable distinction between art and life with the claim, as Jacqueline
Che´nieux-Gendron puts it, ‘to overturn the quest for the probable in art by making an
astounding bet on the imagination, presented as the central power of the human mind,
from which emerges a whole life-in-poetry.’1
In this pursuit of potential energy and the new through language, and the commonly-
perceived strangeness thereby encountered, there is, superficially at least, the hint of a
1Jacqueline Che´nieux-Gendron, Surrealism, trans. Vivian Folkenflik (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1990), p.2.
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prefiguration of certain aspects, albeit more modest, of the Oulipian project. However,
Queneau insists, in his 1962 interview series with Charbonnier, that Oulipian treat-
ments, while resulting in texts of not dissimilar appearance to those of Surrealism, are
totally different in terms of method: ‘on ne fait pas du surre´alisme; l’apparence est
surre´aliste, peut-eˆtre, mais la me´thode ne l’est pas, ce qui est tout a` fait important.’2
[‘We are not doing Surrealism; the appearance is Surrealist perhaps, but the method
is not; that is of the utmost importance.’] The Surrealists, for the Oulipo, are a group
they seem to feel the need to define to define themselves against—Jacques Roubaud
similarly, for example, notes that the Oulipo’s methods ‘radically distinguish it from
. . . the Surrealist group’3—although it may be too strong to describe their position as
a blanket anti-Surrealist one. The objections are typically couched in terms of more
specific points of contrast, as I will outline in this chapter. The core differences be-
tween the Oulipo and Surrealists may be expressed as three major oppositions. First,
of rationality and non- or irrationality: the Oulipo’s methods are rational, conscious
and logical, while the Surrealists prized the non- or irrational, unconscious or unac-
countable as a revelatory source. Second, constraint, as the self-imposed adherence
to (unnecessary) logical forms, is the usual definition of Oulipian work, while for the
Surrealists, the lack of constraint, absolute freedom—a strongly Romantic concept—is
sought. Third, since Oulipian methods are not necessary, they must be chosen volun-
tarily, while Surrealist automatism involves a state of passivity before chance or the
unknown.
The Oulipo do, however, have some direct historical connections to Surrealism,
which is hardly surprising given the intellectual-cultural prominence of the latter group
2Queneau, Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, p.146.
3Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.38.
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in the first half of the twentieth century: the young Queneau was a member of the group
for four years, until his split with Breton in 1929. Also Noe¨l Arnaud, another original
member of the Oulipo, was a member of the group, La Main a` plume, which main-
tained attempts at Surrealist expression—and Resistance activities—following Bre-
ton’s flight from France during the Second World War. In fact, the activities of La
Main a` plume are, in certain respects, proto-Oulipian: texts written under the ma-
terial constraints of restricted communications under Nazi occupation, the results of
which include an unpublished dictionary composed using both formal constraints and
automatism.4
Queneau’s published texts from the years following his split with Breton show a
distinct antipathy towards the more doctrinaire aspects of the latter’s theorising. His
1937 semi-autobiographical novel, Odile, offers an often parodic portrayal of Bre-
ton and the Surrealists’ activities. For example, a meeting of the group is described
in which Anglare`s [Breton] ‘was intent on annexing territory for the greater glory of
his name.’ Anglare`s quizzes Travy [Queneau] about the element of chance in mathe-
matics, to which the latter offers an unproved arithmetical postulate. When Anglare`s
protests that there is no element of chance in it, Travy responds, ‘No. But there’s no ob-
vious reason why it should be like that.’ To which Anglare`s concludes, ‘Which proves
there’s something like a mathematical unconscious.’5 The scene, as well as indicating
the specific difference in concerns regarding chance, consciousness and mathemat-
ics, also shows Queneau’s more cautious approach to theoretical generalisations of the
4See Delphine Lelie`vre, ‘Travaux surre´alistes a` la limite de l’OuLiPo: La Main a` plume et les
manuscrits du Dictionnaire analytique de la langue franc¸aise,’ Formules: revue de cre´ations formelles,
no. 11 (May 2007). Lelie`vre however distances this work from Oulipism since, as she describes it, the
constraint was deployed only as a means towards a ‘true automatism’.
5Raymond Queneau, Odile, trans. Carol Sanders (Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 1988), p.30.
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type characteristic of the avant-gardes, a tendency that would be continued with the
Oulipo. For Anglare`s/Breton here, the mathematical postulate is adapted to serve his
pre-existing programme; that is, it becomes a means. Travy/Queneau’s attitude to the
unknown, on the other hand, is somewhat more ambivalent; what is not proved is worth
exploring, it would seem, in its specificity, rather than under the mystifying blanket of
the Surrealist unconscious.
Probably the Oulipo’s most commonly accepted description—that they engage in
writing under constraints—would certainly seem to be the direct antithesis of (and per-
haps even reaction to) Surrealist free expression, specifically the practice of automatic
writing. The constraint is fundamentally a rational imposition on the process of textual
composition, even if only by virtue of the decision to use it. The Surrealists, by con-
trast, were drawn to dreams and trance-like states, hypnosis and other modes in which
some kind of expression could take place freed from rational demands—of literary
form, of social propriety, of conscious subjectivity itself—as an opening of (or at least
approach to) the absolute, or the unknown that is suppressed by those restrictions. The
Surrealist evaluation of chance—and specifically Breton’s concept of hasard objectif,
along with automatism—as the determination by that which is rationally unaccount-
able, is in this sense a particularly strong point of contention for the Oulipo, although
it is also subject to some equivocation, as I will describe below. Furthermore the ex-
plicitly theorised programme and political engagement of the Surrealists in the 1920s
and 1930s also contrasts with the Oulipo’s reticence, after the war, to produce a total
theory of their work, and certainly not a literary or political theory of the form typical
of Surrealist or other avant-garde manifestos.
Nevertheless, there are points of similarity, both implicit and explicit, between the
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Surrealists and the Oulipo that are worth acknowledging. In formal terms, questions
of game-playing, particularly with language and even certain aspects of technique are
evident in both practices. While the Surrealist project was explicitly a reaction against
social norms, rational stasis and domination, Oulipian work, in its way, is also con-
cerned with subverting certain norms—of literary composition explicitly, but implic-
itly, as may be interpreted critically, the role of rationality in social domination more
broadly. In this sense, both groups are understandable as a product of modernity, of the
progressive rationalisation of all aspects of life in accordance with abstracted rational
norms and the dominance of the commodity form, that is, of mathematised scientific
understanding, and the attendant economic rationalisation that pretends to objectivity.
Where the two groups differ primarily then is in their consideration of the relations
between the sources (of writing) and rationality, whether the rational is to be rejected
as a restriction of the true source of images, in the case of the Surrealists, or, as I will
argue, subverted by itself by its own excess in an activity that is critically interesting
in itself, in the case of the Oulipo.
Andre´ Breton’s famous definition from his 1924 Manifesto of Surrealism gives a
statement of the group’s ambitions:
SURREALISM, n. Psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one
proposes to express—verbally, by means of the written word, or in any
other manner—the actual functioning of thought. Dictated by thought, in
the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any aesthetic
or moral concern.6
6Andre´ Breton, ‘Manifesto of Surrealism,’ in Manifestoes of Surrealism, trans. Richard Seaver and
Helen R. Lane (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), p.26.
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Great weight is put here on the revelation of essential thought, for which the written
word is here considered a ‘means’. Elsewhere Breton talks of the primacy of language
(which does not much accord with determinations of language which insist on a more
socially constituted discursive aspect). I will return to the status of language for Sur-
realist explorations later on, but initially it is useful to consider the relation to certain
discursive forms and games that were used by the Surrealists as a means to the end
of the expression of the unconscious. In games, procedures and linguistic structures,
triggers were found for such exploration. It is in this way that a current of linguistic
play can undoubtedly be traced from the Surrealists to the Oulipo.
There is perhaps no intrinsic significance of the game that is appealed to here in
Surrealist practice, but the sense of the game—or play, which in this context I take as
closely related—as a free activity, separated in some sense from ‘reality’, as unproduc-
tive, and yet as having its own structural rules—these characteristics are among those
identified by Surrealist fellow-traveller, Roger Caillois7—is important, and important
also to the understanding of the Oulipo’s implicit debt to Surrealism. That is, the Sur-
realist game does not respect the conventional demands of ‘reality’, but that does not
make it less serious in itself, in its own structures and in its own transgressive, rather
than socially useful, productivity. This accords with Freud’s assertion that, in child-
hood play, ‘the opposite of play is not what is serious but what is real.’8 But where
Freud sees children’s play as the work of the imagination in the aspiration to attain the
adult, ‘real’ world—and its adult development then as the phantasy that recalls that
7Caillois identifies the following characteristics: free, separate, uncertain, unproductive, rule-
governed, and make-believe. Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games, trans. Meyer Barash (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2001), pp.9–10
8Sigmud Freud, ‘Creative Writers and Day-dreaming,’ in The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume IX (1906–1908): Jensen’s ’Gravida’ and Other Works,
ed. James Strachey, trans. James Strachey and Anna Freud (London: Vintage, 2001), p.144.
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childhood desire, which is Freud’s more major interest—for the Surrealists, games are
a means of breaking with the conventional in the fostering of a greater reality.
A exemplary case of the Surrealist game is cadavre exquis, now better known as a
drawing game, but which originated as a textual device circa 1925. A text is written
piecemeal in such a way that no player sees the entire text until it is complete. The
production of a text in this way limits the rational determination of its purport by any
one of its writers as well as any conscious collaborative determination.9 The collectiv-
ity of its composition is then taken to work at an unconscious level, to draw out what
could not be expressed, or indeed what would be suppressed, by individual subjective
intention.
Given the similarities in the two groups’ relations to games, it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that Cadavre exquis is a game to which Ge´rard Genette compares Oulipian devices,
writing that the Oulipo’s ‘confidence in the “poetic” (semantic) productivity of chance
clearly belongs to the Surrealist tradition, and Oulipism is a variant of the cadavre
exquis,’10 This assessment has (equally unsurprisingly) sparked indignation on the part
of the Oulipians themselves: for example, Arnaud reaffirms the Oulipo’s distinctions
from the unconscious of Surrealist automatism and their objection to chance.11 Yet
it has also been noted that cadavre exquis can be considered as a form of combina-
torial phrase-construction exercise; combinatorics being one of the key mathematical
domains of Oulipian research, if the following schematisation is considered: a pre-
9See Alastair Brotchie andMel Gooding, eds., A Book of Surrealist Games, trans. Jennifer Batchelor
Alexis Lykiard (Boston: Shambhala, 1991), p.25.
10Ge´rard Genette, Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree, trans. Channa Newman and Claude
Doubinsky (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), p.40.
11See Noe¨l Arnaud, ‘Ge´rard Genette et l’Oulipo,’ in La Bibliothe`que Oulipienne, Volume 5 (Bor-
deaux: Le Castor Astral, 2000). See also Le Tellier, Esthe´tique de L’Oulipo, p.28.
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determined number of players (the number must match the number of syntactic units)
each take on a text-generative role defined by a particular lexical element in a gram-
matically prescribed structure. The roles rotate around the players and again, their
order is pre-determined and can be considered as a permutational device. Regarded in
this way, the Surrealist game, Caroline Lebrec argues, is comparable in formal terms to
the Oulipian use of the sestina, a medieval verse pattern often adopted by Oulipians.12
However, while a permutational structure can be ascribed to it, the device—if it can
be called that—does not function in the same way as a constraint, that is, it does not
place a formal imposition on the imagination that would demand some kind of work-
ing process. The Surrealist game is rather meant to ‘spark’ unanticipated images: the
image as the clash of incongruous elements is a key Surrealist concept, its value, as
Breton writes, ‘a function of the difference of potential between the two conductors’.13
Simone Collinet, Breton’s first wife, recalled the experience in 1968: ‘violent surprises
prompted admiration, laughter and stirred an unquenchable craving for new images—
images inconceivable to one brain alone—born from the involuntary, unconscious and
unpredictable mixing of three or four heterogeneous minds.’14 The device functions,
in other words, as a structure in which the unconscious is channeled or provoked to
expression, but here the demand is more towards some kind of ‘pure’ productivity. In-
deed it is precisely any kind of rational accountability that is to be avoided in favour of
‘violent surprises’. The Oulipian form, by contrast, has to be worked with in order to
meet its demand. Where the Surrealist device simply says ‘write’, Oulipian uses of the
sestina, to use Lebrec’s comparison, as an arbitrary constraining form would say ‘write
12This comparison is made by Caroline Lebrec, ‘Contrainte formelles et jeux d’e´criture: le “cadavre
exquis” surre´aliste et la “n-ine” oulipienne,’ Formules: revue de cre´ations formelles, no. 11 (May 2007).
The sestina is described in more detail on p.214, chapter 4.
13Breton, ‘Manifesto of Surrealism,’ p.85.
14Simone Collinet cited in Brotchie and Gooding, A Book of Surrealist Games, p.144.
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with this formal material’, where the material (which would not comprise the entirety
of the resources) would typically make the writing considerably more difficult, though
not pre-determined, and require a degree of rational deliberation.
This is not to say that the Oulipo undervalue the unexpected of course, but that
they do not presume to encounter it unmediated. That is, there is no recourse to a
‘pure’ expression of mystical or quasi-mystical source. Rather, what is produced is
unpredictable, but not constitutively counter to rationality; there is always a mediated
relationship of expression and construction in the production of the new. In the Oulip-
ian case, the resource is not so much unconscious spontaneity or chance combinations,
but something more akin, as I suggested in my introduction, to a ‘craft’ in accordance
with a challenge whose difficulty is an arbitrary imposition, not driven by any literary
or subjective necessity. This then tends toward a rather different conception of ‘inspi-
ration’, not so much in a crudely ‘romantic’ mode (which Surrealism tends towards)
of unconstrained free expression, but rather in the sense of a skilled engagement that
works with the resistant properties of artistic materials.
In many ways, in fact, the Surrealists are the foremost early twentieth-century rep-
resentatives of a dominant strain of Romanticism, who, in their pursuit of an imagi-
nation freed form rational-social constraint, mirror the early German Romantics’ own
response to what they considered to be the ‘disenchantment of nature’, in which math-
ematical reason takes the place of the authority of nature. This latter authority is what
the Romantics saw as the governing spirit of antiquity in which ‘subject and object
simply are, and not just partially, united, such that no separation can take place with-
out injuring the nature of that which is to be divided,’ as Ho¨lderlin puts it in 1795.
The division, the act of judgement, has developed and reached its fruition in Kant’s
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placing of the absolute as a focus imaginarius, a regulative idea of reason rather than
something directly experienceable. In Ho¨lderlin’s case this leads to a nostalgia for a
lost unity. For Friedrich Schlegel, albeit not entirely consistently, the reverse is the
case, and it is here that the Romantic idea of (modern) art really takes hold; that is, for
Schlegel, rather than rediscovering the lost unity of antiquity, freedom—and specifi-
cally free poetry—will make a new synthesis of subject and object, a ‘second nature’.
As Novalis similarly puts it, ‘nature shall become art, and art shall become second
nature.’15 What is at stake here, and what is so influential on the spirit of Surrealism, is
an affirmation of the power of the imagination to recreate a utopian vision of the new,
in a way that is prototypical of the modernism that would follow: a futurity.
As Schlegel writes in what is probably his most famous fragment, ‘Romantic po-
etry is a progressive, universal poetry.’16 The ‘progressive’ here is indicative of the
change brought in by Romanticism, indicative of the distinctly modern valorisation of
the new as such, and with it the modern concept of art defined by that new, rather than
by the the requirements of generic types; that is, the art that is defined as such by its
exceeding such genres. Such art inscribes its own meaning because it creates its own
meaning, rather than aspiring to the pregiven. As Jay Bernstein describes Schlegel’s
conception of the Romantic novel (similar, though not identical, to that of poetry), ‘the
novel as “new and unique” is constitutive of what it is to be a novel; it must exceed
genre requirements—as emblems of traditional authority—as a condition for it being
an artwork.’17 Rather than classical archetypes that speak of a lost universality, what is
15Novalis, ‘On Goethe,’ in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed. J. M. Bernstein, trans.
Joyce P. Crick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), §468.
16Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Athenaeum Fragments,’ in Philosophical Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), §116.
17J. M. Bernstein, ‘Introduction,’ in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed. J. M. Bernstein
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.xxx.
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sought is a new universal, engendered by the ‘pure’ art of poetry.
The role of poetry here, for Schlegel, is central, because, of all expressive forms,
it is only poetry, he asserts, that approaches a pure art and thus absolute freedom.
Considering the relative freedoms in the arts, Schlegel asks, ‘how much less can such
a limit be set for poetry, which is limited by no particular material in either compass
or in strength? whose tool, an arbitrary sign-language, is the work of man, and is
endlessly perfectible and corruptible?’18 If this is a freedom that is, similarly, the spirit
conjured by the Surrealist vision of language, it is also a consideration of the linguistic
‘medium’ that is quite counter to Oulipian methodology. This then is what is at stake
in Oulipian craft: that it rejects the concept of an unmediated freedom, and instead, in
poetry (or writing more generally), models the form of language as a resistant, rather
than intrinsically free (or indeed ideologically transparent) material.
Another ostensible similarity between Surrealism and the Oulipo, in the use of pre-
formed devices, can be found in the comparison of Surrealist ‘proverbs’ to Oulipian
‘perverbs’. For neither the Surrealists nor the Oulipians could these be said to be
among their more significant works, but they do again indicate a difference in thinking
of ‘sources’ with regard to textual production. In 1925, Paul E´luard and Benjamin
Pe´ret produced a pamphlet of 152 ‘new’ proverbs. For example:
Avant le de´luge, de´sarmez les cerveaux
Sommeil qui chante fait trembler les ombres
Un albinos ne fait pas le beau temps19
18Friedrich Schlegel, On the Study of Greek Poetry, ed. and trans. Stuart Barnett (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2001), p.59.
19Paul E´luard and Benjamin Pe´ret, 152 proverbes mis au gouˆt du jour (Toronto: Oasis, 1977).
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[Before the flood, disarm brains
Sleep that sings makes shadows tremble
One albino does not make for good weather]
Here the formal characteristics of the typical proverb are reproduced—the form of
causation, logical consequence or subsumption that imply prescription or caution—but
the aspect of comforting received wisdom in its signification is disrupted: the conjunc-
tion of the thematic elements is more of a Surrealist image-clash than a conventionally
meaningful combination. The Oulipian perverb is, by contrast, more systematic in its
construction—a splicing of two existing proverbs in such a way that the logical struc-
ture of the sentence is maintained while the meaning takes an unexpected diversion.
There is no great technical challenge in these constructions, but they are typi-
cally considered by the Oulipians less as final forms than as devices for further use—
narrative structures, say, as in the case of Harry Mathews’s Selected Declarations of
Dependence, which engages in exhaustive permutational exercises of proverb splicing
that are then used to structure short narrative paraphrases (linking the derived text to
the source perverb is left as an exercise for the reader). For example:
All roads get the worm
Mighty oaks spoil the broth
Too many cooks bury their dead20
Both approaches play on the recognition of the form of the proverb (pithy, formu-
laic, expressive of some time-worn ‘common sense’), and it is precisely this familiarity
20Harry Mathews, Selected Declarations of Dependence (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1996).
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that gives subversive potential, which is exploited in both cases. But while the Surreal-
ist proverb characteristically uses this form as a container for strange new comparisons
or relations—as a vehicle for the unconscious to produce sparking images, the opening
into the otherness of the Surreal—the Oulipian perverb’s use of existing proverbs tries
to uncover a latent strangeness in the text itself, brought to light through reordering and
juxtaposition. There is arguably an image-clash of sorts—and it is not implausible to
see the continuity of a certain disruptive spirit with regard to social norms—but it is not
as a result of unconscious expression. It is true, as Warren Motte says, that some shift
is thereby achieved: ‘something that was banal, secure and familiar has been rendered
strange and somehow disquieting.’21 But this effect is achieved through the manipula-
tion at the structural level of existing language, rather than mining the unconscious or
appealing to another level of reality as its source. In both cases, the re-rendering of
the proverb form results in a defamiliarising effect. Certainly that one may, in encoun-
tering such forms, in Shklovsky’s terms, ‘recover the sensation of life’,22 would likely
be very amenable to the Surrealists’ own intentions, and similarly not too far from
Mathews’s either, but it is significant in the latter case that the perverb also becomes
material for further compositional work. In this sense the proverb/perverb form is a
formal principle from which literary or poetic work is to be developed. The contrast
then is between the Surrealist use of the proverb form as a means, a provocation for
the free expression of the repressed mind, and the Oulipian perverb as a restriction that
demands more ingenious narrative constructions to meet it.
21Warren Motte, Playtexts: Ludics in Contemporary Literature (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1995), p.135.
22Viktor Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique,’ in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, 2nd ed., trans.
Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), p.12.
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Chance, Automatism and Freedom
The claimed antipathy of the Oulipo to Surrealism can be traced back to Raymond
Queneau’s split with Breton in 1929,23 and evidence is found in his 1930s writings
(both fiction and essays) that he had a strong reaction during this period against avant-
garde movements in general, and Surrealism in particular. No overall thesis is ex-
plicitly proposed by Queneau to unite these writings except for an apparent dislike
of dogmatic or reductive universalism, mystification and intellectual posturing. It is
possible however to see certain intellectual preoccupations that are contrary to the Sur-
realist spirit, and which in turn would be influential for the development of the Oulipo.
Queneau hopes ‘to show what a conscious technique of the novel might be,’24 in one
essay from this period, reflecting on his own use of mathematical structures in the
composition of novels. He states, for example, that ‘the distribution of the characters
can’t be left up to chance, for a considerable part of their meaning depends on it.’25
Queneau evidently rejects here the idea that writing should be dependent on sources
that are accidental, irrational or constitutively unknowable. He objects to the celebra-
tion of the ‘brilliance’ of fragments over well-crafted artworks,26 and what he sees as
a modish valuing of spontaneous work or the passivity of authorship that hopes for
23Queneauwas of course hardly unique in falling out with Breton, and he claims in 1950 that the split
was ‘for strictly personal reasons, not ideological.’ Raymond Queneau, ‘Conversation with Georges
Ribemont-Dessaignes,’ in Letters, Numbers, Forms: Essays, 1928-1970, trans. Jordan Stump (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2007), p.175.
24Raymond Queneau, ‘Technique of the Novel,’ in Letters, Numbers, Forms: Essays, 1928-1970,
trans. Jordan Stump (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), pp.26.
25Ibid., pp.28.
26‘Yes, there are flashes of brilliance to be found there, as there are in Leibniz’s unfinished writings,
but what does this mean? That the amorphous is always an in every way preferable? No: only that
its better than nothing.’ Raymond Queneau, ‘Plus and Minus,’ in Letters, Numbers, Forms: Essays,
1928-1970, trans. Jordan Stump (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), p.39.
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‘inspiration’ to be visited upon it:
The poet is never inspired because he is the master of what others assume
to be inspiration. He doesn’t wait for inspiration to drop from the heavens
like roasted ortolans. He knows how to hunt, and puts into action the
irrefutable proverb ‘heaven helps those who help themselves.’ He’s never
inspired because he’s always inspired, because the powers of poetry are
always at his disposal, obedient to his will, receptive to his guidance. He
doesn’t have to seek the source of his genius in soporifics. He is in no way
dependent on surprises, happy accidents, or flights of fancy.27
What Queneau sets out, broadly, is an alternative sense of ‘inspiration’: rather
than the visiting ‘muse’ of romantic cliche´—and he rejects its isolated product, l’art
pour l’art—Queneau’s inspiration is willed, rational and in accord with technique:
something closer, indeed to a pre-romantic idea of artisanship. Indeed, as Queneau
states elsewhere, ‘the litterateur has a craft, and the artist is an artisan.’28 This is also
the assessment of Queneau, made by Michel Leiris, as practicing a ‘demystification’
of literature. He continues: ‘it was most certainly not a question of ridiculing literature
but, with complete artisanal honesty, of putting it back in its proper place—one of the
sturdiest places, incidentally, when one no longer has any romantic illusions about it.’29
The picture of literature and/as art that Queneau indicates here should not be strictly
aligned with the position of the Oulipo, not least because there is no theoretical dogma
27Ibid., p.40.
28Raymond Queneau, ‘What is Art?’ In Letters, Numbers, Forms: Essays, 1928-1970, trans. Jordan
Stump (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), p.36.
29Michel Leiris, ‘Preface,’ in Stories & Remarks, trans. Marc Lowenthal (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2000), pp.xxii–xxiii.
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of the Oulipo that demands what the literary work should be. Certainly, inWhat is Art?,
Queneau declares art’s independence from science—‘it has better things to do’30—
although in his later writings (and indeed those of other Oulipians) this is complicated
by a consideration of scientific or quasi-scientific method in literary composition: take
for example his 1967 article in the TLS, ‘Science and Literature’, in which he states: ‘if
there is a renewal of the contact between science and literature, it is because “science”
has now incorporated the social sciences. Literature, if it survives, cannot ignore this
fact; even less can it remain indifferent to it.’31 There is also, in the earlier essay, more
of a willingness to characterise literature as such, albeit in very vague terms (he is in
fact more voluble in refusing other established doctrines) than is the case in the later
Oulipo. There is, though, no worked out theory of literature that goes much further
than an alignment with hat-making, and this again points to artisanal concerns: thus,
the hat he considers valuable is well-made, he writes, ‘a sturdy, beautiful hat’, and
yet one that ‘fits every head, each according to its capacities, and it gives strength and
valour to everyone who puts it on.’32 The artwork, for Queneau, is non-gratuitous, in
other words, it has a use, and while he is rather general about what constitutes this, it is,
broadly speaking, to do with art’s relation to life: ‘art, poetry and literature . . . occupy
the entire affective realm from knowledge to action, rooted in the former, flowering
in the latter.’33 The Oulipians are far more circumspect in this regard. What continues
from these anti-Surrealist writings of the 1930s, however, is the focus on volition and
craft. Whatever the use of art, for Queneau, here and later in the Oulipo, it is a thing
to be done well, something to be achieved with skill and effort. The major shift in the
30Queneau, ‘What is Art?’ p.36.
31Queneau, ‘Science and Literature,’ p.864.
32Queneau, ‘What is Art?’ p.37.
33Ibid., p.36.
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Oulipian perspective is that this process of making, of technique and the preparation
of materials, becomes itself the point at issue, rather than what is ultimately made.
The rejection of l’art pour l’art is clearly continuous with Surrealism in some
senses, as one might expect, although the terms in which the Surrealists conceived
this, as one of political exigency, is also antithetical to Queneau. What Queneau is most
opposed to in the Surrealist position, however, and what is thus indicated most clearly
with his focus on craft and volition, is his mistrust of the unreliability or accidental
nature of inspiration or some kind of expressive force. ‘Discontinuous inspiration’, for
Queneau, is not a thing to be celebrated: ‘the fact that modern poets have been reduced
to a discontinuous inspiration doesn’t mean we must console them by calling the minus
that afflicts them a plus, their failing a sign of genius, their weakness a strength.’34
These early essays from Queneau precede the Oulipo by some twenty to thirty
years, and thus cannot be taken too strongly as avowing Oulipian attitudes. It is also
of course not only Surrealism itself that Queneau takes issue with; it is perhaps more
strongly the reception of it, or other avant-gardes, as intellectual ‘fashion’.35 In any
case, as Queneau himself acknowledged, some of his writing of this period comes
from a reaction that, on later reflection, did not have the same strength for him. Thus,
in an interview in 1950 he states, ‘I did experience a violent reaction at the beginning,
a passionate loathing. . . . Since then I’ve come to recognise Surrealism’s importance,
for others as for myself, the importance of its influence, both in depth and in breadth.’36
34Queneau, ‘Plus and Minus,’ pp.40–1.
35See Raymond Queneau, ‘Intellectual Fashion,’ in Letters, Numbers, Forms: Essays, 1928-1970,
trans. Jordan Stump (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007).
36Queneau, ‘Conversation,’ p.175.
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Nevertheless there are some striking points of continuity between the reactions of
Queneau in the thirties and the Oulipian project, perhaps most evidently in the quote
from What is Art? that is frequently used in characterisations of the Oulipo:
Another perfectly false idea, also widespread nowadays, is the equiva-
lence of inspiration, exploration of the subconscious, and liberation—of
chance, automatism, and freedom. But the sort of inspiration that consists
in blindly obeying every impulse is in reality a kind of slavery. The classic
writer who composes his tragedy by observing a certain number of rules
that he knows is freer than the poet who writes whatever comes into his
head, and who is a slave to other rules that he doesn’t see.37
It will be useful then to draw out this likening of ‘chance, automatism and freedom’
that Queneau sees in Surrealism in order to address what they mean both for Surrealism
and, whether or not in negative form, for Oulipism.
That the Oulipo are ‘anti-chance’ is often stated bluntly and tends to be taken as
definitive. For example, Jacques Roubaud offers ‘Proposition 13: The Oulipo’s work
is anti-chance.’38 And from Noe¨l Arnaud, whose own history of Surrealist connections
gives the statement some weight: ‘the Oulipo thinks of itself as “anti-chance”.’39 In-
deed, it is one of the key distinguishing claims against Surrealism, contra the claims
of critics such as Genette that liken Oulipian and Surrealist ‘procedures’ to one an-
37Queneau, ‘What is Art?’ p.36.
38Jacques Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ in Oulipo: A Primer of
Potential Literature, ed. and trans. Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998), p.87.
39Noe¨l Arnaud, ‘Twenty Questions for Noe¨l Arnaud (Interview by Warren Motte),’ trans. Warren
Motte, Studies in 20th Century Literature 10, no. 2 (1986): p.300.
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other.40 And yet, in Queneau’s famous quote, an opposition to chance is not exactly
what is declared: his complaint concerns the false equivalence of ‘inspiration, explo-
ration of the subconscious, and liberation—of chance, automatism, and freedom.’ It is
thus a conflation of certain modes of thought in an idea of freedom which proves to be
antithetical to Queneau’s pursuit of ‘voluntary literature’—‘il n’y a de litte´rature que
voluntaire’, as he declared41 [‘There is only voluntary literature.’]—rather than simply
a rejection of any or all of the individual terms. Whereas for the Surrealists, chance
is the opening of and thus the escape from the rational, for Queneau, it is, rather, a
submission to an unaccountable authority—he refuses the essentiality in writing of
something constitutively unknowable.
There is a further indication of an important ambivalence regarding chance in the
minutes of the Oulipo session of 12 April 1962:
BERGE: [. . .] nous sommes essentiallement anti-hasard.
QUENEAU: Nous ne sommes peut-eˆtre pas tellement ‘anti’. Je pre´fe´rais
dire que nous manifestons une certaine me´fiance a` l’e´gard du hasard.
BERGE: N’aimeriez-vous pas: ‘Nous lanc¸ons un de´fi au hasard?’
(Approbations ge´ne´rales.)42
[BERGE: [. . .] we are essentially anti-chance.
QUENEAU: Perhaps we are not so ‘anti’. I would prefer to say that we
show a certain mistrust towards chance.
BERGE: Would you not like: ‘we throw down a challenge to chance?’
40Genette writes: ‘Chance is no stranger to the [Oulipian] endeavour.’ Genette, Palimpsests, p.40.
He adds that ‘the word “potential” evidently means fortuitous. . .’ Ibid., p.44.
41Bens, Gene`se de L’Oulipo, p.42.
42Ibid., p.146.
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(General approval.)]
This exchange took place in response to a suggestion by Jean Queval that the group
should define a collection of certain key terms in order to clarify future discussions. A
comment follows about the dangers of automatism, but the discussion quickly moves
on to questions of structure, and no rigorous definition of ‘chance’ is developed.
It seems then that the declarations of antithesis are not quite straightforward. Chance
is rejected where it is taken as an unaccountable resource, but if it is considered not as
a source, but as an openness in a process, its lack of full determinability and the un-
known nature of its outcome, then in some sense it cannot be entirely dispensed with,
short of the mechanical automatism in writing that the Oulipo also disdain. It is in
this sense that Berge’s approved remark that the Oulipo challenge (rather than simply
reject) chance, acknowledges that in some sense, something not entirely mechanical
must enter into the writing programme that they propose, not as its essence, but as
an aspect of the total material. The relation to chance then needs some clarification,
since it functions at several levels and it is not simply the case that any kind of non-
predictability is excluded in Oulipian writing. Alison James in fact asserts that chance
is both incorporated and resisted in Oulipian work: ‘the Oulipo’s originality lies in
the systematic use of constraints that simultaneously incorporate, produce, and control
chance.’ The incorporation of chance for James is the arbitrary aspect of constraint,
its lack of immanent necessity in the productive situation. This then leads, she contin-
ues, to the generation of ‘the accidental and the unexpected . . . while at the same time
pointing the way to order and aesthetic closure.’43
43James, Constraining Chance, p.131.
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But since chance can have various meanings or suggestions, it is useful to step
back a little and consider the various modalities of ‘chance’ that are at work in artis-
tic production. Of course it is the French term hasard that is at stake in the original
declarations: Oulipian anti-hasard—and, if Surrealism is considered the counterpoint,
hasard objectif. The word is rendered closely enough in translation by the English
chance, though, as Alison James points out, the latter has a positive, and perhaps ac-
tive, connotation of opportunity that is not present in the French.44 James offers a
useful typology of chance as it is found in the production of artworks in general: (a)
the generation of randomness through coin tosses, etc. (ultimately leading to patterns
amenable to probabilistic analysis); (b) the suspension of conscious control in the man-
ner of ‘pure psychic automatism’; (c) the non-subjective determination by mechanical
(rather than psychological) automatism; and (d) work whose final form is not closed,
but depends on reception. Clearly, in this categorisation, the Surrealist engagement
with chance is most strongly identified with case (b), although the active engagement
of case (a) is also documented in their activities. As for the Oulipo, their work can
be characterised in accordance with senses (c) and (d), while their ‘anti-chance’ dec-
larations can be seen to have targets in both (a) and (b) and particularly in the sense in
which these are deemed valuable.45 It is the latter tendency, which is central to the Sur-
realist conception of chance, that it is originary, subversive or revelatory in some sense.
It is thus not so much chance considered as unpredictability—in Oulipian procedures
also, full pre-determination is avoided—but the valorisation of this as a manifestation
of freedom, in line with Queneau’s earlier statement, that is objected to by the Oulipo.
Such chance, in defiance of the rational, cannot be freedom, from an Oulipian perspec-
44Ibid., p.5.
45Ibid., p.117.
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tive. Yet it is the characterisation of chance as the determination by another order (a
somewhat paradoxical formulation) that is central to the Surrealist concept of hasard
objectif.
The Surrealist concept of ‘objective chance’ is an experiential engagement with
events that refuse rational comprehension: here subjectivity takes on a certain passiv-
ity before a more profound, irrational causality. There is clearly more at stake here
than the application (for poetic or other ends) of chance procedures, though this is not
to say that the Surrealists did not take deliberate steps to provoke chance: Breton talks
of ‘slip[ping] a thin blade into a book chosen at random’ to inform him about a woman
who may or may not have been about to visit him,46 and similarly of consulting his
cards to obtain from them ‘a clear view of my fortune and my misfortune.’47 But in
these cases it is in the manner of a consultation—an attempt to draw a response from
a situation beyond rational accountability or control as a response to an underlying
desire. This latter condition is the more significant aspect of Surrealist chance—that it
describes surprise or a fortuitous coincidence of apparently disparate events or objects,
rather than randomness in a strictly mathematical sense. Chance is thus written into
Surrealist experience as a tendency towards mysticism, or, as Walter Benjamin puts
it, not wholly approvingly, their occasional visits to the ‘humid backroom of spiritual-
ism.’48
46Andre´ Breton, Mad Love, trans. Mary Ann Caws (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987),
p.15.
47Ibid., p.16.
48Walter Benjamin, ‘Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia,’ in Selected Writ-
ings: Volume 2, Part 1: 1927-1930, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith, trans.
Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005), p.209.
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The opening to this experience of chance is indicated earlier in Surrealists texts
than its theorisation: in the first section of Nadja, for example, Breton talks of the
observation of ‘facts . . . which permit me to enjoy unlikely complicities’ and more
strongly, ‘certain juxtapositions, certain combinations of circumstances which greatly
surpass our understanding.’ The distance between these and the more rationally ac-
countable experiences, he relates to the distance between the Surrealist text and the text
that is ‘fully weighed and measured.’49 He goes on to give accounts of some of these
‘privileged sensations’ that often involve a sense of the felicitous coincidence of ratio-
nally unconnected events, while also suggesting a deeper continuity running beneath,
and he relates attempts to open himself to such experiences—for example, by enter-
ing the cinema with no prior awareness of what is playing, or visiting the flea market
in the hope of happening upon ‘incomprehensible’ objects. The encounters continue
with Nadja herself, and she becomes for Breton, in some sense, the embodiment of
this unaccountability or irreducibility that he holds so dear. A similar submission to
chance is manifested in Aragon’s writings of the same period: ‘I am the bottle-imp
of my senses and of chance: I am like a gambler seated at the roulette table. . . . My
body is the roulette wheel and I am betting on red.’50 In fact Aragon maintained serious
reservations about the poetic value of automatism in itself, yet his musings on chance
indicate the same recourse to a hidden source.
In Breton’s 1937 workMad Love (L’Amour Fou) these encounters are given a more
theoretical framework in the concept of ‘objective chance’. Here chance, as a phe-
nomenon of conscious experience, is theorised as a concept that goes beyond the ques-
tion of causal unaccountability, or the mismatch between different orders of causality
49Andre´ Breton, Nadja, trans. Richard Howard (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999), p.20.
50Louis Aragon, Paris Peasant, trans. Simon Watson Taylor (Boston: Exact Change, 1994), p.7.
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(‘internal’ vs ‘external’). Breton acknowledges these prior characterisations, in their
‘sluggish evolution’—from Aristotle to Poincare´—before settling on one he ascribes
to ‘the modern materialists’: ‘chance is the form making manifest the exterior ne-
cessity which traces its path in the human unconscious.’51 The logic of these orders of
experience is still relevant, but significantly, it is now the unconscious that transgresses
the boundaries of their separation. Perceived at the level of conscious experience this
formulation risks appearing as a kind of clairvoyance, but Breton’s re-figuring of ex-
perience is both more profound and more challenging than straight prophecy, in that
it refigures the temporal separation of unconscious intent and resolution. Jacqueline
Chenieux-Gendron calls this a ‘diversion of the system of causality.’52 For Breton,
what appears as chance is really the convergence of the human and the natural—the
form of a necessity of which conscious perception, unmediated by desire, is unaware.
A circumvention of categorial experience—of causality, subjectivity, even perhaps the
propriety of temporal succession—this is for Breton the realm of Surrealist experience.
It has the perhaps paradoxical consequence—paradoxical to the notion of chance that
sees it as an absence of causation—that this form of experience appeals to another
causation, a higher, non-rational causation. Thus it is a resistance to the enlightenment
ideal of total rationality, ‘the system from which everything and anything follows,’ as
Horkheimer and Adorno put it.53 But where the latter conceive of this as an inescapable
dialectic of rational modernity, Breton seeks to uncover a state that lies beneath ratio-
nality, one with its own irrational necessity. Breton writes: ‘it is as if suddenly, the
deepest night of human existence were to be penetrated, natural and logical necessity
51Breton,Mad Love, p.23.
52Che´nieux-Gendron, Surrealism, p.81.
53Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed. Gunzelin Schmid No-
err, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p.4.
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coinciding.’54
Looking at this space of Surrealist experience, Che´nieux-Gendron describes ob-
jective chance in terms of ‘a gap between the foreseen and the given . . . experienced
as an excess.’55 But she also points out that it is only through linguistic form that it is
accessible—thus the gap is extended across the space of signification:
The combination sign/event called ‘objective chance’ thus decomposes
into a sign without signification, chronologically prior, followed by an
event called ‘random’ which sustains a privileged relationship with the
prior sign. The event ‘gives meaning’ to the sign; it responds to certain
characteristics evoked by the words or pictorial signs in what they signify
as well as in their signifiers. This system in its entirety may be called . . .
an ‘event margin’.56
This ‘event margin’ identifies an operation of rational uncertainty within the frame
of language—the process of signification itself opened to the unknown, where mean-
ing is not simply the determined usage by a subject, but instead follows a prior uncon-
scious determination of linguistic matter. This accords with a much earlier romantic
conception of language, found in Novalis’s 1798 Monologue, in which language only
speaks truly when its subject’s will is subordinated:
But what if I were compelled to speak? What if this urge to speak were the
mark of the inspiration of language, the working of language within me?
54Breton,Mad Love, p.40.
55Che´nieux-Gendron, Surrealism, p.81.
56Ibid., p.82.
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And my will only wanted to do what I had to do? Could this in the end,
without my knowing or believing, be poetry? Could it make a mystery
comprehensible to language?57
This of course apparently presents the most stark contrast with Oulipian composi-
tional practices, the opposition of consciousness versus unconsciousness—subjective
volition versus submission—in the production of poetic or literary work, a profoundly
different understanding of how linguistic production relates to its source(s): the passive
wait for roasted ortolans to drop from the heavens versus the hunt, to use Queneau’s
image.
The second term of the triad, ‘chance, automatism and freedom,’ also bears the ac-
cusation, in Queneau’s conception, of a kind of submission. Automatism—primarily
automatic writing—is one of the defining practices of Surrealism, given as the main
prescription in Breton’s famous definition in the first manifesto and presented before
this in works such as Breton and Soupault’s 1919 text, Les Champs magne´tiques. How-
ever, the ‘purity’ of automatism comes into question where it meets the inevitably con-
scious aspects of language. Louis Aragon, for example, maintains that the Surrealist
‘incipit’ carries through from the unconscious to the conscious. As Che´nieux-Gendron
states, for Aragon, ‘the first automatic phrase proposes a rhythm, makes an image or
makes sense: this image or this sense is then assumed as such, and developed in a
combination in which consciousness takes its full place.’58 There remains, however,
the question of style: ‘I demand that the dreams I am forced to read be written in
57Novalis, ‘Monologue,’ in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed. J. M. Bernstein, trans.
Joyce P. Crick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.215.
58Che´nieux-Gendron, Surrealism, p.50.
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good French,’59 Aragon writes, not without a certain irony, since this is not quite a
question of consciously well-crafted sentences. Rather it is a question of being true to
the originary sources of language as Aragon sees it, in terms reminiscent of Novalis’s
Monologue: ‘it is when you write a letter because you have something to say that you
are writing any old thing. . . . The meaning is formed outside of you.’60
Breton similarly, is aware of the centrality of language to the Surrealist project. He
writes:
Whoever speaks of expression speaks of language first and foremost. It
should therefore come as no surprise to anyone to see Surrealism almost
exclusively concerned with the question of language at first, nor should it
surprise anyone to see it return to language, after some foray into another
area, as though for the pleasure of travelling in conquered territory.61
Indeed, the verbal form, for Breton, has a more originary link with the (visual)
imagination than visual perception itself. He states: ‘I have always thought that in
poetry verbo-aural automatism was a creative stimulus to reading the most exhilarat-
ing visual images, but never that verbo-visual automatism was a creative stimulus to
reading visual images which could be distantly compared with its results.’62 In Surre-
alism then, language retains a primordial status, an insistence on an expressive essence
that would be prior to its social mediation. In fact the demolition of language itself is
59Louis Aragon, Treatise on Style, trans. Alyson Waters (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1991), p.92.
60Ibid., p.94.
61Andre´ Breton, ‘Second Manifesto of Surrealism,’ in Manifestoes of Surrealism, trans. Richard
Seaver and Helen R. Lane (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), pp.151–152.
62Andre´ Breton, ‘The Automatic Message,’ in The Automatic Message, trans. AntonyMelville (Lon-
don: Atlas Press, 1997), p.29.
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more associated with the nihilism of Dada than with Surrealism’s utopian programme.
Breton states that there was ‘no dismemberment of syntax nor disintegration of vo-
cabulary. . . . We knew where to stop and it goes without saying that there was no
point in reproducing it to a point of satiation; these remarks are intended for those who
are astonished that among us the practice of automatic writing was so quickly aban-
doned.’63 That is, there was no expression that could be retrieved prior to language that
automatism could uncover; automatism, it seems, stopped at the primary substance of
language.
The profound connection between thought and word, is, for Breton, one of ‘rhyth-
mic equivalence’, as Che´nieux-Gendron states.64 It is not clear, however, whether, from
Breton’s perspective, this rules out the idea of a substrate of pre-linguistic thought and
the psychological or metaphysical questions that this would raise. The situation is
more decisively stated by Aragon, for whom Surrealism was conditioned on the iden-
tity of thought and word: ‘we reduced each sensation, each thought we wished to anal-
yse, to a single word. Absolute nominalism was dazzlingly exemplified in Surrealism
and it gradually dawned on us that the mental substance . . . was, in fact, vocabulary
itself. There is no thought outside words: the whole Surrealist experience evidences
this proposition.’65 That there is no shape of thought without the signifying plane is,
of course, relatable to Saussurean linguistics, but where the latter differs is in the ar-
bitrary nature of signified and signifier. The sign is not the ‘speech’ of unconscious
forms. This of course gives a greater latitude for the formal manipulation language’s
63Breton, cited in Anna Balakian, Surrealism: The Road to the Absolute (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1986), pp.5–6.
64Che´nieux-Gendron, Surrealism, p.57.
65Louis Aragon, ‘A Wave of Dreams,’ trans. Susan de Muth, Papers of Surrealism Winter, no. 1
(2003): p.5.
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signifying plane without the implicit necessity for an undercurrent of unconscious sig-
nificance. It is, in certain respects what fosters a scientific or mathematical approach
to language, where its forms can be relationally abstracted from an essential meaning.
The appeal to a ‘primary substance’ of language is problematic from the perspec-
tive of its social constitution. Aragon states that the ‘mental substance’ is ‘vocabulary
itself’, but this neglects the inherent conventionality of linguistic form. There is, it
seems, a refusal of the dialectic in language of its discursive and expressive poles.
That is, in the Surrealist primacy of language, expression is all. Adorno, by contrast,
states that ‘no thought can entrust itself as absolutely and blindly to language as the
notion of a primordial utterance would lead us to believe.’66 What is at stake here is
the idea of language as neither the transparent ‘medium’ supposed by scientific rep-
resentation, nor the pure expressivity inherited from Romanticism—the language that
itself ‘speaks’ despite one’s representational intentions. It is not insignificant that, for
Adorno, this model of language also characterises the artwork in general, that it is in-
eliminably both discursive and mimetic inasmuch as it is both intentionally made and
yet mimetically expressive in ways that exceed its discursive intention. What language
cannot have, however, is some kind of pure mimesis, to be revealed by automatism.
It might seem then, that the Oulipian perspective is one of polar opposition to
Surrealist expressivity, inasmuch as it invokes the rational pole of language, but I want
also to suggest that this rationality is not total for Oulipian procedure: this is why, I
suggest, there is ambivalence with regard to structuralist analyses, as I will develop in
chapter 3. It is also why the Oulipo’s imposition of excess rationality—making use
66Theodor W. Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form,’ in Notes to Literature, Vol. I, trans. Shierry Weber
Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p.7.
SURREALISM, CHANCE AND RATIONALITY 73
of precisely those dominating forms that Surrealism rejects—may arguably be, with
regard to the social aspect of language, a richer ground for a critique of rationality
than its refusal, at least, that is, given the declining viability of the Surrealist project
during the period when the Oulipo emerged. In fact Queneau is already wary of this
in the thirties: ‘every literary revue of the sort currently called “avant-garde,” stuffed
full of images, is in reality only an advertisement for art dealers and canvas pushers, a
billboard for one painter or another promoted by one patron or another.’67 Surrealism’s
decline marks the need for a different characterisation of freedom: freedom, in a social
sense, presumes that constraining circumstances can be resisted, and in a historical
sense that any territory it has won can be retained. But if freedom is passive, these
resistances surely cannot hold. It is in this context then that an Oulipian mediated
praxis—mediated, that is, with material constraint—becomes an alternative vision of
freedom, a more responsive engagement than simple resistance.
In fact, Breton in the manifesto gives a statement of freedom that can be broken into
two aspects—‘dictated by thought, in the absence of any control exercised by reason,
exempt from any aesthetic or moral concerns’68—the dictation by thought and the ab-
sence of control. Broadly speaking, characterisations of this division of ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ freedoms have been prevalent in western thought—from the Kantian con-
ception of autonomy, as opposed to the servitude of heteronomous desire, to Hegel’s
distinction of ‘abstract’ and ‘positive’ liberty, to Isaiah Berlin’s ‘two concepts’. Thus,
with Breton, there is offered the ‘negative’ freedom of a lack of rational constraint,
and the ‘positive’ one of that thought’s own determination, which is thereby implicitly
non-rational or irrational. This latter though is hardly the self-governance implied in
67Queneau, ‘What is Art?’ p.34.
68Breton, ‘Manifesto of Surrealism,’ p.26.
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the most concepts of positive freedom: ‘thought’ here covers an expanded and trans-
gressive conceptual apparatus that is not consciously willed; it is thus more an opening
to an alternate determination than the freedom of self -determination. Breton similarly
addresses the distinction in Arcane 17, where he asserts that while ‘freedom is de-
fined very well by opposition to all forms of servitude and constraint,’ the weakness of
this negative characterisation is that it represents freedom as a ‘state’ rather than what
it needs to be to maintain its resistance, a ‘living force’.69 He thus contrasts freedom
with what he calls ‘liberation’, in the sense of ‘liberation of territory’, a ‘negative idea’.
Freedom, on the other hand, is ‘a constant regenerator of energy.’70 The piece was writ-
ten in 1944 and thus the context is acute with regard to wartime oppression, but it also
maintains that, in addition to the overthrow of objective condition of Nazism, true
freedom—freedom of thought—still demands a revolution in consciousness. What
Breton again does not affirm though is the sense in which freedom may be associated
with rational self-determination. For all that a post-romantic liberation from oppres-
sion is sought, without a deeper engagement in the means of that oppression, not just
beyond the liberation of territory, but beyond the opening to the unaccountable, the
risk remains that aspects of what restricts thought remain unaddressed.
Revolution, Utopia and the Unknown
That Surrealism may have missed a deeper critique of empirical reality by abstracting
its concept of experience is a cause of complaint for some commentators. Maurice
69Andre´ Breton, ‘Arcane 17 (excerpts),’ inWhat is Surrealism? SelectedWritings, ed. Franklin Rose-
mont, trans. Stephen Schwartz Simon Watson Taylor (New York: Pathfinder, 1978), p.330. My empha-
sis.
70Ibid., p.330.
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Nadeau in his History of Surrealism acknowledges that the Surrealist submission to
objective chance is ‘to hold cheap, it will be said, the social conditions which more
than any other determine the vicissitudes of our life, and for this reason some have
censured Breton for not having completely closed the door to “mysticism”.’71 Nadeau
does however go on to offer a defence of Breton in terms of the pursuit of a ‘state of
grace which unites the possible and the impossible.’ One of the best-known—albeit
somewhat reactionary—critiques comes from Sartre in 1947, where he sees Surrealism
as failing to engage critically with the ‘reality’ that it resists, thus having no redeeming
political efficacy. Breton’s attempts to ride through the incompatibility between mate-
rial and spiritual revolution ultimately fail for Sartre: he characterises the Surrealists
as being only tinkerers with superstructural forms that pose no real threat to bourgeois
dominance. The supposed unification of dream and reality is, Sartre asserts, only a
‘mixing’, such that the conceptual value of each is maintained in this ‘merry go-round
of fairies whirling around a pumpkin,’ where ‘the real pumpkin supported by the en-
tire real world contests these fading fairies which run about its rind; and vice-versa
the fairies contest the gourd.’72 There is for Sartre no mediation in Surrealism—and
more specifically no instrument of mediation, as he puts it, which is in this case the
‘free arbiter’ of conscious subjectivity—that would develop the tensions it evokes from
contradictories to make effective political address.
For Sartre then there is a failure of critical engagement in Surrealism. He writes:
‘their rejection of the subjective has transformed man into a plain haunted house: in
that vague atrium of consciousness there appear and disappear self-destructive objects
71Maurice Nadeau, The History of Surrealism, trans. Richard Howard (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1973), p.224.
72Jean-Paul Sartre,What is Literature? Trans. Bernard Frechtman (NewYork: Philosophical Library,
1949), p.195.
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which are exactly similar to things.’73 Of course, Sartre’s position here refuses a mod-
ernist transformative role for language itself, instead relegating it to the status of a
utilitarian bearer of (committed) subjective, intended meaning in the ‘reality’ of the
world; the problem, thus, for Sartre is that Surrealism is not adequately engaging with
that world in a direct way. This criticism does bear a similarity to Queneau’s deni-
gration of automatic writing, as merely reproducing the world as it is: ‘the poet who
claims to “plunge” into his unconscious in search of the wonders and new worlds fore-
told by Apollinaire is not an experimenter, but an empiricist.’ Surrealism here, for
Queneau, remains passive before the empirical. He continues, in perhaps his clearest
indication of a critique of Surrealism in terms of its political inadequacy: ‘if . . . the
poet attempts to provoke his inspiration by automatic means, then he’s engaged not in
science but in industry, falling in with the rear guard as they meekly follow a certain
tendency of their age.’74 But where Queneau’s critique (and his later Oulipian position)
is more radical than Sartre’s in its consideration of language is that he rejects passivity
not just in the face of the world ‘as it is’, but in language’s own capacity to undergo a
transformation, one prompted by refusing to see it, on the one hand, as unaccountably
given, or on the other, as merely a tool. Instead its very structures are to be actively
questioned and triggered in their productivity.
This sense of the reproduction of the existing, rather than its critical transforma-
tion, is also central to Adorno’s critique of Surrealist montage. For Adorno, the dream,
in which Surrealism invests itself so heavily, ‘always leaves reality untouched.’ Yet
Surrealism is not even as spontaneously disruptive of its material as the dream: ‘Sur-
realist constructions are merely analogous to dreams, not more.’ That is, while certain
73Ibid., p.195.
74Queneau, ‘What is Art?’ p.35.
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rules and logic are suspended and contexts changed, their contents come ‘closer to
the form of the object. There is a shattering and a regrouping, but no dissolution.’75
Surrealism then, for Adorno, is typified by its principle of montage, whose objects are
represented rather than transformed: the maintenance of a certain kind of objectivity,
rather than its critical penetration. Thus ‘Surrealism must be understood not as a lan-
guage of immediacy but as witness to abstract freedom’s reversion to the supremacy
of objects and thus to mere nature. The montages of Surrealism are the true still lives.
In making compositions out of what is out of date, they create nature morte.’76 The
result of this is therefore far from a revolution against the rational order of capitalism
and the commodity form, but rather the reproduction of its ‘objects’. Indeed, Adorno
describes the Surrealist images whose value depends on a recognition of childhood
fixation as commodity fetishes.
Oulipian Post-Surrealism
Where then, given their resistance to the Surrealist conception of ‘freedom’, do the
Oulipo figure in this anticipation of futurity? If the Surrealist embrace of the irrational
is its own constitutive relation to the new—the unknown—as the attempt to break
with the dominant forms of capitalist society without being reabsorbed by the latter
in its own progressive homogenisation, have the Oulipians abandoned this modernist
or avant-garde will to the unknown in their own re-embrace of the rational? As re-
gards the condition of modernity, the Oulipo are certainly not overtly resistant to its
dominant rational formations in the manner of the Surrealists, at least in the latter’s
75Adorno, ‘Looking Back on Surrealism,’ p.87.
76Ibid., p.89.
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declarations. Is this, however, in some sense demanded by modern rationality’s de-
velopment, such that the gestures of Surrealism as resistance are no longer adequate?
Clearly the Oulipo do not propose a transformation of life in the manner of the Surre-
alists, but in their working through of certain of the forms of rational domination, it is
possible that their approach offers a critical response in a way that is now impossible
for more overtly resistant strategies. In the three or four decades between Surrealism’s
flourishing and dominance over French avant-garde culture, and the Oulipo’s founding,
partly in reaction to this, the extent of rational domination into life arguably is even
more abstracted: for example Adorno asserts in 1958/59 that ‘in the last forty years . . .
both the awareness of a principle that gives meaning to life in an absolute sense and
the concrete hope that people will thus gain control of themselves have faded.’77 The
emergence of cybernetics in the 1950s can also be seen to connect to computational
models in the human sciences—and of course the question of the significance of com-
puters capable of producing coherent utterances had already been broached by Alan
Turing. All of this also ties to the strand of structuralist thinking that was moving, in
often overtly ‘anti-Surrealist’ ways, towards a ‘science’ of literature.78 The Oulipian
position should not however be considered simply as an adoption of these changes.
What I want to propose is that, through an ironic distancing from the role of scien-
tific rationality, the Oulipo promise (or promised) a critique of these forms in a way
that Surrealist expression could no longer achieve, if only because, as Adorno notes,
expressionism, broadly conceived—and automatic writing is a form of this, striving
for ‘the ideal of pure immediacy’79—cannot help but ‘produce something like cer-
77Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59, ed. Eberhard Ortland, trans. Wieland Hoban (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 2018), p.76.
78For more on this, see chapter 3.
79Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59, p.60.
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tain conventions from within itself.’80 It is thus that Oulipian method re-purposes the
forms of dominant rationality—its mathematised structures—to the point of excess in
the method of their employment in a way that demands that they be worked with in
a deliberative contract rather than falling back on what Adorno calls a ‘complaisant
irrationalism’. In this adoption of formal material—take for example Perec’s use of
Graeco-Latin bi-squares, or the verse constraints of Jacques Bens’s ‘Irrational Son-
nets’81—it still has the character of something ‘delivered ready-made from outside the
work,’ in the words of Adorno’s complaint,82 but it is chosen as a component of the
material and worked through in that sense that is both artisanal and yet unnecessary.
The simplest way to put the antithesis of Surrealism and the Oulipo is in terms of
constraint: in the case of the Surrealists, the idea of freedom as the rejection of con-
straint; in that of the Oulipians, freedom as the self-determined adoption of constraint
in response to the self-dissolution of freedom as autonomy. The ‘infinite’—as that
which is beyond all ‘constraint’—is explicitly targeted as Surrealism’s vanishing point
in Aragon’s Une Vague de Reˆves, published shortly before Breton’s First Manifesto in
1924. The text finishes with the paradoxical formulation, ‘who is there? Ah good: let
in the infinite.’83 It places Surrealism itself as something formed by its relation with
the unknown—thus Aragon writes of ‘the horizon which continually flees before the
walker, for like the horizon this concept exists between the mind and what it knows it
will never reach.’84 This opening up to the truly new, such that Aragon states, ‘I am no
80Ibid., p.61.
81See Georges Perec, ‘Quatre figures pour La Vie mode d’emploi,’ in Atlas de litte´rature potentielle
(Paris: Gallimard, folio essais, 1981) and Jacques Bens, ‘Le Sonnet Irrationel,’ in Atlas de litte´rature
potentielle (Paris: Gallimard, folio essais, 1981). The ‘irrationality’ in question relates, of course, to the
mathematical concept of irrational numbers.
82Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.77.
83Aragon, ‘A Wave of Dreams,’ p.11.
84Ibid., p.5.
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longer the bicycle of my senses, a grindstone honing memories and encounters,’ con-
trasts with the mechanistic ‘peace of mind’ of philosophers who ‘shackle their own
imaginations with foreign rings, robbed in famous graves.’85
The comparison of Surrealism and the Oulipo is not simply a difference of re-
sponses, but is due also to the objective conditions to which these responses are made.
It is closely tied to the conditions of the productive period of each group: for the Sur-
realists, there was perhaps still some optimism that the rational-scientific worldview
could be broken in its dominance and something seen beyond it. For the Oulipo this
appears not to be the case, and instead, precisely those forms of domination must thus
be re-purposed, worked with or played with.
The College of ’Pataphysics
While the foregoing has addressed Surrealism as the Oulipo’s claimed antithesis, there
are certain other currents of twentieth-century—particularly French—culture that feed
into the Oulipianmindset in less antagonistic, though still ambiguous, ways. I will look
at the significance of the axiomatic mathematical model of Nicolas Bourbaki in chapter
2 and the Oulipo’s ambivalent (overtly circumspect) relationship with structuralism in
chapter 3, but a few words should be offered regarding the College of ’Pataphysics, not
least because it is as a sub-comission of the College that the Oulipo first took shape.
In the First Manifesto of Surrealism, Breton lists, aside from his immediate cir-
85Ibid., pp.2–3. This disdain for the timid pace of intellectual culture is also shown at the start of
Paris Peasant, where he complains of a fear of ‘genius itself, pure invention, revelation.’ Aragon, Paris
Peasant, p.5.
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cle who have ‘performed acts of ABSOLUTE SURREALISM’, a number of writers,
stretching back to Dante and Shakespeare, who he considers ‘could pass for Surreal-
ists’. Among these is Alfred Jarry, who Breton claims as ‘Surrealist in absinthe.’86
Jarry also holds a place in Oulipian pre-history, as the inventor of ’pataphysics.87 The
College of ’Pataphysics was founded in 1948, 41 years after Jarry’s death.
With that mention in the First Manifesto, Breton assimilates Jarry with the Surre-
alists’ own consciousness-altering efforts: the implication of intoxication as the tran-
scending of rationality—in this case associated with Jarry’s propensity for alcoholic
excess and eccentricity. In the introduction to a few Jarry excerpts in his Anthology
of Black Humour, Breton uses a quasi-Freudian analysis to affirm Jarry—and his most
famous creation, Ubu, who Breton merges here with Jarry—as a proto-Surrealist ex-
plorer of an expanded reality, collapsing the boundary between art and life: for exam-
ple, celebrating Jarry’s propensity for shooting in public, he writes ‘the pistol serves
here as the paradoxical hyphen between the outer and inner worlds.’88 The transgres-
sive aspects of Jarry’s Ubu plays certainly appear as a precursor to Dada and Surreal-
ism, and accord with the ‘exceptional’ of ’pataphysics inasmuch as established order
is rejected. It is notable, however, that Breton does not, in the Anthology, mention
’pataphysics, Jarry’s other lasting creation, the ‘science of imaginary solutions.’ Bre-
ton’s rather partial reading is significant because ’pataphysics, whatever its subversive
86Breton, ‘Manifesto of Surrealism,’ pp.26–7.
87The term ’pataphysics is, Jarry writes mysteriously, ‘preceded by an apostrophe so as to avoid a
simple pun.’ Alfred Jarry, Exploits and Opinions of Doctor Faustroll, Pataphysician: A Neo-Scientific
Novel, ed. Alastair Brotchie and Paul Edwards, trans. Simon Watson Taylor, Collected Works of Alfred
Jarry, Volume II: Three Early Novels (London: Atlas Press, 2006), p.145. I have here followed the
College’s own prescription that the apostrophe only properly belongs to Jarry’s concept of the imaginary
science and never to its adjectival form. Orthography in citations is not consistent, and I have left these
as they appear in their originals.
88Andre´ Breton, Anthology of Black Humour, trans. Mark Polizzotti (London: Telegram, 2009),
p.258.
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potential, is primarily a reaction to science (rather than art), not as its antithesis, but
rather as its absurd excess. It is transgressive of rationality’s restrictions, but maintains
something of its logical form. ’Pataphysics, it is claimed, is not anti-science; instead,
as Jarry states ‘pataphysics is the science.’89 Both Surrealism and ’pataphysics can be
seen as responses to a general social condition, quite overtly as a negative reaction in
the case of Surrealism, more ambiguously in the case of ’pataphysics: the First Man-
ifesto of the College of ’Pataphysics of 195090 states that ‘the culture of ’Pataphysics
answers . . . a deep need of the present times.’91 But it is the hyper-extension of ra-
tionality, rather than the affirmation of its antithesis, found in ’pataphysics, that can
be seen to inform the Oulipian approach to the production of texts. The linkage here
must remain somewhat loose, not least because both ’pataphysians and Oulipians are
resistant to any kind of definitive containment of their work, but also because Oulipism
deviates in certain respects from its pataphysical heritage. But while this pataphysical
condition is far from diagnostic, it is revealing of certain conditions of thought that are
shared by the two groups.
The College of ’Pataphysics, as I noted above, are resistant to a full definition of
’pataphysics, and furthermore, while clearly drawing a great deal from Jarry, do not
hold him essential to the science, claiming they are not his ‘epigoni, his progeny or his
caryatids. . . . Even if Jarry had not been born 99 years ago, and even were he never
to have been born, BEING ’PATAPHYSICIANS WE WOULD HAVE INVENTED
89Jarry, Faustroll, p.218.
90The College of ’Pataphysics institutes its own calendar: 22 De´cervelage, 77 P.E. (Pataphysical
Era) corresponds to 19 January 1950 (vulg.). I will continue to use the ‘vulgar’ calendar here for the
sake of consistency.
91Ire´ne´e Louis Sandomir, ‘First Manifesto of The College of ’Pataphysics addressed to several peo-
ple likely to be interested in participating in its Works,’ in A True History of the College of ’Pataphysics,
ed. Alastair Brotchie, trans. Paul Edwards (London: Atlas Press, 1995), p.55.
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’PATAPHYSICS ANYWAY.’92 Nevertheless, it is in Jarry’s Exploits and Opinions of
Doctor Faustroll, Pataphysician that ’pataphysics is given its most oft-repeated char-
acterisation:
Pataphysics . . . is the science of that which is superinduced upon meta-
physics, whether within or beyond the latter’s limitations, extending as far
beyond metaphysics as the latter extends beyond physics. . . . Pataphysics
will be . . . the science of the particular, despite the common opinion that
the only science is that of the general. Pataphysics will examine the laws
governing exceptions, and will explain the universe supplementary to this
one. . . . Pataphysics is the science of imaginary solutions.93
Although Jarry posits his description as a ‘definition’, it can hardly be called defini-
tive, and nor should or could it be, since, as implied by Jarry’s account above, and as
developed by the College, it is held to be beyond anything that could be defined. San-
domir, the first Vice-Curator of the College, asserts that ‘there is no role for the College
of ’Pataphysics in the World, there is not even a College of ’Pataphysics, nor a world.
There is only Pataphysics. And we write it weighing up all the insufficiency of this
“there is only.”’94 The ‘world’ then is a fiction and ‘what we say about it is the fic-
tion of a fiction.’95 The idea of the world as a fiction has clear resonances with recent
‘postmodern’ theses, such as Baudrillard’s ‘hyperreality’. Baudrillard, an avowed ’pat-
92Opach, ‘Tintype,’ in A True History of the College of ’Pataphysics, ed. Alastair Brotchie, trans.
Paul Edwards (London: Atlas Press, 1995), p.107 Emphasis in the original.
93Jarry, Faustroll, p.145.
94Ire´ne´e Louis Sandomir, ‘The Last Will & Testament of His Late Magnificence Doctor I. L. San-
domir, in his lifetime Vice-Curator-Founder of the College of ’Pataphysics,’ in A True History of the
College of ’Pataphysics, ed. Alastair Brotchie, trans. Paul Edwards (London: Atlas Press, 1995), p.79.
95Ibid., p.80.
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aphysician himself (he was a Satrap of the College), theorises the loss of the real as
the dissolution of centres of gravity: ‘running counter to the old physics of meaning
would be a new gravitation—the true, the only gravitation: attraction by the void.’96
Baudrillard here draws on an image from Jarry’s Faustroll, but on this narrow point
at least, it appears to be something of a misreading.97 Jarry speculates on an explana-
tion of gravitational phenomena as resulting from a vacuum (‘a unit of non-density’)
being attracted to the periphery, rather than solid bodies attracted to the core: Jarry’s
alternative principle is thus not ‘counter to the old physics’, as Baudrillard claims, but
rather an equivocation of physical ‘laws’. Jarry’s positing of ’pataphysics as beyond
metaphysics is also taken up by Deleuze, who aligns ’pataphysics with Heideggerian
phenomenology, ‘the overcoming of metaphysics.’98 Others have claimed ’pataphysics
as proto-deconstructive.99
What is more relevant from an Oulipian point of view, however, is the sense in
which science in ’pataphysics is not simply rejected, but rather reframed: ’pataphysics
as a science of the imaginary, or an imaginary science. A number of the founding
members of the Oulipo had for some time been members of the College, most notably
Queneau as a Satrap, but also Arnaud, Latis and others.100 A couple of Queneau’s pat-
aphysical works can be found in the volume, Stories and Remarks: ‘When the Mind
. . .’ offers a series of pataphysical speculations on alternative physics, and another
short piece considers the aerodynamic properties of numbers (the play on the physical-
96Jean Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, trans. Chris Turner (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p.18.
97Jarry, Faustroll, p.145.
98Gilles Deleuze, ‘An Unrecognised Precursor to Heidegger: Alfred Jarry,’ in Essays Critical and
Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997), p.91.
99See Christian Bo¨k, ’Pataphysics: The Poetics of an Imaginary Science (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 2002), pp.31–4.
100For a full list, see Oulipo, Oulipo Compendium, p.128.
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ity of mathematical signs prefigures certain more lettrist tendencies of the Oulipo).101
Furthermore, as I mentioned above, the Oulipo began as a sub-commission of the Col-
lege of ’Pataphysics, with their first publication in the College’sDossier 17 in 1961. In
this report, the Oulipo affirm the ‘triple invocation of Potential Literature, Pataphysics,
and thus Ethernity,’102 acknowledging the inherent potential of words, but aiming to
bring science to bear upon them. This is not, however, a declaration of intent to auto-
mate literary production. They state: ‘one can easily believe that Potential Literature
is not a recipe for “making masterpieces”: its aim is infinitely lower, its efforts are
directed toward recovering the same generative faculty that lies beyond, but in the far
more elementary and scientific order of the structure of language.’103
It is not hard to draw a line of assimilation here between the Oulipo and the con-
temporaneous structuralist sympathies, and not wholly incorrect—I address this point
more fully in chapter 3—but there is something else at stake here, which the pata-
physical context helps to make clearer. That is, that the crossing (one might call it
syzygy, to use pataphysical parlance) of literature and science (more specifically, as it
turns out, mathematics) is itself already in the realm of imaginary solutions. To bring
a scientific logic into the generation of texts, in the service of a ‘problem’ with dubi-
ous grounding in the target domain, is to offer an incongruous perspective: a literary
text has no inherent need to be deduced mathematically. What is more, its intention—
101Raymond Queneau, ‘When the Mind ...,’ in Stories & Remarks, trans. Marc Lowenthal (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2000). Raymond Queneau, ‘Some Brief Remarks Relative to the Aero-
dynamic Properties of Addition,’ in Stories & Remarks, trans. Marc Lowenthal (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2000).
102Oulipo, ‘The Colle`ge de Pataphysique and the Oulipo: Presentation of the Subcommittee’s work in
Dossier 17 of the Colle`ge de Pataphysique,’ in Oulipo: A Primer of Potential Literature, ed. and trans.
Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998), p.48. The term ‘ethernity’ is Jarry’s coinage,
combining ‘ether’ and ‘eternity’.
103Ibid., p.49.
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indeed the foundation of its problem as imaginary—is strictly inutilious. Note that, for
the College, ‘the initial GOAL was . . . to FOUND A SOCIETY COMMITTED TO
LEARNED AND INUTILIOUS RESEARCH.’104
‘The science of imaginary solutions’ concerns itself with the imaginary, that is,
with theoretical explanations that are acknowledgedly invented in a way that is not ex-
actly counter to standard scientific explanations, but rather highlights the non-essentiality
of any science as itself a form of fiction: ’pataphysics here pursues the ‘as if’ that es-
capes from the ‘as is’, as Christian Bo¨k puts it.105 Imaginary solutions are, in certain
respects, drawn from the material of established science, that is, these structures and
positions are not rejected, but rather re-framed or alternatively explained. ’Pataphysics,
rather than pursuing the universal rule, valorises its exceptions, or more strongly, posits
the primacy of exceptions as the substance of the world. As the College has it, ‘there
are only exceptions in the world, and . . . a “rule” is merely an exception to an ex-
ception; as for the universe, Faustroll defined it as “that which is the exception to
itself”.’106 ’Pataphysics then is presented as the scientific imagination of alternative
explanations. But if it is a science of the imaginary, it is also important to note that it
is itself, or at least begins as, an imaginary discipline. This at least is its presentation
in Jarry’s Faustroll: the ’pataphysician and his ’pataphysics are the works of Jarry’s
imagination. In this imaginary science there is no hierarchy of scientific truth. ’Pat-
aphysics does not reject the manifestations of conventional science or indeed certain
104The College of ’Pataphysics, ‘Second Manifesto of the College of ’Pataphysics,’ in A True History
of the College of ’Pataphysics, ed. Alastair Brotchie, trans. Paul Edwards (London: Atlas Press, 1995),
p.77. Emphasis in the original. Paul Edwards here uses ‘inutilious’ to translate the French inutile, for
which, he notes, ‘ “useless” does not have the negative force.’
105Bo¨k, ’Pataphysics, p.25ff.
106Sylvain d’Y, ‘What is The College of ’Pataphysics,’ in A True History of the College of ’Pata-
physics, ed. Alastair Brotchie, trans. Paul Edwards (London: Atlas Press, 1995), p.101.
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figures from its established history: in Sandomir’s 1952 ‘Digression’, he cites Kepler,
Newton, Einstein, Reimann. But these are here synthesised with ideas from Aristotle,
the Bible and the Zohar,107 the equivalence of all solutions persisting since there is
no standard of truth to be found in the established material of science by which any
notion of historical progression could be valorised. Indeed, even time itself is consid-
ered as a pataphysical invention rather than a ‘true’ substructure or conditioning form,
such that the usual chronological succession need not be respected. Jarry writes: ‘if
we could remain immobile in absolute space while time elapses, all future and past
instances could be explored successively’,108 a contention that accords quite well with
the Oulipian concept of ‘anticipatory plagiarism’. ’Pataphysics refuses the claims to
explanatory regularity that constitute science as such: there is thus a contradiction in
the maintenance of scientific activity at the same time as that which constitutes it is
refused in a principle of total explanatory equivalence (no theory is universal, none
more valid any other). This is of course only one of many apparent contradictions
of ’pataphysics: consider also that it is the science for which there is no role in the
world, and yet it is ‘the very substance of the world.’109 The ’pataphysician, Sandomir
asserts, ‘denies nothing, he exsuperates. In this, as in everything. He has not come
to abolish, but to adimplete.’110 Indeed antinomy is something of a pataphysical prin-
ciple. A consequence of this is that the (apparently) mutually incompatible must be
held simultaneously. Again this kind of attitude of thought is quite sympathetic for
107Ire´ne´e Louis Sandomir, ‘Digression Pronounced 1st Phalle LXXIX P.E. by the Vice-Curator-
Founder of The College of ’Pataphysics Before Himself,’ in A True History of the College of ’Pata-
physics, ed. Alastair Brotchie, trans. Paul Edwards (London: Atlas Press, 1995).
108Cited in Andrew Hugill, ’Pataphysics: A Useless Guide (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2015),
p.20.
109Sandomir, ‘Testament,’ p.79. d’Y, ‘What is The College of ’Pataphysics,’ p.101.
110Sandomir, ‘Testament,’ p.81. The use of obscure words and neologisms is common in pataphysical
discourse.
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the Oulipo in their pursuit of something incongruous, if not constitutively impossible,
the crossing of science and literature (here not at the level of scientific description but
of mathematical deduction in composition). The introduction of something arbitrarily
scientific or mathematical, that is, a mechanism, into what must remain constitutively
unmechanical, follows a futile or ‘inutilious’ logic.
I will not pursue the metaphysical or post-metaphysical implications further here,
but only note that the gesture is reflective of more than mere game-playing. That is,
while ’pataphysics is responsive to science, it is so in a way which intends to address
its problems (that is, the problems of total rationality), rather than to counter it by
recourse to its other: irrationality. This is reflected in the Oulipo’s reaction against
Surrealism. The ’pataphysians claim that their work is not satire (even if this seems
hard to credit entirely), and that ‘there was never any question of affecting a mocking
pessimism or a corrosive nihilism.’111 Some, they admit, may find it humorous—and
indeed, elsewhere it is noted that seriousness is anti-pataphysical112—but, it is insisted,
’pataphysics is ‘beyond laughter and even smiles.’
The status of seriousness mirrors the status of science in ’pataphysics. The inten-
tion appears not to be humorous in a light-hearted way, but rather to transgress the
boundaries of what constitutes the serious without opposing it as such (in this there are
also resonances with Surrealist games, as I mentioned earlier). Such an appeal, from
within the boundaries of conventional seriousness almost inevitably appears unserious,
in the way that conventional physics can likely only think ’pataphysics unscientific.
111d’Y, ‘What is The College of ’Pataphysics,’ pp.101–2.
112Ire´ne´e Louis Sandomir, ‘Inaugural Harangue Pronounced on the 1st De´cervelage of the Year
LXXVI P.E. by his Magnificence the Vice-Curator-Founder of the College of ’Pataphysics,’ in A True
History of the College of ’Pataphysics, ed. Alastair Brotchie, trans. Paul Edwards (London: Atlas Press,
1995), p.34.
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But ’pataphysics, if anything, reverses this, such that the seriousness of the subset of
the science that is conventional ‘science’ is itself rendered unserious, or as unserious
as ’pataphysics might be accused of being. If there is a re-figuring of seriousness here,
it is one that at once holds all science as both serious and humorous at once.
This question of seriousness is often asked of the Oulipo, since their methods,
at least in their initial outline, seem more akin to games than to the weightiness of
literary writing. There is, certainly, something of an ethos of play in the Oulipo’s
methods, and the more conventionally understood literary aspects that are held to be
serious come only in certain finished works, such as the themes of memory and loss in
Perec’s novels and Roubaud’s Great Fire of London series. This, however, is to allow
a received dichotomy to set the terms of the debate. Le Lionnais states at the end of
the First Manifesto:
A word at the end for the benefit of those particularly grave people who
condemn without consideration and without appeal all work wherein is
manifested a propensity for pleasantry.
When they are the work of poets, entertainments, pranks and hoaxes still
fall within the domain of poetry. Potential literature remains thus the most
serious thing in the world. Q.E.D.113
Similarly Queneau states, in the group’s meeting in April 1961, ‘nous ne sommes
pas des petits plaisantins. C’est tre`s se´rieusement que nous nous livrons a` nos travaux.’
This meets with ‘murmures approbateurs.’114 [‘We are not little jokers. We take our
113Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, ‘Lipo (First Manifesto),’ in Oulipo Laboratory: Texts from the Bibliothe`que
Oulipienne, trans. Harry Mathews and Iain White (London: Atlas Press, 1995), pp.xx–xxi.
114Bens, Gene`se de L’Oulipo, p.57.
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work very seriously. . . . Murmurs of approval.’] And Noe¨l Arnaud, in his scathing
response to the characterisations of the Oulipo in Ge´rard Genette’s Palimpsests, objects
to his conventional division of the ludic and the serious, where Genette finds the latter
only in great works, rather than potential methods:
Ge´rard Genette ne semble pas prendre au ‘se´rieux’ les oulipiens. Ce n’est
pas tant la qualification de ‘ludiques’ accole´e a` nos exercices qui nous le
laisse croire (chez nous, aucune hostilite´ envers les ‘jeux’) que son in-
sistance ulte´rieure a` juger ‘se´rieuses’ quantite´ d’oeuvres qui, a` notre sen-
timent, ne le sont pas plus, et a` vrai dire beaucoup moins que La Vie
mode d’emploi de Perec ou Si par une nuit d’hiver un voyageur. . . d’Italo
Calvino. Doit-on comprendre que Genette confond l’exercice oulipien,
court exemple en ge´ne´ral, destine´ a` montrer la via- ou fiabilite´ d’une con-
trainte et qu’on s’efforce de rendre plaisant (droˆle pourquoi pas? et en
quoi la contrainte serait-elle alors moins ‘se´rieuse’?) et l’œuvre—roman
ou poe`me ou pie`ce de the´aˆtre—e´crite sous contrainte et qui peut atteindre
les dimensions de La Vie mode d’emploi et sa tre`s re´elle gravite´?115
[Ge´rard Genette does not seem to take the Oulipians ‘seriously’. It is not
so much the qualification ‘ludic’ which we are led to believe is attached to
our exercises (for us, there is no hostility towards ‘games’) than his subse-
quent insistence on judging ‘serious’ the number of works which, we feel,
are not more, and indeed much less so, than Perec’s Life a User’s Manual
or Calvino’s If On a Winter’s Night a Traveller. Must one understand that
Genette confounds Oulipian exercises, in general short examples, destined
115Arnaud, ‘Ge´rard Genette,’ pp.13–14.
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to show the via- or reliability of a constraint and that one tries to make
amusing (funny, why not? and in what respect would the constraint then
be less ‘serious’?), and the work—novel or poem or play—written under
constraint and which can reach the dimensions of Life a User’s Manual
and its very real gravity?]
Arnaud here does not deny the playful aspects of their work, but rather demands
a reconsideration of the standard categories of literary seriousness. There are indeed
‘serious’ Oulipian novels, but that is not the primary work of the Oulipo and any as-
pect of the latter, even in its ludic tendency is not thereby rendered worthless. It is
to open up an area of exploration in which the humorous is not simply disdained as
unserious, a direct inheritance, it would seem, from the spirit of ’pataphysics. It is
also important to distance the wider critical seriousness of the import of a particular
artistic practice from its narrowly-defined apparent, or self-conceived seriousness. In
his recently published book on the Oulipo’s intellectual context, Dennis Duncan asks,
‘how then to write an intellectual account of these farceurs? Will it not be, at best,
a fundamental misunderstanding, at worst, an act of bad faith?’116 Duncan goes on
to affirm the Oulipo’s value as lying in a certain lightness, drawing on a statement
by Calvino: ‘were I to choose an auspicious image for the new millennium, I would
choose . . . the sudden agile leap of the poet-philosopher who raises himself above the
weight of the world, showing that with all his gravity he has the secret of lightness.’117
Yet it does not betray this ‘lightness’ or agility to take the Oulipo’s work seriously
in a critical sense. What is at stake here is their work’s significance precisely in its
socio-historical context; that is, both how it responds to the rational conditions of the
116Duncan, The Oulipo, p.8.
117Cited in Ibid., p.10.
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time, by a kind of inappropriate absorption of mathematical method into literary com-
position, and how it finds something new from that unlikely crossing. It might even, in
that sense, be that unseriousness is the necessary characterisation of an artistic activity
that both works with the formal conditions that it opposes, and yet whose purposive
agenda it nevertheless attempts to make futile.
Consider Queneau’s observation that ‘topology and the theory of numbers sprang
in part from what used to be called “mathematical entertainments,” “recreational math-
ematics”.’118 Reflecting on this, Roubaud notes: ‘Oulipian work is regarded as funda-
mentally innovative, as being situated on the cutting-edge, that it cannot avail itself
of any so-called serious finality of any of the criteria serving today in scientific do-
mains to eliminate research that unduly jostles accepted perspectives.’119 It is possible
then to extend this assessment to an aesthetic-critical perspective, in particular with the
question of mathematics. In breaking with what should be done with deductive form,
that is, in arbitrarily applying it outside its ‘legitimate’ domain, Oulipian practice both
takes it wholly seriously in the rigour of its formal integrity (which is something that
Surrealism is more inclined to attempt to dissolve), but not so much in its methodolog-
ical propriety. This recourse to mathematical rigour owes a lot to the axiomatic project
of Nicolas Bourbaki, which will be the subject of the next chapter.
118Queneau, ‘Potential Literature,’ p.52.
119Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.85.
2. Bourbaki and Mathematical Method
The Oulipo has never been simply a literary group. Indeed, its founding members
came with a diverse range of specialisms, spanning scientific or mathematical back-
grounds as well as literary or poetic. As Raymond Queneau tells it, the foundation of
the group stemmed from a discussion with his friend and Oulipian co-founder Franc¸ois
Le Lionnais regarding difficulties in formulating ‘naturally’ his Cent mille milliards de
poe`mes.1 Le Lionnais and Queneau were keen amateur mathematicians, and its seems
that the combinatory structure of the CMMP, as a specifically mathematical problem,
was the concretisation of a possibility that had been in the minds of both figures since
youth: Le Lionnais recounts, ‘we discovered that our routes had been rather similar,
and that the idea of injecting original mathematical notions into novelistic or poetic
creation had come to us at about the same time, after secondary school, during our
1‘J’avais e´crit cinq ou six des Cent mille milliards de poe`mes, et j’he´sitais un peu a` continuer, enfin
je n’avais pas beaucoup le courage de continuer, plus cela allait, plus c’e´tait difficile a` faire naturelle-
ment, quand j’ai rencontre´ Le Lionnais, qui est un ami, et il m’a propose´ de faire une sorte de groupe
de recherches de litte´rature expe´rimentale. Cela m’a encourage´ a` continuer mes sonnets; ce recueil de
poe`mes est, en quelque sorte, la premie`re manifestation concre`te de ce Groupe de recherches.’ Queneau,
Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier, p.116. [‘I had written five or six of the Cent mille milliards de
poe`mes, and I was hesitating a little to go on, that is, I had not much spirit to continue, the more it went
on, the harder it was to do naturally, when I met Le Lionnais, who is a friend, and who suggested a sort
of research group of experimental literature. That encouraged me to continue my sonnets; the collection
of poems is, in some way, the first concrete manifestation of the research group.’]
93
BOURBAKI AND MATHEMATICAL METHOD 94
university studies.’2 It thus seems reasonable to use the words from the title of Le
Lionnais’s essay describing these events as a description of the Oulipo itself, as the
‘amalgam of mathematics and literature’. While the seemingly unlikely combina-
tion of these two fields may not adequately characterise the entirety of the Oulipo’s
work, it was clearly a distinctive feature in the early years—even eleven years after
the group’s founding, Queneau is reported by Le Lionnais as proposing, for a defini-
tion of the Oulipo ‘le crite`re suivant: que le structure utilise´e soit mathe´matique (pas
ne´cessairement nume´rique).’3 This ‘amalgam’ retains a strangeness because it is not
so much that mathematics that is being ‘poeticised’—by appeals to the beauty of struc-
tural proportions or relations for example—as that literature, or more specifically its
constructive process, is being mathematised. In fact, I will argue, it is the apparent
perversity of this crossing of disciplines, critically interpreted, that gives the key to
the Oulipo’s significance in modernity. Inasmuch as modern art is still problematised
in terms of its autonomous status, it would appear that the mathematisation of art’s
construction would be a foremost territory in which that status is contested.
There are Oulipian forms that are explicitly mathematical: the Eodermdrome, a
structure in graph theory and introduced to the Oulipo by Claude Berge, is a prime
example of such a device. The structure is represented as five nodes at the vertices
of a pentagon; these nodes may then be traversed with a single line in such a way
that the line between any two given nodes is traced only once, a demand which offers
123 different permutations for its fulfilment. The name ‘Eodermdrome’ is itself the
2Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, ‘Raymond Queneau and the Amalgam of Mathematics and Literature,’ in
Oulipo: A Primer of Potential Literature, ed. and trans. Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey Archive
Press, 1998), p.77.
3Fonds Oulipo. Dossiers mensuels de re´union (1960–2010). 1971. Aouˆt 1971, https://gallica.
bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b100101296/ (accessed August 20, 2019). [‘. . .the following criterion:
that the structure used be mathematical (not necessarily numerical).’]
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result of the letters EODRM, placed at the vertices and processed accordingly (see
figure 2.1). The form was originally posed as a challenge to choose five letters that
can be arranged such that a meaningful (or at least lexically legitimate) expression
or expressions result: for example ‘SCARE’ will yield ‘SCARCER SEAS’.4 But in
Oulipian terms, the device also functions at higher levels to order words, sentences,
themes and so on as constraining forms for literary composition.
E
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Figure 2.1: An Eodermdrome
Mathematically derived forms are also at the heart of what is probably the most
famous novel to emerge from the Oulipo’s members, Georges Perec’s La Vie mode
d’emploi (Life a Users Manual). The work is of course a highly significant piece of lit-
erature in its own right (and is also thematically rich regarding the question of futility,
the completion or non-completion of puzzles and the totality of forms), but it is only
really with description of the work’s constructive process, which was revealed after
4Oulipo, Oulipo Compendium, p.144.
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publication, that the richness of Perec’s processual adoption of mathematical form is
revealed.5 The major structuring devices in the work are the Knight’s Tour, a math-
ematical problem where each square of a chess board must be visited once and only
once using only the knight’s moves; and the 10x10 Graeco-Latin bi-square, a mathe-
matical structure where two sets of elements are ordered in a matrix pattern such that
no pair of elements is repeated in any one row or column.6 Perec used the bi-square to
distribute lists of elements in order to determine the narrative and descriptive elements
in the book (the ‘schedule of obligations’) for each of the rooms of a Parisian apart-
ment block, arrayed as a 10x10 grid. The ordering of the chapters was then determined
by the Knight’s Tour.7 Also testament to the optimism of their amalgamating project,
Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, in the group’s first collective publication, offers a ‘Boıˆte a` ide´es’,
a large list of more or less developed mathematical structures that, he proposes, may be
used in literary composition. He notes at the end that ‘all that remains is to get to work.
The Oulipo has taken this to heart. At the rate of just one notion per monthly meeting,
the above list, which is in no way intended as restrictive, could provide material for
the agendas of at least a hundred meetings to come.’8
Many other constraints, including the lipogram (perhaps their best known, though
not actually invented by the Oulipo),9 are describable in accordance with the operations
5See Perec, ‘Quatre figures.’
6The bi-square had been contemplated in the Oulipo since 1967. See Claude Berge, ‘Letter to
Jacques Roubaud & Georges Perec,’ in All That is Evident is Suspect: Readings from the Oulipo 1963-
2018, ed. IanMonk and Daniel Levin Becker, trans. Daniel Levin Becker (San Francisco: McSweeney’s,
2018).
7This is, of course, only a very simplified overview of the structures. An extensive analysis is
provided in David Bellos, Georges Perec: A Life in Words (London: The Harvill Press, 1993).
8Le Lionnais, ‘Boıˆte a` ide´es.’ A new translation has recently been published as Franc¸ois Le Lion-
nais, ‘Idea Box,’ in All That is Evident is Suspect: Readings from the Oulipo 1963-2018, ed. Ian Monk
and Daniel Levin Becker, trans. Daniel Levin Becker (San Francisco: McSweeney’s, 2018).
9According to Perec, the earliest recorded lipogram dates back to the sixth century BCE. Perec,
‘History of the Lipogram.’
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of set theory—unions, intersections, differences, products of sets, and it is with these
terms of description that the incongruousness becomes clearer. Jacques Roubaud calls
this kind of intervention ‘“structure transport”: a set, armed with a given structure,
is “interpreted” in a text; the elements of the set become the data of the text; the
structures existing in the set are converted into procedures for composing the text,
with constraints.’10
Given the technological shifts of the twentieth century, and in particular the emer-
gent digital revolution, it would be reasonable to expect that the Oulipo had explored
computational aspects of writing—indeed, it is sometimes thought that the Oulipo, by
virtue of their engagement with logical and algorithmic structures, were forerunners
of the various forms of algorithmic text generation that are common today. Yet this
kind of automation is not really the intention. Certainly, in the early years, there was
an acknowledgement of a possible value for computers in their researches. Queneau
himself noted that ‘we regret having no access to machines: this is a constant lamento
during our meetings.’11 But despite an offshoot group set up to research this area
(ALAMO),12 the Oulipo itself never pursued it with any great seriousness. Indeed, as
already mentioned, in the minutes for the group’s early meetings, a wariness of ‘me-
chanical automatism’ is indicated, as much as that of the ‘psychic automatism’ of the
Surrealists.13 Whatever the methods used, the Oulipian project was not directed to-
wards automating the writing process. Thus there is no attempt to replace the figure of
10Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.94.
11Queneau, ‘Potential Literature,’ p.51. See also Paul Fournel, ‘Computer and Writer: The Cen-
tre Pompidou Experiment,’ in Oulipo: A Primer of Potential Literature, ed. and trans. Warren Motte
(Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998).
12TheAtelier de Litte´rature Assiste´e par la Mathe´matique et les Ordinateurs (Workshop for literature
assisted by mathematics and computers) was set up in 1980. See Oulipo, Oulipo Compendium, p.46.
Note that even here the relation is primarily one of ‘assistance’.
13See Bens, Gene`se de L’Oulipo, p.146.
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the authorial subject with technology—and thus no pretence of computational lyricism
as in Racter’s dubious 1984 text The Policeman’s Beard is Half Constructed14—but
rather to finds new forms and configurations that can be worked with. Recall Que-
neau’s statement that the Oulipo’s aim is to find ‘new forms and structures—to use
this slightly learned word—that may be used by writers in any way they see fit.’15
Take, too, for example, Claude Berge’s assertion of the Oulipo’s (third) vocation as
‘the transposition of concepts existing in different branches of mathematics into the
realm of words,’16 and Franc¸ois Le Lionnais’s description of Oulipian work as ‘inject-
ing original mathematical notions into novelistic or poetic creation.’17 Significantly,
‘novelistic or poetic creation’ in itself is not undermined or replaced here, but with
the notion of transposing or injectingmathematics, we see something new, something
external brought into it. The basic sense of the separation of these two domains, such
that it is a decision that brings them together, rather than (as we have seen Adorno
affirm) an immanent development, is one of the key features of the Oulipian project.
The extrinsic character of mathematics in literary production is acknowledged.
In this crossing of mathematics and literature, the Oulipo follow, above all, the
model of Nicolas Bourbaki—a mathematical collective established in the mid-thirties,
but waning by the seventies—whose own project developed from an attempt to ground
14The cover promises ‘A Bizarre and Fantastic Journey into the Mind of a Machine’. It is dubious
(though not uninteresting) in the sense that it claims to have been ‘written’ by computer—structuralist
analyses not withstanding—rather the pseudo-randomised assemblage of fragments and templates writ-
ten by another—an identifiable non-computer, that is, the programmer. The full source code and re-
sources behind the book were never made public. Racter, The Policeman’s Beard is Half Constructed
(New York: Warner Books, 1984).
15Queneau in conversation with Georges Charbonnier, cited in Jean Lescure, ‘Brief History of the
Oulipo,’ in Oulipo: A Primer of Potential Literature, ed. and trans. Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey
Archive Press, 1998), p.38.
16Claude Berge, ‘For a Potential Analysis of Combinatory Literature,’ in Oulipo: A Primer of Poten-
tial Literature, ed. and trans. Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998), p.116.
17Le Lionnais, ‘Raymond Queneau and the Amalgam of Mathematics and Literature,’ p.77.
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the totality of mathematics not on anything intuitive, but rather on a small number
of highly abstracted, formal axioms. Oulipism then can be seen, in some sense, as
the transposition of a Bourbakist approach into literature. However, the following
excerpt, from 1991, indicates Jacques Roubaud’s acknowledgement of this not entirely
straightforward line of methodological adoption:
13. When the Oulipo was conceived, Bourbaki provided a counter-model
to the Surrealist group.
14. We can also say that the Oulipo is an homage to Bourbaki and an
imitation of Bourbaki.
15. At the same time, it is no less obviously a parody of Bourbaki, even
a profanation of Bourbaki.
16. Bourbaki’s initial plan—to rewrite mathematics in its entirety and
provide it with solid foundations using a single source, set theory,
and a rigorous system, the axiomatic method—is at once serious,
admirable, imperialistic, sectarian, megalomaniac and pretentious.
(Humour has not been one of its prime characteristics.)
17. The Oulipo’s plan, which ‘translates’ Bourbaki’s objectives into the
domain of the arts of language, is no less serious and ambitious, but it
is non-sectarian and not convinced of the validity of its proceedings
to the exclusion of all other approaches.
18. I shall not pursue the comparison of the two groups any further.18
18Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.38.
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A homage, imitation, parody and even profanation of Bourbaki19—as stated above,
Roubaud does not develop the comparison, but what is clear from this is an ambiva-
lence in the meaning of the transference of mathematical form. The Oulipo aims to
reproduce, in literary method, the rigour of structuring a field to its core relations, its
axioms and deductive procedures. Clearly literary writing is not generally thought
to work from axioms and while deduction may feature in the genre of the detective
story—and indeed, in certain cases, be quite rigorously formal—here the logic is in-
herent to the genre and the determination of final content, rather than an abstracted
mathematical ground in the process of composition. In the Oulipian formulation, writ-
ing under constraint is not the determination of structures that should be manifest in
the end work, but rather the methodology of writing in accordance mathematical de-
duction. Roubaud continues: ‘constraints are presented in explicit and systematic form
and can be notated in the language of mathematical logic. Oulipian texts thus become
the literary consequences of these axioms, according to the rules of deduction.’20
These bold declarations draw out the differences between literary and mathemat-
ical procedure. Literary process would not typically be seen as a form of deduction,
based on axioms and formal relationships, and yet this is the model of mathematics that
is the key provocation in the Oulipian project. With this introduction of mathematics to
the literary work, the basic incongruity of the initial juxtaposition is, crucially, main-
tained, rather than synthesised in accordance with the values of one or the other of
its aspects—this is why it appears perverse, playful or even futile. The question then
arises: what is the critical import of this move? Mathematics has, arguably, the highest
19Roubaud gives a similar statement in another text, and gives his source: ‘to take up Octavio Paz’s
axiom: Homage and Profanation are the two breasts of literature.’ Jacques Roubaud, Poetry, etcetera:
Cleaning House, trans. Guy Bennett (København: Green Integer, 2006), p.209.
20Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.41.
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status, in terms of rigour and self-sufficiency, in the scientific thought of modernity: it
proceeds—apparently—in abstraction from its possible applications, and yet the range
of those applications has expanded greatly during this period. Whatever the ultimate
truth of mathematics, its role in society is not an eternal necessity of ‘nature’, nor of
human rationality, but is in fact development of the historical contingency of rational-
ity. If it is possible to shed light on this contingency, then mathematics as a structure
of human necessity comes into question. It is in this context that Oulipian methods, in
their incorporation of the image of logical rigour and abstraction, take on a particular
relevance in the attempt to reveal and comment on these contingent conditions of ra-
tionality, conditions that in turn give the possibility of the Oulipo’s own development.
Specifically in an aesthetic context, the question of such methods is only rendered
more acute where they operate in a domain where mathematics and the logic of de-
duction would seem to be repressive rather than provocative of any critically valuable
artistic production. It is not that there is nothing mathematical in the artwork of course;
even Adorno admits that ‘the aesthetic of pleasure, once free of crude materiality, co-
incides with mathematical relations in the artistic object, the most famous in the plastic
arts being the golden mean, which has its musical correlative in the overtone relations
of musical consonance.’21 But what Adorno objects to—where, for example, he states
that ‘there is absolutely no reducing the concept of form to mathematical relations’22—
and what is at stake in the Oulipian use of mathematics, is the ‘pregiven’ nature of the
mathematical relations, the extent to which they are determining, a priori, the con-
structive conditions of the work. The question therefore is: how is mathematics being
adopted here in a way that is still critically interesting rather than nullifying? For this,
21Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.66.
22Ibid., p.195.
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it is necessary first to consider the condition of mathematics in the twentieth century
more broadly, and more particularly the kind of mathematical approach adopted by the
Oulipo.
Modern Mathematics
The nineteenth and early twentieth century saw an increasing abstraction and au-
tonomy of mathematics as a discipline, or rather disciplines—a key characteristic
of the mathematics of this period was in fact the separation into increasingly dis-
tinct fields, each with its own system of terminology and methodology.23 As these
branches had become disparate from the horizon of mathematical unity, they had also
gained a greater autonomy and abstraction from empirical or intuitive foundations.
The nineteenth century saw decisive moves away from the intellectual safety of in-
tuitive self-evidence in mathematics, with the emergence of non-Euclidean geometry,
higher-dimensional spaces and perhaps most challengingly, Georg Cantor’s work on
transfinite numbers. Such developments seemed to have no direct ‘meaning’ that could
be grounded in experience of the world or established logical structures. Mathemati-
cal formulations could not then be seen as the ‘ideal form of physical happenings and
objects’,24 as previously conceived. Indeed, because of such abstraction, these devel-
opments were not universally accepted, even in the mathematical establishment. With
the ‘truth’ of mathematics no longer secured by immediate self-evidence, if indeed
the question of truth was any longer even relevant, the question of the foundations of
23For this historical development I draw largely on Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought from An-
cient to Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), particularly chapters 43 and 51.
24Ibid., p.1028.
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mathematics presented itself with greater urgency.
The project of securing the consistency of mathematics was pursued with renewed
vigour from the end of the nineteenth century onwards (albeit, it should be added, with-
out extending to the unification of all branches under the same axioms and principles
that would later be attempted by Nicolas Bourbaki). In the early twentieth century,
three dominant ‘schools’ of mathematical foundations arose. The ‘logistic’ school,
drawing on the work of Gottlob Frege, and then pioneered primarily by Russell and
Whitehead, attempted to ground mathematical reasoning in principles of formal logic
and set theory. Meanwhile, the ‘intuitionists’ retained the insistence that mathematics
should be directly comprehensible and intuitively grounded in the structures of human
thought, thus rejecting the legitimacy of the more challenging developments of the
period. For this reason, Leopold Kronecker rejected any analysis not reducible to inte-
ger relations, even dismissing irrational numbers as ‘non-existent’, while certain anti-
nomies of set theory were seen by Herman Weyl as a ‘punishment’ for the ‘sin’ of an
overextension of logical principles.25 In direct opposition to the intuitionists, and most
directly influential on Bourbakist thought, David Hilbert’s ‘formalist’ school main-
tained a simultaneous treatment of logic and mathematics whereby the only objects of
mathematical reasoning are its symbols, which have no independent ‘meaning’, with
mathematics thus proceeding solely from axioms, by deductive principles. The axioms
themselves however still remain arbitrary. Thus through the 1920s Hilbert and his stu-
dents attempted a system of ‘metamathematics’, an attempt to found an ‘indubitable’
logic (which in doing so came rather close, ironically, to falling back on intellectual
intuitions for their source). Although this project was effectively killed off by Go¨del
25Ibid., p.1201.
BOURBAKI AND MATHEMATICAL METHOD 104
in 1931, whose ‘incompleteness’ theorems stated that no axiomatic system can prove
its own consistency, formalism would be taken up again by Nicolas Bourbaki in the
1930s.
For some mathematicians, the autonomy of their discipline(s) from directly empir-
ical or intuitive constraints brought a new freedom to their enquiries. Cantor, for ex-
ample, saw mathematics as bound only by its own immanent conceptual reality (rather
than any empirical demands), writing in 1883 that ‘mathematics is entirely free in its
development and its concepts are restricted only by the necessity of being noncon-
tradictory and co-ordinated to concepts previously introduced by precise definitions.
. . . The essence of mathematics lies in its freedom.’26 Similarly (though some four
decades later), Hilbert affirmed his axiomatic method as ‘logically unassailable and at
the same time fruitful; it guarantees thereby complete freedom of investigation.’27
The assertion in these statements of freedom in a conceptual domain of deduc-
tive rigour, resonates of course with a core theme of early twentieth-century avant-
gardes—social, political and individual freedom, and particularly, the possibility of
emancipatory novelty. Cantor’s ‘precise definitions’ and Hilbert’s ‘logical unassail-
ability’ might seem, however, not to allow much scope for the ‘new’ in such terms.
Hilbert—his statement is from a 1922 article—runs counter, in particular, to the con-
current Surrealist rejection of conscious, deductive rationality as the closure of the
emancipatory imagination. Inasmuch as the Oulipo reacted against the irrationalism
of the Surrealists, as I described in chapter 1, it is thus easy to see why Roubaud talks
of Bourbaki (who inherits this formalist mathematical tradition) as the ‘counter-model
26Cantor, cited in ibid., p.1031
27Hilbert, cited in ibid., p.1027.
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to the surrealist group’ for the Oulipo. But ‘logical unassailability’ here must take on
a slightly different flavour.
Evidence of the influence of Hilbert’s formalism on their thinking is found Ray-
mondQueneau’s parodic, and perhaps pataphysical, ‘Foundations of Literature’. Draw-
ing on Hilbert’s alleged reflection that ‘instead of points, straight lines and planes, it
would be perfectly possible to use the words tables, chairs and tankards,’28 Queneau
thus chooses to replace the terms ‘points’, ‘lines’ and ‘planes’, respectively by ‘words’,
‘sentences’ and ‘paragraphs’ and explore the deductive necessities that emerge for lan-
guage and its constructions. The work itself (or its axiomatic grounds) might be de-
scribed as a variety of the Oulipian method of ‘homosyntaxism’; that is, the prescribed
use of an arbitrary text’s syntactic structure in the construction of a new one—and in
this case, since the source text is itself mathematical, the transposition of mathematical
methods works at two levels.29 It at once demonstrates the absurdity of arbitrary for-
malist constructions applied in a semantic domain, while also suggesting provocative
conceptions of linguistic construction in the contortions that thought must go through
in the attempt to justify these axioms. For example: ‘II, 2—If two words are present
in a sentence, there exists at least one other word so situated that the second word
appears between it and the first word,’ which Queneau acknowledges, ‘may occasion
surprise.’ He goes on to posit, ‘following the example of projective geometry, “imagi-
nary words” and “infinitesimal words.”’30 Clearly, mathematicians’ willingness to con-
28Hilbert, quoted (without written source) in Raymond Queneau, ‘The Foundations of Literature,’
in Oulipo Laboratory: Texts from the Bibliothe`que Oulipienne, trans. Harry Mathews (London: Atlas
Press, 1995), p.3. The statement is often attributed to Hilbert, but was most likely spoken rather than
written, as it does not appear to be in any of his published works; other citations do however support the
general idea.
29See Oulipo, Oulipo Compendium, pp.159–60. Here it is described as a ‘method of translation’.
30Queneau, ‘The Foundations of Literature,’ p.13.
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sider as legitimate objects of analysis the imaginary and infinitesimal (we might also
think of imaginary numbers and calculus) is here the object of ‘parody and homage’,
to recall Roubaud’s words. The adaptation here confronts linguistic proprieties and the
implicit demands of theoretical ‘good sense’, and, by introducing a deductive schema
that is not language or literature’s own, with a straight-face, gives an indication of
the peculiar consequences of arbitrary structures that claim universality being taken at
their word.
While the preceding discussion of mathematics has presented the discipline in its
own terms as if it were a largely autonomous development, it is also undoubtedly the
case that mathematical thought has had far-reaching social involvements in modernity.
This is, paradoxically, not unrelated to its claim to self-sufficiency and rigour, which
internal coherence bolsters its role as the privileged language of a scientifically under-
stood modern world. But if mathematics is only considered as a self-contained study
of eternally necessary and consistent forms, this also needs to be questioned more
broadly in terms of the socio-historical and material contingencies of its developmen-
tal context, contingencies which the mathematised understanding may then be seen to
regularise as if its own structures were original rather than derived. The apparently
occluded inversion in this process requires critical interrogation if, as Adorno states,
‘the metaphysics of numbers exemplarily effects the hypostasis of order with which
spirit so thoroughly weaves a cover over dominated things, until it seems as though the
fabric were itself what is concealed.’31 I do not intend to make any positive assertions
about a social determination here for mathematics as such, or any other address to the
fundamental ‘being’ of mathematics: even to take on the question in these latter terms
31Theodor W. Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique (Studies in Husserl and the Phe-
nomenological Antinomies), trans. Willis Domingo (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p.9.
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would be an implicit reinforcement of the uncritical acceptance of a mathematical re-
ality whose essence is somehow to be discovered. It is important instead to see how
mathematics—or rather a certain image of mathematics, or mathematised thought—
figures, in the critical framework of thinkers such as Adorno, as a socio-historically
contingent structure that presents itself as one of eternal veracity. For Adorno, this
thinking has its origins in Greek philosophy, but more recent developments can be
interpreted to follow the same priority of method over matter. The entanglements of
the modern idea of science with capitalist social formation, and with the commodity
form in particular, are also notable. Thus, for examples, Georg Luka´cs argues that the
ideal of natural science, ‘when it is applied to society . . . turns out to be an ideolog-
ical weapon of the bourgeoisie. . . . It must think of capitalism as being predestined
to eternal survival by the eternal laws of nature and reason.’32 It is from within these
conditions of thought that any subversive conception or application of mathematical
reason must respond critically.
In Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, whose dual thesis fa-
mously states that myth is already enlightenment and that enlightenment reverts to
myth, mathematical rationality is the model form of the kind of abstract, instrumen-
talised thought that has come to dominate society. Enlightenment is totalitarian, they
write, because it refuses anything that its own system has not formally pre-figured.
The system of equivalences which, for Horkheimer and Adorno, characterises math-
ematised thought, as it does commodity exchange, is thus the rule of this system of
domination. They write:
32Georg Luka´cs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney
Livingstone (London: Merlin, 1971), pp.10–11.
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When in mathematics the unknown becomes the unknown quantity in an
equation, it is made into something long familiar before any value has
been assigned. Nature . . . is what can be registered mathematically; even
what cannot be assimilated, the insoluble and irrational, is fenced in by
mathematical theorems. In the preemptive identification of the thoroughly
mathematised world with truth, enlightenment believes itself safe from the
return of the mythical. It equates thought with mathematics. The latter is
thereby cut loose, as it were, turned into an absolute authority.33
Doubtless this seems a rather narrow conception of mathematics, but at stake here
is not a positing of mathematics itself as having any particular determination, but rather
a development of thought that is mathematised. (This is, in any case, presented in an
account that is itself something of a mythic narrative.) It is thus reasonable to con-
sider this an image of mathematical thought that is prevalent in modernity’s own self
conception, or more precisely a critical diagnosis of modern thought’s own mistaken
self-conception. What is at stake here is that mathematised thought has itself become
myth, in the terms of Horkheimer and Adorno’s broader thesis: ‘mathematical pro-
cedure became a kind of ritual of thought. Despite its axiomatic self-limitation, it
installed itself as necessary and objective: mathematics made thought into a thing—a
tool, to use its own term.’34 It is arguable in fact that what is subjected to instrumental-
isation here is not just the administration of society, but even a restricted conception of
mathematical activity as pursued by mathematicians—and the latter’s own diversity of
self-conceptions is certainly not uniformly in accord with an idea of mathematics as a
33Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.18.
34Ibid., p.19.
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tool of enlightenment.35
Although Horkheimer and Adorno’s ‘enlightenment’ is an ongoing process—and
they trace it back to Greek thought—a revealing stage in this is associated with the
more common epochal use of the term. That is, in the shift in scientific reasoning
brought about by Galileo, and specifically, in the openings of the mathematisation of
‘nature’. This shift is significant because it marks something of a conceptual revolu-
tion such that it is now virtually impossible to see beyond the framework of thought
that it inaugurated. For Husserl, while ancient Greek thought had idealised mathe-
matical forms, it is only with Descartes that mathematics was addressed to ‘universal
tasks’. Mathematical geometry thus becomes the analytical access to an ‘ideal space’,
to which belongs
. . . a universal, systematically coherent a priori, an infinite, and yet—
in spite of its infinity—self-enclosed, coherent systematic theory which,
proceeding from axiomatic concepts and propositions, permits the deduc-
tively univocal construction of any conceivable shape which can be drawn
in space.36
With Galileo this mathematisation took on the role of the underlying ‘language’
of the natural world. The universal mathematical formulation of the world allows a
regularity of prediction: as Husserl observes, prefiguring Horkheimer and Adorno’s
35Leopold Kronecker, for instance, grounds mathematics in the intuition of integer forms which he
considers ‘the work of God’, rather countering the idea of mathematics as the keystone of enlighten-
ment’s self-narrative of desacralisation. Cited in Kline,Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern
Times, p.1197.
36Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Intro-
duction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1970), p.22.
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thesis, because the underlying form has already been determined, ‘one can “calculate”
with compelling necessity, on the basis of given and measured events involving shapes,
events which are unknown and were never accessible to direct measurement.’37
The method that Galileo pioneered is now the dominant conception of scientific
understanding, but his mathematisation of nature was, in his own period, a remark-
able step. Husserl notes the ‘strangeness of his basic conception in the situation of his
time . . . The whole of infinite nature, taken as a concrete universe of causality—for
this was inherent in that strange conception—became [the object of] a peculiarly ap-
plied mathematics.’38 Husserl recognises here an aspect of modern science, and with
it the modern world-view: the (historical) contingency of this particular form of ra-
tional apprehension. The peculiarity of the application of a mathematical conception
has indeed become second nature and thus no longer peculiar, that is to say it is ‘the
surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substructed world of idealities for the
only real world,’39 but it is, again, a conception that has lost its ‘original’ meaning.40 I
stress the terms ‘peculiar’ and ‘application’ because there is here an intimation of the
critical import of the similarly peculiar application of mathematics to literary process
with the Oulipo, the difference of course being that in the latter case it is visible as
such, with the potential critically to indicate a wider strangeness whose perception has
been lost.
The latter day result of this revolution is, for Husserl, writing of the mathematical
sciences of the later nineteenth century, a ‘positivistic reduction’ and ‘loss of meaning
37Ibid., p.33.
38Ibid., p.37.
39Ibid., pp.48–9.
40‘Here the original thinking that genuinely gives meaning to this technical process and truth to the
correct results . . . is excluded.’ Ibid., p.46.
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for life’, even while he concedes that scientific disciplines are ‘unimpeachable within
the legitimacy of their methodic accomplishments.’41 The crisis, for Husserl is that
positivist science, or rather sciences, have become fragmented and abstracted from
more fundamental or meaningful questions and human values—a ‘world understood
as the universe of mere facts.’42 What are given up are ‘precisely the questions which
man, given over in our unhappy times to the most portentous upheavals, finds the most
burning: questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human
existence.’43 This is to say that the science that is given over to such a mechanistic
conception of ‘facts’ has no awareness of its own development from experiential ‘life-
world’ to ‘second’ nature, and offers no direction for action.
This move towards an instrumentalised worldview, one in which, beyond its prac-
tical and technological achievements, science cannot answer for its own meaning rep-
resents what Max Weber calls the ‘disenchantment of the world’, where tools are used
in ignorance of what they are44 and more fundamental questions of meaning are not
addressed.45 From a sociological perspective, for Weber, this provides the conditions
for capitalist expansion which is ‘essentially dependent on the calculability of the most
important technical factors.’ This may in turn mean that such sciences receive ‘impor-
tant stimulation from these capitalistic interests,’ but for Weber, ‘the origin of Western
41Ibid., p.5.
42Ibid., p.9.
43Ibid., p.6.
44‘It is enough for us to know that we can “count on” the behaviour of the streetcar. We can base
our own behaviour on it. But we have no idea how to build the streetcar so that it will move. The
savage has an incomparably greater knowledge of his tools.’ Max Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation,’ in
The Vocation Lectures, ed. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 2004), p.12.
45Weber here draws on Tolstoy: ‘Science is meaningless because it has no answer to the only ques-
tions that matter to us: “What should we do? How shall we live?”’ Ibid., p.17.
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science cannot be attributed to such interests.’46 That capitalism itself is more funda-
mental to (rather than contingent upon) this condition of modern rationality is proposed
by Luka´cs. He holds that it is precisely the conditions of capitalist domination, and
most specifically the universality of the commodity form, that have led, since the late
eighteenth century, to an abstraction of thought from material reality. For Luka´cs, the
fetishisation of the commodity form is the central determinant in this condition, hidden
behind the ‘veil of reification.’47 Luka´cs here draws on Marx’s concept of fetishisation,
but dates the crisis back to the origins of bourgeois science with Kant’s postulation of
the inaccessible thing-in-itself, an abstraction of the intellectual from material. The
concept of reification—the making of a social relation into an apparently real thing or
attribute—also draws on the work of Georg Simmel, although Luka´cs complains that
the latter’s account is divorced from the ‘real capitalist foundations.’48 What is dom-
inating here is the levelling influence of a calculative rationality, one comprehending
only quantitative rather than qualitative relations, thus:
The distinction between a worker faced with a particular machine, the en-
trepreneur faced with a given type of mechanical development, the tech-
nologist face with the state of science and the profitability of its application
to technology is purely quantitative; it does not directly entail any quali-
tative difference in the structure of consciousness.49
46Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London:
Unwin University Books, 1930), p.24.
47Luka´cs, History and Class Consciousness, p.86.
48Ibid., p.95. Simmel describes the money form as ‘the purest reification of means, a concrete instru-
ment which is absolutely identical with its abstract concept; it is a pure instrument.’ It fosters intellectual
abstraction and quantitative, ‘calculative functions’ of thought, such that the ‘cognitive ideal is to con-
ceive of the world as a huge arithmetical problem, to conceive events and the qualitative distinction of
things as a system of numbers.’ Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans. Tom Bottomore and
David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2011), pp.211,481.
49Luka´cs, History and Class Consciousness, p.98.
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Adorno notes, with regard to Weber’s descriptive sociology, that such abstraction
did not ‘come into being in the head of a sociological theoretician’ but is ‘really the
specific form of the exchange process itself, the underlying social fact through which
socialisation first comes about.’50 This concept of ‘real abstraction’, first systemati-
cally developed by Alfred Sohn-Rethel in the early twentieth century, offers probably
the most strongly materialist derivation of the crisis of modern rationality. Where
Kant sees the ‘fact’ of reason as eternal and necessary (and in the same way the clas-
sical economists, such as Adam Smith, regard the system of bourgeois economics as
descriptive of real and necessary human relations), Sohn-Rethel pursues an epistemo-
logical critique of modern intellectuality and the separation of intellectual and manual
labour.
Sohn-Rethel contends that the ‘exchange relation’ is the primary social fact upon
which the conceptual apparatus of modern society rests. It is the activity of exchange
itself which is the source of the conceptual abstractions of the intellect. This ‘real ab-
straction’ in exchange is, following Marx, precisely opposed to use, since the two are
mutually exclusive at their point of operation: ‘wherever commodity exchange takes
place, it does so in effective “abstraction” from use. This is an abstraction not in mind,
but in fact.’51 Sohn-Rethel here reverses the more usual understanding of abstraction
as a cognitive activity with regard to concrete objects: here the action is abstract, even
while the engaged parties are in fact ignorant, since they are, rather, ‘supposed to be
50‘The abstraction we are concerned with is not one that first came into being in the head of a
sociological theoretician who then offered the somewhat flimsy definition of society which states that
everything relates to everything else. The abstraction in question here is really the specific form of
the exchange process itself, the underlying social fact through which socialisation first comes about.’
TheodorW. Adorno, Introduction to Sociology, ed. Christoph Go¨dde, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2000), p.31.
51Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology, trans. Martin
Sohn-Rethel (London: Macmillan, 1978), p.25.
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occupied with the use of the commodities they see, but occupied in their imaginations
only.’52 As a result of the suspension of any qualitative change in the object that ex-
change presumes, ‘time and space rendered abstract under the impact of commodity
exchange are marked by homogeneity, continuity and emptiness of all natural and ma-
terial content, visible or invisible.’53 Along with this the concepts of motion and matter
become abstract, in abstract time and abstract space. Similarly, the exchange process
mandates the identity of the exchanged entity in a singular world. These conceptual
abstractions derived from the real abstraction of exchange—‘abstract time and abstract
space, abstract matter, quantity as a mathematical abstraction, abstract motion, etc.’—
become the ‘categories of intellectual labour’, the formal conditions of thought, such
that any natural event conforms: ‘all observable phenomena are bound to fit.’54
What is at stake here then, for our critical reading of the Oulipian use of mathe-
matical forms in literary production, is whether the totalising frame of rationality that
militates against the contemplation of its own conditions of possibility can be crit-
ically revealed in its contingency. The mathematical in this is the underlying form
of this calculative reason, the demand for formal equivalence without regard to par-
ticularity of content. Mathematics considered in this sense, that is one of deductive
reason, of pre-formed patterns, is thus the antithesis of any art that claims autonomy
in modern society. Such rational determination would seem to need to be avoided in
the production of the artwork if it is, on the one hand, to produce anything other than
the ever-same, and on the other, to offer any insight into the limitations of this social
condition rather than be yet another product of it.
52Ibid., p.26.
53Ibid., p.48.
54Ibid., p.73.
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Mathematics and Artistic Production
Is there any relationship then that mathematical form can have critically with artistic
production? Is there any mode of artistic production that is mathematically informed
but not dominated? Certainly the loss of meaning engendered by rationalisation and
the attendant domination had, at least by Adorno’s diagnosis in 1958/59, become even
more acute. He writes that ‘both the awareness of a principle that gives meaning to
life in an absolute sense and the concrete hope that people will thus gain control of
themselves have faded to such a degree that substantiality no longer has the power to
carry art as something objectively binding.’ Adorno’s reference point here is the period
of Expressionism, an era in which ‘the horizon of experience was incomparably more
open to the assumption of an aspect of meaning’ than Adorno’s time of writing here
(the late 1950s), such that any similar Expressionistic attempts at this time would be
‘powerless’.55 Could there therefore be an artistic production that uses dominating
form in such a way as to undermine it? These questions are pertinent for Oulipian
method because the Oulipo are, on the face of it, in their practice, adopting forms
in the 1960s that are more usually associated with the instruments of a neutralising
rational order that would seem incompatible with a critically free art. Avant-garde
movements have of course attempted to resist this order, and with it, indeed, the status
of art itself in its claimed social autonomy—Dada and Surrealism most obviously, as
I have described in chapter 1—while other movements or groups such as the Bauhaus
instead pursued an artistic model that, rather than refusing the technological means of
the era, attempted to repurpose them in socially progressive ways. Walter Gropius, for
55Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59, pp.75–6.
BOURBAKI AND MATHEMATICAL METHOD 116
example, declared that the school’s students should be ‘conscious of the age they were
living in’ and trained to design ‘type-forms which would be the direct expression of
that consciousness.’56
In Adorno’s aesthetic theory however, while the social domination of rational form
is to be critically resisted, it is not the case that rational forms are simply the antithesis
of art. Since art bears relations to its conditions of production, those of the abstractions
of modernity will find their manifestation in the modern art work. ‘New art’, Adorno
writes, ‘is as abstract as social relations have in truth become. . . . The spell of exter-
nal reality over its subjects and their reactions has become absolute, the artwork can
only oppose this spell by assimilating itself to it.’57 The modern artwork, for Adorno,
bears a mimetic relation to the abstractions of society, that is to say, in the respect that
it breaks down the subject-object relation to the world by a non-conceptual ‘affinity’,
aspects of that world are incorporated into the work in a way that could not be dis-
cursively conveyed. But the artwork, as a construction, is also the product of rational
construction, that is, something whose end is determined. It thus bears a tension be-
tween its mimetic and rational poles, that which escapes discursive accountability, and
that which can only be discursively accountable since it is the subjective determina-
tion of the work. The danger, from Adorno’s perspective, in overtly mathematising the
work is that this constitutive tension of the artwork, between mimesis and rationality,
is obliterated in the latter’s favour. By this means, the work would have conformed to
the dominant social model of rationality, instrumentalised: in other words, it takes the
56‘The Bauhaus felt it had a double moral responsibility: to make its pupils fully conscious of the
age they were living in; and to train them to turn their native intelligence, and the knowledge they
received, to practical account in the design of type-forms which would be the direct expression of
that consciousness.’ Walter Gropius, The New Architecture and the Bauhaus, trans. P. Morton Shand
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1965), p.89.
57Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.42.
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form of a commodity therefore, the status of which is the obliteration of the work’s
own telos by its total determination from without.
Whatever the potential ‘beauty’ of mathematical form in a work (harmonious pro-
portions for example are a commonplace), for Adorno, any analytically identifiable
mathematical form in the artwork, if it is to retain any hope regarding its autonomous
status, would need to emerge immanently from the material in question (in Adorno’s
terms, a very broad designation58 rather than being ‘pre-given’). To return to a passage
already cited:
. . . on the basis of its formalism, mathematics is itself aconceptual; its
signs are not signs of something, and it no more formulates existential
judgments than does art; its aesthetic quality has often been noted. Of
course, art deceives itself when, encouraged or intimidated by science,
it hypostatises its dimension of logical consistency and directly equates
its own forms with those of mathematics, unconcerned that its forms are
always opposed to those of the latter.’59
By virtue of this mathematisation, all of the questions that the work embodies in
its constitutive tension would be deductively answerable, the work reduced to mere
mechanism. Yet, for Adorno:
The autonomous law of form of artworks protests against logicality even
though logicality itself defines form as a principle. If art had absolutely
58See chapter 4
59Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.188.
BOURBAKI AND MATHEMATICAL METHOD 118
nothing to do with logicality and causality, it would forfeit any relation to
its other and would be an a priori empty activity; if art took them literally,
it would succumb to the spell; only by its double character, which pro-
vokes permanent conflict, does art succeed at escaping the spell by even
the slightest degree.60
It is against this background that, I am arguing, the Oulipo’s adoption of mathemat-
ical structures can usefully be interrogated. How are, for example, the pre-determination
of mathematical functions (‘affine transformations, projective transformations, inverse
transformations’, to take just three from a list of dozens of mathematical structures
proposed by Franc¸ois Le Lionnais61) as productive elements in literary compositional
methods to be understood? Is it the case that the Oulipo’s methods are in some sense
a submission to mechanism, a closure of critical-aesthetic potential, or is it possible
that in some sense this mathematical engagement could itself ‘convict the status quo
of its irrationality and absurdity’?62 And is there an opening onto the possibility of
the new which the formalist conceptions of mathematics, applied to literary method,
might, paradoxically, bring?
To understand what is at stake here, it is necessary to interrogate what kind of math-
ematical model is used by the Oulipo. This is crucial because it is precisely in the fact
of its arbitrariness as a principle, rather than the determination of a desired form that
the work must take as its end, that the introduction of mathematics in Oulipian method
gains its critical significance. To uncover the Oulipo’s mathematical understanding, it
60Ibid., p.190.
61Le Lionnais, ‘Idea Box,’ p.37.
62‘Capitalist society hides and disavows this irrationality [of its aims], and in contrast to this, art rep-
resents truth in a double sense; it maintains the image of its aim, which has been obscured by rationality,
and it convicts the status quo of its irrationality and absurdity.’ Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.73.
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is important then to look at the work of the pseudonymous collective, Nicolas Bour-
baki, an undertaking of formidable mathematical rather than literary formalism that,
nevertheless, is one of the Oulipo’s most important influences.
Nicolas Bourbaki
The Association des collaborateurs de Nicolas Bourbaki were among the most impor-
tant figures in French mathematics of the forties and fifties, the period immediately
prior to the founding of the Oulipo. Both Queneau and Le Lionnais had direct connec-
tions with members of Bourbaki and wrote on their work. Le Lionnais also edited The
Great Currents of Mathematical Thought, originally published in 1948, which con-
tains a number of articles by Bourbaki members and Nicolas Bourbaki ‘himself’, and
is characterised by an ‘implicit Bourbakism’, in the words of Jacques Roubaud.63 Al-
though the Oulipo do not theorise themselves in overtly Bourbakist terms, Roubaud
does note in his autobiographical writings that ‘there can be no doubt that, when
they founded the Oulipo, Queneau and Le Lionnais, amateur mathematicians that they
were, had this group in mind.’64 Le Lionnais’s description of Bourbaki in the introduc-
tion to the Great Currents serves as a useful initial description of the project, which he
describes as ‘the vanguard of present-day mathematics’:
In order to disentangle the meaning of the totality of mathematics, we
addressed ourselves to Nicolas Bourbaki, that many-headed mathemati-
63Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, ed., Great Currents of Mathematical Thought (2 Volumes), trans. Charles
Pinter R. A. Hall Howard G. Bergmann and Helen Kline (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1971). Jacques
Roubaud,Mathematics: (a novel), trans. Ian Monk (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 2012), p.146.
64Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.38. Roubaud also gives a few summary remarks
about the nature of this relationship, to which I will return below.
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cian who has undertaken the reformulation of the exposition of mathemat-
ics from its origins—not historical but logical—and endeavours to recon-
struct it in all its complexity with materials passed through the sieve of
axiomatic critique. Understood thus, mathematics reduces to the study of
very general laws that apply to collections of elements which are no longer
necessarily numbers or points.65
The group was founded in 1934, giving themselves the pseudonym ‘Bourbaki’
(after a French general of the Franco-Prussian war with no apparent mathematical
connection) as an academic hoax, thus inscribing in their name a certain playfulness
and a willingness to posit rather than discover foundations, mirroring their axiomatic
approach: they ‘resolved to establish Bourbaki’s existence irrefutably by publishing
a note under his name.’66 A group of young mathematicians in Paris met to begin a
new project, ‘to define for 25 years the syllabus for the certificate in differential and
integral calculus by writing, collectively, a treatise on analysis. Of course, this treatise
will be as modern as possible.’67 They were initially motivated by their dissatisfaction
with the teaching of mathematics in France at the time, and its reliance on textbooks
65Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, ‘Introduction and Commentary,’ in Great Currents of Mathematical
Thought, Volume I: Mathematics: Concepts and Development, ed. Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, trans. R. A.
Hall (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1971), p.10.
66Andre´ Weil describes a lecture given at the E´cole normale supe´rieure in 1923 by Raoul Husson,
‘a gentle prankster,’ in which he presented an outlandish piece of mathematics as ‘Bourbaki’s theorem’.
Weil and his associates then ‘resolved to establish Bourbaki’s existence irrefutably by publishing a note
under his name in the Comptes-Rendus of the French Academy of Sciences’. Andre´ Weil, The Appren-
ticeship of a Mathematician, trans. Jennifer Gage (Basel: Birkha¨user, 1992), p.101. Claude Chevalley
gives a variant on this story in which Weil uses the name to concoct a citable source for an unidentified
theorem for one of his students. Claude Chevalley, ‘Nicolas Bourbaki, Collective Mathematician: An
Interview with Claude Chevalley by Denis Guedj,’ trans. Jeremy Gray, The Mathematical Intelligencer
7, no. 2 (1985): p.19.
67Andre´ Weil, cited in Liliane Beaulieu, ‘A Parisian Cafe´ and Ten Proto-Bourbaki Meetings (1934–
1935),’ trans. Liliane Beaulieu, The Mathematical Intelligencer 15, no. 1 (1993): p.28. The initial six
were Henri Cartan, Claude Chevalley, Jean Delsarte, Jean Dieudonne´, Rene´ de Possel and Andre´ Weil.
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that they saw as insufficiently rigorous, insufficiently modern. In comparison with
the dynamism of mathematics in Germany, Russia and other places post-World War I,
French mathematics, was, according to Dieudonne´, somewhat staid and insular, a situ-
ation due at least in part to the loss of a (young) generation of French mathematicians
in the recent war.68 The Bourbaki project then quickly developed from the rewriting
of the university syllabus to something larger and more general, ‘a collection of tools,
which should be as powerful and universal as possible.’69 There is, then, an acute
awareness of a need for some kind of mathematical progress in their endeavour. The
claimed intent was to start ‘from scratch’, but their material was necessarily historical,
thus they attempted to lay out the abstract structuring principles that would reformulate
mathematics in its totality, giving a new deductive ‘ground’ to existing mathematics.
In the attempt to establish foundations of the new of mathematics, Bourbaki in
some ways mirrored the avant-garde movements of the same era, a comparison not
in fact alien to Bourbaki (or at least some of the members). Pierre Cartier, one of
Bourbaki’s ‘third generation’, states:
If you put the manifesto of the Surrealists and the introduction of Bourbaki
side by side, as well as other manifestos of the time, they look very similar.
. . . In science, in art, in literature, in politics, economics, social affairs,
there was the same spirit. The stated goal of Bourbaki was to create a new
mathematics. He didn’t cite any other mathematical texts. Bourbaki is
self-sufficient.70
68Jean Dieudonne´, ‘The Work of Nicolas Bourbaki,’ trans. Linda Bennison, The American Mathe-
matical Monthly 77, no. 2 (1970): pp.134–5.
69Beaulieu, ‘A Parisian Cafe´,’ p.33.
70Pierre Cartier, ‘The Continuing Silence of Bourbaki: An Interview with Pierre Cartier, June 18,
1997, by Marjorie Senechal,’ The Mathematical Intelligencer 20, no. 1 (1998): p.27.
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This ‘time’ is, Cartier notes, broadly similar to that of other transformative move-
ments and developments of the twentieth century, or, perhaps the so-called ‘short twen-
tieth century’, from the First World War to the fall of the Soviet Union, which Cartier
affirms as ‘a century of ideology, the ideological age.’71 However, the explicit political
impetus typical of such movements is not a part of their self-theorisation. This—to
take up the concerns of my first chapter—is in contrast to the sometimes tortuous
attempts at a political synthesis in Surrealism by Breton. For example, in 1934, he
affirms that the ‘liberation of man’ is coterminous with the ‘liberation of the mind’,
with the latter the ‘sine qua non’ of the former, even while he maintains the ‘essen-
tial distinction’ of these two spheres of emancipation.72 Thus, ultimately, Breton was
not willing to subordinate imaginative autonomy to the demands of the Communist
party, even while holding on to a vision of their being united. There was, as Jacqueline
Chenieux-Gendron states, an ‘immense confidence placed by Surrealism in the power
of the imagination . . . already working as if in a classless society.’73
Although clearly there is a fundamental opposition between the rational structures
of Bourbakist thought and the a-rationality of Surrealist exploration, Breton’s ambiva-
lences regarding the ‘purity’ of the endeavour are comparable to Bourbaki’s relation-
ship with the ‘applications’ of their axiomatics (in their case most explicitly physics,74
71‘Andre´ Weil was fond of speaking of the Zeitgeist, the spirit of the times. It is no accident that
Bourbaki lasted from the beginning of the thirties to the eighties, while the Soviet system lasted from
1917 to 1989. Andre´ Weil does not like this comparison. He says repeatedly, “I’ve never been a
communist!” There is a joke that the twentieth century lasted from Sarajevo 1914 to Sarajevo 1989.
The twentieth century, from 1917 to 1989, has been a century of ideology, the ideological age.’ Ibid.,
pp.26–7.
72Andre´ Breton, ‘What is Surrealism?’ InWhat is Surrealism? Selected Writings, ed. Franklin Rose-
mont (New York: Pathfinder, 1978), p.172.
73Che´nieux-Gendron, Surrealism, p.158.
74Pierre Cartier describes a ‘bias against physics’ in Bourbaki, reporting a conversation with Andre´
Weil in which the latter professes complete ignorance about the presentation of quantum mechanics in
1926. Cartier, ‘The Continuing Silence of Bourbaki,’ pp.25–6.
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but we can see this as part of a wider social context of wilful isolation). Yet one of the
aims for their project, according to Dieudonne´ at least, is that it should be useful, that
it should ‘gather from the diverse processes used by mathematicians whatever can be
shaped into a coherent theory, logically arranged, easily set forth and easily used.’75
A tension thus emerges here, of demands best served by developments isolated from
those demands. As previously stated, Dieudonne´’s comments are somewhat distant
from the ‘ideals’ of the earlier Bourbaki, but it is possible, in this ambivalence regard-
ing the fundamentals of thought and their practical application, to see why Jacques
Roubaud calls Bourbaki ‘a sort of mathematical surrealism.’76
Another issue of early twentieth-century avant-gardes is their collectivity, the ex-
tent to which the ideology of individual subjectivity is subverted. An obvious feature
of the Bourbaki’s mode of presentation is that it has a singular pseudonym that fronts
a group endeavour, although again this is not overtly political. Their working methods
were rigorously collective, without hierarchies or organisational structures, a context
where mathematics would be worked through—something akin to artisanship—rather
than ‘given’ by a kind of mathematical inspiration, a position which in itself is disrup-
tive of a powerful and well-established preconception about how mathematics is done.
Roubaud states:
Mathematics, more than art in general and especially the arts of language,
is shot through with the doctrine of inspiration. . . . There is still a general
notion that the great ideas and demonstrations that have marked the disci-
75Dieudonne´, ‘The Work of Nicolas Bourbaki,’ p.141.
76Roubaud notes that Bourbaki’s treatise, ‘after an enigmatic first publication in 1939, became a real
model for young French mathematicians only at the end of the 1940s: a sort of mathematical surrealism,
but altogether foreign to literature.’ Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.80.
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pline’s history were not the fruit of labour, but of an indefinable gift and
quality of mind that distinguish such discoverers from we mortals, raising
them to the status of inexplicable phenomena.77
For all that this collective approach was aimed towards a rational re-ordering of
mathematics, however, it does not appear that the working collective itself was partic-
ularly orderly. Take, for example, Dieudonne´’s description: ‘certain foreigners, invited
as spectators to Bourbaki meetings, always come out with the impression that it is gath-
ering of madmen. They could not imagine how these people, shouting—sometimes
three or four at the same time—about mathematics, could ever come up with some-
thing intelligent.’78 Collectivity is, similarly, a feature of Oulipian work, that is the
work on methods as such, as opposed to the individual end-works of their particu-
lar members or whoever chooses to use their devices; however, the impression given
by their comptes rendus suggests something rather more convivial than Dieudonne´’s
description of Bourbaki meetings.79
Over the course of four decades Bourbaki released seven books of the Elements of
Mathematics,80 developing from the core axioms their deductive derivations: Set The-
ory; Algebra; Topology; Functions of One Real Variable; Topological Vector Spaces;
and Integration. Each volume contains the same prefatory remarks with the promise
to ‘take up mathematics at the beginning and give complete proofs.’ They go on to
outline their generalising intent:
77Roubaud,Mathematics, pp.120–1.
78Dieudonne´, ‘The Work of Nicolas Bourbaki,’ pp.141–2.
79See Bens, Gene`se de L’Oulipo.
80In fact, the original French title is E´le´ments de mathe´matique (rather than mathe´matiques). This
singularity of the term is obviously intentional given the unifying aim. See Armand Borel, ‘Twenty-
Five Years with Nicolas Bourbaki, 1949–1973,’ Notices of the American Mathematical Society 45, no.
3 (1998): p.374
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The method of exposition we have chosen is axiomatic and abstract, and
normally proceeds from the general to the particular. This choice has been
dictated by the main purpose of the treatise, which is to provide a solid
foundation for the whole body of modern mathematics.81
Axiomatic thinking in mathematics was hardly new at that time, and foundation-
alist moves were already well-established, especially with Hilbert’s formalist school.
Where Bourbaki innovated (or perhaps better, consolidated) was the development of
a greater generality across the different branches which they would attempt to unify
under the notion of ‘mathematical structure’.
By ‘mathematical structure’ Bourbaki intended a set of basic axiomatic and deduc-
tive rules, and a standard system of notation, that would apply across all branches of
existing mathematics. These rules would not therefore be grounded in (or rendered im-
mediately meaningful by) the elements of any one of the particular branches—numbers
for arithmetic; points, lines or planes in geometry, and so on:
. . . the axiomatic method allows us, when we are concerned with complex
mathematical objects, to separate their properties and regroup them around
a small number of concepts: that is to say . . . to classify them according
to the structures to which they belong.82
Structure here does bear a resemblance to the ‘deep structures’ of structuralism
(which I discuss in the next chapter), but it is not the same in its genesis—and indeed,
81Nicolas Bourbaki, Elements of Mathematics: Theory of Sets (Paris: Hermann, 1968), p.v.
82Ibid., p.9.
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not the same in its structure, as I will describe below. It is, for Bourbaki, what underlies
any mathematical thought, more deeply than the surface level appearances of it. The
idea is fundamental to mathematical generality, even in its simplest form; for example
that arithmetic is not bound by particular discrete objects, but by an abstract concept
of quantitative equivalence.83 There is thus an efficiency—an elegance, as mathemati-
cians would consider it—to thinking in structures, and typically mathematical analysis
or deduction aims to reduce things to the simplest terms possible. Bourbaki’s ‘innova-
tion’ was to universalise such structures in mathematics, to find, or rather, to posit its
irreducible forms.84
Bourbaki’s structures are inevitably very abstract, and in the manner of the formal-
ist school, are constructed without any regard for the ‘meaning’ of their terms. Such
thinking proceeds with ‘pure symbols’, having no inherent significance. The only
guarantor of the correctness of reasoning in this way is in accordance with the deduc-
tive principles that relate the terms, rather than any inherent comprehensibility. There
are, as Queneau points out, certain gains in such thought: ‘Ce qu’on perd en “intuition”
on le gagne en efficacite´.’85 [‘What is lost in “intuition” is gained in effectiveness.’.]
It is in this way that, for example, the difficulty of conceptualising calculations with
83Dieudonne´ notes, ‘we do not (fortunately!) have to learn a special arithmetic for thermometers
and another for books.’ Cited in J. Fang, Bourbaki: Towards a Philosophy of Modern Mathematics I
(Hauppauge, N.Y: Paideia, 1970), p.77.
84This ‘simplification’ does not render the work easy. Queneau notes, ‘La lecture des Ele´ments,
dit le prospectus, “ne suppose (. . .) en principle, aucune connaissance mathe´matique particulie`re, mais
seulement une certaine habitude du raisonnement mathe´matique et un certain pouvoir d’abstraction”.
Naturellement, il ne faut pas prendre cette phrase trop au pied de la lettre; et le “certain” peut eˆtre
qualifie´ de litote.’ Raymond Queneau, ‘Bourbaki et les mathe´matiques de demain,’ in Bords (Paris:
Hermann, 1963), p.14. [‘The reading of the Elements, says the prospectus, “does not assume . . . in
principle, any particular mathematical knowledge, but only a certain familiarity with mathematical
reasoning and a certain capacity for abstraction”. Naturally, one should not take this sentence too
literally; and the “certain” can be considered an understatement.’]
85Ibid., p.22.
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infinity vanishes if, as Jean Dieudonne´ states, ‘it is needless for a proposition to evoke
any other mental image than the perception of the symbols used to write it.’86 Bourbaki
tells us:
It is now possible to indicate in a general way what should be understood
by a mathematical structure. The common trait of the various notions des-
ignated by this generic name is that they apply to sets of elements whose
nature is not specified; in order to define a structure one or several rela-
tions involving these elements are given (in the case of groups it is the
relation z = x τ y involving any three elements); it is then postulated that
the given relations satisfy certain conditions (which are enumerated) and
which are the axioms of the structure envisaged. To study the axiomatic
theory of a given structure is to deduce the logical consequences of the
axioms of the structure, while excluding all other hypotheses about the el-
ements considered (in particular, any hypothesis concerning their special
‘nature’).87
Clearly this positing of constitutively meaningless structure is the very epitome of
the malady identified by Husserl and other theorists, as set out earlier in this chapter.
That there should be an underlying structure indifferent to its application, one whose
posited universality makes it impossible to discard on the grounds of the shortfall of
any inherent meaning rather than coherence, is just the kind of totalising vision that
86Jean Dieudonne´, ‘Modern Axiomatic Methods and the Foundations of Mathematics,’ in Great
Currents of Mathematical Thought, Volume II: Mathematics in the Arts and Sciences, ed. Franc¸ois Le
Lionnais, trans. Helen Kline (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1971), p.260.
87Nicolas Bourbaki, ‘The Architecture of Mathematics,’ inGreat Currents of Mathematical Thought,
Volume I: Mathematics: Concepts and Development, ed. Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, trans. R. A. Hall (Mine-
ola: Dover Publications, 1971), pp.28–9.
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reduces the world to mechanism, albeit one that its effective. This tendency is also
present in the scientific aspirations of structuralism, but there is perhaps nothing quite
so abstractly formal as the pure quantitative equivalence of this highly refined math-
ematics, and thus—from the perspective of the Oulipo’s adoption of it as a model—
nothing quite so antithetical to socially critical art.
Despite the term then, and conflations in some accounts of Bourbaki, these ‘struc-
tures’ do not appear to have a genetic link with structuralism as it is commonly un-
derstood in the ‘human sciences’, the origins of which are generally traced back to
Saussure and the Russian formalists. Structural linguistics relies on the assertion that
language could be explained functionally as a synchronic system of internal relations,
divorced from its historical development and with only an arbitrary relation between
its conceptual and signifying planes, thereby freed from the messiness of actual socio-
historical relations. The description of language as a system—la langue—independent
of its practice—la parole—moves to formulate it as a rigorously structured and for-
mally definable object of science. In this sense, it is not hard to see parallels with
the formalist tendencies in the mathematics of the same period. But beyond asserting
some kind of Zeitgeist,88 it would remain for those who wish to assert positively a
direct connection between linguistic and mathematical structuralism to justify such a
notion.
The two ‘structuralisms’, in their immanent development, have no identifiable
shared source, and while linguistic structuralism spread across the humanities and
88As, broadly speaking, does David Aubin in his essay, David Aubin, ‘The Withering Immortality
of Nicolas Bourbaki: A Cultural Connection at the Confluence of Mathematics, Structuralism, and the
Oulipo in France,’ Science in Context 10, no. 2 (1997): 297–342. He coins the term ‘cultural connector’
to describe the role of Bourbaki in this.
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social sciences, if anything this may be seen as a tendential attempt at mathemati-
cal rigour in these domains, a ‘small door’ opened to the ‘world of the natural and
exact sciences as a kind of paradise’, as Le´vi-Strauss puts it, fostered primarily by
linguistics, rather than a direct source in mathematics or its own notion of structure.89
Nor do mathematical structures appear in any way to be an offshoot of the Saussurean
paradigm or its developments. Indeed, the notion of mathematical structure can be
traced back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the development of ‘al-
gebraic structures’.90 The idea expands to other areas of mathematics but, prior to
Bourbaki, as Leo Corry observes, it ‘belongs to the corpus of tacit knowledge shared
by mathematicians in their day-to-day work without, however, being part of any spe-
cific formal mathematical theory.’91 Bourbaki’s project then makes mathematics more
scientific, by means of its own tools, which is, similarly, an Oulipian intention—as Le
Lionnais states, ‘that which certain writers have introduced with talent . . . the Oulipo
intends to do systematically’92—although in the latter case, were its end reached it
would be its dissolution.
89‘For centuries the humanities and the social sciences have resigned themselves to contemplating
the world of the natural and exact sciences as a kind of paradise which they will never enter. And all of a
sudden there is a small door which is being opened between the two fields, and it is linguistics which has
done it.’ Claude Le´vi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest
Schoepf (NewYork: Basic Books, 1963), p.70. Also, the mathematician Jean-Michel Kantor reports that
Le´vi-Strauss stated in a letter to him: ‘ne croyez pas un instant que Bourbaki m’ait emprunte´ le terme
“structure” ou le contraire, il me vient de la linguistique et plus pre´cise´ment de l’Ecole de Prague.’
Jean-Michel Kantor, ‘Letter to the Editor,’ The Mathematical Intelligencer 33, no. 1 (2011): p.1. [‘Do
not believe for one minute that Bourbaki borrowed the word “structure” from me, or the contrary; it
came to me from linguistics, more precisely, from the School of Prague.’]. The term ‘structuralism’ is
generally agreed to have been coined by Roman Jakobson in 1929.
90This received a comprehensive treatment in 1930 by B. L. van der Waerden (Modern Algebra),
though without an explicit definition of ‘structure’.
91Leo Corry, ‘Nicolas Bourbaki and the Concept of Mathematical Structure,’ Synthese 92, no. 3
(1992): pp.316–7.
92Le Lionnais, ‘Lipo (First Manifesto),’ p.xix.
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One rare instance of the confluence of these two structuralisms however is found
in the Bourbakist Andre´ Weil’s mathematical appendix to Le´vi-Strauss’s Elementary
Structures of Kinship, in which the former proposes ‘to show how a certain type of
marriage laws can be interpreted algebraically, and how algebra and the theory of
groups of substitutions can facilitate its study and classification.’93 It was Le´vi-Strauss
who requested this particular algebraic interpretation of his system, believing that the
structural complexity mandated a mathematical treatment, and Weil was happy to en-
gage with this, not on the understanding that marriage had any inherent mathematical
significance, but precisely on the understanding that it was best considered in purely
relational terms—in this case the question being the relations betweenmarriages rather
than marriages as relationships. Thus the substantive ‘object’ drops out of the analy-
sis.94
But while there may have been agreement between Le´vi-Strauss and Weil on this
point, the nature of their respective ‘structuralisms’ was not thereby rendered identi-
cal. As Aubin states, ‘while Bourbaki imposed systemic structures onto sets of un-
specified elements Le´vi-Strauss emphasized the irreducible relations linking elements
together.’95 Any ‘elements’ of structures in the linguistic tradition are always related
93Andre´ Weil, ‘On the Algebraic Study of Certain Types of Marriage Laws (Murngin System),’ in
The Elementary Structures of Kinship, ed. Rodney Needham, trans. James Harle Bell and John Richard
von Sturmer (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1969), p.221.
94Le´vi-Strauss recalls: ‘I was working on problems of Australian kinship so complex that I thought it
would take a mathematician to solve them. I looked up Hadamard, who was also a refugee in the United
states—he was already quite old, but a famous mathematician. I posed the problem to him, and . . .
he said that mathematicians know only the four operations and marriage could not be included among
any of them. Still pursuing the matter I met Andre´ Weil, another refugee. I told him about my visit to
Hadamard. His reaction was completely different. There is no need, he said to define marriage from a
mathematical standpoint. Only relations between marriages are of interest. I gave him the data for the
problem and he produced the analysis.’ Claude Le´vi-Strauss, Conversations with Claude Le´vi-Strauss
by Didier Eribon, trans. Paula Wissing (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp.52–3.
95Aubin, ‘The Withering Immortality of Nicolas Bourbaki,’ p.311.
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to the totality of the relations of the system, and determined by those relations, such
that ‘any modification of one of them entails a modification of all others.’96 Bourbak-
ist structures on the other hand begin with axioms, defined abstractly, which are then
supposed to be universally applicable in deductive terms. In linguistic structuralism
(and its derivations), structures are interpreted from manifest content of the domain,
whereas in mathematical structuralism, given the posited axioms, the totality of its
possible manifestations is logically derived from the structures. Bourbakist structur-
ing is a one-way operation then, its structures are more akin to a set of tools, and its
operation is not so much a descriptive science aiming at the ‘truth’ of mathematics, but
a productive framework for mathematical innovation.
In addition to the difference in the nature of relationality, is also worth noting that
mathematical structuralism does not face many of the complexities that are found in
structuralist thought in the linguistic mould, precisely because mathematics is not a
language in the same way as a so-called ‘natural language’. There is no inherent am-
biguity, no polysemy, no metaphor in the mathematical sign (not, at least, in its strictly
mathematical adoption)—this, after all, is why it is the aspirational form of scientific
rigour more generally. It is also, in part at least, why mathematics is not generally
considered literary. As Art Berman puts it, ‘mathematics is to be a language (or, more
precisely, is to be used as a language) with no errors of correspondence to real rela-
tions, errors with which ordinary language is replete. . . . Mathematics presumably can
eliminate this confusion between the lexicon of things and the lexicon of desires. This
is the confusion that makes art and literature possible.’97 The standard Saussurean
separation of synchronic linguistics from diachronic, in order to promote its formal
96Le´vi-Strauss, cited in ibid., p.310.
97Art Berman, Preface to Modernism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), pp.134–5.
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rigour, is wholly uncontroversial in mathematical practice—mathematics could, per-
haps should, be considered historically, but its functioning is not primarily described
in such terms. Indeed its standard of ‘truth’ is effectively synchronic, that is, a question
of systemic coherence. Similarly the mathematical sign is not obviously separable into
signifie´ and signifiant. All of which would seem to suggest that mathematics is not so
readily described semiologically.
For all the formalism of his approach, and the tendential development of semiology
as in some sense a mathematisation of language, Saussure does not explicitly seem to
have addressed the question of mathematics itself as semiological.98 Louis Hjelmslev,
in his even more strongly formalistic account of structural linguistics, proposes that
the particular science of linguistics should be ‘an algebra of language.’99 He notes
that language and mathematics are similarly analysable, but the question of whether
mathematics is semiological would be answered by determining if it is ‘biplanar’ in
the way that language is; that is to say, an ‘exhaustive description’ of language in fact
‘necessitates operating with two planes.’100 Hjelmslev stops short, however, of mak-
ing a substantive declaration regarding the semiological status of mathematics, and
considers the possibility that it may be better described as a symbolic system (and
here, contrary to Saussure, he does not restrict ‘symbolic’ to non-arbitrary entities).
That is to say its content and expression plane (or signified and signifier in Saussurean
98Saussure writes in his notes for the Cours, ‘Eventually, and we are quite aware of the implications
of this statement, it will be accepted that it is in the intrinsic nature of language that its elements and
the relationships between them can, as a matter of course, be expressed by mathematical formulae.’
Ferdinand de Saussure, Writings in General Linguistics, ed. Simon Bouquet and Rudolf Engler, trans.
Carol Sanders and Matthew Pires (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 143.
99‘Such a science [linguistics] would be an algebra of language, operating with unnamed entities,
i.e. arbitrarily named entities without natural designation, which would receive a motivated designation
only on being confronted with the substance.’ Louis Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language,
trans. Francis J. Whitfield (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), p.79.
100Ibid., p.112.
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terminology) are one, or that there is no analytic requirement to distinguish them. Fol-
lowing Hjelmslev’s logic, it seems entirely plausible to state that mathematical entities
are ‘isomorphic with their interpretation,’101 not least because this unambiguousness
of mathematics is precisely the feature for which it is valued as an exact science. The
upshot of this, for an Oulipian adoption of mathematical rather than linguistic struc-
turalism, is that the structure in question stems from a domain where the content plane
definitively is not at issue, and thus further divorced from forms that might conven-
tionally be proper to language and literary composition.
For all that it is named as the central concept of the Bourbakist approach, it is, how-
ever, not clear that ‘structure’ in its fully formal definition actually fulfils the claims
made for it by Bourbaki (or by its commentators). Bourbaki do give formal defini-
tions of the main ‘mother structures’ of mathematics in Chapter IV of the Theory of
Sets, but, as Leo Corry argues, there remains a gap between the ‘image’ of these as
fundamental structures and the way in which they are developed, such that the con-
cept of structure ‘has no real mathematical use in the rest of Bourbaki’s work.’102 The
structural approach, for Corry, ‘fails to simplify proofs and . . . ultimately does little
more than introduce extraneous terminology.’103 Bourbaki is not here damned by Corry
as irrelevant or fundamentally flawed exactly, but he notes that their influence in the
practice of actual mathematics is a little different to the more widely received image
of absolute rigour and mathematical totalisation.104
101Ibid., p.113.
102Corry, ‘Nicolas Bourbaki and the Concept of Mathematical Structure,’ p.326.
103Ibid., p.338.
104It is interesting in this regard that the formal rigour attributed to Bourbaki in the few brief remarks
in the hyper-structuralist Cahiers pour l’analyse, whose authors themselves are aiming at the most
rigorous treatment of structure (but whose immediate sources are Le´vi-Strauss, Lacan and Althusser),
are perhaps ill-founded. In fact there appears to be very little substantive engagement with Bourbakist
ideas in the Cahiers, though this is hardly damning since their theoretical developments are not made to
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Corry argues that the centrality of ‘structure’ to Bourbaki may be misattributed
(and indeed self-misattributed), but this is not necessarily the same as a wider criticism
of their lack of an absolute ground for their axioms. Such criticismwould itself suggest
a reading more insistent on totality (or its possibility) than the intentions of Bourbaki.
Later claims from Bourbakists suggest that from the start, they did not aim to reproduce
the ‘metamathematics’ of Hilbert, that is, the attempted logical proof of the system’s
consistency, the very possibility of which had been fairly conclusively dismissed by
Go¨del in any case. Dieudonne´ notes that Bourbaki’s methods are not those of Hilbert
and that we can ‘give no other reason for our belief [in the consistency of mathematics]
than the fact that up to now the sun has risen every morning, and the same argument
applies to the consistency of mathematics.’105 Bourbaki thus claims only ‘naive’ status
for their theory: ‘we take the “naive” viewpoint and do not approach the troublesome
questions, half philosophic, half mathematical, raised by the “nature” of mathematical
“entities” or “objects”.’106 The term ‘naive’ typically refers to set theory that is non-
formalised, that is given in natural language (and that is thus not subject to Go¨del’s
aporetic diagnosis). However, despite their claim to avoid ‘troublesome questions’,
Jacques Roubaud observes that, in The Architecture of Mathematics, Bourbaki ‘wields
philosophical bludgeons’. Thus he contends that Bourbaki did better by ‘remaining
resolutely “technical”’ in order to escape ‘the most flagrant metaphysical snares.’107
For Roubaud at least, Bourbaki were better simply to proceed with their project, albeit
with great ambition, rather than laying out in advance its meaning, in the sense of a
metamathematical justification. That is, in other words, to proceed in the manner of
depend upon such an engagement.
105Dieudonne´, ‘Modern Axiomatic Methods,’ p.264.
106Bourbaki, ‘The Architecture of Mathematics,’ p.28.
107‘In [The Architecture of Mathematics], Bourbaki calmly wields philosophical bludgeons of quite
Neanderthal proportions, in contrast with his usual snake-like prudence.’ Roubaud,Mathematics, p.144.
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Diogenes in his ‘proof’ of motion (which is to say, by walking): ‘on these foundations,
I state that I can build up the whole of the mathematics of the present day; and, if there
is anything original in my procedure, it lies solely in the fact that, instead of being
content with such a statement, I proceed to prove it in the same way as Diogenes
proved the existence of motion; and my proof will become more and more complete
as my treatise grows.’108
Bourbaki’s ‘rigour’ then, is not quite as strong as the idea of their rigour, which
is best sustained—according to Roubaud at least—by their own avoidance of self-
theorisation, a situation which bears some obvious relations with the theoretical diffi-
dence of the Oulipo. Compare for example, Queneau’s own statement—which picks
up on the Diogenes reference—that ‘our research is . . . naive: I use the word “naive”
in its perimathematical sense, as one speaks of the naive theory of sets. We forge ahead
without undue refinement. We try to prove motion by walking.’109
Despite the early ambition of Bourbaki to reinvent mathematics in a culture that
was not sufficiently modern, a certain ambivalence emerged regarding the new, that
is, whether Bourbaki ever really attempted to innovate, if they only sought to prepare
the ground or if, even, at some level they actually inhibited the new. Dieudonne´ states
bluntly, in 1968, that ‘Bourbaki does not attempt to innovate mathematics,’ and even
more starkly that ‘Bourbaki does not touch living mathematics.’110 Similarly, Cather-
ine Chevalley, the daughter of Claude, another of the Bourbaki founders, reflected
that ‘the way my father worked, it seems that . . . what counted most [was the] pro-
108Nicolas Bourbaki, ‘Foundations of Mathematics for the Working Mathematician,’ The Journal of
Symbolic Logic 14, no. 1 (1949): p.8.
109Queneau, ‘Potential Literature,’ p.51.
110Dieudonne´, ‘The Work of Nicolas Bourbaki,’ p.138, 145.
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duction of an object which then became inert—dead, really. It was no longer to be
altered or transformed.’111 Yet Dieudonne´ ‘completely fails to understand’ the accusa-
tion of Bourbaki ‘sterilising mathematical research.’112 Dieudonne´ thus contends that
the accusation is based on a misapprehension of the nature of Bourbaki’s activities.
For Dieudonne´, the work of Bourbaki was always preparatory: ‘here is my picture of
mathematics now. It is a ball of wool, a tangled hank where all mathematics reacts one
upon another in an almost unpredictable way.’ The task of Bourbaki is, then, to cut
the threads and rearrange them.113 Bourbaki addresses not the ‘ends’ of mathematics,
not the mathematically ‘new’ as such, but instead provides a tool for the pursuit of
such ends, a universal tool, such that all branches of mathematics would be unified in
this structure, but also that it would be usable in ‘the greatest number of mathematical
places.’114
This defence of Bourbakist reticence towards innovation is, however, made some
time after Bourbaki’s main period of activity from the thirties to the fifties—Bourbaki
had ‘reached his dotage after 1968’, as Roubaud notes—and can perhaps thus be taken
as a post-facto defence of their failure to fulfil the ‘immensity of its ambition (it failed)
(it was destined to fail),’115 in Roubaud’s words. He continues to describe how the
Elements of Mathematics, in its successive volumes aimed to
. . . position the foundations of . . . ‘fundamental structures’, on which are
based (will be based, would be based) the sequel, the mythical ‘second
111Catherine Chevalley, cited in Cartier, ‘The Continuing Silence of Bourbaki,’ p.26
112Dieudonne´, ‘The Work of Nicolas Bourbaki,’ p.144.
113Ibid., p.140. See also Claude Chevalley’s remarks on ‘bourbakisation’ on p.139 below.
114‘The idea which soon became dominant is that the work had to be primarily a tool. It had to be
something usable not only in a small part of mathematics, but also in the greatest number of mathemat-
ical places.’ Ibid., p.138.
115Roubaud,Mathematics, p.73.
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part’, in which genuine mathematics . . . would at last reveal itself in all its
splendour, illuminated by the author’s initial intention. . . . After the fact,
this can be considered as a cathedral, immediately engulfed, left incom-
plete and in ruins.116
The reasons for this failure are manifested in their ‘perpetually rewriting, cease-
lessly refashioning chapters that are already finished,’ according to Roubaud, but a
more fundamental impossibility seems also to be suggested here, that the settling of
mathematical grounds that were adequately foundational was, from the start, a some-
what quixotic undertaking. Nonetheless, Roubaud takes Bourbaki, and its failing, as
the model for his own seven-volume Great Fire of London project, inasmuch as the
acknowledgement of its impossibility—as a memory project—is written into its own
foundations. It is of course readable in the Oulipian concept of potential, as the pur-
suit of something whose actualisation, by definition of the scope, is held at a dis-
tance. What, for Bourbaki, was an unfulfilled ambition, becomes, for the Oulipo, a
decided limitation. That is, ‘true’ foundations are not pursued; instead arbitrary ones
are posited (as constraints), but if there is a notion of ‘genuine literature’, akin to
Roubaud’s characterisation of Bourbaki’s ultimate ambition to reveal ‘genuine mathe-
matics’, this is for others, Oulipians or otherwise, to pursue.
Bourbaki’s work, beyond its own unfulfilled intentions, was ultimately overtaken
by developments in wider mathematics; a more organic approach, often drawing on
the interfaces with physics, biology and other sciences, was gaining in influence in
the 1970s. In particular, catastrophe theory and fractal geometry emerged, drawing
116Jacques Roubaud, The Great Fire of London: A Story with Interpolations and Bifurcations, trans.
Dominic Di Bernardi (Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 1992), p.241.
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on, and better able to describe, complex patterns in nature that older geometric ab-
stractions struggled with. Even twenty years prior, however, in the early fifties, it was
becoming clear that Bourbaki’s chosen foundation of set theory would be better re-
placed by another contender for axiomatic status, category theory, which was simpler
and more agile. Bourbaki however was reluctant to acknowledge this, even though
certain aspects of category theory had already been developed by them. By this point
then, Bourbaki was engaged in a defensive exercise and with the publication of Theory
of Sets in 1957, they had stopped referring to ‘fundamental structures’, a key under-
pinning of the coherence of their whole project. In terms of mathematical innovation,
Bourbaki’s consolidation of mathematical structures led to their own project’s ossifica-
tion, even while their method was productive outside of it. Yet their image of rigour, as
Corry puts it, has remained potent. Bourbaki projected a re-invention of mathematics,
but a re-invention such that it would not discard the state of mathematics, but rather
re-interpret its foundational structures. They maintained, effectively a faith in the pos-
sibility, ‘on the horizon’, of the ‘complete formalisation’ of mathematics.117 With this
method, with the boundary always in sight, the possibility of the radically new, the
rationally unthinkable new, is outside the scope of the Bourbaki project itself. Yet in
their claim to re-found the field, to revolutionise mathematics, there is something more
at stake than simply consolidating the existing. There is the expectation that through a
properly mathematical consolidation, something beyond that consolidation might yet
be fostered, the mathematical new in potential, and in method.
117‘Written in accordance with the axiomatic method, and keeping always in view, as it were on the
horizon, the possibility of a complete formalisation, our series lays claim to perfect rigour.’ Bourbaki,
Theory of Sets, p.12.
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Oulipian Bourbakisation
As Roubaud insists, Bourbaki can be taken as the counter-model to Surrealism for the
Oulipo,118 and the sympathies seem clear enough: the conscious, rational development
proposed by Bourbaki as opposed to the unconscious, a-rational exploration of the Sur-
realists. But, as Roubaud also states, Bourbaki’s formalist mathematics is ‘altogether
foreign to literature.’119 Admittedly, in Queneau’s declaration, the Oulipo is ‘not a lit-
erary school’,120 but there is undoubtedly a connection to literary production (however
undefined its end may be) and thus something intriguing about Roubaud’s observation
of the incongruousness of the mathematical model.
The Oulipo would appear to take seriously the concept, described by Claude Cheval-
ley, of ‘Bourbakisation’, a process that aims to take ‘a text that one considers screwed
up and to arrange it and improve it’121—that is, the introduction of mathematically rig-
orous order into any given domain—and yet it is by no means obvious that the specif-
ically literary text would be ‘improved’ by this (in any case, the ‘text’ in question in
Chevalley’s statement I take to be a more general notion of texte as a piece of work, a
construction). It is the very perversity of this application that renders it interesting, not
118‘It so happened that shortly after the creation of Surrealism, France witnessed the birth—this time
in the domain of mathematics—of another avant-garde group called Bourbaki. There can be no doubt
that, when they founded the Oulipo, Queneau and Le Lionnais, amateur mathematicians that they were,
had this group in mind. . . . When the Oulipo was conceived, Bourbaki provided a counter-model to the
Surrealist group.’ Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.38.
119Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.80.
120Queneau, ‘Potential Literature,’ p.51.
121‘There is a word which was—which still is—in current usage, to bourbakise (bourbachiser). This
means to take a text that one considers screwed up and to arrange it and improve it. It’s more than just
to improve; it’s to treat it according to the norms which Bourbaki wanted to introduce in mathematics,
essentially the theory of sets and the notion of structure. It is the notion of structure which is truly
bourbakique.’ Chevalley, ‘Interview,’ p.20.
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directly in literary terms—that is to say, not in accordance with the values normally
attached to literature, poetry, or other ‘creative’ writing—but precisely in the methods
themselves. There is therefore a similarity of method, not of course in the domain of
application, but in the positing of axioms (constraints). And it is at this point that the
amalgamation of mathematics and literature can best be critically interpreted, rather
than in directly assessing mathematical structures in literary works—their attendant
aesthetic judgements in terms of mathematical proportion (as in classical aesthetics),
pattern or form. All of which is not to say that such values or assessments may not
be found in Oulipian works, but that this is not the locus of critical interest, as I ap-
proach it at least, in the Oulipian method as such. In ‘modernist’ terms, the Oulipo are
certainly interested in the new in literature, but in a slightly distanced way: the new in
potential, rather than the actual new of literary product. Rather than determining what
this new should be in terms of the form, or social responsiveness of works themselves,
they instead offer the methodologically new, whose results are kept at arm’s length.
This mirrors Bourbaki’s insistence (and that of mathematics more broadly) on their
independence from pragmatic application in their formal genesis. It also mirrors the
mathematical interest, in general, in the process rather than the result of calculation:
the proof rather than the postulate.
If it is true that, as Jacques Roubaud notes, ‘seen from inside literature, nothing
looks more artificial than mathematics,’122 it is primarily in terms of the method of
production involved, though of course the place of literature (or art) and mathematics
socially is different in substance as well. Thus, to return to Roubaud’s own axiomatic
descriptions of Oulipian practice given at the start of this chapter, such texts become
122Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.41.
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the ‘literary consequences of these axioms, according to the rules of deduction.’123 It
is of course not clear that this axiomatic re-structuring is even possible in the field of
literary production, as Roubaud also acknowledges: ‘undoubtedly this is only an ideal
situation.’124 The reasons for this are twofold: first, that ‘the domain of the formula-
tion of constraints’—that is to say language, from the level of letter to paragraph and
beyond—and certain of the quasi-mathematical operations of displacement, substitu-
tion, addition, subtraction, and so on—which are laid out in Queneau’s ‘Queneleyev’
table125—are ‘strongly unhomogeneous’, which is to say they are not inscribable in
a universal structure in the manner of Bourbaki’s axiomatics in set theory. Secondly,
there is the basic question of deduction. ‘What is an Oulipian demonstration?’ asks
Roubaud. There is, in literary composition, no clear resolution with the same analytic
structural coherence as mathematics. Thus, Roubaud admits:
One may think that a text composed according to a given constraint (or
several constraints) will be the equivalent of a theorem. It is a fairly in-
teresting hypothesis. It is nonetheless true that the foreseeable means of
passage from the statement of the constraint to its ‘consequences,’ the
texts, remain in a profound metaphorical vagueness.126
It is thus an ironic rigour that sees the transportation of mathematical structures
to literary composition. Of course the disparity between mathematical structure and
123Ibid., p.41.
124Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.89.
125 Raymond Queneau, ‘Classification des travaux de l’OuLiPo,’ in Atlas de litte´rature potentielle
(Paris: Gallimard, folio essais, 1981). As with ‘Mendeleev’, alternate spellings also occur, such as
‘Quenelejeff’. See also Marcel Be´nabou’s expanded version of the ‘Table of Elementary Linguistic
and Literary Operations’ in Marcel Be´nabou, ‘Rule and Constraint,’ in Oulipo: A Primer of Potential
Literature, ed. and trans. Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998), pp.44–5.
126Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.89.
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literary composition, and in particular the deductive form, as I propose it here, is not
equally strong or evident in every Oulipian method. But even in Oulipian work that
is ostensibly the most amenable to deductive form within the work, that of detective
fiction—and this is a domain of some interest to the Oulipo, such that there is an
offshoot dedicated to the genre, the Oulipopo (Ouvroir de litte´rature policie`re poten-
tielle)—the mathematisation of it tends towards something perverse that might destroy
the work. Specifically in the case of detective fiction, this risk would be that if the work
could be mathematically deduced it would seem to render a contentful reading of the
work redundant. A work that plays with this tension is Claude Berge’s Who Killed
the Duke of Densmore?, a murder mystery in which the solution is ‘mathematically
accessible’.127
The Oulipian adoption of Bourbakist mathematics in 1960 took place at a time
when the latter would soon be rendered outdated by its own rigidities, as acknowl-
edged by Roubaud: an ‘essential trait’ of Bourbaki was the attempt ‘to build the house
of mathematics according to an architecture of “structures”. This trait brought with it
not only greatness but failure; for its choice of a “foundation”—set theory—became
obsolete at the very moment when the undertaking was reaching maturity.’128 Else-
where Roubaud notes the quick decline of Bourbakist vitality from the ‘vibrancy’ of
the mid-fifties, to weariness in the mid-sixties.129 The Oulipo’s Bourbakist enterprise
thus has a rising trajectory just as Bourbaki’s own is falling. But if Bourbaki’s failure
was the direct result of the success of its own rigour, the Oulipo, according to Roubaud,
127Claude Berge, ‘Who Killed the Duke of Densmore?’ In Oulipo Laboratory: Texts from the Bib-
liothe`que Oulipienne, trans. Iain White (London: Atlas Press, 1995).
128Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.42.
129‘ “He” was already decidedly weary when I had the opportunity to approach him, albeit in rather
a roundabout way, circa 1965. . . . But in 1954 he was still vibrant, forceful, conquering, full of ardour
and ambition.’ Roubaud,Mathematics, p.73.
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‘avoided making this mistake. It never sought to establish an overview of constraints
or to organise them according to the hidden parameters of a literary theory.’130 Thus,
again, there is a step back from the full consequences of the non-formalisable as-
pects of their proposal. Yet, despite Roubaud’s confidence in the continuity thereby
achieved, the Oulipo cannot avoid the contradictions inherent in this scheme simply
by refusing theorisation, and in fact it is these contradictions that are vital to what is
critically interesting in their work in any case. The application from outside, the lack of
immanence of mathematical method to literature, is a central peculiarity in the Oulip-
ian project. This artificiality or incongruousness is not to be homogenised (or is best
when it is not), and it is more than a ‘metaphorical vagueness’; it is a methodological
perversity.
It is a methodological perversity because mathematics is applied to artistic produc-
tion, which directly challenges Adorno’s (and others’) denigration of the mathemati-
sation of the artwork: when art ‘hypostatises its dimension of logical consistency’ by
equating the forms of art and mathematics which are ‘always opposed’, it loses what
distinguishes it as art. The rational aspect entirely takes over the mimetic. It is not that
art is without logic—this after all is what the artwork requires to ‘gain objectivation’,
to be ‘self-alike’—but, argues Adorno, ‘the logic of art, a paradox for extra-aesthetic
logic, is a syllogism without concept or judgement,’ its ‘premises and givens are ex-
tralogical’. Thus ‘it thwarts every effort to comprehend artworks on the basis of their
effect.’ This is not simply empirical logic, but a figurative logic. Such logic comes
to ‘the point of parody in totally determined works deduced from a minimum of basic
material.’131 Take as comparison Adorno’s concern for serialism in the tendential risk
130Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.42.
131Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, pp.187–8.
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of ‘robot music’, the ‘extreme of pure factuality’ which ‘ends by submitting to the
spell of what actually exists’ (although he also states that this ‘is not the inevitable fate
of serial practice’).132 Where the mathematisation of art’s logic becomes rigidified, the
work becomes mechanical, and no longer achieves any social-critical tension. Fol-
lowing such an analysis, it would appear that the application of explicit mathematical
form in literature could only serve to nullify its aesthetic import. The totalising aspect
of mathematical order is, as Adorno puts it, ‘a compositional defect.’133 The ‘second
world’ that art creates with its immanent logic derives from the empirical world, but
its logic is modified in art, and is thus not mathematics, whose logic, in Adorno’s
thought, is always pre-determined. Through this it offers ‘the implicit critique of the
nature-dominating ratio, whose rigid determinations art sets in movement by modify-
ing them.’134 If the Oulipian use of mathematics brings unmodified logic into the work,
would it not lose this implicit critique, lose precisely the capacity to indicate that ‘the
world could be other than it is’?135 Would it in fact render in Adorno’s terms, the ‘texts
that are the consequences of . . . axioms, according to the rules of deduction,’ non-art,
non-literature, merely rational mechanism?136 This, nevertheless, seems to be what the
Oulipo propose.
There is a phrase of Gertrude Stein’s quoted both by Jacques Roubaud and Herve´
le Tellier—‘If it can be done, why do it?’137—that expresses the inherent irony in this
132Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ p.304.
133‘The idea of complete organisation refers to the content of the organic and not to mathematical
necessity. In its pure form the latter is always a compositional defect. . . . Anything which only seems
right everywhere, cannot be right anywhere.’ Ibid., p.308.
134Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.191.
135Ibid., p.190.
136Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.41.
137Roubaud calls it ‘Stein’s axiom’, and states it in relation to a mathematician reluctant to complete
proofs. Roubaud, Mathematics, p.95; Le Tellier as a response to the inclination towards free creative
endeavour—‘l’ironie est une re´ponse aux limites du langage.’ Le Tellier, Esthe´tique de L’Oulipo, p.288.
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endeavour. Neither of them use it in quite the theoretical context I am presenting here,
but the raising of this contradictory formulation is nevertheless indicative of a certain
spirit in the Oulipo—doing something that cannot, or should not be done. The form
of this contradiction can be held because it is potential, so the literary consequences
(in the ‘finished’ work), while necessary for the carrying out of the exercise, are not
the holders of the value for that exercise. It is an irony of method, a contradictory
method, which retains critical interest as method, because it is not (yet) synthesised in
the end-work.
Far from falling prey to the Adornian proscription of mathematical hypostatisa-
tion of artistic form, the Oulipo instead offer, then, a critical opening in the narrowing
aesthetic field precisely through that hypostatised mathematical form. Rather than nul-
lifying the artwork’s tension, rigid mathematically determined form here draws back
the tension into the compositional method, seeking to leave the end-work at once free
from total mathematical determination, but also free from the contradictory impulse of
the amalgamation of disciplines in its construction.
If, as cited above, Roubaud concedes that the crossing of mathematics and litera-
ture is ‘only an ideal situation,’ the ‘unhomogeneous’ crossing of the two domains is
not a flaw, but rather the seed of the Oulipian provocation as presented here. That is to
say, it is this that allows the maintenance of the constraint’s arbitrariness, its resistance
to being determined as an artistic, rather than logical, end. Compare here Be´nabou’s
distinction between rule and constraint—the rule is established, accepted, natural; the
constraint is artificial, excessive:
[‘irony is a response to the limits of language.’]
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Now it is actually in the passage from the rule to the constraint that the
stumbling block appears: people accept the rule, they tolerate technique,
but they refuse constraint. Precisely because it seems like an unnecessary
rule, a superfluous redoubling of the exigencies of technique, and conse-
quently no longer belongs—so the argument goes—to the admitted norm
but rather to the process, and thus is exaggerative and excessive. It is as
if there were a hermetic boundary between two domains: the one wherein
the observance of rules is a natural fact, and the one wherein the excess of
rules is perceived as shameful artifice.’138
The arbitrariness of the constraint is the central distinction from conventional struc-
turing forms (which themselves, particularly in poetry, may have mathematically anal-
ysable or formalisable aspects). It draws on the arbitrariness of Bourbaki’s axiomatic
structures. Since Bourbaki does not engage in a fully formalised metamathematics on
the model of Hilbert, they can only acknowledge that their own ‘mother structures’ are
not necessary in accordance with the system that they then go on to derive. In fact
they can be said to be the products of mathematical history, though this diachronic
perspective does not change their synchronic function in the mathematical totality
postulated—but the point is that it is thereby acknowledged that this mathematical
totality could be otherwise. The Oulipian project, at its most innovative, however,
takes the arbitrariness of starting points and elevates it to a principle, which distin-
guishes the arbitrary constraint from any traditional literary structure that constitutes a
formal demand of the work rather than the method. Even more strongly, it is the case
that no literary or linguistic structure exists that would or could justify such axioms of
138Be´nabou, ‘Rule and Constraint,’ p.41.
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composition, or even the validity of axioms in literary construction in the first place.
This is the ‘heterogeneity’ of the field that Roubaud states; and similarly the deduc-
tive procedures themselves have no pre-existing structural coherence that justifies their
identification as literary procedures.
Bourbakist structures are ‘justified’ by their development, that is, having reduced
mathematics to core axioms, these axioms become useful—it is proposed—within
mathematics as a foundation upon which to develop, or at least they did until Bourbaki
was overtaken. Oulipian structures, in terms of a critique of method as such, cannot be
so justified by a literary work: this is definitive of the arbitrariness of the constraint.
Thus the presentation of full ‘rigour’ in literary deduction remains external to liter-
ature itself inasmuch as Oulipian rigour only extends to the working through of the
constrained form. The method is, unlike Bourbaki, ironic—it deploys a rigour in a do-
main in which, if it had an intrinsic relation to it, would destroy the literary specificity
of that domain.
For this reason, Oulipian method is not a synthesis of mathematics and literature,
it is not the attempted systematisation of literary production as a mechanism (and thus
not, for example, ‘computer writing’—recalling the group’s concern to avoid ‘me-
chanical automatism’). Rather it is the impossible maintenance of the conditioning
of literary material by mathematical means—impossible that is, for each strand of
this crossing to maintain itself in the crossing when fully worked through. The ten-
sion of instrumentality is only maintainable in the method and this is why a critique
of Oulipian mathematical method remains at the level of potential literature. This
pre-forming of mathematical material, maintains a position of externality against that
which it meets—literary material. The method presents something of the form of ex-
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pediency without having a literary purpose, since it has been deliberately suspended
from that, a situation which is, of course, unsustainable in the actuality of the total
work’s process.
It is this, I want to argue, that enables us to locate in the Oulipo a resistance to
instrumentalisation. The constraint itself is instrumental in form: it is given from out-
side the literary material and gives a partially dominating formal demand. But how
that demand is met is not in literary terms specified: as Roubaud says, ‘constraint is
a principle not a means.’139 This means that the form of instrumentality is admitted
at the same time as it is denied: that the work maintains an irreducibly rational and
determined element—in fact an excess of this element in relation to the kind of imma-
nence of the artwork’s development that Adorno would prescribe—held in momentary
suspension together with some unspecified literary purport. The constraint has effects
here, clearly, but these are not simply mechanical since they are a negotiation between
subjective constructive work and resistant material.140 This particular tension dissolves
with the completed work. Of course it may or may not be the case in the individual
Oulipian work that other, perhaps related, tensions emerge that wold render it critically
interesting, but again, this is a different question.
This situation offers an ironic reflection on the attempted totalisation of mathe-
matics in Bourbaki, but also more widely on the condition of modern rationality from
which this stems. The condition of instrumental reason, that knowsmeans but not ends,
is here mirrored in the artwork, but refracted through a prior structure of determined
irrelevance. Bourbaki’s project was a ‘making orderly’ of mathematics. The Oulipo’s
139Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.87.
140I address the question of material more fully in chapter 4.
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deployment of this ordering scheme, rather than showing the benefits of making liter-
ature orderly, plays with the impossibility of it, thus reflecting back on the value of the
total order of the Bourbakist scheme, and more widely the occlusion of the ‘ends’ of
order in modern rationality.
The move here is in some respects similar to the interpretation of the role of math-
ematical form that Rosalind Krauss finds exemplary in Sol LeWitt’s geometrical struc-
tures of the 1960s and 1970s (although with this comparison I resist any implication
that the Oulipo’s work itself thus constitutes some sort of conceptual art, which would
undermine that critical focus on method as such141). Krauss argues, in a 1978 essay,
that such work is usually taken to represent the transcendent ideals of mathematical
form, ‘the demonstration of rationalism itself.’142 By this analysis it is the art suitable
for the ‘cognitive moment.’ But Krauss sees LeWitt’s pieces as obsessional rather
than strictly purposive in a rational sense, ‘meticulous’ but ‘meaningless’, ‘the demon-
stration of a kind of mad obstinacy.’143 Where logic and mathematics are typically
reductive, aiming to simplify expressions to their basic terms or structures, ‘the babble
of a LeWitt serial expansion has nothing of the economy of the mathematician’s lan-
guage.’144 Rather than the expression of the rational, LeWitt’s works are instead a kind
of logical persistence of the irrational. ‘LeWitt . . . wrote, “irrational thoughts should
be followed absolutely and logically.” The consequence of obeying this direction, and
LeWitt’s art does obey it, is to arrive at the opposite of Idealism. It is to achieve an
absurd Nominalism.’145
141The method requires a work, but the method is not the work; but the method and not the work is
object of interpretation. I develop this further in chapter 4.
142Rosalind Krauss, ‘LeWitt in Progress,’ October 6 (1978): p.48.
143Ibid., p.54.
144Ibid., p.55.
145Ibid., pp.57–8.
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The Oulipian scheme similarly undertakes to do something unnecessary and ab-
surd, and pursues it with mathematical rigour. Such rigour may also be obsessional,
and this is sometimes associated with Oulipian work, though it is not in itself a consis-
tent or necessary definition of Oulipian activity. The work thus finds a way of break-
ing received literary necessities, but also indicates an inherent irrationality of deductive
reason. If instrumental reason is one of the ‘unsolved antagonisms of reality’, in Oulip-
ian method, which offers something instrumental without any literary justification or
end, then it can be seen as that reality’s return as an ‘immanent problem of form.’146
Excessive mathematisation in the literary process is reflective of the loss of ‘meaning’
in modern rationality—mathematics, science, society. By a perversity of method, the
Oulipian mathematisation touches on the irrational ends of rationality. If, as Adorno
says, ‘capitalist society hides and disavows this irrationality,’ then might we see here in
the Oulipian method a glimmer of the ‘irrationality and absurdity of the status quo’?147
146‘The unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent problems of form.’ Adorno,
Aesthetic Theory, p.7.
147Ibid., p.73.
3. Structure and Genesis
Given their historical coincidence and apparent shared concerns, French structuralism
might seem like the most obvious theoretical reference point for understanding the
practices and specific significance of the Oulipo within post-war literary modernism.
However, the relationship between the two is somewhat ambivalent. There is, in the
work of the Oulipians, an unwillingness to address structuralism overtly, or to make
explicit any connections with their own project. While clearly there are shared pre-
sumptions about the nature of linguistic and literary forms—primarily that these could
be approached with the dispassion of a formal science—there are also significant dif-
ferences, which will come to light over the course of this chapter. Specifically, I aim to
show that there is, in the Oulipo, a rather different approach to the uses and limitations
of rational structures—mathematical, linguistic or otherwise—in the literary work and
to the ways in which these structures are brought forth critically and overcome practi-
cally.
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Science, Structure, Form
The wider context of structuralist abstraction in the human sciences is a major presence
in the Oulipo’s emergence, even though they consistently distance themselves from
it theoretically. In a short 1967 article in the TLS, Raymond Queneau writes of a
‘renewal of the contact between science and literature . . . because “science” has now
incorporated the social sciences,’1 and yet there is no mention here of structuralism.
Where structuralism is mentioned by the Oulipo, it is the object of specific disavowal,
such as that found in the 1973 second manifesto, drafted by Franc¸ois Le Lionnais.
Le Lionnais states their attitude of ‘circumspection’ towards ‘structurAlism’, while
claiming ‘structurElism’ as their own (and demanding that the two not be confused).2
Jacques Roubaud claims that ‘structure, in its Quenellian and Oulipian sense, has only
a minimal relation to “Structuralism”.’3 Similarly Noe¨l Arnaud finds he cannot deny
the similarity of ‘preoccupations’, but states that ‘there were no relations between the
Oulipo and the structuralists.’4 A slightly dismissive sounding note by Georges Perec,
in the afterword to La Disparition, his famous ‘e-less’ novel, indicates little regard for
1Queneau, ‘Science and Literature,’ p.864.
2‘The overwhelming majority of Oulipian works thus far produced inscribe themselves in a SYN-
TACTIC structurElist perspective (I beg the reader not to confuse this word—created expressly for this
Manifesto—with structurAlist, a term that many of us consider with circumspection.’ Franc¸ois Le Li-
onnais, ‘SecondManifesto,’ in Oulipo Laboratory: Texts from the Bibliothe`que Oulipienne, trans. Harry
Mathews and Iain White (London: Atlas Press, 1995), p.
3Roubaud has different structures in mind. He goes on: ‘ideally (like constraint in respect to axiom),
it refers to the Bourbakian structure.’ Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’
p.93. For the mathematical concept of structure and the Oulipo’s debt to Bourbaki, see chapter 2.
4‘The fact remains that on a few important points (beginning with the way of regarding literary
production), structuralist preoccupations—the word “structuralist” taken here in its most general sense
(or both generalising and simplifying at once)—were not wholly unrelated to the preoccupations of the
Oulipo. Aside from personal friendships, however, there were no relations between the Oulipo and the
structuralists.’ Noe¨l Arnaud, ‘Prolegomena to a Fourth OulipoManifesto—or Not,’ in Oulipo: A Primer
of Potential Literature, ed. Warren Motte (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998), p.xiv.
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the current intellectual fashion (which can be presumed to be structuralism): he claims
to have been inspired by ‘un support doctrinal au gout du jour qui affirmait l’absolut
primat du signifiant.’5 [‘A doctrinal support for the flavour of the month that affirmed
the absolute primacy of the signifier.’]
Claude Le´vi-Strauss (drawing on Nikolai Troubetzkoy’s work on linguistics) de-
fines the four ‘basic operations’ of the structural method as follows: the study of ‘un-
conscious infrastructure’ rather than conscious phenomena; the interrelatedness (and
thus non-independence) of its terms; the concept of ‘system’, which it serves to elu-
cidate; and finally the discovery of ‘general laws’.6 Despite their attempts at distanc-
ing outlined above, the Oulipo clearly share something of the basic suppositions at
stake here, all of which converge on the idea of scientificity—that is to say the model
of science as the discovery of a-subjective, underlying systems of fundamental laws.
Consequently the Oulipo and the structuralists can be placed, contra Surrealism, on
the same—conceptual—side of the great ‘dividing line’ that Foucault considers can
be drawn in twentieth-century French thought in general, a line ‘that separates a phi-
losophy of experience, of meaning, of the subject, and a philosophy of knowledge, of
rationality and of the concept.’7 Yet while structuralismmight approach the humanities
in the manner of a science, the idea of science entering into literature’s production, as
in the Oulipo, is, as seen in the previous chapter, more controversial in this respect, not
5Georges Perec, La Disparition (Paris: Gallimard, 2016), p.309. I have avoided here Gilbert Adair’s
translation of the novel and its afterword—since he also maintains the novel’s constraint and thus various
convolutions are required of the translation—in favour of a more ‘literal’ rendering. See Georges Perec,
A Void, trans. Gilbert Adair (London: Harvill Press, 1995), p.281.
6Claude Le´vi-Strauss, ‘Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology,’ in Structural An-
thropology, trans. Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p.33.
7Michel Foucault, ‘Life: Experience and Science,’ in Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology: Essen-
tial Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume Two, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:
The New Press, 1998), p.466.
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least because it is more destructive of the basic formulation of literature as art in the
broad post-romantic sense.
Crucially, unlike structuralism’s philosophy of the concept, the Oulipian adoption
of science is not primarily to do with description, or at least not the description of liter-
ature as such; rather it informs the question of how literature can or should be written.
Consider for example, Georges Perec’s ‘Scientific Papers’. (From 1961 to 1978, Perec
worked as a scientific archivist at a CNRS-funded neurophysiology research unit, and
was thus well-versed in the format, and indeed content, of scientific papers.8) The
collection is, at one level, a series of hoaxes, perhaps most obviously in ‘Experimental
Demonstration of the Tomatotopic Organisation in the Soprano’, whose abstract states:
The author studies the ways in which tomato-throwing sets off the yelling
reaction in the Chantatrix and shows how various areas of the brain are in-
volved in the response, in particular the vegetal cortex, the thalamic nuclei
and the lyrical fissure of the north hemisphere.9
The paper has an extensive bibliography (with bad puns), plenty of technical (or
technical-sounding) terminology and several diagrams and charts of parodic inscrutabil-
ity. Yet it is not iconoclastic. The paper that follows it, on the double-hybridisation of
butterflies, is more subtle; its content is entirely plausible, and scientifically astute.10
Indeed one would be forgiven for thinking it authentic were it not for the alteration
8See Bellos, Georges Perec, chapter 25.
9Georges Perec, ‘Experimental Demonstration of the Tomatotopic Organisation in the Soprano
(Cantatrix sopranica L.),’ in Cantarix Sopranica L.: Scientific Papers (London: Atlas Press, 2008), p.12.
10Georges Perec, ‘The Spatio-Temporal Distribution of Coscinoscera Victoria, Coscinoscera tigrata
carpenteri, Coscinoscera punctata Barton & Coscinoscera nigrostriata on the Island of Iputupi,’ in Can-
tarix Sopranica L.: Scientific Papers, trans. Ian Monk (London: Atlas Press, 2008).
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of the name of the island, ‘Iputupi’, on which the butterflies are found, through its
every iteration in the paper. The development is suggestive of an underlying code or
schema: the expansion of the name follows a regular pattern in which the central letter
is spliced, which may be reflective of gene mutation. I have rendered the iterations
(with a backward projection to ‘i’) in pyramid-fashion to make this clearer, in figure
3.1. In fact the entire paper is rich in interpretative possibilities.11
i
ipi i -> ipi
ipupi p -> pup
iputupi u -> utu *
iputitupi t -> tit
iputipitupi i -> ipi
iputipupitupi p -> pup
iputiputupitupi u -> utu
iputiputitupitupi t -> tit
Figure 3.1: Perec’s ‘Iputupi’ mutation (* indicates original name)
None of this, however, is to say that the Oulipo in any way propose to elucidate
or develop scientific laws in a descriptive-theoretical sense, but rather that they are
receptive to the use of ideas in literature from the usually disparate domain of natu-
ral science. A strong statement of the presumption towards scientificity, shared with
structuralism, is given by Jean Lescure: ‘one can therefore operate on [language] as
on other objects of science.’12 The issue here is one of the prescriptive methods that
11See Bernard Magne´, ‘La cantatrice et le papillon: A propos de deux pastiches d’article scientifique
chez Georges Perec,’ in Perecollages 1981-1988 (Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail-Toulouse,
1998). Among other interpretative significances, Magne´ considers the paper on hybridisation as itself a
genre-hybridisation.
12Lescure, ‘Brief History of the Oulipo,’ pp.35–6.
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can be carried out with scientific forms as a component part of the artistic materials.
Yet it should be stressed that any prescription here is only partial. The Oulipo aim
to avoid being bound by a total formalism—hence the principle of constraint rather
than mechanism. There is thus some ambivalence regarding the rigour of the scien-
tific descriptions that underlie their productive principles. As testament to this attitude
take, for example, Queneau’s insistence on the ‘craftsmanlike’ rather than ‘scientific’
nature of their work (something I return to in the final chapter): ‘we forge ahead with-
out undue refinement. We try to prove motion by walking,’13 a stance that, as well as
disavowing absolute rigour, also values praxis over theory—the reference is of course
to Diogenes’s counter to Zeno’s theoretical argument against the possibility of motion.
This ‘undue refinement’ does however meet more strident appeals to systematicity in
other cases—thus Le Lionnais’s declaration that the Oulipo intends to pursue literary
innovation ‘systematically and scientifically.’14 These variants of approach (Le Lion-
nais is perhaps the most formally inclined of the group) are also indicative of the fact
that they did not have a totalising theory of their practice, and in any case Le Lionnais’s
ideas here do not touch on any kind of literary-theoretical demand. In this respect we
can also note Roubaud’s comments that the Oulipo avoided the ‘mistake’ that results
in the sedimentation of theory: ‘[the Oulipo] never sought to establish an overview
of constraints or to organise them according to the hidden parameters of a literary
theory.’15
Clearly then, there are Oulipian concerns with regard to the totalising and hypo-
statising aspects of structuralist thought. There was, with structuralism, as Franc¸ois
13Queneau, ‘Potential Literature,’ p.51.
14Le Lionnais, ‘Lipo (First Manifesto),’ p.xix.
15Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.42.
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Dosse notes, ‘a desire for modernism in search of new models,’16 that is to say the
development of a theoretical world-view responsive to the shifts towards quantitative
evaluation and processes of modern productive society. The same could clearly be said
of the Oulipo with the proviso that the ‘models’ in question are less the formal patterns
for theoretical engagement but rather formal materials to be worked with. Their think-
ing is itself a historically contingent product of the same intellectual-cultural milieu
that produces the theory (from which they distance themselves) and that theory’s ab-
stracted forms (which they engage practically). The aim here is to find the critical
reflection of the latter practice back onto the conditions of the former theory.
For structuralists, Saussure’s developments in linguistics brought a formal rigour
and systematicity previously absent in the human sciences. It was perhaps not quite
so revolutionary as the earlier mathematisation of the natural world inaugurated by
Galileo, yet this latter shift, in its imposed logical consistency, was clearly the model.17
However, from the start, structural linguistics had more difficulty determining its em-
pirical content.18 The result of this, the relational system of underlying linguistic
structure, bears the problems of abstraction and stasis for which structuralism would
later be criticised more generally: the resolution to relations rather than positive terms
(a sign, tying inextricably its conceptual and material planes, only emerges from its
16Franc¸ois Dosse, History of Structuralism: Volume 1: The Rising Sign, 1945–1966, trans. Deborah
Glassman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p.xx.
17‘As regards its method, linguistics was not in the same favourable condition as natural science.
It could not follow the example of modem physics which, to use the terms of Kant, had entered upon
the safe way and the sure method of a science by a sort of intellectual revolution. It had to grope its
way; it had to proceed hesitatingly and tentatively. It was natural that, in these first attempts, linguists
looked for the help and guidance of other branches of knowledge that, long before, had established their
methods and principles.’ Ernst A. Cassirer, ‘Structuralism in Modern Linguistics,’Word 1, no. 2 (1945):
p.99.
18‘A language . . . has this curious and striking feature. It has no immediately perceptible entities.’
Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. and trans. Roy Harris (London: Bloomsbury,
2013), p.126.
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relations with other signs); the abstraction of its determination from its use (langue
over parole); and the discarding of its historical genesis (synchrony over diachrony).
While this achieves a certain autonomy for the science in question—linguistics as a
total system—it also absents from that science any consideration of how and why its
material develops. Saussure of course considered that such questions could be taken
up in different domains of study, and that the restrictions of his proposed system bol-
stered its status as an independent science. But the problem is not so easily eliminable
by limiting the domain—as Fredric Jameson notes: ‘if the opposition in the long run
proves to be a false or misleading one, then the only way to suppress it is by throwing
the entire discussion onto a higher dialectical plane, choosing a new starting point,
utterly recasting the problems involved in new terms.’19
The aspiration to establish an autonomous human science finds similar expression
in the work of the earlier theorists usually referred to as Russian formalists, who were
thus, unsurprisingly, claimed by many structuralists as their own immediate forebears.
It is worth pointing out, too, for the perspective of Oulipian studies, that Franc¸ois Le
Lionnais identified the formalists among those whose work should inform the foun-
dation of the group: ‘I decided to propose to Raymond the creation of a workshop
or seminar of experimental literature, which would address in a scientific manner that
which the troubadours, the Rhe´toriquers, Raymond Roussel, the Russian formalists
and a few others had merely adumbrated.’20 The formalists’ interests spanned linguis-
tics and literature, but their most decisive move was the attempt to secure the scientific
study of literature as a self-sufficient object. In particular, they sought to free the
19Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian
Formalism (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972), p.18.
20Le Lionnais, ‘Raymond Queneau and the Amalgam of Mathematics and Literature,’ p.77. Note—
again—that Le Lionnais is probably the most ‘scientifically’ inclined of the group.
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study of literature from its subservience to other disciplines or concerns (as merely
their means of expression)—and determine literature for itself, in its literariness, as
indicated in Roman Jakobson’s famous 1921 quote:
The object of a science of literature is not literature, but literariness—that
is, that which makes a given work a work of literature. Until now literary
historians have preferred to act like the policeman who, intending to arrest
a certain person, would, at any opportunity, seize any and all persons who
chanced into the apartment, as well as those who passed along the street.
The literary historians used everything—anthropology, psychology, pol-
itics, philosophy. Instead of a science of literature, they created a con-
glomeration of homespun disciplines. They seemed to have forgotten that
their essays strayed into related disciplines—the history of philosophy, the
history of culture, of psychology, etc.—and that these could rightly use lit-
erary masterpieces only as defective, secondary documents.21
It is striking, however, that while Le Lionnais noted the Oulipo’s similarity of
concern with formalists in the matter of bringing science and literature together, what
was done with this combination was rather different. If the formalists were pursuing a
science of literariness—however impossibly essentialist and reductive such a project
might be22—it is just this aspect of literary composition, as its end, that the Oulipo
21Roman Jakobson, cited in Boris Eichenbaum, ‘The Theory of the “Formal Method”,’ in Russian
Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, 2nd ed., trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 2012), p.107.
22‘The attempt to identify the “specific difference” of literariness was effectively doomed to failure
from the outset, since the very concept of literature . . . is constituted, historically, precisely through
such contamination.’ David Cunningham, ‘Genre Without Genre: Romanticism, the novel and the new,’
Radical Philosophy, no. 196 (March 2016): p.25.
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specifically avoid theorising as a group, working instead on how scientific methods
and structures could be brought in as a resource for literary (or poetic) writing, without
specifying what the latter end should be.
Central to the work of Victor Shklovsky and other formalists was a contrast be-
tween ‘poetic’ and ‘practical’ language. The function of practical language, in this
distinction, is to communicate effectively. But language that is determined by its ob-
ject of communication then becomes secondary to the more essential importance of
that object. Thus the formalists similarly reject any grounding of the poetic in its
sources or intentions, and, in particular, anything in poetic analysis that might appeal
to metaphysical or mystical attributions. Rather, the work is most definitely to be
considered as something ‘made, fashioned, contrived . . . not only artful but also arti-
ficial’, and not read in pursuit of some kind of originary spirit, or as the expression of
the poetic soul—such would be ‘false in scholarship’, as Eichenbaum attests.23 This of
course leads to Shklovsky’s well-known theory of ‘defamiliarisation’, where the poetic
is determined as a collection of devices that interrupt smooth perception, that ‘make
strange’ that which has become habitual (a reversal of the usual process of learning),
and return it to perception with a renewed sharpness.
There is, no doubt, an Oulipian rendering of this in the use of constraint, a defa-
23‘Proceeding from the basic proposition that in a work of art not a single sentence can, in and of
itself, be a mere “reflection” of the author’s personal feelings, but rather is always a construct and a
performance, we cannot and have no right to see anything other than an explicit artistic device in such a
passage. The customary procedure of identifying some given statement with the contents of the writer’s
“psychology” is false in scholarship. In this sense, the mind of the artist as a man who experiences
various moods always remains and must remain outside the bounds of what he creates. The work of art
is always something that is made, fashioned, contrived; it is not only artful but also artificial, in the best
sense of the word. Therefore, there neither is nor can there be any place in it for the reflection of the
empirical reality of the inner self.’ Boris Eichenbaum, ‘How Gogol’s “Overcoat” is Made,’ in Gogol
from the Twentieth Century: Eleven Essays, ed. and trans. Robert A. Maguire (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1974), pp.286–7.
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miliarisation of method that defeats the idea that poetic or literary construction is built
on finding the ‘best’ or most transparent way of expressing feeling, intent or meaning.
But Shklovsky’s determination of what constitutes the poetic is a theoretical stance
not to be found in the Oulipo—there is no Oulipian theory of the poetic as such, which
would extend beyond their determinations of innovation solely in the potentialities of
method. Furthermore the demand that poetic writing is constituted by the ‘laying bare’
of technique (as Shklovsky finds exemplary in Sterne) is one that is—when rendered
as a specifically Oulipian question of the normative visibility of the constraint in the
work—without consensus in the Oulipo.24
For all that Shklovsky focuses on literary technique25—that is to say, a particular
skill of making—the process of production as such is not really addressed—analysis is
kept to what is manifest in the work itself, a limitation which is quite in keeping with
the idea of an empirical science, but does not quite step into the territory explored by
the Oulipo. Indeed, to address such questions would, for the formalists, most likely fall
foul of a ‘genetic fallacy’, which would disallow any analysis of works (specifically or
in general) in terms of production in itself. What can be said of the genesis of works
is that they maintain coherence by virtue of an established system of signs, that is, of
24See, for example, Daniel Levin Becker, Many Subtle Channels: In Praise of Potential Literature
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), p.77ff. The question of the visibility of the constraint in
the work is of course one posed from the perspective of the work, and thus not the question I ask here,
which is about the method itself.
25The idea of technique that Shklovsky presents is not actually all that formal in a strict sense,
and more to do with incongruities of perspective or framing than anything like Saussure’s linguistic
formalism; thus, his famous formulation, ‘one may recover the sensation of life; [art] exists to make one
feel things, to make the stone stony.’ Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique,’ p.12. Indeed, the Russian formalists
were perhaps ill-served by the title ‘formalist’. Erlich notes that Boris Eichenbaumwould have preferred
the term ‘morphological’. Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History and Doctrine, 4th ed. (The Hague:
Mouton, 1980), p.171. Eichenbaum also retracts from the risk of formalist stasis, as he notes in 1927:
‘from the beginning we understood the historical nature of our task. . . . Science itself is still evolving,
and we are evolving with it.’ Eichenbaum, ‘Formal Method,’ p.138.
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literary conventions. This consideration bears comparison with T. S. Eliot’s concep-
tion of poetry as situated in history as at once bound by tradition but also altering it,
with the poet as the catalyst for the collected materials of the developing tradition—in
this sense poetry ‘approaches the condition of science.’26 However, while such analy-
ses observe that change occurs, and offer a description of the structures and devices of
writing as manifestations of a certain constructed-ness in the work as it is—indeed as
an object that can be approached scientifically—what they lack is any actually mod-
ernist reflection on what could or should be done to continue to produce work, and
how those methods themselves, in themselves, bear a critical relation to the conditions
of their own development.
If the concept of ‘defamiliarisation’ is taken not as a descriptive criterion of the
literary object, but as a prescriptive demand, then the Oulipian use of mathematical ra-
tionality in literature would appear to be a manifestation of such an approach in terms
of method at least. It is, as I have argued in the previous chapter, pursued precisely
because the domains of literature and mathematics are constitutively incongruous. But
this is a defamiliarisation ofmaking, rather than of end-work. (To be clear, I am talking
here about ‘making’ in a narrowly compositional sense, of the construction of linguis-
tic material, which a broader ‘making’ in terms of social meaning—encompassing the
work’s reception, its historical continuation and development as work—takes as its
point of artefactual initiation.) Recalling how strange Galileo’s introduction of math-
ematical abstraction was to natural science, but how ‘natural’ it has become, the de-
familiarisation of mathematical-scientific structure by means of literary method takes
on a certain critical leverage here. Such ‘making strange’ can be couched in terms that
26T. S. Eliot, ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent,’ in Selected Prose, ed. John Hayward (Har-
mondsworth: Penguin, 1953), p.25.
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are familiar to Oulipian commentary (recalling, for example, Roubaud’s comments
that ‘seen from inside literature, nothing looks more artificial than mathematics’27)—
that is, that the introduction of arbitrary constraints, rather than closing down literary
potential, refreshes something in that process, something of literature’s own structures.
This is often, in Oulipian commentary, put in terms of a rather too substantive subject
(that would tend towards the sort of psychologism that would no doubt have been
disdained by the formalists)—that is, that it refreshes the subjective resources of the
writer. For all its intuitive plausibility, however, there is no necessary causal inference
from a ‘strange’ method to a strange result: a peculiar or ‘difficult’ method may yet
result in quite banally conventional work, where little or no trace of that method is
manifest—indeed there are Oulipian works where this accusation has been made.28 If,
however, the critical focus remains on method, it is possible to interpret a productive
tension that otherwise dissolves in a too-easily accommodated synthesis in the ‘final’
work.
While the formalists did not broach the prescriptive question of making as such—
the question of ‘how to make work?’—Vladimir Propp does offer a brief glimpse
into the possibility of such a programme. Propp’s Morphology of the Folktale—much
prized by latter structuralists, including Le´vi-Strauss and Greimas—offers a system-
27Roubaud, ‘The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art,’ p.41.
28Kenneth Goldsmith for example, states that ‘one of the greatest problems I have with OULIPO
is the lack of interesting production that resulted from it. . . . On the whole, they embraced a blandly
conservative narrative fiction which seems to bury the very interesting procedures that went into creating
the works.’ Kenneth Goldsmith, Interview by Erik Belgum, http://writing.upenn.edu/epc/
authors/goldsmith/readme.html (accessed August 20, 2019). Lauren Elkin and Scott Esposito, in
their somewhat polemical book, complain that Jacques Jouet’s Metro Poems have a ‘facile profundity’
and that his novels ‘range from the divertingly pleasant to downright awful.’ Elkin and Esposito, The
End of Oulipo? p.34. Herve´ Le Tellier is similarly accused: ‘Le Tellier sets himself only medium-
interesting and often juvenile constraints, and plays it safe in executing them.’ Ibid., p.69. A defence
is offered in Peter Consenstein, ‘Forever Never Ends,’ in Verbivoracious Festschrift Volume Six: The
Oulipo, ed. G. N. Forester and M. J. Nicholls (Singapore: Verbivoracious Press, 2017).
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atic schema for the narrative ‘elements’ of any given folktale. Finding ‘systematicity’
lacking in existing folktale description, Propp considers his morphology a necessary
propaedeutic: ‘the accuracy of all further study depends upon the accuracy of clas-
sification.’29 There are resonances of the systems of classification of the natural sci-
ences: Linnean taxonomy—though Propp notes that ‘our studies are still in their “pre-
Linnean” stage,’30—and the Mendeleyev table of chemical elements. Le´vi-Strauss
notes that Propp’s arrangements of terms (‘β: Absentation’, ‘γ: Interdiction’, ‘δ: Vi-
olation’, ‘ε: Reconnaissance’, etc.) appear ‘analogous to chemical formulae’.31 This
kind of scientificity clearly appeals to Le´vi-Strauss’s thinking: elsewhere he specu-
lates on the formulation of a ‘table of linguistic structures . . .comparable to the table
of elements which Mendeleieff introduced into modern chemistry.’32 This is also com-
parable to Raymond Queneau’s 1974 table of Oulipian operations, the ‘Queneleyev’
table, which organises Oulipian constraints in tabular form, arranged by types of entity
and operation.33
The ‘elements’ of Propp’s system are narrative functions (31 in total), arranged
along a single axis of the tale and ‘defined from the point of view of [their] significance
for the course of action’,34 rather than subjects of their enactment. From this emerge
seven ‘spheres of action’, defining the categories of ‘dramatis personae’. The ordering
of the functions is unvarying, although they may be subject to various exclusions, sub-
29Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, 2nd ed., ed. Louis A. Wagner, trans. Laurence Scott
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968), p.5.
30Ibid., p.11.
31Claude Le´vi-Strauss, ‘Structure and Form: Reflections on aWork by Vladimir Propp,’ in Structural
Anthropology 2, p.122.
32Claude Le´vi-Strauss, ‘Language and the Analysis of Social Laws,’ in Structural Anthropology
(New York: Basic Books, 1963), p.58.
33See p.141 n.125 in this thesis.
34Propp,Morphology, p.21.
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patterns and variations of manifestation; the ‘dramatis personae’ similarly may have
a one-to-one, one-to-many or many-to-one relation to their actualisation as characters
in the specific tale.35 Given this ‘necessary’ underlying structure of the tale, a reversal
of the process becomes plausible: from a descriptive to a prescriptive narratology that,
in certain respects, foreshadows Oulipian methods. Thus Propp writes: ‘it is possible
to artificially create new plots of an unlimited number. All of these plots will reflect
the basic scheme, while they themselves may not resemble one another.’36 However,
Propp is not proposing a total mechanisation—folktale construction is still the work
of a ‘storyteller’, one who is ‘constrained’ in terms of the sequence of functions, but
‘free’ in the details of realisation.37 Propp’s account thus serves as a manifestation of
the kind of shift away from the craft of storytelling that Walter Benjamin describes in
‘The Storyteller’. The craftsmanship of the storyteller, for Benjamin, is displaced by
something more appropriate to industrial technology, the unmediated directness and
explanatory efficiency of ‘information’, in which the traces of experience are lost.38
In this sense, Propp’s ‘explanation’ of the folktale—the aspect that, for Benjamin,
is kept in abeyance by storytelling—risks its becoming another casualty of modern
rationalisation. This presentation of constrained and free aspects of literary creation
might at first glance seem proto-Oulipian—indeed, it seems plausible that this is what
Le Lionnais had in mind when he referred to Russian formalists as forerunners of the
35Ibid., p.80.
36Ibid., p.111.
37Ibid., pp.112–13.
38‘The storytelling that thrives for a long time in the milieu of work—rural, maritime and then
urban—is itself an artisanal form of communication, as it were. It does not aim to convey the pure “in
itself” or gist of a thing, like information or a report. It submerges the thing into the life of the storyteller,
in order to bring it out of him again. Thus, traces of the storyteller cling to a story the way the handprints
of the potter cling to a clay vessel.’ Walter Benjamin, ‘The Storyteller: Observations on the Works of
Nikolai Leskov,’ in Selected Writings: Volume 3: 1935-38, ed. Howard Eiland andMichael W. Jennings,
trans. Harry Zohn (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), p.149.
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Oulipo—though it should be noted that it lacks the innovation of arbitrary form, which
is central to Oulipian practice, and is in fact only a more formalised description of
any narrative construction, inasmuch as it means to conform to some possibility of
recognition in its basic principle(s) of generic unity.
The strict linearity of Propp’s schema that would, prospectively, allow the possi-
bility of a reversal of an analytic process into a constructive one is, however, deemed
by Le´vi-Strauss, and other structuralists, to be at once too formally distanced from the
actual content of the folktale, but at the same time drawn too close to an empirical
description—too close, that is, for a science, which ought to offer invariant underlying
principles. It is thus, Le´vi-Strauss asserts, that Propp’s formal analysis is inadequate
for the synthetic reconstruction of folktales: ‘the proof of the analysis is in the synthe-
sis. If the synthesis is shown to be impossible, it is because the analysis is incomplete.
Nothing can be more convincing of the inadequacy of formalism than its inability
to reconstitute the very empirical content from which it was itself drawn.’39 In fact,
Le´vi-Strauss’s domain is still strictly analytic here, since his criticism is over the ‘in-
adequacy’ of the schema to tales not yet analysed in its terms, but it functions as well
as a dismissal of the generative possibility of the system to produce something that
could be successfully classed within the same domain.
The broader aim of Le´vi-Strauss’s critique is to distance his own structuralism from
the failings and limitations he ascribes to formalism, even if, as he acknowledges, the
latter has played a significant role in the development of the former. The problem with
formalism, by Le´vi-Strauss’s account, is that it is too tied to a binary separation of
form and content, whereby form can be independently determined and simply applied
39Le´vi-Strauss, ‘Structure and Form: Reflections on a Work by Vladimir Propp,’ p.134.
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to an arbitrary content. Drawing on a linguistic analogy, he writes: ‘the error of for-
malism . . . is the belief that the grammar can be tackled at once and the dictionary
postponed.’40 It is doubtless a tricky problem for structuralism also to exonerate itself
from the same accusation, but the solution for Le´vi-Strauss, is effectivelymore formal-
ism rather than less: thus, using an established aphoristic form, ‘if a little structuralism
leads away from the concrete, a lot of structuralism leads back to it.’41 More structural-
ism here means that form can no longer be determined independently of content—both
are to be considered as aspects of a total structure, a human science of meaning.
Formalism presumes to identify the formal structure of the folktale, while leav-
ing certain contingent details arbitrary or free (and thus, in Propp’s speculation on
synthesis, at the whim of the author), but for Le´vi-Strauss, no aspect of a structural
reading (in this case the folktale, but for him it only conforms to a wider mythologi-
cal ‘substance’), is independent of structure. Structure is identified at different levels
of signification, by oppositional pairs (rather than Propp’s mutual implications)—the
model here being Jakobson’s (and Troubetzkoy’s) work on distinctive features in lin-
guistics: that is to say, the smallest identifiable linguistic unit is the distinctive feature,
determined as an opposing pair.42 In Le´vi-Strauss’s account there is not the distinction
between an essential form and contingent content. At all levels meaningful entities are
identified in terms of opposition. The totality of the domain of meaning is structured:
form and content as inseparable as, in Saussure’s famous image, signifier and signified
(or sound and thought) correspond to the two sides of a single sheet of paper, where
40Ibid., p.144.
41Ibid., p.116. The form can be traced to Francis Bacon, and is also adopted by Barthes in Myth
Today. Roland Barthes,Mythologies, p.112.
42‘Each of the distinctive features involves a choice between two terms of an opposition that displays
a specific differential property, divergent from the properties of all other oppositions.’ Roman Jakobson
and Morris Halle, Fundamentals of Language, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1971), p.14.
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‘it is impossible to take a pair of scissors and cut one side of paper without at the same
time cutting the other.’43 Thus, in Le´vi-Strauss’s examples of native American ‘oral
literature’ (as he calls the folktale), structural analysis does not ‘come to a stop’ with
an opaque element of essential function, as formalist analysis does, but continues with
oppositively determined pairs according to context—that is, structure is total and also
includes all that Propp calls contingent. By contrast, Propp’s analysis, as Le´vi-Strauss
sees it, of variables and constants (the contingencies of actualisation versus the neces-
sary structures)—are only organised by a pre-formed theoretical schema that does not
see beyond its own static organisation of ‘the data’.
Propp’s own response to this is to defend the narrowness of his empirical domain,
and criticise Le´vi-Strauss for excessive abstraction: ‘the difference between my way
of reasoning and that of my critic is that I draw my abstractions from the data, whereas
Le´vi-Strauss draws abstractions from my abstractions.’44 But, even if Le´vi-Strauss can
be taken to be reading Propp with broader implications than he would like, Le´vi-
Strauss’s own development towards a greater abstraction can also be read as an ex-
tension of the same tendency (which indeed he does). Of course, by the same token,
this also means the charge of formalism is not so easily discarded by structuralism.
Le´vi-Strauss’s crucial move here is to discard the perceived need for the syntagmatic
structure (effectively the internal diachrony) of the tale—the temporal organisation of
narrative—in order to uncover deeper structures expressed paradigmatically. This is
what, for Le´vi-Strauss, distinguishes the study of myth from that of language, such that
43Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p.132.
44Vladimir Propp, ‘The Structural and Historical Study of the Wondertale,’ in Theory and History
of Folklore, ed. Anatoly Liberman, trans. Serge Shishkoff (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1984), p.76.
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its significance is preserved ‘even through the worst translation.’45 But this insistence
on deep structures also tends towards a core stasis with Le´vi-Strauss: the growth of
myth is crystalline; its basic structure remains the same.46 Again, the model of science
as the establishment of universal descriptive laws is evident.
Le´vi-Strauss’s structures find literary application with the likes of Barthes’s and
Todorov’s proposal for the analysis of discourse as a ‘second linguistics’, an extension
of the analytic methodology of linguistics (acknowledging the pre-eminence of rigour
in the human sciences proposed by the structural study of linguistics); a step war-
ranted by linguistics proper’s limitation—it ‘stops at the sentence’.47 Here again struc-
turalism’s scientific aspirations are evident with the positing of fundamental structures
beyond or prior to those that are manifest—Todorov offers, for example, a chemical
analogy for a proposed distinction between ‘atomic’ and ‘molecular’ analyses of litera-
ture48—but, as Barthes acknowledges, it is an ‘immense’ and even ‘infinite’ analytical
task, and falls back on a structuralist act of faith, positing a universal ‘homological
relation’ that orders ‘all semiotic systems.’49
45Claude Le´vi-Strauss, ‘The Structural Study ofMyth,’ in Structural Anthropology (NewYork: Basic
Books, 1963), p.210.
46Ibid., p.229.
47Roland Barthes, ‘Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives,’ in Image Music Text, ed.
and trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1977), p.82.
48There may, he contends, not be any elements of literature (or at least they have not yet been iden-
tified) that are uniquely literary, yet the combination of elements—atoms that are shared with other
disciplines—results in a molecular constitution of literature that is not shared by those other disciplines:
‘there is not a science of literature exclusively, for the features characterising literature are to be found
outside it, even if they form different combinations.’ Tzvetan Todorov, Introduction to Poetics, trans.
Richard Howard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p.71 By virtue of this contextual-
ity, Todorov notes that poetics may be a transitional science.
49‘If a working hypothesis is needed for an analysis whose task is immense and whose materials
infinite, then the most reasonable thing is to posit a homological relation between sentence and discourse
insofar as it is likely that a similar formal organisation orders all semiotic systems, whatever their
substances and dimensions.’ Barthes, ‘Structural Analysis of Narratives,’ p.83.
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Le´vi-Strauss’s key criticism of Propp’s morphology is basically that it proposes an
incomplete formalism: it does not account for the arbitrary nature of its own forms.
A structuralism that structures form and content at all levels is, from this perspective,
effectively a greater formalism, with universal scope. Indeed, Le´vi-Strauss was later
criticised from within a structuralist perspective for his own recourse to anthropolog-
ical generalisations about the universality of human thought—for example, a certain
‘naturalisation’ of cultural manifestation in his recourse to the ‘raw’ forms of primitive
cultures, or the ‘biologism’ of his suggestion that the brain is ‘behind the mind.’50
For the Oulipo there is of course no overt theoretical assessment of these devel-
opments, but two aspects of response: first that, inasmuch as such theory could pro-
vide formal material, it could be of interest (although not much appears to have been
done with structuralist theory explicitly, save for Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a
traveller—of which I will offer a reading below); and second that the structuralist or
formalist methodology itself implicitly informs a willingness to use form as productive
material in an exaggerative way. What the Oulipo refuse though, it seems, is the stasis
and totality that structuralism might tend towards. In this sense, insofar as an Oulipian
theoretical sympathy can be inferred, Propp’s maintenance of an arbitrary dimension
to his morphological description—however problematic in terms of a totalising struc-
turalist critique—is in fact a more sympathetic theoretical position for Oulipian meth-
ods than the universal, fundamental structures of Le´vi-Strauss. That said, the arbitrary
aspects of Propp’s putative folktale construction programme are quite limited, not al-
lowing much change in the ‘essential’ structure of its domain, such that the possibility
50Le´vi-Strauss proposes an ‘elementary logic, which is like the least common denominator of all
thought, . . . an original logic, a direct expression of the structure of the mind (and behind the mind,
probably, of the brain).’ Claude Le´vi-Strauss, Totemism, trans. Rodney Needham (Boston: The Beacon
Press, 1963), p.90.
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of the radically new would still appear to be closed down.
The dismissal of diachrony—that is, the dismissal of history as an aspect of a sci-
entific or theoretical construct—in structuralism’s core is a matter of well-established
criticism; specifically that the methodologies of both formalism and structuralism leave
unaddressed the temporal constitution of art and literature. Thus, for example, Jame-
son states that ‘synchronic systems cannot deal in any adequate way with temporal
phenomena.’51 Importantly, temporal phenomena can be taken to include all that falls
within the domain of art: as Peter Osborne observes, a distinctive concept of (mod-
ern) art itself needs to retain ‘some critically significant, irreducibly historical aspect,
whereby the work is subject to processes of historical temporalisation which desta-
bilise and transform what might otherwise appear as purely structural relations, con-
ceptual or aesthetic.’52
The critical significance of Oulipian work in relation to theoretical structures (di-
rectly or indirectly) is derivable not as a direct response, but as one mediated by a
particular mode of use, understood precisely in historical terms. Structuralism’s adop-
tion of a formal purity, present right from the start with Saussure’s relational rather
than referential concept of meaning, discards ontology, but with it loses any ground
for its own structures. It is for this reason that Jameson condemns structuralism as
ideology—inasmuch as the structural system’s own conditions of possibility are not
scientifically accountable.53 Inasmuch as a relation can be found between structural-
51Jameson, The Prison-House of Language, p.xi.
52Peter Osborne, ‘October and the Problem of Formalism,’ in The Postconceptual Condition (Lon-
don: Verso, 2018), pp.93–4. Note also that both Jameson and Osborne equate structuralism with formal-
ism (see Jameson, The Prison-House of Language, p.195, and Osborne, ‘October,’ p.97).
53‘Structuralism finds itself condemned to the study of ideology, not by choice, but out of a kind of
internal necessity . . . its concept of the sign forbids any research into the reality beyond it.’ Jameson,
The Prison-House of Language, pp.105–6.
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ism and the Oulipo, it is in the sense of a historical retrieval of praxis from abstraction,
and—as I will address in the following chapter—by discarding strict theoretical de-
scription but re-purposing strict material prescription (in the sense of literary materials
as constituted by everything that is ‘worked’ in the production of the work, scriptural
and conceptual), they point towards a recuperation of the disdained concept of craft.
Beyond Structure?
The Oulipians are, of course, not the only group, and far from the best known, with
concerns about the stasis of the total structure. Developments in later structuralism,
or more accurately perhaps, in parallel with structuralism, tending towards what has
latterly been termed ‘poststructuralism’, also came to question the viability (and the
productivity) of the total structure. Tel Quel is perhaps the most prominent umbrella
term (naming a journal and a group) for developments in the France of the late 1960s
that brought the apparent rigidity and closure of structuralist theory into question. The
crucial move perpetrated by the group is, while retaining the categories of formalist-
structuralist analysis—and with it a regard for the ‘scientific’ in the theory of poetic
language—to problematise the boundaries of both domains (scientific, poetic), thus
re-opening the perspective of temporality as a historical dialogical dimension and pro-
ductive resource. The aspect of development rather than static system is given in the
literary and philosophical figures that they propose to re-introduce to their structural
analyses—that is to say the re-incorporation of historical pre-structuralist thought—
specifically Lautre´amont, Mallarme´, Marx, Freud.54 Tel Quel’s project thus articulates
54Tel Quel, ‘Division of the Assembly,’ in The Tel Quel Reader, ed. Patrick ffrench and Roland-
Franc¸ois Lack, trans. Patrick ffrench (London: Routledge, 1998), p.22.
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history, politics and literature in structures of plurality or difference. The theory of
literature, while still given a quasi-scientific presentation, becomes, again, a historical
study, and also, interrogating the boundaries of the structures of signification, one of
openness and process. Science itself, as the archetypical ‘monological’ semiotic prac-
tice, is subjected to attacks on the hierarchical dominance that place poetic practice
in non-scientific subordination. In this way, Tel Quel attempt an ‘effacement of the
mystique of “literature” and the ideology constructed around it,’55 which is to say, a
reconceptualisation of the constitutive separation of literature and science (and in this
science congruent with traditional structuralist concerns), but also a proposed displace-
ment of ‘monological’ science in favour of an appraisal of the ‘dialogical’ structures of
literature. However, the status of scientific logic here is a matter of some ambivalence,
since its engagement (or subversion) is frequently offered as rhetorical performance or
‘typographical gesture’ in Tel Quel texts.56
It would seem reasonable then to ask if there are similarities between Tel Quel’s
literary experiments and science-literature boundary transgressions, and those of the
Oulipo. The Oulipo themselves were aware of possible overlaps of concern—Le Li-
onnais asks, near the start of the meeting of 27 August 1971:
Cherchent une de´finition de l’OuLiPo a` l’ape´ritif, question grave, sur laque-
55Patrick ffrench and Roland-Franc¸ois Lack, ‘Introduction,’ in The Tel Quel Reader, ed. Patrick
ffrench and Roland-Franc¸ois Lack (London: Routledge, 1998), p.3.
56The editors of The Tel Quel Reader offer as evidence of the theorists’ scientificity, ‘the typograph-
ical disposition on the page of numbered sections and subsections, as in Devade’s “theorem” text on
chromatic painting or Julia Kristeva’s first article in the review, . . . the quasi-mathematical formulae
that constellate Kristeva’s piece, performing the same typographical gesture as the Chinese characters
which also begin to appear in Tel Quel.’ Furthermore, ‘Kristeva’s references to Ko¨nig, Go¨del, Bour-
baki, Boole, . . . Cantor and Hilbert, also mark out a certain strategic scientificity.’ Ibid., p.3. The risk
here is that ‘scientificity’ comes to be seen as no more than the use of particular forms of notation and
references to ‘master’ discourses.
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lle il nous faudra revenir longuement, Queneau voulait nous imposer le
crite`re suivant: que le structure utilise´e soit mathe´matique (pas ne´cessairement
nume´rique). En effet, plusieurs e´crivains aujourd’hui, notamment ceux
qui se re´fe`rent au nouveau roman, ou a l’e´quipe de Tel Quel, ou a` celle de
Change, sont attentifs a` l’utilisation de constructions recherche´es, parfois
de´licates. Leurs recherches diffe`rent-elles de noˆtres? Et si oui, en quoi?57
[Looking for a definition of the Oulipo as an aperitif, a serious question, to
which we will have to return at length, Queneau would like to impose the
following criterion: that the structure used be mathematical (not neces-
sarily numerical). Indeed, several writers today, notably those associated
with the new novel, or the Tel Quel group, of that of Change, are attentive
to the use of refined, sometimes difficult, constructions. Is their research
different to ours? And if so, how?]
The question is not addressed further in that meeting in terms specific to Tel Quel;
however, as I will go on to argue, the Oulipo’s relation to science, and more particularly
mathematics, is actually significantly different to that of Tel Quel, in that the Oulipo,
rather than transgressing boundaries, respect the specificities of the two domains, with
the cross-fertilisation all the stronger for that.
In Julia Kristeva’s work, the processual, and with it the historical, aspect of the text
is at once drawn in terms of a continuation of certain structuralist categories, but also
as a repudiation of the stasis of the total structure. She affirms that ‘literary semiology
is already going beyond what are thought to be the inherent limitations of structural-
57Re´union Aouˆt 1971.
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ism, its “staticism” and its “non-historicism”.’58 She continues to theorise the total
structure, in which the subject position is lacking, though in some sense emergent as
a manifestation of that structure; but the aspects of time and process are brought back
to that structure, such that the total structure is not one of hermetic self-containment,
but of processual dynamism, whose scope is infinite. Kristeva’s best known concept,
‘intertextuality’, which owes much to Mikhail Bakhtin’s theorisation of the novel as
an inherently ‘dialogical’ and indeterminate form,59 offers a web of mutual referential-
ity, not just as a development from source(s) to product, but as an endless opening of
significations between different layers or systems:
If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of
various signifying systems (an inter-textuality), one then understands that
its ‘place’ of enunciation and its denoted ‘object’ are never single, com-
plete and identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of
being tabulated. In this way polysemy can also be seen as the result of a
semiotic polyvalence—an adherence to different sign systems.60
With this the idea of the text as parole actualising the single, latent langue is ex-
ploded. Instead, as Roland Barthes puts it in 1970 (by which time he had taken on
58Julia Kristeva, ‘Towards a Semiology of Paragrams,’ in The Tel Quel Reader, ed. Patrick ffrench
and Roland-Franc¸ois Lack, trans. Roland-Franc¸ois Lack (London: Routledge, 1998), p.25.
59‘They [novelised genres] becomemore free and flexible, their language renews itself by incorporat-
ing extraliterary heteroglossia and the “novelistic” layers of literary language, they become dialogised,
permeated with laughter, irony, humour, elements of self-parody and finally—this is the most important
thing—the novel inserts into these other genres an indeterminacy, a certain semantic open-endedness,
a living contact with unfinished, still-evolving contemporary reality (the openended present).’ Mikhail
Mikhailovich Bakhtin, ‘Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology for the Study of the Novel,’ in The
Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p.7.
60Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1984), p.60.
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much of Kristeva’s programme):
. . . the one text is not an (inductive) access to a model, but entrance into
a network with a thousand entrances; to take this entrance is to aim, ul-
timately, not at a legal structure of norms and departures, a narrative or
poetic law, but at a perspective (of fragments, of voices from other texts,
other codes), whose vanishing point is nonetheless ceaselessly pushed
back, mysteriously opened.61
Kristeva talks of ‘the multi-determination of meaning’, a ‘network’ that replaces
‘univocity (linearity) by encompassing it . . . enabling us to formalise the symbolic
operation of language as a dynamic mark, as a moving “gram” (hence as a paragram)
which makes rather than expresses a meaning.’62 Rather than a structuralist enclosure
of meaning, or the more traditional model (to which structuralists objected) of an ex-
ternal psychological or social content which finds its means of expression, Kristeva
proposes that ‘poetic language’ is a complement to the ‘code’ of scientific or ‘nor-
mal’ language, rather than a sub-code. That is, poetic language’s forms are not devi-
ations from a scientifically determined system of denotative meanings; she observes
‘scientific logic’s inability to formalise, without distortion, the functions of poetic dis-
course.’63 Thus poetic language should not be considered as a ‘sub-code’ in a hierarchy
of signification, but rather ‘only in poetic language is found the practical realisation
of the “totality” (though we prefer the term “infinity”) of the code at man’s disposi-
tion.’64 Structuralism’s scientific aspirations are, however, still much in evidence with
61Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p.12.
62Kristeva, ‘Semiology of Paragrams,’ p.32.
63Ibid., pp.26–7.
64Ibid., p.28.
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the claim to a certain logic—a poetic logic rather than scientific in the traditional sense,
and with this the univocity of scientific discourse still plays a part in the Kristevan anal-
ysis, even while its status is questioned.
Scientific logic then must, for Kristeva and others associated with Tel Quel, be
‘transgressed’ by poetic logic in ways that partly recall Surrealism, since the former
cannot ‘contain’ the latter—in fact the reverse is the case for Kristeva: ‘ordinary’
language can be seen as a ‘functional abstraction’, a sub-set of the infinity of poetic
language.65 Therefore poetic language needs a treatment that at once has the apparent
rigour of scientific logic—and thus something of the structuralist systematicity—but
with an (infinite) dynamism and plurality that cannot be accounted for by the latter.
Structural processes are therefore inverted –‘to make difference the goal rather than
the means of analysis.’66 With this however a problematic relation presents itself, an
appeal to the rigour of scientific logic at the same time as its dissolution is proposed
in the domain of the poetic. Jonathan Culler observes that ‘it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the theories of the Tel Quel group and the arguments which they might
bring to bear against the notions of a literary system and literary competence do, in fact,
presuppose these notions which they claim to have rejected.’67 Culler makes this point
in support of his own notion of interpretative competence, but the key observation is
that something systematic is appealed to at the same time as it is undermined in the Tel
Quel strategy. This duality is particularly apparent in Kristeva’s use of mathematical
notation. For example, Kristeva offers the following definition of poetic language,
65Ibid., p.28.
66Franc¸ois Dosse, History of Structuralism: Volume 2: The Sign Sets, 1967–Present, trans. Deborah
Glassman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p.57.
67Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1975), p.284.
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with recourse to the concept of mathematical function and its suitable notation: ‘poetic
language is not a code encompassing all others, but a class A which has the same power
as the function φ(x1...xn) of the infinity of the linguistic code.’
68
In specifically mathematical terms, the notation here is resistant to the discovery
of denotative significance since there is no mathematical context introduced in which
its terms are grounded—given that such monological significance is just what is meant
to be transcended here, this is perhaps hardly surprising. There is of course a certain
suggestive aspect to it—provided it is read in terms that are not strictly mathematical.
Kristeva goes on to offer the difference of poetic language as an absorption but also
destruction of ‘linear’ relations, the ‘monologism’ of scientific logic that ‘evolves in
the binary space of 0–1 and proceeds by means of identification, description, narra-
tion, the exclusion of contradictions, the establishment of truth.’69 The transgression
of this logic ‘[absorbs] the 1 (the prohibition), announces the ambivalence of the poetic
paragram: there is a coexistence of the monological (scientific, historical, descriptive)
discourse and the discourse that destroys this monologism.’70 The function of poetic
writing, however, ‘has an invariable property: it is dialogical and its minimal interval
is 0 to 2.’71 Leaving aside for now the mathematical objections to the formulation, the
suggestion is that there is no meaning by identification, but rather by an expansive
plurality. The ‘coexistence’ of the two logics is key to the text, since it is what allows
Kristeva to present a logic that diffuses another logic in the latter’s own terminology,
a double gesture towards the rigour of a system that is, purportedly, preserved and
dissolved simultaneously.
68Kristeva, ‘Semiology of Paragrams,’ p28.
69Ibid., p.31.
70Ibid., p.31.
71Ibid., p.32.
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Kristeva notes later in the essay that ‘the use of notations derived from new math-
ematics is obviously only metaphorical, insofar as an analogy can be established be-
tween, on the one hand, the relation of ordinary to poetic language, and on the other,
the relation finite/infinite.’72 There is perhaps something slightly disingenuous about
the term ‘only’ here, since the move to subordinate the monologic of mathematics
to the infinity of dialogical poetic language is precisely to open such denotations to
metaphor. In fact, Kristeva’s characterisation of the poetic recalls Jakobson’s descrip-
tion of metaphor (and language’s other pole, metonymy): he writes that ‘the study
of poetical tropes is directed chiefly toward metaphor.’73 In other words, for poetry,
meaning is sought in relations in absentia (and in Kristeva’s rendering, this associativ-
ity extends indefinitely). The metonymic pole of language, for Jakobson, is that con-
stituted by relations in presentia, thus he states that the latter is the greater constituent
of prose or ‘realism’ (which, in any denotative sense, would presumably be opposed to
Kristeva’s poetic language), the former the chief direction of Romanticism, Symbol-
ism, Surrealism. With the metaphorisation of mathematics then, Kristeva opens it up
to relations that are alien to the singular logic of mathematics: mathematics has been
poeticised. The trouble is, however, that poetised mathematics no longer functions as
mathematics. Two apparent aims of Kristeva’s adoption of the forms of mathemati-
cal notation thus come into question: first, whether a displaced notation can still fulfil
its function as a guarantor of rigour (rather than merely its suggestion); and second,
whether mathematical logic and the norms and hierarchies that attend it, are actually
transgressed socially by this presentation.
Clearly most mathematicians would find the Tel Quel approach somewhat incon-
72Ibid., p.43.
73Jakobson and Halle, Fundamentals, p.96.
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gruous and it meets an inevitably indignant response from those who present them-
selves as the defenders of scientific rigour against the ‘abuses’ enacted by what they
call ‘postmodernism’ and ‘epistemic relativism’.74 That Kristeva’s mathematical no-
tation is not mathematics properly speaking is hardly controversial, and is in a sense
precisely the point—its hegemony is to be undermined by its dialogical presentation
with poetic language. Kristeva notes that ‘poetic language appears as a dialogue of
texts: every sequence is made in relation to another sequence deriving from another
corpus, such that every sequence has a double orientation: towards the act of rem-
iniscence (the evocation of another writing) and towards the act of summation (the
transformation of this writing).’75 If this is dialogism it seems to be something of a
one-way conversation. The more interesting point however is that Kristeva’s approach
appears to court such indignation from the defenders of mathematical propriety, since
it claims a parallel rigour that, from the latter’s perspective, is impossible, since for
them the rigour of the mathematical is indissociable from its ‘proper’ instantiation.
Take for example, Kristeva’s claim to break with the logic of identity and the ‘exclu-
sion of contradictions’. Without the principle of non-contradiction, we are led to what
in classical logic is called ‘explosion’—as the medieval scholars would have it: ex
contradictione sequitur quodlibet. There are of course other logics, and mathematics
is not inviolate, unchangeable or the single proper form of rational discourse; but it
does cohere, as a discipline, around such principles, and its shifts are made by trace-
74Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern Philosophers’ Abuse of Sci-
ence, 2nd ed. (London: Profile, 1999), p.x. This book in turn of course provoked much backlash in the
disciplines at which it took aim. I do not propose to resurrect the skirmish here, but note that actually
much of the reception of the work, hailing it as a victory for common-sense over continental obscu-
rantism, was more reactionary than Sokal and Bricmont themselves, and that while the accusation of
‘abuse’ of (mathematical) language is unwarrantedly defensive, in certain respects, they are not wholly
wrong.
75Kristeva, ‘Semiology of Paragrams,’ p.30.
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able arguments rather than rhetorical presentation. Which is to say, the mathematical
material is ‘worked through’.
Kristeva denatures mathematical notation by a poeticisation that renders it largely
irrelevant in the supposedly transgressive calculus of poetic logic. Contrast this then
with the Oulipo’s use of scientific, mathematical or logical structures in poetic or lit-
erary construction. Rather than the poeticisation of mathematics associated here with
Tel Quel’s poststructuralism (and post-Surrealism), the Oulipo’s pursuit could be bet-
ter characterised as the mathematisation of poetry. To put this in terms of Jakobson’s
dichotomy, it is a transfer of absent patterns into metonymic plane of linguistic con-
struction. Whether this transfer is considered as metaphor in the sense of Jakobson’s
schema would depend on whether metaphor is taken, in the Aristotelian sense, as a
perception of similarities, or whether it is the imposition (the construction) of simi-
larities. It is in the sense of Oulipian practice as an imposition into the metonymic
plane that a lack of theorisation of this operation becomes almost a necessity. Jakob-
son notes that, ‘when constructing a metalanguage to interpret tropes, the researcher
possesses more homogeneous means to handle metaphor, whereas metonymy, based
on a different principle, easily defies interpretation.’76
It is possible to draw a loose parallel between the de-rationalisation of mathemat-
ical logic and the supposed ‘irrationalism’ of the Surrealists. In terms of the latter,
Adorno famously disdains Surrealism as the enactment of a form of ‘montage’, aimed
at a transformation or ‘at best to awaken their latent language’, but whose elements
only ‘make up the reality of an unchallenged common sense’, which is ‘powerless . . .
insofar as it is unable to explode the individual elements. It is precisely montage that
76Jakobson and Halle, Fundamentals, p.95.
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is to be criticised for possessing the remains of a complaisent irrationalism, for adap-
tation to material that is delivered ready-made from outside the work.’77 In the rupture
of monologism, there is an irresolvable splitting of mathematical ‘linearity’ (although,
for what it is worth, linearity has a more particular meaning in mathematics) in a way
that mathematical logic, intrinsically, does not allow of itself. This is then, from the
perspective of mathematics, a form of irrationalism, or at any rate, a dereliction of
mathematical rationalism. The question is, has that mathematical rationalism been
transgressed in any (socially or poetically) effective way, or is it in fact still bound to
the terms of that mathematics in a way that, despite its gesture against it, only recon-
firms something ‘ready-made’? It similarly can be seen not to ‘explode the individual
elements’, if we take these elements to be concepts from the corpus of mathematical
logic. That is to say, it may only be a superficial dialectic that simply reaffirms its
original object of negation through the act of transgression.
The analogy with Adorno’s critique of Surrealism must of course remain highly
qualified, since Kristeva also claims opposition to Bretonian Surrealism, dismissing its
claim to unmediated irrationalism, its supposed ‘mentalism and religiosity.’78 Never-
theless, a Surrealist sympathy is not wholly absent from Kristeva’s work (and indeed
Tel Quel more generally, although more usually identified with the ‘dissident’ Surreal-
ism of Bataille or Artaud), inasmuch as there is an irreducible element of the irrational,
albeit in a contradictory entanglement with the rational: thus her theory of the ‘thetic’,
as the chain of signification, and the semiotic ‘chora’, outside or prior to the thetic, and
incompatible with it.79 Signifying practice thus is:
77Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.77.
78Julia Kristeva, ‘The Subject in Process,’ in The Tel Quel Reader, ed. Patrick ffrench, trans. Roland-
Franc¸ois Lack (London: Routledge, 1998), p.168.
79There is also, particularly in the psychoanalytic work of Kristeva and Tel Quel, a significant debt
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. . . asymmetrically divided—neither absolutising the thetic into a pos-
sible theological prohibition, nor negating the thetic in the fantasy of a
pulverising irrationalism: neither the intransgressable and guilt-producing
divine fiat nor “romantic” folly, pure madness, surrealist automatism, or
pagan pluralism. Instead we see the condition of the subject of significance
as a heterogeneous contradiction between two irreconcilable elements—
separate but inseparable from the process in which they assume asymmet-
rical functions.80
The Surrealist reference points for the development of this rational-irrational bind
are with the ‘dissident’ developments of Artaud and Bataille. Thus Kristeva claims
that the ‘pulsional network, which is readable, for example, in the pulsional roots of
the non-semanticised phonemes of Artaud’s texts, represents (for theory) the mobile-
receptacle site of the process, which takes the place of the unitary subject.’81 There is
here an appeal to the materiality of language, to ‘vibrations . . . the palpitating life of
gesture, of the body, of magic,’82 which refuse the linearity of standard discursive logic.
But again, for all that this describes a certain productive dynamic in the genetic situa-
tion of signification, it also represents, by contrast to the Oulipo, a withdrawal from a
productive aspect of mathematical logic in itself—that is, as a non-significatory logic.
Comparable here is Franco Moretti’s accusation of a misreading of Joyce: Kristeva
‘salute[s] in Joyce the “semiotic” subversion of the “symbolic” order: alas, exactly the
opposite is true.’ What Moretti reads in Ulysses is, rather than an appeal to an ‘anthro-
pocentric’ narrative of romantic unity, a modernist ‘polyphony’ of ‘special’ languages
to Lacan and his own Surrealist sympathies, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to pursue that here.
80Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.82.
81Kristeva, ‘The Subject in Process,’ p.134.
82Kristeva, ‘Semiology of Paragrams,’ p.45.
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which remain divided, precisely because it is a novel of modernity—a ‘genuine fac-
tory of meaning . . . a sign of the division of labour that reigns within it.’83 It is useful
then, to consider that the Oulipian retention of the particularity of the poetic and math-
ematical logics, even while here it is not the question of the (dis)unity of the work as
such that is at stake, bears with it the stamp of a similar division of modernity, whose
strangeness needs to be discovered and interpreted, rather than masked by a structural
totality of whatever sort.
Calvino’s Structures
I want to end with a reading of Italo Calvino’s 1979 work If on a winter’s night a trav-
eller, which is probably the most deliberate, overt and extensive Oulipian engagement
with structuralist (and in fact more obviously poststructuralist) ideas. Calvino himself,
more forthcoming than some Oulipians, acknowledges an interest in structuralism,
‘which I immediately felt to be something that responded to my needs and to what
I instinctively knew writing to be.’84 This reading will function not simply to show
this work’s use of Oulipian methods, but also to bring to the fore the tension between
structuralist, poststructuralist and Oulipian thought. Calvino, in many ways, is not a
typical Oulipian, and If on a winter’s night a traveller (henceforthWN) is not a typical
Oulipian work. (It is in any case probably misguided to consider any such generality as
a typical Oulipian or Oulipian work.) The main reason for asserting Calvino’s distinc-
tion here is his overt engagement with the theoretical developments of the era, which
83Franco Moretti, Modern Epic: The World System from Goethe to Garcia Marquez, trans. Quentin
Hoare (London: Verso, 1996), p.206.
84Italo Calvino, ‘An Interviewwith Italo Calvino, by Gregory L. Lucente,’ trans. Gregory L. Lucente,
Contemporary Literature 26, no. 3 (1985): p.246.
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contrasts with the overwhelming avoidance of any such acknowledgment among most
Oulipians. At the same time, there is also, in Calvino’s use of theoretical forms as
part of the constructive material of the novel, a very distinctively Oulipian relation to
theory. This is constituted by a relation of praxis rather than descriptive subsumption:
theoretical forms, of whatever sort, are, for the Oulipo, a prescriptive intervention in
the subjective-objective dynamic of the production of works (which process is thus
neither autonomous authoriality nor machine determination), rather than a descrip-
tive account of the meaning or critical significance of those works. In fact, Calvino’s
WN performs something of both of these aspects—overt critical reflection and formal
prescription—though in ways that are in neither case entirely straightforward.
The novel is presented as the opening chapters of ten disparate novels, interspersed
with a framing or meta-narrative, in which ‘you’, the reader, encounter and read these
chapters, before being frustrated by the interruption of your reading, for various rea-
sons, as each text breaks off at a crucial or climactic moment. It begins in the second
person, as ‘you’ settle down to read the (eponymous) book, and indeed the first framed
chapter is then presented under that same title. Following the interruption of the first
chapter, the reader attempts to find the remainder of the book (this first missing text
is, according to the novel, due to a printers’ error—several books having been mixed
up) and encounters the second central character of the other reader, Ludmilla. From
hereon, further opening chapters are encountered and a quest begins to find the original
text for each of these in order to complete their reading. The quest becomes increas-
ingly complicated as we meet further personae: the non-reader, the expert reader (the
academic), the book-seller, publisher, translator, counterfeiter, and so on; all of whom
are agents in the ecosystem of the novel, its production and consumption.
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The composition of the ‘found’ chapters offers a kind of broad-level intertextual-
ity, though perhaps initially only in what Julia Kristeva would call the ‘banal sense
of “study of sources”.’85 Although collected together these texts form a kind of brico-
lage of source texts, each of these texts themselves does not resolve to any reliable
originary principle: they are rather shown to be counterfeits or fabrications of some
sort, whose authenticity seems to recede further away as they are investigated. Rather
than revealing an author, any potential sources become dissolved in the developmen-
tal complications of the text. Calvino’s focus is, instead, on the figure of the reader,
the act of reading, and the various forms of coherence thereby sought. Ultimately,
this reader-incorporation extends ‘beyond’ the bounds of the book and thus meets a
proposed (though impossible) finality in the figure of the ‘actual’ reader—the other
pole of the textual process to the one that dissolves in the pursuit of sources. All of
this seems, on the face of it, to represent some fairly standard poststructuralist themes,
most obviously as manifested in Barthes’s and Foucault’s well-known essays on the
author.
Increasingly convoluted scenarios arise that propose to explain the complications
of the novel(s) in numerous ways, involving inauthentic sources, machine generations,
translations (including fake translations) and other break-downs of originary textual
stability—for example, at one point an attempted political plot is countered by con-
cocted translations of subversive material hidden in novels.86 In addition to the main
85Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.60.
86Calvino here reformulates aspects of the frame-narrative of the Arabian Nights: a Sultan suspects
revolutionaries of communicating with conspirators, including his wife, by means of encrypted mes-
sages in Western novels provided for the Sultana’s entertainment (another reader figure) as part of their
wedding contract. In an attempt to defuse this activity, the Sultan demands that the texts be translated
to render the messages irretrievable. However, the Sultana must also be kept reading and not get bored,
in order to prevent the revolutionaries from communicating with her and triggering an attack (it is for-
bidden to interrupt her while reading). The works then must provide the necessary dramatic tension to
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framing narrative and multiple levels of sub-frames, there is a penetration of layer
upon layer of textual ‘sources’, none of which reaches an authoritative end point. This
is a concern reflected in some of Calvino’s theoretical writings. For example, in his
‘Levels of Reality in Literature’, written the year before WN, Calvino asserts that ‘lit-
erature does not recognise reality as such but only levels.’87 These ‘levels’, whether
configured as ‘boxes within boxes’, or as contiguous on a singular plane, represent
different fictional realms and thus form layers of ‘metaliterature’ which, at each stage,
reflect, in WN, the text’s self-awareness as fiction and as material construction, but
with the diffusion of the reliability of any originary point. What ultimately do the
‘successive layers of subjectivity’ encountered in layered metanarratives resolve to?
Calvino suggests that ‘perhaps it is a phantom “I”, an empty space, an absence.’88 At
the other end of the text is the tendency of the work to incorporate itself, a mise en
abyme, tending towards the ‘beyond’ of textual expression. Calvino thus speculates
‘perhaps it is in the field of tension between one vacuum and another that literature
multiplies the depths of a reality that is inexhaustible in forms and meanings.’89 WN
thus appears as a play on the status of the textual ‘object’ where its boundary condi-
tions have been problematised. That, at least, is a possible representation of the novel
in broadly poststructuralist terms.
The lack of originary coherence implies the text’s divisibility or potential break-
maintain her interest, but must not be allowed to conclude, thus ‘he [the translator] will break off this
translation at the moment of greatest suspense and will start translating another novel, inserting it into
the first through some rudimentary expedient; for example, a character in the first novel opens a book
and starts reading.’ Italo Calvino, If on a winter’s night a traveller, trans. William Weaver (London:
Minerva, 1992), p.125.
87Italo Calvino, ‘Levels of Reality in Literature,’ in The Literature Machine, trans. Patrick Creagh
(London: Vintage, 1997), p.120.
88Ibid., p.113.
89Ibid., p.120.
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down—as an intertextual side-effect—which renders the text susceptible to combina-
torial analysis, a principle that is, from this perspective, readable as both structuralist
and Oulipian (if the break-down also implies its analytical reversal into a constructive
principle). Take for example the following assessment by Barthes in his 1971 ‘From
Work to Text’: ‘if the text extends itself, it is as a result of a combinatory systematic . . .
Hence no vital ‘respect’ is due to the text: it can be broken; . . . it can be read without
the guarantee of its father, the restitution of the inter-text paradoxically abolishing any
legacy.’90 And, by comparison, the Oulipian constructive principle: ‘combinatorics,
for its part, studies configurations. It attempts to demonstrate the existence of configu-
rations of a certain type. . . . It is thus not surprising to learn that a systematic study of
these problems revealed a large number of new mathematical concepts, easily trans-
posable into the realm of language.’91 Calvino presents this image of breaking as a
material de-structuring of the novel at one point inWN: frustrated at the printer’s error
that has interrupted the first reading, losing the expected coherence of the single book,
the reader imagines throwing the book across the room, ‘through the slats of the Vene-
tian blinds,’ breaking it down into ‘sentences, words, morphemes, phonemes,’ then
further, into atoms and elementary particles. The dissolution does not stop there—the
book is ‘reduced to . . . the flow of information . . . degraded into a swirling entropy,’
before reaching its ultimate situation of ‘nonbeing’, ‘to be lost in the most absolutely
guaranteed undeniable negativity.’92 Beyond this material dissolution of the text no
irreducible essence or meaning remains, and it is tempting then to seek coherence
elsewhere, echoing the famous contention by Barthes that it is only in reading that any
90Roland Barthes, ‘FromWork to Text,’ in Image Music Text, ed. and trans. Stephen Heath (London:
Fontana Press, 1977), p.161.
91Berge, ‘For a Potential Analysis of Combinatory Literature,’ p.116.
92Calvino, If on a winter’s night a traveller, pp.26–7.
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unity of the text is made: ‘the reader is the space on which all the quotations that make
up writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its ori-
gin but in its destination.’93 Similarly, in WN the fantasy of book destruction ceases,
and we return to the search for the complete book, but it is, ultimately, the finality of a
reading that is being pursued.
The ‘book’ that is sought here would figure as the closure within an indeterminate
literary field. As Kristeva states, ‘the book . . . situated within the infinity of poetic lan-
guage, is finite: it is not open, but closed, constituted once and for all; it has become a
principle, one, a law, but it is only readable as such within a possible opening onto the
infinite.’94 Yet in the fact that these complete texts are not found, there appears to be a
certain ambivalence regarding the unifying potential of reader as well as author. The
other reader, Ludmilla, and her sister Lotaria, represent two poles of readerly possibil-
ities in Calvino’s novel. For Ludmilla, reading is a search for unity, for meaning and a
retained faith in authoriality—‘this ideal model—to say it in her words—is the author
who produces books “as a pumpkin vine produces pumpkins.”’95 The ideal text here is
thus akin to a natural production, with an organic coherence and unity. Lotaria, on the
other hand, offers a quasi-scientific appraisal of texts, emphasising their constructed-
ness. Thus, she claims to use a reading machine that statistically digests texts for her,
breaking them down into frequency-ordered word lists.96 The question is then raised
of the efficacy of such textual digestion: is a machinic reading possible? (Later in
93Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author,’ p.148 The familiar Barthesian take on the author is also ren-
dered elsewhere in the novel—take, for example, the publisher’s reflections on authors: ‘the true authors
remain those who for him were only a name on a jacket, a word that was part of the title, authors who
had the same reality as their characters . . . The author was an invisible point from which the books
came, a void travelled by ghosts.’ Calvino, If on a winter’s night a traveller, pp.101–2.
94Kristeva, ‘Semiology of Paragrams,’ p.29.
95Calvino, If on a winter’s night a traveller, p.189.
96Ibid., p.186ff.
STRUCTURE AND GENESIS 190
the book, the break-down of this machine itself further problematises the operation.)
Speculation follows that an inverse computational system could compose a novel from
such a statistical reduction.
This computational process pursued by Lotaria’s reading machine yields a break-
down that is still readable in human terms—the basic outline, genre and tenor of the
books, something seemingly essential generated by a quasi-reading process; and its
reversal—a writing machine would reconstruct the textual artefact from these ‘ele-
ments’. However, the ‘personality’ of authorship, as a uniquely human guarantor of
essential unity, has here become irrelevant, as linguistic and literary structures become
only as vital as any other material elements of a mechanistically determinable universe
once the insistence on a unifying ‘spirit’ of creation is abandoned. Such questions of
textual generation are clearly of long-standing concern for Calvino: he asserts in his
1967 essay ‘Cybernetics & Ghosts’, that a writing machine, working with linguistic
combinations, ‘would bring to the page all those things that we are accustomed to con-
sider as the most jealously guarded attributes of our psychological life . . . What are
these if not so many linguistic “fields”?’97
Calvino’s essay was written the year before he was invited by Raymond Queneau
to join the Oulipo, and the concern to de-mystify authorial process is clearly some-
thing more broadly Oulipian, even if, for the majority of the group, the possibility of
full machinic automation was something to be avoided rather than actualised. The
Oulipian position is rather, I would argue, that the materiality of linguistic and literary
structures may be considered as discrete, manipulable entities, subject to certain forms
97Italo Calvino, ‘Cybernetics and Ghosts,’ in The LiteratureMachine, trans. Patrick Creagh (London:
Vintage, 1997), p.12.
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of scientific analysis, but that the process of literary composition is still one of work
that is not fully formalised. Calvino is in this sense more willing to countenance the
replacement of the author than most of his Oulipian counterparts for whom, while any
mysticalness of authorial inspiration is to be defused, the process, at least, does not
become one of unmediated computation. Yet there still remains for Calvino, in the
essay, the question of that which escapes language. Even while the author has been
displaced as the guarantor of vital meaning, the reader is held to seek something more
than a strictly rational analysis. Thus Calvino writes that ‘what stirs literature is the
call and attraction of what is not in the dictionary.’98 If the literary work is in some
sense capable of mechanical production, what constitutes its meaning, in the sense
of its reception among readers, is not thereby prescribed. In this contention, Calvino
again follows the Barthesian notion of the reader, rather than the author, as the pro-
ducer of any potential coherence or vitality of meaning: ‘once we have dismantled and
reassembled the process of literary composition,’ he writes, ‘the decisive moment of
literary life will be that of reading.’99
This shift—from writer to reader—can be seen to recur in Calvino’s WN (along
with the image of de- and re-composition by computer), although by this point, twelve
years after ‘Cybernetics and Ghosts’, and with further developments in French the-
ory, Calvino has taken on a more strongly poststructuralist thematic concern with the
boundaries of the text, and the problem of the unaccountability of a hermetic system’s
outside to the system itself. The references to a ‘void’ or an absence are numerous:
for example, the reader’s observation that ‘the claim to portray vital fullness revealed
the void beneath’; elsewhere, in one of the framed tales, the narration begins to give
98Ibid., p.18.
99Ibid., p.15.
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way to self-consciousness of its language formation—a bridge is crossed, and beneath
it a ‘void’: ‘the story must also work hard to keep up with us, to report a dialogue
constructed on the void . . . beneath every word there is nothingness.’100 This place
(or non-place) of the void in relation to a self-consciously textual narration may be
taken to reflect Derrida’s famous (and famously misunderstood) statement that ‘there
is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors-texte].’101 But
if so, it is here a reading of Derrida via Barthes—the notion of the void is a Barthesian
adaptation, a defensive measure that substantialises what for Derrida is an aporetic dis-
solution by theory itself of its own conditions of possibility. It is also worth noting that
the somewhat phenomenological concept of the ‘reader’ is a very Barthesian (rather
than Derridean) category.
When Derrida refers to the ‘blind origin of the work in its darkness’,102 it is not
the darkness that conditions the blindness but the reverse—blindness as rationality’s
aporetic self-dissolution. ‘Representation in the abyss of presence is not an accident
of presence; the desire of presence is, on the contrary, born from the abyss (the indefi-
nite multiplication) of representation, from the representation of representation, etc.’103
Abyss here is a cognitive destination, posing as (and driving desire for) an origin. In
Calvino’s rendering, the void becomes more substantive as an originary condition, an
invisibility that constitutes the possibility of the appearance of anything. Thus as char-
acters contemplate the ‘void’ that is outside the work, they approach precisely that
which cannot be contemplated as the condition of their own (fictional) apprehension.
100Calvino, If on a winter’s night a traveller, p.43, 83.
101Jacques Derrida,Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997), p.158.
102Jacques Derrida,Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), p.7.
103Derrida, Of Grammatology, p.163.
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The address to the reader then places that figure with a God-like view of proceedings,
one which can only be named with a placeholder.
The book ends with a reiteration of this doubling, presented as alternatives, though
in fact they are concomitant: ‘The ultimate meaning to which all stories refer has two
faces: the continuity of life, the inevitability of death.’104 With the male and female
readers in bed together (thereby fulfilling a well-established narratological prescrip-
tion) and the light about to be extinguished, the reader contemplates finishing his
reading before the darkness ensues—the darkness of the ‘outside’ reader, the end of
the book.
It is worth returning for a moment to the possible misunderstandings or simplifica-
tions of Derrida’s thought however, because it is possible to read WN as an enactment
of just such a caricature. If we imagine that the characters themselves in WN could
consider their own inscription as fictional beings, they may not be wrong to consider as
‘nothing’ the outside of their world-book. But Derrida’s ‘axiom’ is not simply the as-
sertion of a nothingness beyond empirical language nor that ‘reality’ is only a linguistic
construction. Such nothingness risks taking on a quasi-substantiality of negative the-
ology, and thus a return to the kind of metaphysical speculation quite antithetical to
the more aporetic direction of Derrida’s thinking. (What is at stake is the idea of an
unmediated ‘reality’, that is so easily offended here.) Neither is it to affirm any kind of
absolute outside, and with it an absolute presence of the ‘text’, however constituted.
Rather it is that the condition of possibility of any apprehension at all is already a for-
mal articulation, which is to say any contemplation of what escapes articulation is by
necessity contaminated by the same.
104Calvino, If on a winter’s night a traveller, p.259.
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Yet in a sense, the question of whether Calvino’s text is ‘adequate’ to such a de-
constructive programme is moot. The point is, rather, that such a theoretical context
is part (though only one part) of the material for Calvino’s own literary games. As A.
J. Greimas (whose work provides an Oulipian key to Calvino’s novel, as I will outline
below) notes, regarding the theoretical leanings of WN, Calvino is ‘un auteur tre`s peu
se´curisant . . . Quiconque a tant soit peu fre´quente´ ses e´crits sait bien qu’un tel traite´,
manifestation de l’hybris calvinienne, doit eˆtre lu au de´la des e´valuations du se´rieux et
du frivole, avec se´re´nite´ et un soupc¸on de sourire.’105 [‘A very unsafe author. . . . Any-
one who is familiar with his writings knows well that such a treatise, a manifestation
of Calvinian hubris, must be read beyond the evaluations of serious and frivolous, with
serenity and a hint of a smile.’]
With this caution in mind, I want then to consider Ju¨rgen Habermas’s reading of
WN, in which he claims to find an unequivocal advocacy of deconstruction—a concept
which Habermas is quite keen here, as elsewhere, to dismiss—but fails to appreciate
the specifically Oulipian aspects of the text. Habermas himself presents something
of a theoretical caricature of Derrida as the destructive demon, a fictionaliser of re-
ality, for whom, he asserts ‘the house of “being” is itself sucked into the maelstrom
of an undirected linguistic current.’106 Habermas interprets WN in this light as part of
a theoretical project attempting to ‘reach’ outside the fictional realm to the ‘reality’
of the reader. Calvino, he states, ‘wants, in literary practice itself, to make the bor-
der between fiction and reality perceptible as mere appearance, as a difference that is
generated by the text itself—and to make this text (like every other) recognisable as
105Algirdas Julien Greimas, ‘Avis au Lecteur,’ Actes Semiotiques - DocumentsVI, no. 51 (1984): p.3.
106Ju¨rgen Habermas, ‘Philosophy and Science as Literature?’ In Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philo-
sophical Essays, trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992), p.210.
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a fragment of a universal text.’107 Calvino’s move in WN is to present a framing text
that posits, and reaches into, its own outside —the second person protagonist, per-
haps at its most plausible (or where its implausibility is least apparent) in the opening
words: ‘you are about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel.’108 It is of course
not quite representative because you already are reading it, an irreducible ‘not quite’.
This outside-text of the reader, the non-original sources, the uncompleted narratives
all offer, for Habermas, an ‘acting out’ of Derridean theory.109 WN is a text that, in
this depiction of theory, he asserts, privileges the fictional over the theoretical text, or
rather, renders theory a branch of fiction as ‘an exercise that is supposed to bring to
light the truth about literature: there are no originals, only their traces, no texts, only
readings, no fictional worlds in contrast to a reality.’110 Habermas thus sees the figure
of the ‘reader’ within the fiction as an illegitimate territorial claim, an attempted grasp
into ‘reality’ to bring it within its own compass. His critique then lies in the (uncontro-
versial) observation that the actualisation of the ‘reader’ (as one of Calvino’s dramatis
personae) in the fictional narrative, is not, and cannot correspond to, any real-world
reader for whom it forms the object of reading. Thus, he writes, ‘the fiction that tran-
scends itself falls prey to the laws of fiction. What Calvino wanted to demonstratewith
the novel has instead to be portrayed within it: the transition of the novel into life and
the presentation of life as reading.’111 This critique turns on an empirical appeal to the
illocutionary impact of actual speech as opposed to fictional representation. Which
is to say, in communication, rational engagement is effective, or at least bears with it
the expectation of effect, in a way in which literature—by virtue of the condition of
107Ibid., p.214.
108Calvino, If on a winter’s night a traveller, p.3.
109Habermas, ‘Philosophy and Science as Literature?’ p.216.
110Ibid., p.217.
111Ibid., p.222.
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fiction—does not.
Habermas wants to identify the specific difference of the fictional text, to retain
the differences between the scientific, the literary and philosophical, which he sees
threatened by his interpretation of ‘deconstruction’ as ‘falsely turning science and
philosophy into literature.’112 However, this reading takes as a too monological ad-
vocacy only the aspects of Calvino’s text that could be aligned with what is in any
case only a caricature of Derrida’s thought. Regardless of how well Calvino may be
assessed to have interpreted the poststructuralist theory that informs his work, there
is more at stake in WN than these problems of fictionalisation and the presentation of
fictional reality. What Habermas does not acknowledge, and what complicates this
picture somewhat, is that the novel is, according to Calvino’s own claims, constructed
on the basis of a model adapted from A. J. Greimas’s semiotic squares, and further,
that this model functions as a constraint in the Oulipian sense, a structuring device
not demanded by any internal necessity of its thematic material. This latter point is
particularly pertinent because it offers a methodological coherence to the productive
conditions of a novel that, at least by Habermas’s reckoning, represents an attempted
textual dissolution of ‘reality’. Thus if it were appraised as a ‘depiction’ of deconstruc-
tion (whatever that might mean), such an appraisal would also have to contend with
the depiction of Greimassian semiosis, and of Oulipian constrained writing practice.
Clearly, the suggestion that there is a structuralist cohesion of the work problematises
any straightforwardly poststructuralist reading of the kind (negatively) proposed by
Habermas. Calvino’s use of Greimassian models renders that disparity as acute as it
could be, since Greimas’s semiotics is itself generally acknowledged as the nearest
112Ibid., p.226.
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approach made by structuralist thought to the rigour of the mathematical sciences.113
Indeed, Calvino himself refers to Greimas as ‘the inflexible master of methodological
rigour.’114 Just as importantly, the Oulipian aspect complicates this further by render-
ing what, in structuralism proper, is a descriptive science of meaning as a prescriptive
programme for the composition of a novel. That is, inasmuch as Greimas’s proposal
of a universal, deep structure of meaning enters into the work, it is not claimed as
a description of the existing work (although, to some extent it also fulfils that role
in its presentation of the scheme, as I will describe below), but as a prescription for
structures around which the work, it is claimed, was composed. This prescription is,
however, not total, and indeed, the specifics of the ‘truth’ of such structural analysis in
its own terms is, in this prescriptive reversal at least, not directly the issue.
Calvino’s Comment j’ai e´crit un de mes livres [How I Wrote One of My Books]—
its title a reference to Raymond Roussel’s 1935, posthumous (partial) revelation of his
own ‘process’, Comment j’ai e´crit certains de mes livres [How I Wrote Some of My
Books]—appeared three years after the novel it was used to structure, as Number 20 of
the Bibliothe`que Oulipienne series.115 It presents the Oulipian aspect of the book—a
constraint system under which it was written. Each framing chapter is here given a
formula—a ‘model square’ (or rather, beginning with a single model for the first chap-
ter, an increasing number of squares up to the middle chapters, and then an incremental
113For example, in Franc¸ois Dosse’s extensive survey: ‘Closest to the hard sciences and to mathe-
matical language, semiotic structuralism was the most formalised branch of structuralism.’ Greimas, he
notes, was its ‘first promoter’, who ‘sought to encompass all of the sciences of man.’ Dosse, History of
Structuralism, Vol I, p.210.
114Italo Calvino, ‘In Memory of Roland Barthes,’ in The Literature Machine, trans. Patrick Creagh
(London: Vintage, 1997), p.302.
115It also appeared a year later in Actes Semiotiques—Documents with a foreword by Greimas him-
self. For an English version, see Italo Calvino, ‘How I Wrote One of My Books,’ in Oulipo Laboratory:
Texts from the Bibliothe`que Oulipienne, trans. Iain White (London: Atlas Press, 1995).
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retraction down to one again for the final chapter). The model diagrams are accompa-
nied by an explanatory text—a free-verse quatrain accompanied by a distich. The first
is shown in figure 3.2.
L l
L′l′
The reader who is there (L) is reading the book that is there (l)
The book that is there relates the story of the reader who is in the book (L′)
The reader who is in the book does not succeed in reading the book in the book (l′)
The book that is in the book does not relate the story of the reader who is there
The reader who is in the book claims to be the reader who is there
The book that is there claims to be the book that is in the book
Figure 3.2: Calvino’s model square
As Calvino states, this is a ‘personal adaptation’ of A. J. Greimas’s semiotic square.
The latter, for Greimas, represents ‘the elementary structure of signification’, upon
which the whole of the semantic universe—that is, the world as meaning, as the coher-
ent totality of meaning—is organised.116 Greimas’s square opposes signification (S) to
non-signification (S¯), the axis of contradiction. Each side of this axis is comprised of
a pair of contrary ‘semes’ (semiological units—s1 and s2), such that s1 – s¯2, and s2 –
116Algirdas Julien Greimas, On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory, trans. Paul J. Perron
and Frank H. Collins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p.50.
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s¯1 bear relationships of implication.
s1 s2
s¯1s¯2
S
S¯
: relation between contraries
: relation between contradictories
: relation of implication
Figure 3.3: Greimas’s model square
The basic square, shown in figure 3.3, is here presented as a structure of significa-
tion in its fully abstracted form. It is thus fairly simple to relate to the ‘model square’,
of the first chapter at least, in Calvino’s ‘adaptation’. Firstly, the primary opposition
of S and S¯ represent the two horizontal axes of a world ‘that is there’ and the world
within the book, each represented by a reader and a book. In Calvino’s model, s1 is
fulfilled by ‘the reader who is there (L)’, and is contrary to s2, ‘the book that is there
(l)’.117 Similarly, s¯1, ‘the reader in the book (L’)’ and s¯2 ‘the book in the book (l’)’
are contrary semes. For both cases, the act of reading (or the attempt at least) estab-
lishes the opposition of two semes, reader and book, in the first case ‘successfully’
117I have retained here the notation of L and l, from both the original French and Iain White’s trans-
lation, representing Livre (book) and lecteur (reader) respectively.
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(‘the reader who is there is reading the book that is there’) and ‘unsuccessfully’ in the
second case (‘the reader who is in the book does not succeed in reading the book in
the book’). The vertical axes, of implication, then connect ‘the reader who is there’ to
‘the book in the book’ and ‘the book that is there’ to ‘the reader in the book’ in the
mode of narrative relation (again, with a disparity of success): ‘the book that is there
relates the story of the reader who is in the book’ (s2 – s¯1); ‘the book in the book does
not relate the story of the reader who is there’ (s¯2 – s1). Finally the ‘distich’ presents
the diagonal relations of contradiction: ‘the reader who is in the book claims to be the
reader who is there’ (s¯1 – s1); ‘the book that is there claims to be the book that is in the
book’ (s2 – s¯2). Clearly the ‘claims’ here are false, placed, as they are, on the relation
of contradiction according to Greimas’s schema. Thus the model square prescribes
that the book is not the book in the book, and the reader is not the reader in the book.
It is clear then, that what Habermas presented as a conclusive point to undermine the
plausibility of an apparent ‘fictionalising’ of reality has actually been determined at
the very first step in the programmatic prescription for the novel.
Greimas describes ‘narrative structures as an autonomous instance within the gen-
eral economy of semiotics.’118 It is a surface level manifestation of deeper semiotic
structures. He acknowledges the similarity of his squares to Le´vi-Strauss’s paradig-
matic myth structures—that is, as a correlation of two pairs of binary oppositions.
This, he states, is the ‘primary nucleus of an elementary morphology’, but it may be
‘narrativised’. That is, ‘signification, to the extent that one seeks to find it in an object,
appears as an articulation of stable fundamental relations, it can also be represented
dynamically, if one considers it as an apprehension or production of meaning by a
118Greimas, On Meaning, p.65.
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subject.’119 What Calvino appears to have done then is to have taken this mode of
representation of possible apprehension of meaning—and here it becomes the meta-
meta-narrative of Calvino’s novel120—and use it, in Oulipian fashion, as the prescribed
structure for the generation of meaning in narrative construction, effectively the appli-
cation of a science. Calvino’s novel represents a shift from the projection of a universal
structure of interpretation onto existing literary works to the generation of such a work
in accordance with those same principles. The former, descriptive science of literature
is well-established in structuralist work; the latter, as a genetic structure of literature,
rather less so, if at all.
It should, however, be stressed that Calvino states that his models are an ‘adapta-
tion’ of those of Greimas rather than a direct application. The main apparent diversion
of Calvino’s square from its Greimassian prototype is the unidirectionality of the vec-
tors linking the semes. In the first example above they trace the perimeter of the square
in sequence, but this is not so in every case. In fact, the five squares of chapter 5 each
consist of the same arrangement of semes, only distinguished by the direction of the
relations (this is not, incidentally, an exhaustive list of arrangements). What is signifi-
cant about this unidirectionality is that it renders Greimas’s system of paradigmatic re-
lations into one of narrative continuity (of sorts). The directed-ness of action, in a nar-
rative application, introduces a temporal implication to what, in purely formal terms, is
a static system of oppositions and implications. This marks most clearly the reversal of
the usual direction of structuralist interpretation—the flattening of diachronic narrative
such that it allows the relations of its ‘constituent units’ to be appraised synchronically,
119Ibid., p.68.
120Greimas observes that, considered in such terms, any analysis such as I am pursuing here forms a
fourth level discourse. Greimas, ‘Avis au Lecteur,’ p.4.
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an interpretative operation that is crucial to Claude Le´vi-Strauss’s analysis of myth.
Furthermore, in this adaptation and in its instantiation in the end novel, ‘other
schemata and other constraints’ have also been used, as Calvino notes (without ex-
panding) at the end of the ‘explanatory’ essay.121 It is wise therefore to note Greimas’s
own caution: ‘rien ne serait-il plus faux que de chercher a` homologuer, par exem-
ple, la pre´sentation carre´iforme de son texte avec quelque the´orie—standard ou post-
standard—du carre´ se´miotique.’122 [‘. . .nothing would be more wrong than to look
to validate, for example, the presentation of the square-form of his text with some
theory—standard or post-standard—of semiotic squares.’] The texts—the novel and
the programme—are not simply a theoretical manifestation, an actualisation of struc-
turalist (or poststructuralist, or indeed any other) principles in novelistic form (as
Habermas claims of the novel at least), but represent rather an engagement with theo-
retical forms not so much motivated by the value of their criticism or the truth of their
interpretation, as by the way in which the forms they propose can be adapted as con-
structive material. In this case those former aspects—of interpretative value—might
even be irrelevant, and yet the forms are worked with (or perhaps it should be said,
played with) quite seriously—the proposed functions, the ‘deep’ structures entailed,
are engaged as objective material that constrains the hand of the subjective producer.
At the same time of course these texts can be read as reflections of the poststruc-
turalist theoretical context of the late seventies; but some caution, I would argue,
should be maintained therefore before the determinedly direct theoretical representa-
tion that Habermas claims to uncover is accepted. It is rather the case that, as Greimas
121Calvino, ‘How I Wrote One of My Books,’ p.20.
122Greimas, ‘Avis au Lecteur,’ p.3.
STRUCTURE AND GENESIS 203
writes, the work offers ‘ce qu’on pourrait appeler “ide´ologie de la forme”, cense´e in-
terpre´ter l’attitude, consciente ou inconsciente, d’un auteur, d’une e´poque ou d’une
culture, sur ses propres signs.’123 [‘. . .what one could call “ideology of form”, sup-
posed to interpret the conscious or unconscious attitude of an author, an epoch or
a culture, to its own signs.’] From this perspective, the work may be read precisely
as a product of, and a sly reflection back upon, the projected universality of the ‘sci-
entificity’ of the epoch, which it cannot resist from a transcendent critical position.
The manifestations here of deep structures as a kind of universal scientific rationality
can be taken as evidence of Horkheimer and Adorno’s diagnosis that ‘for enlighten-
ment, anything which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility
must be viewed with suspicion.’124 Art’s response to this cannot, however, simply be,
the Oulipo suggests, to transform itself into science, nor (as in Surrealism) to resist it
as irrationalism: as Adorno states in Aesthetic Theory, ‘art is not an arbitrary cultural
complement to science but, rather, stands in critical tension to it.’125 The artwork that
thus succeeds in maintaining this tension needs to adopt something of science’s ratio-
nality, but in a refracted form that makes the blind instrumentality of the latter available
to critical reflection. It is thus that Calvino’s work here engages in a committed and de-
tailed fashion—as, I propose, Oulipian methodology does at its best more generally—
with that scientificity that is both its condition of possibility and its ambivalent object
of implicit critique. That is, it allows it to be seen as an arbitrary prescription of the
work, rather than scientific description that claims its part in a rational totality.
The shift from description to prescription represents a significant reversal of the
123Ibid., p.4.
124Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.3.
125Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.315.
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usual structuralist interpretative technique with narrative, which is, in narrative or
mythological analysis, the abstraction of the paradigmatic from the syntagmatic—a-
chronic relations from temporally ordered narrative units (or indeed sub- or super-
narrative units). Instead, what we find in Calvino, as in certain other Oulipian texts, is
the (re-)construction of a narrative order from scientific (or quasi-scientific) schemata
of mythological, folkloric, anthropological, or indeed, abstractly, any structure given
synchronic presentation. Or in other words, what is ‘performed’ is the projection of a
paradigmatic system of relations onto a syntagmatic structure, a syntax of narrative.
Calvino’s adoption of Greimas’s semiological analysis is the clearest, perhaps the
sole, case of overtly structuralist methodology being used as the basis of an Oulipian
constraint. However, the relation to its theoretical validity is non-committal. In fact,
what makes Greimas’s theory susceptible to criticism is what makes it particularly
suitable (as constraint) for Oulipian adoption. That is, insofar as Greimas represents
likely the farthest extent of a project true to Saussure’s proposal of a ‘general semiol-
ogy’,126 the abstract reduction to core formal relations tends towards the hypostatisa-
tion of form itself—as Franc¸ois Dosse notes, ‘there was a steep price for the quadruple
negation of the first person pronoun, of the subject, of intersubjective dialogue, and of
the here and now with respect to space and time, and Greimas’s theory rather quickly
ran onto the shoals of an impoverished narrative reality, in favour of an ontologised
structure.’127 What renders the semiological square suitable as a model of narrative
production (rather than description) is precisely its abstract rigidity—it is this that al-
126Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p.18.
127Dosse, History of Structuralism, Vol I, p.215 In fact, Greimas himself concedes this tendency
towards the hypostatisation of form: ‘any metalanguage we are able to imagine for the purposes of
speaking about meaning turns out to be not only a signifying but a substantifying language as well,
which freezes all intentional dynamism into a conceptual terminology.’ Greimas, cited in Jameson, The
Prison-House of Language, p.126.
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lows it to form a constraint for Calvino. Considered as a development of scientific
rationality in the domain of narrative, Greimas’s model can be adopted in two ways:
first, a claim to be the true and universal structure of meaning (within which literature
is subsumed); and second (which may or may not fully respect the ‘truth’ of the first
even while it respects its form), the manifestation of a structure whose use in literary
production is an innovation. The former aspect implies the a-temporality of narrative
form; the latter effects a re-temporalisation (as the methodically new) by means of its
artistic use.
In a move to avoid the hypostatising tendency of Greimas’s theoretical structures—
specifically his actantial model, which functions, effectively, as a completion of Propp’s
categorisation of ‘dramatis personae’, incorporating the lacking (according to Le´vi-
Strauss) semantic analysis128—Jameson suggests that it is better considered as a pro-
cess performed on a text rather than a revelation of that text’s underlying static struc-
ture, that is, that Greimas’s squares do not define the underlying structure itself, but
offer analytic strategy towards finding those invariants.129 The upshot of this is pre-
cisely the reverse of the Oulipian adaptation—in Jameson’s attempt to restore its the-
oretical viability (attempting to keep a certain fluidity of its signifying concepts), the
theory’s specification of structural determinants is softened, so that it becomes less
prescriptive; but—again—what the Oulipian project demands—what, in part, defines
the constraint—is hard structural determinants. For formal-theoretical materials to
become objects of deliberate use, they must take on a certain substantiality, yet this
128See Algirdas Julien Greimas, ‘Reflections on Actantial Models,’ in Narratology: An Introduction,
ed. Susana Onega Jaen and Jose´ Angel Garcı´a Landa, trans. Daniele McDowell, Ronald Schleifer, and
Alan Velie (London: Longman, 1996).
129‘It seems more revealing in this connection to use the language of process rather than that of
substance and to speak of the “actantial reduction” as a type of operation performed upon a text, instead
of the “actantial model” as a static vision of structure.’ Jameson, The Prison-House of Language, p.125.
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substantiality is not one that is strictly related to their viability in terms of any expe-
riential applicability or ‘truth’. Rather the internal coherence is what is of value, and
again, this is the mark of formalism over referential theory, that it needs no recourse to
experiential grounding. Furthermore, the Oulipian use of such formalism is not a re-
flection of that theory’s assumed totality; it only forms a component part of the artistic
materials adopted by the Oulipian constrained writer. Given the tendency of formalist
thought in the twentieth century, this approach is not without a certain irony: the more
hermetically rigorous the constraint, the better it functions as such, but the less it has
any kind of meaning. What it does have is a certain resistance as an abstract mate-
rial, making its use comparable to artisanal processes, which will be the topic of the
following chapter.
4. Craft, Construction and Constraint
Artisan des mathe´matiques je salue
—Jacques Roubaud1
Oulipian Craft
In the previous chapter, I presented an account of the scientific aspirations of the for-
malist and structuralist developments of the human sciences in the twentieth century as
the object of a certain ambivalence, from the perspective of Oulipian practice. On the
one hand, the homogenising and rigidifying tendency of totalising scientificity, where
taken as programmatic, was held to be antithetical to artistic or literary production (that
is, at the point where descriptive structures reversed into prescriptive ones). On the
other—and this is, I would suggest, the particularly Oulipian context—the tendency
towards reification in such rationalist conceptual patterns of the modern world could
render these forms as distinctly modern material (that is, whatever must be worked
1Jacques Roubaud,Mathe´matique: (re´cit) (Paris: Seuil, 1997), p.76. ‘I hail you craftsman of math-
ematics.’ Roubaud,Mathematics, p.87.
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with) for artistic construction. To put this in Adorno’s terms, the absolutising tendency
of modern rationality which, he avers, compels the artistic process to develop its own
rational-constructive measures, here becomes not just a mimetic aspect of the work,
but, in the character of its hypostatic domination, part of the constitutive material upon
which the artistic process may draw. With this, and particularly with the sense that
this modern material is itself worked, the constructive process of the modern literary
work, in the Oulipian mould, begins to resemble something of an older conception of
craft. This resemblance is in the framework of a broad concept of material, as any-
thing which, in Adorno’s terms, ‘artists work with, . . . the sum of all that is available
to them.’2 Modern art, by Adorno’s conception, is driven towards ever more subjec-
tively willed constructive principles, while craft, as a now-redundant antecedent of
the modern conception of art, is deemed aesthetically null. This shift is traceable in
terms of materials. I aim to show that craft, considered in light of its Oulipian adap-
tation, is actually not so distant from what Adorno means by construction, and has
aspects that may yet be recovered, redeemed or reinvented; at least if Adorno’s artistic
categories—in which material here has a focus—are broadened somewhat.
Although the idea of a craft of formal materials is a result suggested by the previ-
ous chapter, the prevalence of the craft concept is implicit in the whole of the Oulipian
project, as one of skill in the manipulation of their primary medium—language. ‘Craft’
may also be encountered quite explicitly in the group’s own descriptions of their prac-
tice. For example, an early document of the group’s intentions states their intention
‘to inventory—or to invent—the procedures by which expression becomes capable of
transmuting itself, solely through its verbal craft [facture verbale], into other more or
2Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.202.
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less numerous expressions.’3 Queneau, in his ‘Potential Literature’, as one of three
primary characteristics, designates their researches as ‘craftsmanlike’ [artisanales].4
And a little later, Jacques Roubaud offers, in a 1977 essay, the following proposition:
‘Oulipian work is craftsmanlike [artisanale]’; and that they have ‘a claim to crafts-
manship [revendication d’artisanat].’5
The artisanal claim is inscribed in the group’s name: the Ouvroir, which, as I
noted in my introduction, is inadequately translated by the English term ‘workshop’.
In fact, Raymond Queneau, in his 1967 TLS article, ‘Science and Literature’, written
in English, himself uses the term ‘workroom’,6 but ‘workshop’ is the more usual En-
glish translation. The word is carefully chosen: Queneau, in his programmatic essay
‘Potential Literature’, offers, as part of the breakdown of the group’s name: ‘Ouvroir
because it intends to work,’7 thus setting out the Oulipo’s practical intent. In a simi-
lar vein, Jean Lescure recalls that the term ‘ouvroir . . . flattered the modest taste that
we shared for beautiful work and good deeds.’8 What Lescure alludes to here is the
word’s sense of charity, modest scale, communal production and above all the hand-
icraft nature of a non-industrial and prosaic (rather than poetic) kind of work—all of
which are in some sense characteristic of Oulipian activity. (The sense of ‘charity’ is
perhaps not immediately obvious, but it should be recalled that the Oulipo’s aim, in
3Oulipo, ‘The Colle`ge de Pataphysique and the Oulipo,’ p.49. Oulipo, ‘Le Colle`ge de ’Pataphysique
et l’Oulipo: Pre´sentation des travaux de la Sous-Commission dans le Dossier 17 du Colle`ge de ’Pata-
physique,’ in La litte´rature potentielle (Paris: Gallimard, folio essais, 1973), p.37.
4Queneau, ‘Potential Literature,’ p.51. Raymond Queneau, ‘Litte´rature potentielle,’ in Baˆtons,
chiffres et lettres (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), p.322.
5Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.85. Jacques Roubaud, ‘La
mathe´matique dans la me´thode de Raymond Queneau,’ in Atlas de litte´rature potentielle (Paris: Gal-
limard, folio essais, 1981), p.53.
6Queneau, ‘Science and Literature,’ p.864.
7Queneau, ‘Potential Literature,’ p.51.
8Lescure, ‘Brief History of the Oulipo,’ p.33.
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the beginning at least, was to provide tools for writers rather than to create literary
works.9) Le Petit Robert defines ouvroir as: ‘1: Lieu re´serve´ aux ouvrages de couture,
de broderie. . ., dans une communaute´ de femmes, un couvent. 2: Atelier de charite´ ou`
des personnes be´ne´voles faisaient des “ouvrages de dames” pour les indigents ou des
ornaments d’e´glise.’ [‘1: Place reserved for sewing, embroidery . . ., in a community
of women, a convent. 2: Charitable workshop where volunteers did “ladies’ work”
for the destitute or made church ornaments.’] Noe¨l Arnaud, in his ‘Prolegomena to a
Fourth Oulipo Manifesto, or Not’, reiterates these meanings, and recalls discussions
with Albert-Marie Schmidt in which the latter ‘was aware of the successive or parallel
definitions of the word ouvroir; he saw in it above all a secluded place where people
work together on a difficult task, where people strive to elaborate new techniques, not
knowing whether the latter will produce results or explode sadly like a child’s bal-
loon,’ adding that ‘this aura of the trade guild with its slow and precise elaboration of
the “masterpiece” in its newness, its originality steeped in the most ancient lessons of
the masters, suited this subtle and perverse spirit.’ In addition to the definitions already
set out, Arnaud adds:
. . . an ouvroir—a word that has fallen into disuse—once denoted a shop
and, as late as the eighteenth century, a light and mobile shop made of
wood, in which the master cobblers of Paris displayed their wares and
pursued their trade. The word could also denote that part of a textile fac-
tory where the looms are placed; or, in an arsenal, the place where a team
of workers performs a given task; or a long room where the young women
in a community work on projects appropriate to their sex; or a charitable
9See Queneau, ‘Potential Literature,’ p.51.
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institution for impoverished women and girls who found therein shelter,
heat, light, and thankless, ill-paid work, the result of which these institu-
tions sold at a discount, not without having skimmed off a tidy profit, thus
depriving the isolated workers of their livelihood and leading them (as it
was charged) into vice.’10
The word ouvroir is cognate with the verb ouvrer—to make, work on or fashion
manually; ouvrier—a manual worker; and also ouvrage and oeuvre, both of which
denote (a) work in the object-sense. Yet these two latter associations also suggest a
certain playful ambivalence: ouvrage is a piece of work in the prosaic sense, while
oeuvre tends to relate to art-works (in English, of course, we take it to mean the total
collection of works of a given artist), and thus objects that, in some sense, transcend
their merely empirical status. That there is something at stake in this etymological
ambivalence is indicated by Jacques Roubaud’s comments on Queneau’s Cent mille
milliards de poe`mes:
The first properly Oulipian work [ouvrage oulipien] par excellence, claimed
as such by the Oulipo, is a work that exhibits potentiality in all its force:
the Cent mille milliards de poe`mes . . . In his cmmp, it seems clear to me
that RQ casts potentiality in the service of composition, but not of litera-
ture. That book is not, in the sense understood by FLL, an Oulipian work
[oeuvre oulipienne].11
The Oulipian work—ouvrage—is thus a craft of making whose significance is
10Arnaud, ‘Prolegomena,’ p.xii.
11Jacques Roubaud, ‘Perecquian OULIPO,’ trans. Jean-Jacques Poucel, Yale French Studies, no. 105
(2004): pp.100–1.
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not simply subsumed by what it makes; that is, it validates potential as such. The
end-work, in which this potential might find its actualisation, the work of literature—
oeuvre—is a separate (though of course related) concern. This reiterates what I have
elsewhere noted, that the Oulipian project—put bluntly—is to develop methods rather
than end-works. However, this emphasis on composition as such also leans towards a
valorisation of the craft of making that is, while not independent of the artwork itself,
able to be approached critically in a way that is not subsumed by the latter concept. It
shifts the focus of writing to the act of writing itself and the materiality of language.
Jean Lescure writes:
Language (literary language) doesn’t manipulate notions, as people still
believe; it handles verbal objects and maybe even, in the case of poetry
. . ., sonorous objects. Just as in painting the dissimulation of the object
of reference by grids of non-figuration claimed less to annihilate this ob-
ject, table, landscape, or face, than to divert attention toward the painting
object, a certain number of sentences written today fix the attention of the
observer on the singular object that is literary language.12
The constraint makes a demand of the writer to be more deliberate, more rational,
in the construction of the text. Here the texture of letters, words, sentences is at the
forefront of compositional concerns and language is not simply the transparent means
to express something.
That there is (or can be) something craft-like in writing is, on the face of it, a
rediscovery of older concepts of art. The separation of art from craft is, as is well
12Lescure, ‘Brief History of the Oulipo,’ pp.35–36.
CRAFT, CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRAINT 213
known, a relatively recent development: art is a shifting category. Since antiquity,
and still in the middle ages, writing was associated with grammar and rhetoric, such
that the skill of composition was not subsumed by the importance of ‘creativity’. This
is not to say that the medieval poet simply followed rules, but rather that the ‘art of
rhetoric’ provided the framework for poetic invention and thus a harmonisation of
social form and artistic composition.13 There is, in the Oulipo’s project, an explicit
recovery of certain outmoded writing forms characterised by this craft-like skill of their
production. Oulipians frequently cite the Rhe´toriqueurs (or Grands Rhe´toriqueurs), a
group of court poets of the fifteenth and early sixteenth century (called ‘anticipatory
plagiarists’ by the Oulipo). Their work comes from an era where poetry was not yet
classed separately to rhetoric, though their use of intricate formal devices represents
a particular extreme of the valuing of technical skill in composition (to the disdain of
some).14 One of the Oulipo’s founding members, Albert-Marie Schmidt, researched
and wrote extensively on the Rhe´toriqueurs and Baroque poets.15 Jacques Roubaud
writes:
A family of Plagiarists of the Oulipo, the Rhe´toriqueurs, dubbed ‘Grands’
by pleonasm and redundancy, were, in the fifteenth and beginning of the
sixteenth century, the disciples and assiduous copycats of the Oulipo. In
fact, the Rhe´toriqueurs borrowed from the Oulipo their conception of lit-
13Shiner, The Invention of Art, p.32.
14See Alex Preminger and T. V. F. Brogan, eds., The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and
Poetics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), p.1052. In Ernst Curtius’s book on medieval
European literature, the Rhe´toriqueurs merit only a passing mention in a somewhat dismissive section
on formal mannerisms: ‘the mannerist wants to say things not normally but abnormally. He prefers
the artificial and affected to the natural.’ Lipogrammatic, pangrammatic and alliterative schemes are
described as ‘trifling’, ‘absurd’, ‘barbaric’. Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin
Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013), p.282ff.
15Motte, Oulipo Primer, pp.189–90.
CRAFT, CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRAINT 214
erature: they consider themselves craftsmen of language and fashioned
themselves as ‘facteurs’ (crafters): that is to say, as artisans, joiners, or
cobblers of the word.16
The term ‘anticipatory plagiarism’ encapsulates the Oulipo’s dual relation to tradition—
the prizing of the new alongside the recovery of the (apparently) outdated in a relation
that is at once ironic and respectful of precedence.17 The earlier Occitan Troubadours,
who include Arnaut Daniel (fl.1180–1200), the devisor of the sestina form, are con-
sidered by the Oulipians in similar terms. Roubaud classes the Troubadours as those
who ’fashion themselves as “labourers” of language, as “blacksmiths”, or, sometimes
more arrogantly as ‘goldsmiths’ of the word.18 Traditionally, the sestina is a poetic
form of six six-line stanzas with a permutational progression for the sequence of end-
words (123456, 615243, 364125, 532614, 451362, 246531)—a diagram tracing this
progression takes the form of a spiral (which is, coincidentally or not, reminiscent of
the ‘grand Gidouille’, the spiral on the belly of Jarry’s Ubu). The sestina is one of
the Oulipo’s favourite rediscoveries, and its form has been the subject of Oulipian re-
searches, particularly by Queneau and Roubaud. This has led to the generalisation of
the form as the n-ina orQuenina along with the positing of the series of prime numbers
that are susceptible to the form as ‘Queneau numbers’.19
16Roubaud, ‘Perecquian OULIPO,’ p.103.
17Noe¨l Arnaud writes in the preface to the first compilation volume of the Bibliothe`que Oulipi-
enne: ‘Qu’on ne s’y trompe pas: le “franc¸ais vivante” comporte aussi la re´habilitation de formes et
de contraintes anciennes, et parmi celles des Grands Rhe´toriqueurs.’ Noe¨l Arnaud, ‘Pre´face,’ in La
Bibliothe`que Oulipienne, Volume 1 (Paris: E´ditions Ramsay, 1987), p.ii. [‘Make no mistake: “living
French” also includes the rehabilitation of ancient forms and constraints, and among them, those of the
Grands Rhe´toriqueurs.’]. See also Perec, ‘History of the Lipogram.’
18Roubaud, ‘Perecquian OULIPO,’ p.104. Curtius also has a few words about Arnaut Daniel: he
adopts ‘the stylistic ideal of difficult technique. . . . He wrestles with his “arduous material”.’ Curtius,
European Literature, p.352.
19See Oulipo, ‘La Quenine,’ in Atlas de litte´rature potentielle (Paris: Gallimard, folio essais, 1981).
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Art Versus Craft
It is necessary then to consider how the concepts of art and craft have diverged in
the modern era (with a concomitant hierarchy in favour of the former); and so what
it means now to hark back to an older model of cultural production in certain Oulipo
writings. ‘Craft’ is characterised by skilled production, a direct (human) engagement
with the materials and tools of production, and, perhaps most significantly for the con-
cept of art that has become its other, the idea of subordination to a given (social rather
than autonomous) purpose. The term today implies an outdated mode of production,
in terms both of the actual activity of production, as well as the conditions of thought
about its meaning. The art-craft combination prior to their categorial separation as a
model of productive activity has been superseded by, on the one hand, industrial cap-
italism, and on the other, fluctuating conceptions of autonomous art as something that
proposes precisely to separate itself from the functional demands of the former.
Given the historical context of such references, the pursuit of craft as such in the
modern era retracts from what Adorno considers to be the imperative dynamic of art,
whose social truth is only possible in its relation to the conditions of its own time,
rather than its harking back to earlier modes of production and society. Consider for
example, Adorno’s description of Bach as a transitional figure—‘no archaic master
craftsman but rather a genius of mediation.’20 Adorno dismisses the ‘devotees’ of Bach
Oulipian works using the sestina form are numerous. A recently translated example is Harry Mathews,
‘Saint Catherina,’ in All That is Evident is Suspect: Readings from the Oulipo 1963-2018, ed. Ian Monk
and Daniel Levin Becker, trans. Ian Monk (San Francisco: McSweeney’s, 2018). An example of a work
utilising a higher order n-ina (17 in this case) is Ian Monk, ‘Return(s),’ in All That is Evident is Suspect:
Readings from the Oulipo 1963-2018, ed. Ian Monk and Daniel Levin Becker, trans. Daniel Levin
Becker (San Francisco: McSweeney’s, 2018).
20Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Bach Defended Against his Devotees,’ in Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry
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who find in the latter’s music a timeless essence,21 because, for Adorno, Bach’s music
cannot be ‘deciphered’ without understanding the
. . . change in the work-process that took place during the same epoch
through the emergence of manufacturing, which consisted essentially in
breaking down the old craft operations into its smaller component acts.
If this resulted in the rationalisation of material production, then Bach
was the first to crystallise the idea of the rationally constituted work, of
the aesthetic domination of nature; it was no accident that he named his
major instrumental work after the most important technical achievement
of musical rationalisation.22
The change in the ‘work-process’ that Adorno refers to here—both a change in
the nature of productive processes with the emergence of industrial capitalism and
the associated rise of enlightenment rationalisation—is part of the complex of social
developments that led to the general concept of ‘art’. This ‘modern system of the
arts’ is comprised, as Kristeller tells us, of ‘the five major arts of painting, sculpture,
architecture, music and poetry’, which ‘constitute the irreducible nucleus . . . on which
all writers and thinkers seem to agree.’ While other arts may enter into this core set,
Kristeller observes that they are distinguished by being ‘clearly separated by common
characteristics from the crafts, the sciences and other human activities, [which] has
been taken for granted by most writers on aesthetics from Kant to the present day.’23
Weber (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1981), p.138.
21Adorno couches this in terms of a quasi-theological ontological appeal, closely connected to what
he calls the ‘vogue of ontology’. Ibid., p.135.
22Ibid., p.139. The work in question here is, of course, Bach’s 1722/1742Well-Tempered Clavier.
23Paul Oskar Kristeller, ‘The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics Part
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Kristeller identifies the Abbe´ Batteux’s Les beaux arts re´duits a` un meˆme principe
(1746) (rather than the perhaps more influential Encyclope´die (1751–72) by Diderot
and D’Alambert) as the decisive crystallisation of ideas that had been tending that way
for some time. In this work, Batteux offers a distinction between the pleasure-giving
‘fine arts’, the functional ‘mechanical arts’ and a third category combining both use-
fulness and pleasure in which he places eloquence and architecture.24 This separation
of the ‘fine arts’ from science, craft and other activities made a decisive break from
the various earlier divisions of antiquity and the early middle ages.25 In these pre-
modern schemes, ‘aesthetic quality’ is not a criterion, and no division of functional
from beautiful productions is conceived. (The concept of beauty, where it is discussed,
is presented as a ‘metaphysical aspect of God’ rather than an attribute of art.26) Fur-
thermore, where art is not constitutively separated from scientific knowledge, there is
not the same division, made prominent by Kant’s third critique, of the roles of learning
and genius in its production.
The development of concepts represented here is in line with transformations in
the character of commodity production and certain hierarchical changes in the social
situation of art, changes that would further distance the ‘fine arts’ from historical craft
I,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 12, no. 4 (1951): pp.497–8. Of course, the ‘present day’ of Kristeller’s
writing here is the early fifties, and the time between then and our own ‘present day’ has seen significant
developments in the concept of art that bring this ‘modern system’ into question, one of which being
the often overlooked activities of the Oulipo.
24Paul Oskar Kristeller, ‘The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics Part
II,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 13, no. 1 (1952): p.20ff.
25For example, the late Roman, Martianus Capella’s ‘definitive scheme’ of the liberal arts comprises
grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music. A twelfth-century scheme
of ‘mechanical arts’ lists weaving, weaponry, navigation, agriculture, hunting, medicine, and drama,
in which, intriguingly, architecture, sculpture and painting are classed as subdivisions of weaponry. In
schemes of this period, music is usually associated with mathematics; and poetry with grammar, rhetoric
and logic. Kristeller, ‘The Modern System of the Arts I,’ p.505ff.
26Ibid., p.509.
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production, on the one hand, and its industrial replacement, on the other. Meanwhile,
the shift in industrial processes with the development of mass-production and the di-
vision of labour led to the de-skilling of manual workers and their subordination to
machines, or machine-like demands of unchanging and repetitive operations, as Marx
observed.27 With this loss of craft skills a certain level of human productive engage-
ment with material is lost, the worker no longer has mastery of the process, nor a direct
relationship with the product—experience is diminished through rationalisation.
The role of the hand in Benjamin’s ‘The Storyteller’ is significant in understanding
what changes with craft’s decline, in an account very close, in this respect, to that of
Adorno:
[Storytelling] does not aim to convey the pure ‘in itself’ or gist of a thing,
like information or a report. It submerges the thing into the life of the
storyteller, in order to bring it out of him again. Thus, traces of the story-
teller cling to the story the way the handprints of the potter cling to a clay
vessel.28
‘The hand marks out authentic experience’ in Benjamin’s essay, as Esther Leslie
observes.29 It is the figure of human mediation in the wider process of the world from
which the storyteller draws material, and the hand in turn leaves its mark on the objects
27‘In every craft it seizes, manufacture creates a class of so-called unskilled labourers, a class strictly
excluded by the nature of handicraft industry. If it develops a one-sided speciality to perfection, at the
expense of the whole of a man’s working capacity, it also begins to make a speciality of the absence of
all development.’ ‘In handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the
machine makes use of him.’ Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes,
vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p.470, 548.
28Benjamin, ‘The Storyteller,’ p.149.
29Esther Leslie, ‘Walter Benjamin: Traces of Craft,’ Journal of Design History 11, no. 1 (1998): p.6.
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it produces in a way that is neutralised by the functional determinations of informa-
tion. Benjamin also imagines the combination of travelling journeyman and traditional
craftsman as a weaving—as Leslie notes, another craft image—of the spatial and tem-
poral dimensions of experience. This is not simply to define craft activity solely by its
manual engagement, and clearly storytelling, the crafting of a story, is not the produc-
tion of a material artefact in quite the same sense as the making of pottery for example.
That said, there are parallels with the change in material production and the develop-
ment of the modern concept of ‘literature’, which has a relation to autonomous ‘fine
art’ in its discarding of the functional writing which was previously considered under
the same term.
Both material craft and storytelling in Benjamin’s essay are the working through
of experience, of experience as a mediating form that is absent in the modern form
of ‘information’. This means that the hand represents synecdochically the body and,
more broadly, the actuality of its life: more than just the handling of clay or the twisting
of fibres, this is the grasp of reality, real praxis.
Now if it is to be maintained that Oulipian practice has something of a craft char-
acter about it, it must be shown that there is a conception of craft in a sense that is
broader than its pre-industrial manual aspect. My argument will be that what makes
the Oulipian conception of ‘craft’ different is that, here, the materials of production, in
a hardened era of ‘information’, have become primarily intellectual, but nevertheless
still need to be worked upon. This leads to the paradoxical situation of a material that
has the form of information, but is used or drawn into a process of artistic production in
the same way that the material characteristics of physical craft shape, rather than dom-
inate, the latter’s production. Clearly the sense in which the ‘world’ is engaged in this
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has shifted, but this reflects the social condition of rational structures that themselves
have become reified as if they were natural forms.
The shift in the concept of art that leads to craft’s becoming outmoded, separate
and categorially inferior—above all, less free30—is the result of a complex of social
and conceptual changes. As already mentioned, these include the changes in industrial
production and the division of labour that render craft skills largely obsolete, but also
changes in the context of artworks’ production, both social and economic: the desacral-
isation of art accompanying the Enlightenment; the shift from artists’ dependency on
patronage to a ‘free’ and anonymous marketplace; the establishment of academies;
and related social hierarchies of cultural producers and the objects and places of con-
sumption.31 These changes may be more commonly understood as developing toward
the of the category of ‘autonomy’ in art, in which the exclusion of craft as such is a
side-effect rather than a primary concern.32
The long-standing hierarchy of the intellectual over the manual comes to concep-
tual fruition in relation to the arts with Kant’s theory of the aesthetic.33 The attempted
30‘The idea of the artist’s freedom versus the artisan’s dependence underlay each of the other ideal
qualities ascribed to the artist: freedom from the imitation of traditional models (originality), freedom
from the dictates of reason and rule (inspiration), freedom from restrictions on fantasy (imagination),
freedom from the exact imitation of nature (creation).’ Shiner, The Invention of Art, p.112.
31See Ibid., p.99–111.
32See Bu¨rger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p.36ff. Bu¨rger presents several proposed explanations for
this concept’s emergence, none of which he considers definitive. For example, he relates B. Hinz’s the-
ory that, with industrialisation, ‘autonomous’ art retained something of the craft stage of production—
the producer’s relation to the produced object, otherwise lost in industrial process—and yet at the same
time denied craft by intellectualising such production. This is, at least, suggestive that something may
be retrieved from the concept of craft.
33As Alfred Sohn-Rethel notes regarding Kant’s project more generally, the hierarchy of intellectual
over manual is crystallised in Kant into an irresolvable gap, such that ‘transcendental spontaneity’ is
an inexplicable fact—this is, for Sohn-Rethel, the idealist’s fetishism, placing a taboo on any temporal-
spatial interpretation of the pure understanding, which ‘presupposes that the existing division between
head and hand is in its very nature timeless—and this said, bourgeois order must run according to its
self-appointed norms until the end of time.’ Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour, p.39.
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grounding of the supposed ‘autonomy’ of art in Kant’s theory of disinterested aesthetic
judgement is, of course, to mistake a transcendental judgement for an objective condi-
tion, but Kant’s critical project represents a philosophical crystallisation of the chang-
ing culture. Indeed, as Adorno notes, the concept of the aesthetic and the associated
one of ‘nature’ that supports it, is reflective of the historically contingent ‘devaluation’
of the immediacy of desire or real sensuous engagement; that is, beauty, in fact, is
constituted by ‘that strange interplay of forces between desire and the prohibition of
desire.’34 However, the separation of craft from autonomous fine art is not so clear cut
in Kant’s work, and he does not support the crudely romantic idea of the artist as an un-
constrained free spirit, nor of the artwork as autonomous production. Indeed, I would
argue, at this crucial juncture of philosophical thinking, Kant retains something of the
older idea of skilled production, recalling the Greek concept of techne¯, which makes
no division between art and craft. In other words, Kant is not simply a proto-romantic,
and even while the seeds of that movement can be found in his work, he retains notions
of artistic production that complicate it.
If Kant is in certain respects a key figure in the rise of idealist hierarchies that
accompany the division of art and craft in bourgeois modernity, some care needs to
be taken with his concept of ‘aesthetic’ and how it relates to art, since, while Kant
offers a theory of the aesthetic to explain judgements of beauty, it offers neither an
ontological explanation of artworks, nor the grounds for supposing their autonomy.
Kant gives an overview of art ‘in general’ by means of its distinction from three other
concepts: nature (art is a doing that produces a work, as opposed to nature’s effects;
which is to say that art is a free activity, grounded in reason); science (art is a practical
34Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59, pp.31–2.
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rather than theoretical faculty); and handicrafts [Handwerke] (art is liberal, purposive
as play as opposed to remunerative—of value only by virtue of its effect, that is, its
end lies outside itself). Art is primarily defined here by Kant in terms of the activity
that constitutes it, and thus draws on the classical concept of art—techne¯ or ars—as
a skill for producing things. Techne¯, which Aristotle defines as the ‘trained ability of
making something under the guidance of rational thought,’35 rather than our modern
‘fine art’, provides the broader concept here. In fact, despite Kant’s third distinction
above, he still retains something of this older concept of art that combines elements that
were, at his time of writing, only just diverging into art and craft. Kant’s distinction
of art from craft echoes the ancient distinction of liberal and ‘servile’ or ‘vulgar’ arts,
a distinction based not so much on the activities or objects themselves but on their
purposive context.
Kant then subdivides art into mechanical and aesthetic art, in which the mechanical
is that activity that is purely cognitively determined and the aesthetic is that aimed at
producing some pleasure or other. This latter art is then further divided into agreeable
art (sensuously enjoyable) and beautiful (or ‘fine’) art (provoking the reflecting power
of judgement).36 It is apparent here that fine art is only one subdivision within a wider
sphere of productive activities—and with the further explanation of fine art and its
productive source(s) that follows, Kant is here offering the philosophical ballast to an
emergent idea of the period. But it is also the case that certain aspects of production
that would henceforth be denigrated as craft retain a role in the production of even
fine art, despite the distinction that Kant makes with ‘handicraft’. That is, inasmuch as
35Cited in Shiner, The Invention of Art, p.23. Shiner adds that this definition is rather narrow in Greek
culture, since the concept also includes ‘a dimension of spontaneous tact.’ Ibid., p.23.
36Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:303–6.
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Kant’s concept of art recalls techne¯, it also implies skill with materials, the ability to
fashion effectively—Kant does not identify art as entirely coincident with the aesthetic,
a conflation perpetrated by some later theorists.37
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement is not primarily a work on art theory,
and his theorisation of the faculty of aesthetic judgement is based on the impossibility
of a rational determination of nature as such rather than artworks: in the Critique of
Pure Reason, Kant complains of the attempted rational determination of ‘aesthetics’ as
‘the failed hope . . . of bringing the critical estimation of the beautiful under principles
of reason.’38 When Kant does finally accede to the use of the term for judgements of
beauty, it is still, however, distanced from determinate concepts of the understanding.
That, indeed, is its definition—beauty is a subjective, but disinterested reflection on
nature, constituted by the faculties of cognition in general (and hence universal)—the
imagination and understanding—engaged in ‘free play’ but without subsumption by
concepts of the understanding. Thus ‘beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an
object, insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of an end.’39 The artwork,
by contrast, is necessarily cognised as a determinate object inasmuch as it is a human
product, but in order to be judged beautiful it must nevertheless appear as nature.
Thus Kant makes the apparently paradoxical statement that ‘nature was beautiful, if at
the same time it looked like art; and art can only be called beautiful if we are aware
37For example, Clement Greenberg: ‘aesthetic judgements are given and contained in the immediate
experience of art. They coincide with it; they are not arrived at afterwards through reflection or thought.
Aesthetic judgements are also involuntary: you can no more choose whether or not to like a work of art
than you can choose to have sugar taste sweet or lemons sour.’ Clement Greenberg, ‘Complaints of an
Art Critic,’ in The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4: Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969,
ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p.265.
38Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A21/B35. Here the term is restricted to the transcendental
aesthetic as the ‘principles of a priori sensibility’. Ibid., B36.
39Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 5:236.
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that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature.’40 In the first case then, Kant aligns
the appreciation of nature’s purposiveness with its teleology, that is its absolute moral
purpose. In the second, art—that is, human artifice—retains its freedom by evading
the total determination of a causal chain. But the difficulty arises that the artwork is
nonetheless irreducibly something produced.
The relation of the artificial and the genial in the artwork is one of some ambiva-
lence in Kant. He posits an ‘inborn predisposition’ given by nature, quite without
accountability, to the artist. He calls this genius, which ‘gives the rule to art’. It ‘is a
talent for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given, not a predisposi-
tion of skill for that which can be learned in accordance with some rule, consequently
that originality must be its primary characteristic.’41 (Note that the ambivalence over
the term ‘rule’ [Regel] begins here.) That genius escapes rationalisation, is not sub-
ject to the plans of its possessor and that it cannot be communicated, looks, on the
face of it, a clear contradiction with Oulipian principles of deliberate, rational deter-
mination in literature—voluntary literature, to use Queneau’s phrase. The Oulipo’s
insistence on the deliberateness of writing is in opposition to what they call ‘eructative
literature’42 (which would, for the Oulipo, likely describe Surrealism, as I described
in chapter 1). Regardless of whether or not it can be described as eructation, however,
for Kant, genius, while it brings spirit [Geist] to art, does not alone produce beautiful
art—‘there can also be original nonsense’, he states—and it therefore needs also to be
channeled, shaped by a certain ‘academic form’, even though the latter must not be
allowed to ‘show through’ in the work.43 Thus, Kant continues, ‘genius can only pro-
40Ibid., 5:306.
41Ibid., 5:307.
42Le Lionnais, ‘Second Manifesto,’ p.xxiv.
43Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 5:307,5:308.
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vide rich material for products of art; its elaboration and form require a talent that has
been academically trained in order to make a use of it that can stand up to the power of
judgement.’44 Here it is no longer clear that genius is giving the rule so much as giving
material to be constrained by a rule, one instilled by academic training, and it is this
training now that is necessary for it to stand up to the power of judgement.
It could be argued that this academic training is simply that exposure to artworks
of genius, models that are ‘exemplary’ without any other ‘scientific’ explanation of
their production (since genius, unlike scientific learning, cannot be communicated in
any cognitive sense).45 J. M. Bernstein for example, notes that ‘artists acknowledge
the connection between exemplarity and succession by producing successive works
themselves.’ However, according to Bernstein, since the rule given cannot simply be
imitated—since that would undermine the autonomy of genius—the successive pro-
duction of genial works is in constant revolution.46 But it is not so clear that Kant
refuses the determinate rule: he also asserts that ‘there is no beautiful art in which
something mechanical, which can be grasped and followed according to rules, and
thus something academically correct, does not constitute the essential condition of
the art.’47 Here the artwork’s cognitively appreciable form—something mechanical—
seems to take precedence. The determinate form of the fine artwork is thus not merely
the fact of its having been made as an artwork—that which is clear inasmuch as the
work’s purposiveness as an object of art is not purposeless in the manner of objects
44Ibid., 5:310.
45Ibid., 5:308. John Zammito, for example: ‘the only way the potential genius can be cultivated is
to subject him or her to that rigorous exposure to exemplary instances of artistic genius which is just
what is meant by “academic training”.’ John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgement
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p.141.
46J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), p.94.
47Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 5:310.
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of natural beauty—but also its conformity to certain established qualitative standards,
and thus a judgement of taste is required.
However, the judgement of taste [Geschmack] in the beautiful artwork is not the
same as the judgement of beauty in nature, precisely because of the artwork’s sub-
sumption by a concept:
If the object is given as a product of art, and is as such supposed to be
declared to be beautiful, then, since art always presupposes an end in the
cause (and its causality), a concept must first be the ground of what the
thing is supposed to be, and, since the agreement of the manifold in a
thing with its inner determination as an end is the perfection of the thing,
in the judging of the beauty of art the perfection of the thing will also have
to be taken into account, which is not even a question in the judging of a
natural beauty (as such).48
Given the differences between the types of judgement, the attendant ambivalences
thus carry over to the productive conditions of the artwork. Both genius and taste are
required, Kant contends, but there is some vacillation regarding which is subordinated
to the other. As stated above, Kant proposes that genius ‘gives the rule’. He goes
on to state that spirit—an ‘animating principle’—is lacking in artworks which ought
to be beautiful. ‘One finds,’ he notes, ‘nothing in them to criticise as far as taste is
concerned.’ Spirit, he clarifies is ‘the faculty of aesthetic ideas,’49 which are ideas
of the imagination (rather than reason) for which no determinate thought is adequate.
48Ibid., 5:311.
49Ibid., 5:313–4.
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Thus genius, constituted by a ‘certain relation’ of the imagination and understanding,
represents a liberated imagination:
In an aesthetic respect . . . the imagination is free to provide, beyond that
concord with the concept, unsought extensive undeveloped material for
the understanding . . . for the animation of the cognitive powers . . .; thus
genius really consists in the happy relation, which no science can teach
and no diligence learn, of finding ideas for a given concept . . . and hitting
upon the expression for these.50
Yet only a few paragraphs later, Kant states that it is ‘only in regard to [taste] that
[art] deserves to be called beautiful art.’51 By way of genius, he continues, art may
be called inspired, but this is ‘not as necessary’ as taste, which is the ‘primary thing’.
Genius here is portrayed as a wayward freedom that must be constrained. Taste is
affirmed as ‘..the discipline (or corrective) of genius, clipping its wings and making
it well behaved or polished.’52 The discussion closes with a statement proposing the
unity of these several faculties in beautiful art—‘for beautiful art . . . imagination,
understanding, spirit and taste are requisite.’53—which rather glosses over the conflicts
that have led up to it. Kant here seems torn between the tendency towards subsumption
under a rational form that characterises classicism, and the emergence of a more radical
idea of a non-accountable poiesis that was influential for the early Romantics who were
to follow in his wake.
50Ibid., 5:317.
51Ibid., 5:319.
52Ibid.
53A footnote clarifies that taste is the unifier of the first three faculties. Ibid., 5:320.
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In the latter case, it is Kant’s formulation of the role of genius in production, more
than his aesthetic reflection, that is important for the Romantic conception of art. The
latter provides no philosophical grounding for the autonomy of art, since aesthetic
judgements are a kind of transcendental auto-affection—the pleasure of the mind in its
own cognitive processes short of an actual cognition—and thus say nothing about the
objectively constituted object that is an artwork. Genius, as a productive faculty, comes
some way towards the claim of art’s autonomy, but it is only the early Romantics who
tied this to a concept of self-determination, and thus the concept of autopoiesis. As
Peter Osborne notes:
[Kant] failed to connect genius to self-determination, or to the illusion of
self-determination (at least explicitly), let alone to theorise the production
of the illusion of self-determination as the self-reflexive structure of the
artwork (since he had no ontological concept of the artwork). That was
left to Novalis’s transposition of the structure of Fichte’s absolutisation of
the subject onto the work of art.54
By contrast, Kant’s concept of art as practice is still tied to the ancient techne¯,
and even his theorisation of the shifts of the era toward a more elevated ‘fine art’ still
bear the necessity of some aspect, perhaps even the primacy, of the skill (material or
cognitive) of making rather than untrammelled spirit. Where there is tension in Kant’s
writing, it comes from the fact that it is a moment of theoretical transition where Kant
is still haunted by the loss of a direct, cognitive engagement with nature, where, ‘in
its time’, pleasure would have been taken ‘in the comprehensibility of nature and the
54Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art (London: Verso, 2013),
p.44.
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unity of its division into genera and species.’55 For Bernstein, this means that ‘in
. . . our world, judgements of beauty are memorial: in making aesthetic judgements
we judge things “as if” from the perspective of our lost common sense.’56 The kind
of ‘pre-critical’ unity here, usually more associated with Romanticism, clearly goes
back much further than the division of hand and head with industrialisation that drives
the separation of craft and art in modernity, but it can be seen as a part of the same
process of enlightenment, and the same problematic terrain in which Kant is battling
to organise the terms of conceptual modernity. The traces of this problematic (the
resonances of craft) persist, I would argue, right through to our present day and are
crucial to our understanding of the Oulipo.
Kant’s artwork must contain an element of freedom, constituted by genius, but, I
have argued, that element is not unmediated by an artist’s skill in the actual production
into which it enters. In this sense it is not enough to regard artworks simply as products
of freedom even if, in the dawning distinction of fine art, this element is essential. Yet
if the technical skill associated with craft production has held fluctuating regard in
the two centuries or so since Kant’s writing, it has nevertheless taken a subordinate
position in the hierarchy of cultural values.
Through the course of the nineteenth century and beyond, the gap between the
spiritualised activity of the artist and the outdated productive skills of the craftsman
widened. Though this did not necessarily remove art from all craft-like skill and
55‘To be sure, we no longer detect any noticeable pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature and the
unity of its division into genera and species, by means of which alone empirical concepts are possible
through which we cognise it in its particular laws; but it must certainly have been there in its time, and
only because the most common experience would not be possible without it has it gradually become
mixed up with mere cognition and is no longer specially noticed.’ Kant, Critique of the Power of
Judgement, 5:187.
56Bernstein, The Fate of Art, p.60.
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dedication—Flaubert would famously ‘spend days at a stretch on a single page’, a
model of textual mastery that was very influential for Georges Perec57—such ‘crafts-
manship’, however, was now seen to be in the service of the artist’s (or better, art’s)
own purpose rather than the external purposiveness characteristic of craft as such. Re-
call Curtius’s (retrospective) description of the ‘mannerism’ of certain medieval writers
as ‘unnatural’:58 the denigration here is not simply the skill of the production, but that
this aspect takes precedence over what is deemed to be, implicitly, a more ‘authentic’
mode of composition. The near-religious status accorded to artistic autonomy in the
late nineteenth century is, as Shiner notes, particularly evident in the tension in fields
like architecture, where functional demands, one might think, would be irreducible,
yet which provoked an ‘anti-engineering’ response in defence of the discipline’s ‘ex-
pressive’ possibilities.59
Attempts at re-consolidation were made by John Ruskin and later William Morris
and the Arts and Crafts movement in the nineteenth century. Bemoaning the degrading
social (and aesthetic) effects of industrialisation, they rejected machine production;
but despite the utopian ideals, the return to workshop production fostered an expensive
market for premium commodities rather than significant reform to industrial society.60
The aspiration to reconcile artist and artisan was further pursued by the Bauhaus. In
theManifesto of 1919, Walter Gropius wrote:
Architects, sculptors, painters, we all must return to the crafts! For art is
57Bellos, Georges Perec, p.310.
58See p.213 n.14
59Shiner, The Invention of Art, pp.211–12.
60C. R. Ashbee, formerly of the Arts and Crafts movement, wrote in his memoirs, ‘We have made,
of a great social movement, a narrow and tiresome little aristocracy working with great skill for the
very rich.’ Cited in Gillian Naylor, The Arts and Crafts Movement: A Study of its Sources, Ideals and
Influence on Design Theory (London: Studio Vista, 1971), p.9.
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not a ‘profession’. There is no essential difference between the artist and
the craftsman. The artist is an exalted craftsman. In rare moments of inspi-
ration, transcending the consciousness of his will, the grace of heaven may
cause his work to blossom into art. But proficiency in a craft is essential
to every artist. Therein lies the prime source of creative imagination.61
The school’s early ‘bipolar teaching model’ combined tuition in both art and craft.62
Contrary to the Arts and Crafts movement however, the Bauhaus school was affirma-
tively modernist, aiming to educate its students in modern productive skills, technolo-
gies and design principles, and also how these could be harnessed for social purpose.
There was thus no antipathy to machines in themselves, only the conditions of their
deployment.63 Yet if ‘merciful heaven’ was still the grantor of access to the status of
art, it would seem as if the hierarchical distinction remained. Certainly, with the later
Bauhaus, under Mies van der Rohe, emphasis had moved towards abstract principles
of ‘art’, rather than functionally directed practice,64 and the assimilation by art history
and museums has since effectively neutralised any real transgression there may have
been of fine art’s boundaries.65 In more recent years, further attempts have been made
to rehabilitate craft, but without much affecting the hierarchical division with art; that
is, if craft is here re-evaluated, it still gains its approval as art. In certain cases, as
Larry Shiner describes, an exaggerated functionlessness of what would otherwise be
61Cited in E´va Forga´cs, The Bauhaus Idea and BauhausPolitics, trans. John Ba´tki (Budapest: Central
European University Press, 1995), p.27.
62Magdalena Droste, Bauhaus 1919–1933, trans. Karen Williams (Ko¨ln: Taschen, 2015), p.34.
63‘Our object was to eliminate every drawback of the machine without sacrificing any one of its real
advantages.’ Gropius, The New Architecture and the Bauhaus, p.54.
64Under Mies, ‘Bauen’ (building) became ‘Baukunst’ (the art of building). ‘Mies was more or less
indifferent to the burning social questions of the day. For him architecture was art, confrontation with
space, proportion and material.’ Droste, Bauhaus, pp.213–4.
65See Shiner, The Invention of Art, pp.261–3.
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perceived to be craft forms—‘pots with holes in them, cups you can’t drink out of,
chairs you can’t sit on, books you can’t open’66—seems to serve as the entry point into
a domain of ‘aesthetic’ approval.67
From Craft to Construction
Clearly a nostalgic resurrection of craft—an obsolete mode of production—or the sim-
ple re-presentation of craft as art does little to address the critical position of craft as
such. The categories themselves, though historically and socially contingent, are ir-
revocable. And it cannot simply be denied that the category of art, in modernity, is
one that has critical bite in a way that craft lacks, precisely because of the condition
of former’s autonomy. This is not the abstract negation of l’art pour l’art, but rather
art’s ‘double character as both autonomous and fait social’ as Adorno puts it,68 where
‘even the most sublime artwork takes up a determinate attitude to empirical reality by
stepping outside of the constraining spell it casts, not once and for all, but rather ever
and again.’69 Craft, on the other hand, considered in its modern conception as art’s
redundant other, does not appear to resist instrumental demands, or if it does so, it
thereby elevates its claim to the status of art.
Craft, in its historical conception, is intimately tied to practical engagement: as
in Benjamin’s ‘Storyteller’, a work (in both the senses of process and result) stem-
ming from direct experience of the world and being thus intimately embedded in—in
66Ibid., p.277.
67See ibid., pp.274–278.
68Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.7.
69Ibid., p.7.
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a processual harmony with—that world. The material sense of this is maintained in
contemporary crafts where the principal characteristic is usually some kind of physi-
cal usefulness, or that at least its subsuming category is function, even if any particular
object in question is not actually used, or even useful. This receives its negative de-
termination with the craft-as-art objects defined as such by their failure to meet their
historically established concept. However, where the condition of rationality moves
towards one of domination and control, the category of function takes on a more op-
pressive character—an object’s function becomes alienated from its being (its function
denotes its being for an other). The changing conception of craft in industrial society
marks, in this sense, the loss of a non-conflictual category of function.
Yet it is not simply the case that all aspects of the meaning of craft are lost where
that un-alienated experience of material production is lost, as in the case of mass indus-
trialisation that has superseded it. In fact it is precisely in art’s resistance to industry
(and more acutely that of fine art to the culture industry) that it retains something of
that pre-industrial mode of production. The traces of craft can be found, as Adorno
notes, in ‘procedures that originated in the artisanal praxis of the medieval produc-
tion of goods, a praxis from which art, resisting integration into capitalism, never
completely diverged.’70 These traces of craft are perhaps found most obviously in the
fact that art is something subjectively produced. This is still the case with even the
most aleatory, a-subjective material, if only by its attempted determinate negation of
‘making’ (and even here the subjective-productive element is, arguably, still traceable
in such item’s selection and presentation as art). This is despite, or rather dialecti-
cally tied to, art’s claim to autonomy, which is still, however complicatedly, the core
70Ibid., p.290.
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problematic of the possibility of (modern) art. This paradoxical autonomy of art is
drawn from its historical formation. Adorno writes that ‘the artwork’s autonomy is,
indeed, not a priori but the sedimentation of a historical process that constitutes its
concept.’71 This concept is, in part, to be found in the memory of forms of production
lost to industrial-rational domination, that is, in craft, or rather, in the older form of
pre-autonomous, pre-aesthetic (which is not to equate these two terms) art production
in which art and craft are not separable concepts. Adorno famously declares the im-
portance of recognising ‘aesthetic form as sedimented content,’72 which at once relates
both the implication of art in its modern situation, as the ‘sedimentations or imprintings
of social relations of production’,73 and also the memorial traces of its historical de-
velopment, even though—importantly—this does not imply a static relation, nor static
conditions: ‘the definition of art is at every point indicated by what art once was, but
it is legitimated only by what art became with regard to what it wants to, and perhaps
can, become.’74 Art’s constitution is thus always conflictual, inasmuch as ‘its concept
refers to what it does not contain,’ but ‘not according to any set of invariants.’75
The concept of craft, or rather—to avoid a too singularly positive determination—
certain conceptual formations that converge on that designation, are both retained and
refused variously by the modern characterisations of art: autonomy versus function;
71Ibid., p.25.
72Ibid., p.6.
73‘What may be called aesthetic relations of production—all that in which the productive force is
embedded and in which it is active—are sedimentations or imprintings of social relations of production.’
Ibid., pp.6–7.
74Ibid., p.3. That there is a relation to craft-like historical forms is indicated more strongly in the
1958/59 lectures: ‘the ornament, as it were, is the scar that appeared on a vase at the point where it
could not be made at the potter’s wheel without such an interruption. So, following this analogy, it
should be the case for all so-called artistic forms that they were once content and, through a process of
sublimation, of spiritualisation—which is after all the process of artistic development as such—took on
that peculiar independence.’ Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59, pp.151–2.
75Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.3.
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imagination versus skill; spirit vs mechanism. The relation to craft in this is thus
that of art’s antithesis to instrumental production, and also its historical memory of
a mode of production where what constituted art was not conceptually distinct from
its usefulness. As Adorno writes, ‘art acquires its specificity by separating itself from
what it developed out of; its law of movement is its law of form.’76 Modern art thus
bears the tension of this changed concept in its form, in its conflictual autonomy. Even
where art claims one side of these dichotomous relations it retains the conflict of their
formation.
In this sense then, to ascribe certain craft characteristics to Oulipian work is, in
the first case at least, only to develop, albeit in unorthodox ways, potentials that are
already present in art’s modern day concept. Art’s recollection (albeit one which may
only be approached through critique) through its form, of the historical development
of that which now constitutes it is what gives the possibility of seeing the contingency
and conflictual nature of its own conditions. The tendency towards total rationalisation
of production excludes the older modes: adherence to exact time schemes, repetitive
processes and subordination to the machine leave no room for the direct engagement
afforded by an attempted recuperation of pre-alienated labour. Art now poses as the
antithesis of this universal rationalisation—of commodification—and offers itself as
non-instrumentalised, autonomous. Yet, this latter claim is of course impossible. In
Adorno’s famous statement ‘the absolute artwork meets the absolute commodity.’77
The core contradiction in terms of the commodity form is that the autonomous art-
76Ibid., p.3.
77This is Stewart Martin’s translation which represents the internal contradictoriness of the consti-
tution of the artwork better than Hulot-Kentor’s. Stewart Martin, ‘The Absolute Artwork Meets the
Absolute Commodity,’ Radical Philosophy, no. 146 (November 2007): 15–25. See Adorno, Aesthetic
Theory, p.30.
CRAFT, CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRAINT 236
work is both a product of commodification, insofar as it represents the ‘liberation’ of
production from religious service or patronage, but that the form of the market which
allows this itself reduces everything to exchange value, thus destroying the supposed
independence of the artwork.78
Clearly craft—in its historical condition and in its dominant contemporary nos-
talgic conception—is not straightforwardly the answer to this riddle. Craft might be
posed as art’s lament for a historical unity of usefulness and authenticity, but, in the
social context that supersedes that situation, what are now typically taken as craft
forms—pottery, textiles, glassware, and so on, which are often deprecatingly called
‘applied arts’ (with the implied superiority of ‘pure arts’)—seem to stand little chance
of critical engagement. Instead they seem more like the hobbyist’s nostalgic attempt to
rediscover a non-alienated relation to their own productive activity. From this perspec-
tive, craft seems like a refusal to acknowledge the extent of the ‘progressive rational
control of nature’, rather than an ‘attempt to do justice to all that falls victim to this
ongoing concept of control over nature’,79
That said, as stated above, craft is nevertheless retained as a memory in the modern
concept of art, and not simply in terms of a loss. Indeed, specifically in art’s relation to
technique—‘the medium of art’s crystallisation’, as Adorno states—it retains a craft-
like subjective element. Adorno writes:
78Martin states that ‘the artwork is presented as a contradiction produced by capitalism. Commod-
ification is a condition of possibility of autonomous art as well as a condition of its impossibility. The
implication of Adorno’s account is that the absolute artwork meets itself with the absolute commodity.’
Martin, ‘The Absolute Artwork,’ p.18.
79‘One could say that art is an attempt to do justice to all that falls victim to this ongoing concept of
control over nature . . .—namely the portion of memory, the memory of the suppressed, of that which
becomes a victim, and also the memory of all those internal human powers which are destroyed by this
process of progressive human rationalisation.’ Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59, pp.47–8.
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In the language of art, expressions like technique,me´tier, and craft [Handw-
erk] are synonyms. This points up that anachronistic aspect of craft [anachro-
nistisch handwerklichen Aspekt] that Vale´ry’s melancholy did not over-
look. It admixes something idyllic with art’s existence in an age in which
nothing true is any longer permitted to be harmless. On the other hand,
however, whenever autonomous art has seriously set out to absorb indus-
trial processes, they have remained external to it. . . . The radical indus-
trialisation of art, its undiminished adaptation to the achieved technical
standards, collides with what in art resists integration. If technique strives
for industrialisation as its vanishing point, it does so at the cost of the im-
manent elaboration of the work and thus at the cost of technique itself.
This instills into art an archaic element that compromises it.80
The relation to this element is far from straightforward, since it is at once ‘archaic’,
in the resistance to industrialisation, but also tends towards a future dissolution in the
constructive tendency. Adorno’s observation on the synonymity of the terms in the lan-
guage of art should not, however, be taken to mean that he is positing a single concept
that unites them. Rather these terms tend toward a complex of ideas, both contempo-
rary and historical, in the context of functions associated with art and its production,
or surrounding it. If anything, the statement indicates a criticism of the conflation of
terms, or at least of concepts, in common discourse about art; hence Adorno’s unpick-
ing, that follows, of the contradictory aspects. In fact Adorno, in Aesthetic Theory,
uses various terms associated with (and partially translated by) the English ‘craft’—
Handwerk, Kunstgewerbe, Me´tier, Technik—which are used to express different con-
80Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.295.
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notations, though they are closely overlapping and, as one would expect with Adorno’s
non-deductive style, no definitive statement of them is set out.
Handwerk is the broadest, and most directly translated as ‘craft’, contrasting with
both industrial production and art. It is in fact broader than our ‘craft’ however, in that
it may be used to describe skilled activities like hairdressing, plumbing or bricklay-
ing81 The term Kunstgewerbe—whose components might be given as ‘art trade’ or ‘art
business’, though this could easily be misconstrued—is rendered by Hullot-Kentor as
‘arts and crafts’ or ‘applied arts’ and is used by Adorno in a more obviously denigra-
tory way to denote activities which maintain a connection to ‘art’, but whose purpose
has been subsumed without protest by the commodity form. Kunstgewerbe serves as ‘a
prophetic warning for art’,82 inasmuch as art that follows the same logic will similarly
lose its inner purposiveness.
The termMetier—translated by Hullot-Kentor as its French source me´tier—is per-
haps the subtlest of these terms, since, while it bears a connection to the other ‘craft’
designations, it is used by Adorno to denote something that goes beyond the merely
skilful and is thus ‘fundamentally different from traditional artisanal methods [handw-
erklich traditionalen]’. The associations of the French term are retained here: not
just manual work or skill, but something that pertains more directly to the subject of
its attribution. Thus for Adorno, the sense it is not bound to a nostalgic simplicity
in the pre-industrial; in fact it tends towards the progressive. He writes: ‘its concept
indicates the totum of capacities through which the artist does justice to the concep-
81See Stefan Muthesius, ‘Handwerk/Kunsthandwerk,’ Journal of Design History 11, no. 1 (1998):
85–95
82Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.296.
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tion of the work and precisely thereby severs the umbilical cord of tradition.’83 While
skill or technique is needed here—and is indeed learnable, at least initially—such skill
does not constitute what Adorno means by Metier, and whatever is learned here is not
definitive: ‘me´tier ultimately sloughs off its provisional, limited shape.’84 It is thus an
‘almost mimetic’ kind of analysis. Indeed, Adorno notes that me´tier is ‘bound up’
with the ‘auratic element, . . . the memory of the hand that, tenderly, almost caress-
ingly, passed over the contours of the work and, by articulating them, also mollified
them.’85 Here Adorno draws on the craft concept that is also elicited in Benjamin’s
Storyteller, and the primacy of the hand. But Adorno also finds here a more profound
analytic capacity in the production of work that is not simply the application of rules,
but more also than unmediated mimesis. Me´tier then, has a paradoxical signification,
recalling an outmoded concept of production at the same time as breaking with tradi-
tion by virtue of its adequacy to the artwork whose concept directs it. This conception
is a specifically modern one since it relates to a memorial aspect in the modern concept
of art. Adorno writes:
The quality [of art] that is at stake here is the quality of the trace that
aesthetic forming leaves behind in what it forms without doing violence
to it: it is the conciliatory element of culture in art that characterises even
its most violent protestation. It is implicit in the word me´tier, and it cannot
simply be translated as craft [Handwerk].86
It is important here that me´tier evokes a ‘criterion of mastery’, a ‘civilisatory trace’
83Ibid., p.58.
84Ibid., p.292.
85Ibid., p.292.
86Ibid., p.391.
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that is irrevocable in the artwork, a stipulation that retains a craft-character in art that
defines itself against craft. Adorno concludes: ‘that trace is what is redolent of art in
the artwork.’87
Finally, technique [Technik] refers most directly to consciously determined artis-
tic means. It coincides with modern technology, but bears the trace of its historical
development: ‘all artistic procedures that form the material and allow themselves to
be guided by it coalesce under the technological aspect, including those procedures
that originated in the artisanal [handwerklichen] praxis of the medieval production of
goods.’ It is, of these constellatory terms of craft, the most rationally determined, be-
ing ‘the predominance of conscious free control over the aesthetic means, in contrast
to traditionalism, under the cover of which this control matured.’88 Technique gives
the artwork ‘logical consistency’, a necessity without which ‘no work would gain ob-
jectivation; this necessity is art’s antimimetic impulse, one borrowed externally, which
unites the work as an interior.’89 In this, technique is not simply a reproduction of the
logic of the empirical world, but its refraction, giving an appreciable discursive aspect
to the work, while frustrating fully determinate judgement. Adorno writes: ‘Tech-
nique, as the measure of the “logic” of works, is also the measure of the suspension of
logic.’90
Art then cannot be simply divorced from craft-like processes in Adorno’s account,
cannot divert itself off to pure expression or the undialectical isolation of l’art pour
l’art. The traces of craft are evident in the terminology associated with art’s produc-
87Ibid., p.391.
88Ibid., p.290.
89Ibid., p.187.
90Ibid., p.291.
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tion. The decisive factor for the retention of these aspects in the modern concept of art
is that of the direction of technique by a certain purposiveness, but one which separates
itself from the empirical form from which that technique is drawn. Adorno writes:
Certainly artworks are defined by technique as something that is purpose-
ful in itself. The work’s terminus ad quem, however, has its locus exclu-
sively in itself, not externally. Therefore the technique of its immanent
purposefulness also remains ‘without a purpose,’ whereas technique itself
constantly has extra-aesthetic technique as its model.91
Modern art cannot dismiss technique through an undialectical attempt to retrieve
‘pure immediacy’ as a ‘protest against hardened social and conventional forms,’ of the
sort that Adorno finds in Expressionism as a reaction against the ornamental categories
of Jugendstil.92 Such would be a refusal of the form by which expression becomes
objective, its unfolding in space and time. Art’s vital condition is its difference to the
merely empirical, but its critical relation to that is only gained through its adaptation
of the latter’s forms:
Through the domination of the dominating, art revises the domination of
nature to the core. In contrast to the semblance of inevitability that char-
acterises these forms in empirical reality, art’s control over them and over
their relation to materials makes their arbitrariness in the empirical world
evident.’93
91Ibid., p.296.
92Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59, p.59.
93Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.189.
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But in order to maintain its critical relation to empirical reality, art increasingly
becomes a subjective—and that is, rationally determined—production. Art is not ex-
empted from the process of rationalisation. It is only inasmuch as art itself is also
the product of rational progression that it can give voice to what is suppressed by the
same. Without its objectivation being consciously determined, art simply falls back
into convention. This was the inevitable fate of Expressionism, for Adorno: ‘this
anti-conventional art, which expressionism was everywhere, must evidently produce
something like certain conventions from within itself.’94 The importance of conscious
control over the production of works is of course a central feature of Oulipian prac-
tice, recalling in particular the group’s antipathy towards the proposed immediacy of
automatic writing as an evasion of the constraining forms of rationality: recall Que-
neau’s dismissal of the writer ‘who is a slave to . . . rules that he doesn’t see.’95 Thus,
regarding subjective determination, Adorno’s principle of construction would seem to
be borne out in practice by the Oulipo. However, the concept as Adorno develops it
also becomes quite antithetical to the Oulipo’s arbitrary applications of mathematical
logic, as I will go on to argue later in this chapter.
As with the Oulipo’s formal interventions, Adorno’s principle of construction is a
response—via Expressionism—to the inadequacy of convention to developing moder-
nity, the breakdown of the self-evidence of artistic forms. Expressionism is, for Adorno,
an intervening moment in art’s development, since it ‘cleansed the material . . . of all
merely conventional bonds,’ and also ‘[carried] out that emancipation of the subject
from predetermined forms which now permits it to control the material confidently and
94Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59, p.61.
95Queneau, ‘What is Art?’ p.36.
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freely.’96 Art, having liberated itself from traditional forms, nevertheless finds subjec-
tive immediacy inadequate. Expression cannot be without some form, but this cannot
be simply a re-assertion of classicist form. Such a reaction would be antithetical to the
concept of art.97 Construction then becomes a necessity where established forms can
no longer be relied upon and where increasing subjective control is required to avoid
slipping into uncritical orthodoxy. Thus far perhaps, no great divergence from Oulip-
ian practice can be found. Indeed, inasmuch as Adorno’s development from traditional
forms to construction involves a move from reliance on given forms to the subjectively
willed engagement of construction, Oulipian writers can be seen to have expressed
quite similar sentiments. Two documents presenting the results of the group’s early re-
searches are testament to this. In a 1961 presentation for the Colle`ge de Pataphysique,
the group write:
The divine potentiality of the Word, in spite of a few notable fulgura-
tions, had always remained latent and implicit, although ever ready to
spring forth. Here, it’s a question of going straight to the explicit and
putting these forces into play: this is what the creation of the Ouvroir
de Litte´rature Potentielle signified. Thus, the time of created creations,
which was that of the literary works we know, should cede to the era of cre-
ating creations, capable of developing from themselves and beyond them-
selves, in a manner at once predictable and inexhaustibly unforeseen.’98
Jacques Duchateau similarly, in his 1963 Lecture at Cerisy-la-Salle, observes that
96Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59, p.63.
97‘For it is in the nature of artistic forms that they are only possible because of the historico-
philosophical conditions of their period.’ Ibid., p.62.
98Oulipo, ‘The Colle`ge de Pataphysique and the Oulipo,’ pp.48–9.
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established forms, those that have traditionally been implicit or have appeared to be
self-sufficient, have been brought into question—his allusion here is obviously to the
‘deep structures’ of the likes of Le´vi-Strauss (as I discussed in chapter 3, but also to
the move in mathematics from intuitionism to axiomatics, as discussed in chapter 2):
Writers have always used structures: some consciously, others uncon-
sciously, some with the conviction that it is merely a question of sim-
ple evidence substantiated over time. From an intuitive perspective, evi-
dence supervised by time is a prerequisite. From a structuralist perspec-
tive, shall we say, all that is evident is suspect. Those forms that are rel-
atively general, accepted by all, and modelled by experience can conceal
infra-forms. A systematic re-questioning is necessary to uncover them. A
re-questioning which will lead, beyond the discovery of subjacent forms,
to the invention of new ones.99
This questioning of forms is the ground, he proposes, upon which the Oulipo builds
by inventing new forms ‘made possible by a working practice first used by mathemati-
cians: the axiomatic method.’100 In this regard, Jacques Roubaud considers the turn
to mathematics as the ‘repair’ of literature: ‘the exhaustion of tradition, represented
by rules, is the starting point in the search for a second foundation, that of mathemat-
ics.’101 This latter point however, the deliberate ‘transposition’ of new forms from the
otherness of mathematics into literary creation, is directly antithetical to the principle
99Jacques Duchateau, ‘Lecture on the Oulipo at Cerisy-la-Salle,’ in All That is Evident is Suspect:
Readings from the Oulipo 1963-2018, ed. Ian Monk and Daniel Levin Becker, trans. Daniel Levin
Becker (San Francisco: McSweeney’s, 2018), p.16.
100Ibid., p.17.
101Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.93.
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of construction. Adorno states that construction is not ‘a form of power inflicted on the
material as something foreign, through recourse to constraints, through stylistic will
or the like, but rather an articulation that grows from the matter itself, even from the
logic of the material itself.’102 Here is manifest a strong distinction from the methods
proposed by the Oulipo, since the principle of constraint is clearly characterised as
something ‘inflicted on the material’. This is its distinction from convention on the
one hand and unmediated expression on the other.
Mathematisation, as the model of the form of constraint, is the guarantor of this
distinctiveness, since it militates against the recuperation of received literary forms.
Adorno acknowledges that mathematisation arises ‘during historical periods when the
traditional self-evidence of forms dissolves and no objective canon is available’, by
virtue of the semblance of ‘universality and necessity’. It is, however, a weakness for
Adorno. It is inadequate since it ‘does not originate in the specific structure and fails
when confronted with the particular.’103 Mathematisation is thus antithetical to art in
that it neutralises the specificity of artwork’s critical socio-historical context, which
should, rather, be addressed by the particularity of a subjectively determined construc-
tion. That is to say, it suppresses the artist’s ability to work with the material in a
properly constructive fashion. In his 1958/59 lectures, Adorno explicitly distinguishes
this from ‘constraint’ (even if this is clearly not a reference to the Oulipo).104 Con-
struction is not constraint; its articulations are immanent to the material rather than a
pre-formed demand.
102Adorno, Aesthetics: 1958/59, p.62.
103Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.196.
104The construction of the work is not ‘a form of power that is inflicted on the material as something
foreign, through recourse to constraints, through stylistic will or the like, but rather an articulation that
grows from the matter itself—even from the logic of the material itself, if you will.’ Adorno, Aesthetics:
1958/59, p.62.
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This reflects Adorno’s philosophical stance more generally regarding his distinc-
tion between matter and method, the latter of which is itself characteristic of rational
domination—the subsumption of the world to methodological principle, from which
nothing new can emerge since it ‘models the other after itself’105—to which art re-
sponds critically. That it is mathematics as constraint that is the primary manifestation
of this imposition of form for the Oulipo only reinforces the disparity with Adorno’s
critique of method: ‘Mathematics is tautology . . . by the limitation of its total domi-
nance to what it itself has already prepared and formed.’106
A typical example of this contra-Adornian imposition of mathematical form is
manifest in Paul Braffort’s Mes Hypertropes. The work makes use of the Fibonacci
series, which is particularly interesting in this regard since it straddles the use of form
which Adorno considers regrettable and that which he barely considers at all. The Fi-
bonacci sequence (where each number is the sum of its two preceding terms—thus 1,
1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13 . . .), specifically in the asymptotic approach of the final two terms to
the golden ratio, φ, has often been held to be a principle of ‘beautiful’ spatial propor-
tions. As such it represents the kind of mathematisation that Adorno would object to
as a rigidification into an axiom, indifferent to the particularity of what possesses or
tends towards that proportion. But in its application to the construction of a sequence
of poems, in Braffort’s work, the spatiality is not readable in this sense, and it retains
its arbitrariness as a mathematical imposition a priori unrelated to the work’s content.
Braffort utilises Zeckendorf’s theorem (which states that any natural number can be
formed by the sum of two or more Fibonacci numbers) to turn the structure given by
the Fibonacci sequence into a constraint: ‘le transfert de la structure mathe´matique vers
105Adorno, Against Epistemology, p.12.
106Ibid., p.11.
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la contrainte litte´raire est d’ordre se´mantique: le contenu du poe`me de rang n de´pend
du contenu des poe`mes dont le rang forme la repre´sentation “de ZECKENDORF” de
n.’107 [‘The transfer of the mathematical structure into the literary constraint is of se-
mantic order: the contents of the poem of position n depend on the contents of the
poems whose positions form the “ZECKENDORF” representation of n.’] For example
poem 20 must re-use elements of poems 2, 5, and 13.108 A simpler (simpler to describe
at least) example is Jacques Roubaud’s 31 au cube, consisting of 31 poems of 31 lines
of 31 syllables.
Tradition and Technique in Schoenberg
The contrast between imposed form and the immanent logic of the material is exem-
plified in Adorno’s consideration of the development of Arnold Schoenberg’s com-
positional technique, particularly in its relation to tradition; and also provides a case
study in certain limitations of Adorno’s critical position that may be revealing with
regard to the ‘alternative modernism’ of the Oulipo. Schoenberg’s introduction of the
twelve-tone series is one of the most significant innovations in twentieth-century com-
position. It marks the shift from the tonal organisation of the European tradition into
a serial organisation, with the comfortable intervals of thirds and octaves, familiar to
the western ear, no longer given priority. With this development, Adorno’s prescrip-
tion that the modern artwork must become increasingly rationally determined, that it
107Paul Braffort, ‘Mes Hypertropes: Vingt-et-un moins un poe`mes a` programme,’ in La Bibliothe`que
Oulipienne, Volume 1 (Paris: E´ditions Ramsay, 1987), p.169.
108Braffort adds, in the preamble that ‘bien entendu, nous avons ajoute´ au syste`me ci dessus quelques
contraintes supple´mentaires que le lecteur de´chiffrera sans peine.’ [‘Of course, we have added to the
above system, some supplementary constraints that the reader will decipher without difficulty.’]
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must be constructed rather than emerging in a pseudo-organicity in accordance with
prevailing norms, appears to have been realised. Schoenberg’s music has often been
criticised as ‘intellectualised’, itself an indication, as Adorno points out, that music is
generally expected to be reassuringly ‘exempted’ from such demands and above all,
‘melodic’. The trouble with the latter demand, for Adorno, is that the ‘reified mind’
does not understand melody but rather the ‘docile repetition of mutilated fragments.’109
However, for all that Schoenberg’s compositional technique was revolutionary in the
development of western music, he himself considered his work as very much part of
the tradition that it appeared to overturn, rather than an abstracted intellectual exercise.
He felt himself ‘guided above all by very strong expressive licences in particular and
in general, but also, and not least, by a feeling for the form and logic inherited from
the tradition and well developed by application and consciousness.’110
Schoenberg’s ‘technique’, by his own reckoning, is driven by a development of,
rather than beyond, traditional material. That is, it moves—he composes—in accor-
dance with a certain necessity of that material. Given this, Schoenberg distances the
‘art’ of composition from ‘craft’, associating the former with the immanent necessity,
the latter only with a certain learned skill: ‘I believe art is born of “I must”, not of
“I can”. A craftsman “can”.’111 The point is not much developed philosophically, but
evident here is a post-Kantian Romanticism of the artist-genius compelled to create, in
opposition to the mere expediency of craft: ‘this ability to express oneself differs fun-
109TheodorW. Adorno, ‘Arnold Schoenberg 1874–1951,’ in Prisms, trans. Samuel and ShierryWeber
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1981), p.152.
110Schoenberg, cited in Pierre Boulez, ‘Schoenberg is Dead,’ in Notes of an Apprenticeship, ed. Paul
Thevenin, trans. Herbert Weinstock (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p.270. Adorno characterises
Schoenberg as a ‘naı¨ve artist, above all in the often hapless intellectualisations with which he sought to
justify his work.’ Adorno, ‘Schoenberg,’ p.150
111Arnold Schoenberg, ‘Problems in Teaching Art,’ in Style and Idea, ed. Leonard Stein, trans. Leo
Black (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.365.
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damentally from the craftsman’s ability, which in fact really expresses someone other
than himself.’112 It is of course a restricted concept of craft that is at stake here, and
if what Schoenberg is resisting in his refusal of craft as such is the externality of pur-
pose, at the same time, there is nevertheless a need for skill and learning in the artist,
provided they remain in service of the artistic ‘vision’: ‘the inspiration, the vision, the
whole, breaks down during its representation into details whose constructed realisation
reunites them into the whole.’ To work without this vision, merely constructing, is, for
Schoenberg to work ‘without freedom’.113 But even this ‘vision’ does not appear ex
nihilo, but is rather in response to a situation which must be confronted by the artist:
Schoenberg draws an analogy with technological innovations—he recounts reading
documents in a patent office: ‘genuine results, which proceed from the point at issue.
Here is “inspiration”, mind-work, achievement.’114 An artist, whose genius should be
in response to a ‘point at issue’, must ‘come to grips with all the problems’.115 While
there is a tendency here toward a rather loosely romantic artist-as-genius thinking,
Schoenberg nevertheless holds that there is a context which innovation addresses. That
context is tradition.
The aspect of traditionalism might seem to be at odds with Adorno’s affirmation of
the importance of the new as a category of modern art: ‘since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury and the rise of high capitalism, the category of the new has been central. . . . Since
that moment no artwork has succeeded that rebuffed the ever fluctuating concept of the
modern.’116 Yet tradition is itself not static: ‘the attitude of contemporary art toward
112Ibid., p.365.
113Arnold Schoenberg, ‘Constructed Music,’ in Style and Idea, ed. Leonard Stein, trans. Leo Black
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.107.
114Schoenberg, ‘Problems,’ p.368.
115Ibid., p.368.
116Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.28.
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tradition, usually reviled as a loss of tradition, is predicated on the inner transformation
of the category of tradition itself.’117 Schoenberg, for Adorno at least, was a constant
innovator, but always with reference to a tradition of which he saw himself a part, and
the working through of his innovations always developmental with that tradition. For
Adorno then, this relation to tradition is not an unproductive contradiction, but one that
is in fact needed for innovation, such that ‘only that which has been nourished with the
life-blood of the tradition can possibly have the power to confront it authentically.’118
The extent to which Schoenberg adequately confronts tradition is arguable how-
ever. Consider Pierre Boulez’s criticism that Schoenberg is actually bound by an
unyielding idea of tradition, even if he shifts certain of its contents. Boulez, while
applauding Schoenberg’s innovations up to a point (that point being the latter’s atonal
works prior to the introduction of twelve-tone technique), asserts a dead-end with do-
decaphony, which ‘went off in the wrong direction so persistently that it would be hard
to find an equally mistaken perspective in the entire history of music.’119 This is not
because the technique is too ‘radical’, as reactionaries would have it, nor because it
is (or became) too mathematically formal, as Adorno’s critique holds. If anything it
is not formally radical enough, or to be more precise, not rigorous enough in its re-
alisation of the revolutionary potential afforded by the disruption of traditional forms.
Boulez points out that, from the beginning, Schoenberg’s own traditionalism holds the
inevitability of ultimate failure of the twelve-tone system. As he points out, the piece
that inaugurated the technique (the Five Pieces for piano, opus 23, that Boulez calls
Schoenberg’s ‘no-man’s land of rigour’) has the form of a waltz: as Boulez puts it,
117Ibid., p.29.
118Adorno, ‘Schoenberg,’ p.155.
119Boulez, ‘Schoenberg is Dead,’ p.271.
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a ‘very “expressionistic” meeting of the first dodecaphonic composition with a type-
product of German Romanticism.’120 Boulez complains that Schoenberg’s shift of or-
ganisation of tonal material does not extend to a more radical structural reorganisation,
‘extending from the generation of the constituent elements to the total architecture of
a work.’121 More specifically, he notes that Schoenberg’s ‘exploration of the serial do-
main had been carried on unilaterally: it was lacking on the rhythmic level, even on that
of sound, properly speaking—the intensities and attacks.’122 The flaw with Schoen-
berg’s twelve-tone work, for Boulez, is that it has not adequately upset the framework
inherited from the western tradition, a ‘very unhappy heritage owed to scarcely defen-
sible scleroses of a certain bastard language adopted by romanticism.’123 Boulez finds
in Schoenberg the attempt to maintain something unchanging in the western musical
tradition: in this sense, twelve-tone both becomes such a principle, but also implicitly
reaffirms the persistence of that which, due the narrowness of its domain, it has failed
to confront. This contrasts with Boulez’s own demand for ‘the constant reconsidera-
tion of what is transitory that the artist must accept, and with it reconsideration of his
own beliefs and attitudes.’124
That twelve-tone technique has become a dead-end is a position shared by Adorno,
though his criticism is rather less damning of Schoenberg himself125 than that of
120Ibid., p.271.
121Ibid., p.272.
122Ibid., p.274.
123Ibid., p.273.
124Boulez, cited in Cunningham, ‘A Time for Dissonance and Noise,’ p.64.
125Though perhaps more of certain followers: ‘Schoenberg himself distinguished almost mechan-
ically between the preparation of twelve-tone material and composition, and on account of this dis-
tinction he had reason to regret his ingenious technique. The heightened logical consistency of the
following generation, however, which obliterated the distinction between the preparation of the material
and actual composition, not only exchanged integration for music’s self-alienation but incurred the loss
of articulation, without which form is almost inconceivable.’ Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.196.
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Boulez. Adorno similarly finds that the twelve-tone technique has become rigid, but
this is described as an inevitability, rather than a fatal decision. Initially at least,
Adorno contends, twelve-tone developed progressively from free atonality, just as the
latter had, in its time, emerged out of ‘large tonal chamber music.’126 The trouble is
that in establishing itself as a definable logical schema, independent of the material
in which it developed, it becomes static: ‘no longer open and accessible to dialectical
correction.’ Adorno continues:
[Technical-aesthetic and cognitive systems] become models. But in deny-
ing themselves self-reflection and making themselves static, they become
moribund and cripple the very impulse that produced the system in the
first place. There is no middle way that avoids the alternative. To ignore
the insights that have coalesced into the system is to cling impotently to
what has been superseded. Yet the system itself becomes a fixed idea and
universal recipe.127
The hypostatisation of method is the termination of that technique’s truth in art,
that is its ability to reveal something—the untruth of its conditions. Inasmuch as that
truth is valuable, and indeed constitutive of art, it is imperative that art resist its incor-
poration into a logical totality, and yet ‘as the aesthetic subject is less and less able to
orient itself on something which is both distinct from it and yet in harmony with it,’ it
126Adorno, ‘Schoenberg,’ p.162 Adorno gives a rather more severe assessment of the move from
atonality to twelve-tone a few years later, as the ‘violence and rupture in the transition from the ex-
periences of free atonality to the systematisation of twelve-note technique’, in which ‘order is derived
from the need for order and not from the truth of the matter.’ Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’
pp.274–5.
127Adorno, ‘Schoenberg,’ p.166.
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cannot avoid that direction.128 Art here finds itself in a double-bind, since the reverse
pole of this indifferent logical organisation—what Adorno calls the ‘nominalistic art-
work’, which ‘should become an artwork by being organised from below to above, not
by having principles of organisation foisted on it’—itself ends in isolation from any
signifying norms that give social meaning to the work: ’Unchecked aesthetic nominal-
ism liquidates . . . all forms as a remnant of a spiritual being-in-itself. It terminates in
a literal facticity, and this is irreconcilable with art.129
The rather pessimistic picture presented here is that of art’s dissolution through
its own development. However, in Adorno’s essay ‘Vers une musique informelle’, he
does offer an idea of musical development that would avoid this impasse, and yet, as
an idea, it must perhaps remain just that. Although inevitably, given that it is offered
in response to the deleterious consequences for art of a defined system, his musique
informelle recalls the tendency which ‘mocks all efforts at definition,’ Adorno does
nevertheless offer its ‘parameters’ as ‘a type of music which has discarded all forms
which are external or abstract or which confront it in an inflexible way’ as well as be-
ing ‘objectively compelling . . . in the musical substance itself.’130 These criteria meet
perhaps their strongest antithesis with the tendency towards mathematisation in mu-
sic, which is, Adorno avers ‘always a compositional defect. . . . Anything which only
seems right everywhere, cannot be right anywhere.’131 This thesis of the importance of
the immanence of development in terms of artistic materials is quite familiar, though
usually, in Adorno’s works, presented as a progressive impossibility. The presenta-
tion here is slightly more optimistic inasmuch as Adorno offers informal music as a
128Ibid., p.166.
129Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.300.
130Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ p.272.
131Ibid., p.308.
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regulative idea, ‘a little like Kant’s eternal peace. Kant himself thought of this as an
actual, concrete possibility which is capable of realisation and yet is nevertheless just
an idea.’132
Is there, however, something rather conservative in Adorno’s prescription? Al-
though he specifically refuses a ‘a repeat of the style of 1910’—that is, Schoenberg’s
atonal period—there is, in his refusal to countenance certain ‘formalist’ interventions
into compositional process, a rather narrow conception of musical ‘material’. Indeed,
Boulez here seems rather more radical in his suggestion that, ‘perhaps one could en-
large the serial domain with intervals other than the half-tone: microdistances, irregular
intervals, complex sounds.’133 That Adorno’s ‘tastes’ are in the western, and perhaps
even more narrowly, German, tradition of ‘serious’ music is well-acknowledged, es-
pecially given his apparently dismissive critiques of jazz. In his contemplation of the
musical material of any given epoch, how it has developed and how it might develop,
there is little awareness that progressive forms may come from different developmental
trajectories. But this problem of restricted scope goes even further, to the heart of the
developmental aspect of Adorno’s dialectic of tradition and modernity, in the concept
of dissonance. That concept, as David Cunningham points out, where it is considered
as the dismantling of tonality, makes too central the concept of harmony as the musical
category upon which this dialectic of the new moves, which ‘has the effect of either
marginalising other forms of experimentation, in the spheres, for example, of rhythm
or timbre, or, as in total serialism, presuming that such spheres can be assimilated to
the same essential procedures as those underlying the negation of tonality.’134
132Ibid., p.322.
133Boulez, ‘Schoenberg is Dead,’ p.275.
134Cunningham, ‘A Time for Dissonance and Noise,’ p.67.
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Clearly the question of the relation of mathematical forms to musical development,
as so despised by Adorno, is not the same as that of the interrelations of different mu-
sical traditions, not least because, while the latter might be offered as a factor simply
beyond Adorno’s purview, the former is precisely that logic of dominating authority
that art, for its truth content, needs to resist. But if it is acknowledged that a unilinear
development of composition (constituted as a single tradition and its ongoing negation,
such that the ‘negated is nevertheless retained in the negation’135), however dialecti-
cally acute, may not be adequate to allow an expanded field of conceptual modernity,
then the terrain opens up to developments that are not just one negation after another
in a Hegelian movement of history, even if, as with Adorno, it lacks teleological reso-
lution.
Material
The narrowness of Adorno’s conception of music’s historical development can be con-
sidered in terms of what he considers its material. It is worth noting from the outset
that the idea of art as working with ‘material’ again recalls the concept of craft, not
least because one of the most obvious characteristics of craft is its material specificity
and the nature of productive methods that are tightly interwoven with the material’s
characteristics. Of course where these materials are typically considered as physical
substances, it must be stated that ‘material’ in the context of the present argument
means much more. Nevertheless, the craft-like work process that the concept of mate-
135‘If [the composer] turns critically against tradition through the use of an autonomous material, one
completely purged of concepts such as consonance, dissonance, triad and diatonicism, the negated is
nevertheless retained in the negation. Such works speak by virtue of the taboos they radiate.’ Adorno,
Aesthetic Theory, p.203.
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rial suggests provides a perspective on artistic production that foregrounds the activity
of the work itself rather than the status of the work produced. Interrogating the con-
cept of material then may lead to an expanded idea of the critical value of the craft of
artistic production.
Artistic material is, for Adorno, the totality of the conditions that the artist con-
fronts. Material is distinct from the content of an artwork, inasmuch as the latter is
what transpires in the work (mediated by form), whereas the material precedes the
production of the work: ‘material is what is formed’ in the process. Adorno continues:
Material . . . is what artists work with: it is the sum of all that is available
to them, including words, colours, sounds, associations of every sort and
every technique ever developed. To this extent, forms too can become
material; it is everything that artists encounter about which theymust make
a decision.’136
This scope of consideration for artist material is very broad: the inclusion of tech-
nique is particularly interesting, since technique is also the ‘mastery’ over material,137
but inasmuch as it is also something that has a particular state of development at any
given time, in accord with the social and productive conditions of that time, it too is
considered as part of the total material available for work. Thus technique and material
are mutually mediated in their historical development. Similarly, Adorno’s acknowl-
edgement that ‘forms too can become material’ is interesting for a parallel reason,
since ‘material is what is formed’. Thus again there is a mutual mediation of form and
136Ibid., p.202.
137‘The aesthetic name for mastery over material—technique. . .’ Ibid., p.290.
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material. The consideration is opened up not just of developmental forms in artworks
(which are already, as he points out, the return of ‘unsolved antagonisms of reality’138),
but also social forms themselves (particularly those of quantitative equivalence) of the
sort that the artwork may critically adapt. Despite Adorno’s avowed inclusion of forms
as material however, he does not appear to follow through with the idea that hyposta-
tised forms can be worked with in any way that is not ruinous to the artwork produced.
By Adorno’s thinking, forms that have become static only enter into the artwork as
neutralising methodical forms. To put it another way, it seems that Adorno does not
countenance the possibility that a properly artistic decision could be made about static
form as material. As I will argue below, however, if such forms are considered as
material rather than method, this actually opens an interesting development, whereby
hypostatised form becomes a peculiarly resistant type of material, its rigidification not
the neutraliser of tension, but rather a heightened provocation for artistic technique.
Important to Adorno’s thinking here is that ‘material is not natural material even if
it appears so to artists; rather, it is thoroughly historical,’139 a point which is perhaps
more obvious with material that is conceptual rather than supposedly raw physical
‘stuff’, though it applies equally in the latter case. (The antithesis of nature and history
is in any case, for Adorno more generally, a dialectical relation, such that it is not just
that artistic material is not ‘natural’, but that the concept of nature itself depends on that
of history—and similarly the converse.140) Adorno’s ‘artistic material’ is constituted
by the condition of its historical moment, and the work thereby produced takes up this
material and re-presents it in refracted form. Thus, as Peter Osborne notes: ‘the critical
138Ibid., p.7.
139Ibid., p.203.
140See Theodor W. Adorno, ‘The Idea of Natural History,’ trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Telos, no. 60
(June 1984): 111–124.
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potentiality of a work is determined by the materials out of which it is produced.’141
In this regard, the importance of the concept of material becomes evident: Osborne
points out Peter Bu¨rger’s assertion that the concept of material is central to Adorno’s
aesthetics as the ‘basic category through which the aesthetic and social dialectics are
mediated.’ The trouble is however—a point also raised by Cunningham with regard to
modern music as I noted above,142 and one important as well to Bu¨rger and Osborne—
that ‘[Adorno] can recognise only one material in a given epoch.’143 That is to say,
the total material of the epoch can only allow its forms to come from the same line
of development; there are, by this conception, no parallel lines of development, from
which forms (their fluidity or stasis notwithstanding) can cross over.
In this light, some consideration must be given to what constitutes the material en-
gaged by the Oulipo worked on in their proposal of constrained writing. If Adorno is
taken at his word and ‘forms too can become material’, it is plausible to consider the
rigidified forms employed by the Oulipo as constraints as material, albeit material of a
somewhat resistant character. This is all the more so with the definitive forms imported
or ‘translated’ from mathematics, which here take on a logical impermeability. While
Adorno himself considers such formal rigidity to be an artistic weakness, it is never-
theless the case that a decision is taken here, a choice made about the material: the
constraint is nothing if not deliberate. The constrained form then becomes part of the
palette of materials, selected or prepared, that are necessary for the construction of the
Oulipian work. In Oulipian methods, the constraint is the most definitive prescription
as a part of the material, but it then imposes its own demands on the remaining material
141Osborne, ‘Adorno and the Metaphysics of Modernism,’ p.44.
142See above, p.254.
143Bu¨rger, cited in Osborne, ‘Adorno and the Metaphysics of Modernism,’ p.44.
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that must be chosen for the construction of a work. Indeed that the whole process is
rendered more conscious is an oft-cited justification for the principle of constraint, and
one of the primary distinctions from Surrealist practice.
This imposition of forms appears antithetical to Adorno’s own presentation of what
constitute the immanent domain of artistic construction. Inasmuch as mathematical
relations may be found in the artwork, for Adorno, ‘they can only be grasped in relation
to a historically concrete configuration, they cannot be hypostatised.’144 Yet this is
precisely what the Oulipian use of constraint does: it takes abstract mathematical form
and applies it arbitrarily. In some respects (but only some) this is comparable with
Schoenberg’s twelve-tone technique because this too, at least in the terms that Adorno
criticises, is an instance of hypostatised form in the artwork. Putting this in terms of
the employment of material, as was indicated above, Adorno notes that, with twelve-
tone technique, the more traditional ‘reconciliation’ of material and composition is
lost. Adorno states, that with twelve-tone technique: ‘the composer’s material, the
row, is preformed—or, as many would not hesitate to assert, manipulated by him’—
this does not represent much concern for ‘the connection between what is composed
and the materials of composition.’145 That the material is ‘preformed’ is significant
in that it suggests that the forming of the material proper to artistic production has
been supplanted by a given form that is insensitive to the rest of the material, and thus
resistant to composition.
The trouble here for Adorno, of a lack of reconciliation of a particular part of
the artistic material with the composition itself—and twelve-tone technique can le-
144Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.390.
145Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ p.285.
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gitimately be called material, but, crucially, preformed or treated material146—comes
about as a result of a development in the tonal tradition. This is precisely Schoenberg’s
self-conception, as noted above. It thus takes on the position of an authority of form in
the tradition from which it meant to distance itself. As Adorno writes, ‘while inflicting
the most deadly blows on authority through his work, he seeks to defend the work as
though before a hidden authority and ultimately to make it itself the authority.’147 In
this sense, for Adorno, Schoenberg’s relation to tradition is not one that challenges
tradition as such, but rather the specific manifestations of it at any particular moment.
While this can be considered, in Adorno’s terms, as the ‘logic of music itself’, there
remains a desire for order, with the risk (the risk that is realised in the twelve-tone
technique) that a new form that breaks the old authority, in its own orderliness, be-
comes the replacement authority.148 In that case, the problem with Schoenberg’s serial
technique, where it might be criticised in Adorno’s terms as arbitrary, is rather that it
is still too traditional, as Boulez indicates; that is, right from the start, it is not arbitrary
enough. Boulez’s prescription is for a more comprehensive disruption. Adorno, with
Schoenberg, will only allow a linear progression.
It is thus its inherent arbitrariness to its domain of application that distinguishes
Oulipian constraint from something like twelve-tone technique. The former does not
mean to set itself up as a universal authority of literary composition, neither as the
wider practice of constraint as such, nor any particular manifestation of it. Precisely
what determines it as constraint, as opposed to convention, norm, ‘nature’, or any such
146‘. . . comparable to an industrial form of production: a ruthlessness in the treatment of the material.’
Ibid., p.285.
147Adorno, ‘Schoenberg,’ p.151.
148‘The vulgar notion that the twelve-note technique has its origins in the longing for order does
contain a grain of truth, . . . despite its blindness towards the role played in its emergence by the logic of
music itself.’ Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ p.275.
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‘given’ of the medium, is this lack of inherent necessity. Indeed, constraint needs to re-
tain its distinction from the ‘conventional’ and must not become too widely accepted,
too normal (and this is one of the problems of longevity for the Oulipo). The distinc-
tion between the constraint and the conventional context, against which constraint is
defined, is noted by Marcel Be´nabou: ‘people accept the rule, they tolerate technique,
but they refuse constraint.’ That is, they object to what is perceived as the ‘unneces-
sary’ rule—one that is ‘exaggerative and excessive.’149 Considering this in relation to
his criticism of the use of hypostatised form in artworks, it can be seen that Adorno—
while he does not appear to have encountered the Oulipo’s work and would likely not
have been much impressed had he done so—does not address anything that is quite
like it. His criticism of twelve-tone technique is precisely as something immanently
developed as a necessity of a strengthened artistic construction that has defeated itself
by that same strength. His criticisms of mathematisation tend to acknowledge certain
aspects of mathematical proportion and so on, but object to their becoming abstracted.
The critical point is based around the lack of a connection between method and mate-
rial, but it is to counter the supposition that such method itself demands that it ought
to be congruent—not least by virtue of its claim to the same line of historical develop-
ment as the matter—and that its forms can be isolated as universally applicable. What
is offered by the Oulipo however, is, I suggest, a radical arbitrariness of method.
Peter Osborne writes that ‘once [Adorno’s] unilinearity is recognised as an inade-
quate representation of the complexity and essential unevenness of the process of his-
torical development, . . . a whole series of aesthetic possibilities begin to emerge cen-
tred upon the “non-contemporaneous” moment of the dialectics of development.’150 It
149Be´nabou, ‘Rule and Constraint,’ p.41.
150Osborne, ‘Adorno and the Metaphysics of Modernism,’ p.43.
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is then possible to look again at formal interventions that would, on the face of it, seem
to be prohibited by Adorno’s prescription for art as a defeat for the vital tension of the
work. Osborne here identifies the temporal aspect of this opening, that is, that there
are numerous traditions and social developments which are not necessarily synchro-
nised as a single progressive vector. These can then be seen to possess forms which
may migrate to each other, liberating what might otherwise be dead-end processes.
The Oulipo’s relating back to their anticipatory plagiarists, the Troubadours, Grands
Rhe´toriqueurs and others as practitioners of a kind of literary craft is not so easily
dismissed as nostalgia then, if it is allowed that the line of development is not even,
not always a straight line—indeed not always a single line.151 Many of the Oulipo’s
forebears are, in literary history, generally considered marginal—as Perec contends,
‘systematic artifices, formal mannerisms (that which, in the final analysis, constitutes
Rabelais, Sterne, Roussel . . .) are relegated to the registers of asylums for literary
madmen.’152 Raymond Roussel here is one of the clearest anticipatory plagiarists of
the Oulipo,153 but was, in his time (and still is, though is now valued for it), considered
something of an eccentric. Indeed this kind of marginality is (or was) perhaps vital for
the Oulipo themselves. It is likely that the status of the group as outside the bounds
of conventional literary history gives them a peculiarity that guards against constraint
becoming that which defeats it—convention.154
151In any case, the Oulipo are not alone in these historical recuperations; Ezra Pound, for example,
was also fascinated by the Troubadours, as well as other historically and geographically disparate poetic
forms.
152Perec, ‘History of the Lipogram,’ p.98.
153Roussel’s ‘procedure’ involved constructing narratives in accordance with an arbitrary statement
and its homophonic equivalent. The similarity to Oulipian constraint is clear from Michel Leiris’s 1936
interest in his ‘voluntary submission to a complicated, difficult rule (and especially the fact of having
to focus his attention on solving a problem whose givens are as foreign, detached, futile as possible).’
Michel Leiris, ‘How I Wrote Certain of My Books,’ in Brise´es: Broken Branches, trans. Lydia Davis
(San Francisco: North Point Press, 1989), p.51.
154In the epilogue, I will consider whether they have managed to retain this status.
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Jacques Roubaud makes the provocative assertion that ‘the claim to craftsmanship
reflects an affirmation of amateurism; it is a voluntary archaism.’155 But this archaism
of certain formal devices in a different context may yet render them rather different in
critical terms to their earlier appearance. There is thus a difference appreciable in their
adoption in the now of the early Oulipo (the 1960s), inasmuch as the meaning of such
rational interventions in a ‘creative’ process is different in a time where such forms of
craft—craft-forms—are specifically demoted/deprecated by the dominant concept of
art. If these forms are considered as craft, they are novel, because the meaning of craft
has changed, and here the significance of Roubaud’s ‘voluntary’ comes to the fore,
in conjunction with the earlier assertions of the Oulipo of their self-consciousness of
method. Craft is no longer the integrated harmonious productive activity of historical
retrospection; thus to engage in such an activity now is in defiance of the general
current of social necessity (including the social necessity of art).
The emergence of artistic possibilities can also be considered in terms of the re-
maining spaces of un-administered life in the social totality, or even that aspects of
rational domination may yet be artistically refracted in ways unconsidered by Adorno,
lateral to the progressive negation of the ‘line’ of development. Adorno himself notes
that art must confront itself with anti-art, which ‘implies nothing less than that art must
go beyond its own concept in order to remain faithful to that concept,’156 but does not
allow that this might include some rethinking of ‘craft’.
With this allowance in mind then, I want to propose that the Oulipo’s use of arbi-
trary formal interventions, primarily mathematical, represents the instantiation of the
155Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.85.
156Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.40.
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radically arbitrary as artistic material. This form comes not from the main line of writ-
ing tradition, and ultimately not even from the marginal mannerist tradition, but from
an unrelated discipline, mathematics. It thus cannot be seen as the hypostatisation of
method that has its origins in motivic or thematic practice in writing, as Adorno sees
something like twelve-tone technique. It is quite the opposite. Thus as material, it de-
mands subjective engagement, rather than providing ready-made form in accordance
with an idea of what the work should be. It is also worth pointing out that this ar-
tisanal aspect makes it quite distinct from chance-based operations, such as those of
John Cage, whose aim, as Adorno says, is ‘to transform psychological ego weakness
into aesthetic strength;’157 that is, to let the material itself speak rather than the artis-
tic subject. There is no rejection or suppression of the voluntary in Oulipian literary
method. The point is, rather, to consider this arbitrary form as something to be worked
with, that technique must master: the designation of constraint as material (in Adorno’s
sense) makes this clear and brings back to the fore the material-engagement sense of
craft (Handwerk, travaux manuels). This is therefore an attempted recuperation of
craft (though it never wholly went away in art) as a form of non-alienated labour with
material, even as both the activity of labour and this material itself appear in capitalist
modernity in a necessarily alienated form.
The arbitrary constraint, since it has logical form by definition, has the implication
of a logical (and thus predictable) trajectory (and this again differs from chance oper-
ations): an end is to be met in fulfilling the demands of the constraint with a text. As
Roubaud proposes, ‘a constraint must “prove” at least one text.’158 The ‘proof’ of the
text is that it be traced back to its axiomatic grounds—its constraint(s); thus there is an
157Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ p.283.
158Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.91.
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instrumental demand in this property of the constraint.159 Where a certain ‘artistry’ (in
a pre-modern sense) is required to meet a pre-determined end, the activity is typically
called (and thereby denigrated as) craft.
But can mathematical constraint really escape the damaging instrumentalisation of
the commodity form? It is arguable what the ‘origins’ of mathematics are, whether
a fully materialist account can be given of the discipline. I do not intend to take a
position on that, but note that, for Adorno, it appears as the epitome of method with-
out material, and thus aesthetically and philosophically null—Adorno would seem to
concur with Hegel’s dismissal of mathematics as ‘defective cognition . . . of a kind that
philosophy must disdain.’160 There is then, as I noted in chapter 2, a particular perver-
sity to the use of this form as the radical arbitrariness of the Oulipo (which is, as well,
its justification): its inappropriateness and its arbitrariness are grounded in the same
social fact, that mathematically deductive logic is antithetical to the idea of artistic pro-
duction in modern consciousness—precisely that its arbitrary method (which is fine in
terms of its own coherence) is indifferent to the truth of oppression that art reveals.
How then can this instrumentality be read critically in the work of the Oulipo? For
Adorno, ‘that art is possible in the midst of rationality, and that it employs its means,
is a response to the faulty irrationality of the rational world as an over-administered
159The constraint for which no text could be written could be an interesting fantastical structure, but
clearly it could no longer be a ‘constraint’ since there is nothing for it to constrain.
160‘Mathematics is proud of the self-evidence of this defective cognition, and flaunts it even in the face
of philosophy, but it is based solely on the poverty of its purpose and the defectiveness of its material,
and is therefore of a kind that philosophy must disdain.—The purpose or concept of mathematics is
magnitude. This is precisely the inessential, unconceptual relationship. Accordingly, the movement of
knowing proceeds on the surface, does not touch the Thing itself, not the essence or the concept, and
is therefore no conceptual comprehension.’ George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of
Spirit, trans. Michael Inwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), §45.
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world.’161 And yet art must subvert those means: ‘art mobilises technique in an op-
posite direction than does domination.’162 Would the importation of mathematics ar-
bitrarily not maintain the direction of domination rather than reformulate it? Or is it
possible that the method’s lack of immanent reformulation is actually itself subver-
sive? Inasmuch as the Oulipian constraint involves a problem, and the resultant work
is then, in those terms at least, a ‘proof’ of the required deduction, it has no literary
relevance. It does not by any necessity touch the literary purport of the task of writ-
ing. There are cases, of course, where the constrained form is incorporated into the
content of the work quite deliberately, Georges Perec’s La Disparition being perhaps
the most famous. In fact, Jacques Roubaud makes the claim that the recounting of the
constraint in this case is a consequence of an Oulipian axiom (although it is one of his
own positing). The constraint in this text is, he writes:
. . . at once . . . its developmental mechanism, and at the same time the
meaning of the text. . . . It is thus both the story of what it recounts and
the story of the constraint which creates that which is recounted. This
highly involuted aspect of constraint (which is undoubtedly not proper to
Oulipian constraint, but which is in this case practically pure) is a direct
consequence of the . . . axiom: constraint is a principle, not a means.’163
Note, however, Roubaud’s caveat, that this is ‘not proper to Oulipian constraint’:
that is, it is a consequence, rather than a pre-condition—it is not itself an axiom (and
the point is thus, in this respect, fundamentally misrepresented by Christian Bo¨k as
161Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.73.
162Ibid., p.74.
163Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ pp.86–87.
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‘the constraint, if enacted, must mention its own existence’164). Careful interpretation
is required here, since Roubaud’s affirmation of the narratological or thematic conse-
quence of his lipogrammatic constraint does not imply that the consequences of all
constrained forms must be readable in such terms even if they have consequences of
some sort. In any case, as I stated, this is Roubaud’s position, and it is not defini-
tively Oulipian; indeed Oskar Pastior appears to take the polar opposite position: ‘an
oulipian text cannot, should not, speak of itself—it speaks, quite simply, or it doesn’t
speak.’165 Whatever the legibility of the constraint in the final text, my argument here
is that the critical interpretation of the process of textual production under constraint
is indifferent to whether those consequences are manifest in the literary reading of the
resultant work.
It is also this latter point that maintains the method’s critical interest, despite the
paradox of its being instrumentalised. Since the instrumentality does not directly ren-
der the work itself useful (socially, as commodity form), the technique, in itself, main-
tains a kind of futility, a genuinely useless craft. There are, in a sense, two processes at
work in the Oulipian process of writing: the instrumentalised logic of meeting a con-
straint, and the artistic logic of the work (about which the Oulipo makes no demand).
The relation of the two, as a material condition of writing, is a difficult context to work
with. It demands a skill—a techne¯—of writing to meet its instrumental demands, but
at the same time, those instrumental demands are not socially ordered as an end for
164Christian Bo¨k, ‘Oulipo and Unconscious Tyranny,’ in The Noulipian Analects, ed. Christine
Wertheim and Matias Viegener (Los Angeles: Les Figues Press, 2007), p.160. The odd formulation
here of the constraint’s ‘mentioning’ itself is indicative of Bo¨k’s assimilation of the Oulipo—whose
major concern he posits as ‘rules about rules’—to his own movement of conceptual writing, where the
idea and its performance are primary—a point which I will return to in the Epilogue.
165Oskar Pastior, ‘Rule of the Game, Threnodials, Translations,’ in All That is Evident is Suspect:
Readings from the Oulipo 1963-2018, ed. Ian Monk and Daniel Levin Becker, trans. Ian Monk (San
Francisco: McSweeney’s, 2018), p.133.
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the artwork. They are contained by the decision to use constrained form. Now for
this to have some kind of critical truth, in terms that are informed by Adorno’s aes-
thetics, it must offer some kind of incorporation of its material in terms that dominate
it in a refracted form of the dominance of mathematical form socially; we might say,
the constrained genesis of the work, representing a certain ‘unfreedom’ speaks for the
‘victim’, as Adorno affirms of the artwork. This is the image of mathematical logic
in its social applications, the fact that it is used to dominate social forms of all sorts
instrumentally; but here it is incorporated into an artistic project and made useless,
while retaining instrumental form.
Take even the relative simplicity of Franc¸ois Le Lionnais’s Boolean Poetry. The
method draws on mathematical set theory, and the consideration of any given textual
work as a set of terms:
C’est ainsi qu’un dictionnaire donne´—par exemple, le Dictionnaire de
l’Acade´mie—constitue un ensemble dont chaque mot est un e´le´ment. Un
poe`me forge´ uniquement avec des mots de ce dictionnaire est un sous-
ensemble. Un autre poe`me, un autre sous-ensemble. Le Lecteur imaginera
sans peine ce que l’on appellera la re´union de ces deux sous-ensembles—
ce sera la liste des mots qui se trouvent soit dans l’un, soit dans l’autre
poe`me—et l’intersection de ces deux sous-ensembles—ce sera la liste des
mots qui se trouvent a` la fois dans l’un et dans l’autre poe`me.166
[It is thus that a given dictionary—the Dictionnaire de l’Acade´mie, for
example—constitutes a set of which each word is an element. A poem
166Franc¸ois Le Lionnais, ‘Poe`mes boole´ens,’ in La litte´rature potentielle (Paris: Gallimard, folio es-
sais, 1973), p.258.
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formed with words from this dictionary alone is a sub-set. Another poem
is another sub-set. The reader will imagine without difficulty what will be
called the union of these two sub-sets—that will be the list of words which
are found in one or the other poem—and the intersection of these two sub-
sets—which will be the list of words which are found at the same time in
the one and the other poem.]
Le Lionnais notes that his resultant poems do not represent the totality of the in-
tersection and that ‘cette possibilite´ de choix permet d’e´chapper a` toute me´canisation
et tout automatisme. Elle garantit la liberte´ cre´atrice (ou expressive) de l’auteur a`
l’inte´rieur d’un proce´de´ donne´.’167 [‘This possibility of choice allows the escape from
total mechanisation and total automatism. It guarantees the creative (or expressive)
freedom of the author within a given process.’] In fact, by the standard of some Oulip-
ian constraints, it is far from programmatic, though the narrowness of the constraint
here depends on the choice of source material. But the description of this process in
specifically mathematical terms is highly significant: Le Lionnais makes explicit that
‘les notions que nous avons de´crites appartiennent a` deux branches des mathe´matiques:
The´orie des Ensembles et Alge`bre de Boole’168 [‘The notions that we have described
belong to two branches of mathematics: set theory and boolean algebra.’] The pro-
cess of poetic composition, where the right word would seem to be, lyrically at least,
essential, meets the operation of a mathematical formalism that is, properly speaking,
wholly indifferent to the nature of what it structures (that is, after all, the basis on
which set theory operates—the fact of membership of the set, rather than the reason
for or meaning of that membership). The set theoretical intersection appears here in
167Ibid., p.262.
168Ibid., pp.268–8.
CRAFT, CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRAINT 270
the constructive process as a formally disinterested operation, but upon which the au-
thorial subject must work, both to produce a poem, but also to prove the viability of
the intersection as a poem. It is this latter that is the more specifically Oulipian point,
as opposed to questions of authorial ‘success’ in a literary sense: Le Lionnais him-
self notes that ’la proce´de´ . . . n’offre de possibilite´s inte´ressantes que dans des cas
exceptionels.169 [‘The procedure . . . offers interesting possibilities only in exceptional
cases.’] The point at stake is the process.
Throughout this thesis, I have indicated that the interesting critical point in Oulip-
ian work is in the method (or the process) rather than the end-work. This is where the
innovation is: as Be´nabou states, ‘to create structure—Oulipian act par excellence—is
. . . to propose an as yet undiscovered mode of organisation for linguistic objects.’170
In fact it is arguably the case that the Oulipian process itself must include its conse-
quential text, but that this end-work, in literary terms, is not what is at stake, thus there
should, with this concession, be just one ‘proof’ text (of course there may be any num-
ber of other texts utilising the same constraint but this enters into a different domain of
reception). The situation is clearly summed up by Roubaud:
. . . a constraint having been defined, a small number of texts (only one,
in some cases) are composed by deduction from this axiom, which then
ceases to preoccupy the Oulipo; the former then enter either into the public
domain or into that of the ‘applied Oulipo’ (whose status is but ill-defined).
. . . In fact there even exists a tendency, which might be qualified as ultra,
for which every text deduced from a constraint must be classed in the
169Ibid., p.262.
170Be´nabou, ‘Rule and Constraint,’ p.46.
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‘applied’ domain, the only admissible text, for the Oulipian method being
the text that formulates the constraint and, in so doing, exhausts it. This,
it seems to me, is to omit the deductive aspect of the method.171
Admittedly this may seem a perverse way to interpret writing, but it is crucial to
the Oulipian constraint qua constraint. The repetition of the constraint tends towards
convention, towards tradition—whatever other critical interpretation can be made of
that, it is simply the case that what designates the status of constraint has been eroded.
In critical terms, the parallel ‘logic’ introduced in the method as a deductive proce-
dure of composition is interesting as long as it is potential. That is, the tension that is
present in the mismatch of deductive and ‘creative’ processes comes to an end with the
completion of the work. It is of course also the case that this tension could not emerge
without working through towards a work. Important here is the fact that constraint,
however, is not a means: as Roubaud states, ‘constraint is a principle, not a means.’172
I take the means here to be in relation to an end constituted by the literary work, that
is, by specifically literary intentions, which is of course beyond the principle of the
Oulipian constraint itself. It does retain the demand for an instrumentality, however—
‘the constraint is the problem; the text the solution’, as Jouet asserts173— inasmuch as
the logical aspect of it remains to be demonstrated by the production of a work that
fulfils it. There is an interplay of instrumentality here in the Oulipian method, with the
incongruity of the formal deduction and the literary direction not aligning in terms of
purpose except at the point where the work is finally done, and the incongruity is re-
solved. Whatever tensions then pertain to the work would be the subject of a different
171Roubaud, ‘Mathematics in the Method of Raymond Queneau,’ p.91.
172Ibid., p.87.
173Jouet, ‘With (and Without) Constraints,’ p.4.
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kind of analysis. Of course to consider the work (process) in this way, as the object
of critical reception, is also, implicitly, to consider it as a work (end). This leads to
a paradox: Oulipian method is artwork and also it is not: it is, because we can draw
from it the critical-interpretative response that the artwork demands; it is not because
for it to retain its character as method, it cannot be a work in its own right.
Epilogue
The focus of this thesis has been an interpretation of the work of the Oulipo at a par-
ticular historical juncture, that is, a crisis of art’s autonomy in the increasingly ratio-
nalised and technological social context of the 1960s. I do not claim that this is a total
diagnosis of the Oulipo or of their methods in either the breadth of the work of their
early years, or of the developments that have happened in the half-century or so since
then. Nevertheless the question arises of whether the Oulipo can still be appraised in
these terms. In later years, as the group itself has become better known (though still
not exactly famous), and particularly as some Oulipian novels by certain of the group’s
members have become widely-known,174 the reception and associations have perhaps
become more actual than potential. The group is remarkably long-lived. The fact that
the Oulipo has never insisted on a theoretical foundation, a dogmatic philosophical or
political stance; their congenial and playful ethos; and the fact that leaving the group
is forbidden (even in death)175—all these factors are at least partially responsible for
174Perec’s A Void and Life a Users Manual, Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveller and Invisible
Cities, Queneau’s Exercises in Style, Roubaud’s Great Fire of London series, and more recently Anne
Garre´ta’s Sphinx, to mention only a few with identified constraints. Harry Mathews has also produced
a number of well-respected novels, though he remains aloof about his methods.
175This in accordance with the group’s unwritten constitution. For example, Levin-Becker reports
that ‘shortly after obituaries for Caradec began to appear in French newspapers [in 2008], the Oulipo
announced that he was “definitively excused” from attendance at subsequent meetings, owing to the
handicap of being deceased.’ Levin Becker,Many Subtle Channels, pp.20–21.
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the group’s near sixty year life-span. At the same time, however, despite—or perhaps
because of—this longevity and raised profile, it may be reasonably asked whether the
group’s vitality has declined since the 1970s. By this suggestion, I do not mean that the
membership of the group has diminished, that they are less active, less well respected,
or even less productive of literary work; rather, the question is whether the conditions
that made their work distinctive, and distinctively strange, in the early years have per-
haps faded somewhat. Has the ouvroir—the small circle of literary artisans—given
way to its English namesake, a writers’ workshop that is more pedagogical and perfor-
mative than innovative or subversive?
As early as 1986, Noe¨l Arnaud stated that ‘today, the Oulipo finds itself shaken to
its foundations by its very success. . . . Its physiognomy is changing as pedagogy
instills itself in its veins. Its personality is dissolving: it is becoming a “writers’
workshop” among many other “writers’ workshops.”’ This is doubtless a ‘danger-
ous’ situation, but Arnaud concludes—one wonders how seriously—by affirming that
‘Oulipians will rise up renewed, restored to their initial vigour, all questions answered,
all dramas resolved.’176 In fact, Oulipian workshops, with a directly pedagogical func-
tion, ran from 1976 until the late eighties, when ‘the demand for them became so great
that what had begun as a secondary activity threatened to make major inroads on the
time of the few Oulipians who regularly took part in it,’177 but the social role was set in
place. Another quarter of a century on and Oulipian technique is well-represented in
the domain of practical ‘creative writing’.178 The group is also, by now, well-integrated
176Arnaud, ‘Prolegomena,’ pp.xiv–xv.
177Oulipo, Oulipo Compendium, p.246.
178Aside from numerous websites offering Oulipian technique as a solution to writer’s block, the Uni-
versity of Essex has an undergraduate module called ‘Creative Writing: Oulipo and the Avant Garde’,
which aims ‘to enable students to combine different Oulipian methods in new ways and to create simi-
lar methods of their own invention applicable to their own creative writing’. LT359-6-FY-CO: Creative
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into the cultural establishment, in France at least, with the ‘DifDePo’ project funded
by the French National Research Agency and a recent exhibition at the Bibliothe`que
nationale de France.179 Furthermore the group has taken on a rather more performative
role in wider society. Since 1996, the Oulipo has held its increasingly well-attended
‘jeudis’, staged once a month to read out texts to an audience of several hundred.
Daniel Levin Becker, the group’s youngest member at the time of writing—and whose
activities in the group appear to be primarily documentary—describes the scene:
Normally during jeudis the group reads in front of a projection of what
is called the galaxie oulipienne, an astral map of the members’ faces spi-
ralling out from the centre in rough chronological order of their recruit-
ment. . . . [The readings] give the audience a reason to care, to buy a book
afterwards, to put a face to the name on the spine, to rub elbows with other
elegantly dishevelled mordus. . . . [The venue] is a place where new ma-
terial can be tested before a sympathetic audience and where old material
can be repurposed and given new valence.180
In the same vein, Marcel Be´nabou relates that when, in 1989, he was tasked by
an editor with producing a new book on the Oulipo, his intention was, rather than
offering a text about Oulipian work, ‘de donner quelque chose comme une se´rie de
Writing: Oulipo and the Avant Garde, https://www1.essex.ac.uk/modules/default.aspx?
coursecode=LT359&level=6&period=FY (accessed August 20, 2019). The Cambridge Introduction
to Creative Writing presents the Oulipo as a resource for the ‘challenges of experiment’. Suggested ex-
ercises are N+7 and a model drawn from Queneau’s Exercises in Style. David Morley, The Cambridge
Introduction to Creative Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.74–78.
179Alison James, ‘Perec and the Politics of Constraint,’ in The Afterlives of Georges Perec, ed. Justin
Clemens and Rowan Wilken (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), p.168 n.11.
180Levin Becker, Many Subtle Channels, p.27,36 Levin Becker’s book acts as effective publicity for
the group; it is accessible and journalistic, comprised mainly of anecdotes and vignettes of the Oulipian
‘personalities’.
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photos de famille, largement commente´es, de l’Oulipo et de ses membres.’181 [‘To
give something like a series of generously explained family photos of the Oulipo and
its members.’] Although that particular book never came to fruition, it provided the
model for a collection of personal recollections by Oulipians, finally published in 2004
as Moments oulipiens, which focuses on personalities, memories, stories rather than
the theory or technique of Oulipism.
While the group was never overtly antagonistic to wider society, in its earlier years
it maintained a semi-clandestine status that longevity and public recognition, even the
recognition as ‘mordus’, turns into an acceptable personality, a reproducible and fa-
miliar ‘brand’ in the literary landscape. There is, perhaps, to use Adorno’s words, ‘the
danger of the dangerless’ apparent here.182 And if, taking this to an extreme, it has
become the case that, as Mark Wolff puts it, ‘Oulipian writing depends on who writes,
not on how one writes’, then it is not hard to agree with his assessment that ‘the current
insistence of the Oulipo on the personal qualities of the group’s membership reveal the
limits of their innovations within the discourses and practices of the literary field.’183
181‘Il n’e´tait pas question pour moi, bien entendu, de reprendre une fois de plus le discours sur les
vertus libe´ratrices de ”l‘e´criture sous contrainte”, dont l’Ouvroir de Litte´rature Potentielle s’est fait le
chantre opiniaˆtre et que certains oulipiens, comme Queneau, Perec ou Calvino, ont magistralement
illustre´es. Il me fallait explorer un autre terrain. J’avais donc propose´ pour cet ouvrage le titre Portraits
oulipiens: mon intention e´tait de donner quelque chose comme une se´rie de photos de famille, largement
commente´es, de l’Oulipo et de ses membres.’ Marcel Be´nabou, ‘Foreword,’ in Moments Oulipiens
(Bordeaux: Le Castor Astral, 2004), p.7. [‘It was, of course, out of the question for me to take up the
discussion, once again, of the liberating virtues of “constrained writing”, of which the Oulipo has been
the dogged apologist and that certain Oulipians, like Queneau, Perec or Calvino, have magnificently
illustrated. I had to explore another territory. I had thus proposed for this work the title Oulipian
Portraits: my intention was to give something like a series of generously explained family photos of the
Oulipo and its members.’]
182‘Where art turns into decorative art, or where what I have called the ‘danger of the dangerless’
holds sway—where alienation from the concrete world becomes a wallpaper pattern.’ Adorno, Aesthet-
ics: 1958/59, p.152.
183While I agree that there are questions here regarding the contemporary Oulipo, I disagree with
Wolff’s appraisal of the early Oulipo; specifically the contention that they were characterised primarily
by an attempt at scientific reproducibility in literary production: ‘a new function for texts, one that
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What Wolff identifies here is that there is a risk that the focus on personalities has taken
over from the rigour of methodical innovation as that which defines the Oulipo. There
are two results of this: on the one hand, an increasing vagueness about what constitutes
potential literature; on the other, a willingness to accept devices that have become con-
ventional according to an Oulipian type as still ‘experimental’. Some recent defences
of the Oulipo do little to counter these risks. Peter Consenstein, for example, offers an
affirmation of the Oulipo inasmuch as he offers an affirmation of literature: ‘literature
changes. Art changes. The Oulipo facilitates those changes. It ends when literature
ends, which may mean never.’184 A similar avowal of the near-eternality of the Oulipo,
bolstered this time by recourse to evolutionary theory, is offered by Marc Lapprand.185
The volume in which these essays appear also contains several new pieces of con-
strained writing, and it is striking that perennial favourites such as the lipogram, N+7
(in the book’s introduction they are described as ‘provocative’) and beau pre´sent are
wheeled out, all of which by now could well be described as Oulipian standards.186
The problem of convention, in fact, starts to approach the heart of the issue here.
If, as I have argued, the critical value of the Oulipian approach lies predominantly in
the peculiarity of the method—the introduction of alien and formal material (partic-
ularly, mathematical material) to literature—and that this is definitive of the critical
emphasised the reproducibility of structure,’ with its concomitant tendency towards ‘anonymous and
autonomous’ textual production; or with the idea that there is much ground for linking the Oulipo with
N. Katherine Hayles’s ‘posthumanism’. Mark Wolff, ‘Rules of the Oulipian Game: Authorship and
Posthuman Literature,’Contemporary French and Francophone Studies 11, no. 1 (2007): pp.113–4,117.
184Consenstein, ‘Forever Never Ends,’ p.190 The assertion is made in response to the pessimistic but
rather flimsy book The End of Oulipo? Elkin and Esposito, The End of Oulipo?
185Marc Lapprand, ‘Oulipo Forever,’ in Verbivoracious Festschrift Volume Six: The Oulipo, ed. G. N.
Forester and M. J. Nicholls (Singapore: Verbivoracious Press, 2017).
186Forester and Nicholls, Verbivoracious Festschrift Volume Six. More recent N+7s are to be found
in Wertheim and Viegener, The Noulipian Analects. A beau pre´sent is a form of reverse-lipogram, in
which only the letters of a given name may be used for composition.
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or modernist sense of constraint that is at stake here, then the becoming conventional
of constraint is the end of constraint in that sense (though not necessarily in every
sense). This is not to say that there is no interest in these becoming-conventional de-
vices (nor that there necessarily is), but only that the criticality of such devices with
regard to a crisis of modernism—acute, as Adorno identified it, in the period of the
Oulipo’s emergence—is one that cannot perpetually retain its valency over the course
of changes in society, in literature and in art. The ‘problems’ of the Oulipo’s public
acceptance and broader institutionalisation are only the wide-scale manifestation of
the same general movement of conventionalisation. Again, this is not to imply that the
Oulipo more broadly are necessarily beyond the possibility of any critical appraisal.
That their devices, their activities and their public presence may have value or interest
and indeed that they may be progressing towards different interpretative possibilities
is not precluded (although the assertions of ‘eternality’ tell us very little about what
these may be); only that the critical situation in the form at least that I have proposed
appears no longer viable. This, in the most general terms, is really only to consider the
Oulipo’s work under the principle that every critical context is necessarily historical.
In fact, a risk of conventionalisation was likely inherent in the Oulipian project
from the start, not just in the shifting boundary between convention and constraint
over time, but in the definitive boundary between constraint and its other—that is,
what is not constrained in literary process.187 This need not apply only to a narrow
concept of constraint: any formal intervention in the Oulipian mode needs not to be
total, for two reasons. First, it would constitute a total determination of the text in
187For an extensive analysis of the field of norms, rules and constraints in writing, see Bernardo
Schiavetta and Jan Baetens, ‘De´finir la contrainte?’ Formules: revue des litte´ratures a` contraintes, no. 4
(April 2000).
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advance—notionally speaking, since this is presented here as a logical rather than prac-
tical possibility—and thus the mechanical automatism that the Oulipo caution against.
Second, the unconstrained here needs to retain some accepted form to be recognisable
as a medium of constraint: genre-bound narrative forms, certain poetic conventions,
norms of grammar and semantic coherence. Without this, what is left is simply a proce-
dure: take for example the quasi-lipogram or perhaps quasi-slenderising operation188
presented by Julianna Spahr and Stephanie Young at the noulipo conference in 2005
in which the removal of the letter ‘r’ from the text is simply a mechanical operation
that demands no work of integration (resulting in this case in a text comprising many
non-words, or perhaps near-words) and the critical significance of this—whatever its
value—thus needs to be detected in the significative gestures of something done to
language and its results, lying just beyond the margin of standard language (one com-
mentator writes: ‘it almost sounded like Elmer Fudd Speak’) rather than in the process
of linguistic construction itself.189
It seems plausible then that there was a certain inevitable conservatism in the
Oulipo, and the counterposition of the strange and the non-strange, the excessive and
the expected, from the outset. As Christelle Reggiani notes, ‘la contrainte est une
rhe´torique de l’invention sentie comme puissante pre´cise´ment parce qu’elle de´passe
l’attente culturelle de´finie par la re`gle.’190 [‘The constraint is a rhetoric of invention
whose power is felt precisely because it exceeds the cultural expectation defined by the
188See Oulipo, Oulipo Compendium, p.228.
189Julianna Spahr and Stephanie Young, ‘“& and” and foulipo,’ in The Noulipian Analects, ed. Chris-
tine Wertheim and Matias Viegener (Los Angeles: Les Figues Press, 2007). The response is from Joseph
Mosconi, ‘Politics of Constraint: The Panel,’ in The Noulipian Analects, ed. Christine Wertheim and
Matias Viegener (Los Angeles: Les Figues Press, 2007), p.167.
190Christelle Reggiani, ‘Contrainte et litte´rarite´,’ Formules: revue des litte´ratures a` contraintes, no. 4
(April 2000): p.15.
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rule.’] It follows that constraint is distinctive for as long as it resists becoming con-
ventional itself. This is not to say that constraint simply becomes convention, which
would be to ignore certain formal differences of these two concepts,191 but that the use
of the constraint can itself become conventional where it is widely accepted. If this
happens, it may still be interesting or even, in some sense, useful (for creative writing
workshops, say), but it does not have the critical interest that I have described in the
previous chapter. That is, it does not refract the arbitrary methodical application of
external rule as a social critique. This is despite the fact that conventional constraint
still retains some characteristic of constraint: as Chris Andrews notes, prescriptive
rules of composition are not the same as empirical regularities, but Andrews’s direct
mapping of constraint–convention onto rule–regularity is rather too neat.192 The wider
point is that where the interruptive perversity of constraint, its arbitrariness, is lost,
something different is at work. This is why pieces with motivated constraints are less
critically acute. It is also the reason that more recent criticisms of the Oulipo for not
realising the political potential of constraint are generally wide of the mark: there are
of course significant grounds for critical interpretation of the Oulipo with regard to the
socio-historical condition of their emergence—as I have attempted here—but it is not
a question of manifest content or ‘committed’ literature.193
Other legacies of the Oulipo can be found in their influence on other non-affiliated
writers, artists or movements. A number of contemporary writers, associated with the
191See Chris Andrews, ‘Constraint and Convention: The Formalism of the Oulipo,’ Neophilologus
87, no. 2 (2003): 223–232.
192‘Once we have distinguished the empirical regularities of language and genre from the prescriptive
rules that are sometimes useful in explanation and teaching, it becomes clear that the constraint, as it
is used by Oulipo, closely resembles a prescriptive rule, while the generic convention is a regularity.’
Ibid., p.227.
193See for example the papers on politics and gender in Wertheim and Viegener, The Noulipian
Analects.
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terms conceptual or uncreative writing and the web archive UbuWeb, cite the Oulipo
as influential on their work but are similarly critical of their apparent a-politicalness
and conservatism. Christian Bo¨k for example (who has produced tightly-constrained
univocalic texts and a genetically encodable poem194) asserts that ‘even though the
wacky rules of Oulipo might imply a freedom from such conventional storytelling, the
content of such restricted literature often seems skewed towards normality.’195 Simi-
larly, an affiliate of Bo¨k and perhaps the most prominent member of the movement,
Kenneth Goldsmith, has accused the Oulipo of having ‘embraced a blandly conser-
vative narrative fiction which seems to bury the very interesting procedures that went
into creating the works.’196
These writers thus consider their own practice as a proper continuation and ex-
tension of Oulipian principles in ways that are—in their conception—more radical,
more responsive to contemporary themes and more overtly politicised. Bo¨k writes:
‘UbuWeb goes on to accentuate [the] affinities between the idea of the “constraint” in
poetic writing and the idea of the “conceptual” in visual artwork.’197 Bo¨k considers
Oulipian constrained writing then as one of four ‘limit cases’ of writing which interest
the conceptual writers: 1. the unoriginal text (readymade); 2. the constrained text
194Each of the chapters of Bo¨k’s 2001 Eunoia consists of a text using a single vowel. His Xeno-
text project proposes a poem that can be encoded into a DNA sequence which in turn synthesises a
‘response’ poem. Bo¨k makes the (dubious) claim that this provides a ‘near-permanent storage of the
poem.’ Christian Bo¨k, The Xenotext: Book 1 (Toronto: Coach House Books, 2015), p.150. (One rather
scathing commentator points out that the poem ‘will not be “read” unless a lengthy and durable Rosetta
Stone also survives that reveals how to read the code.’ A. M. Juster, The Immortal Poetry Experiment,
https://www.c2cjournal.ca/2016/07/the-immortal-poetry- experiment/ (accessed
August 20, 2019).)
195Christian Bo¨k, ‘UbuWeb and Intentional Freedom,’ in The Noulipian Analects, ed. Christine
Wertheim and Matias Viegener (Los Angeles: Les Figues Press, 2007), p.222.
196Goldsmith, Interview.
197Christian Bo¨k, ‘UbuWeb, The Conceptualists and,’ in The Noulipian Analects, ed. Christine
Wertheim and Matias Viegener (Los Angeles: Les Figues Press, 2007), p.220.
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(mannerist); 3. the unreadable text (illegible); 4. the authorless text (aleatoric).198
Goldsmith similarly aligns the Oulipo with a form of conceptualism which he consid-
ers their most interesting aspect: ‘while I like the idea of “potential literature,” it strikes
me that their output should have remained conceptual—a mapping, so to speak; judg-
ing by the works that have been realised, they might be better left as ideas.’199 The
trouble with these associations is that they are a false conflation: the Oulipo’s work
was not a variety of conceptual art.
Conceptual writing proposes the same relation in writing that the conceptualism of
the 1960s had towards developments in the visual arts, thus willingly adopting Brion
Gysin’s claim in 1959 that writing was fifty years behind painting—‘he might still be
right’, states Goldsmith.200 The justification for this, it is stated, is that text and the
production of text have undergone a radical shift in the last generation or so, specifi-
cally regarding digital technologies that allow easy duplication and distribution and a
huge base of potential text-producers, both human and machine. Goldsmith states:
What we’re dealing with here is a basic change in the operating system
of how we write at the root level. The results might not look different,
and they might not feel different, but the underlying ethos and modes of
writing have been permanently changed.201
198This schema was presented at a ‘Masterclass’ given by Bo¨k at the University of Westminster, 23
May, 2016.
199Goldsmith, Interview.
200Kenneth Goldsmith, Uncreative Writing: Managing Language in the Digital Age (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011), p.13.
201Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘Why ConceptualWriting?Why Now?’ In Against Expression: An Anthology
of Conceptual Writing, ed. Craig Dworkin and Kenneth Goldsmith (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 2011), p.xxi.
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In this sense, for Goldsmith, writing is undergoing revolutionary change just as
art did (though in different ways) over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies. Undoubtedly our era is seeing shifts in the way that text is produced and in
the transmissibility of huge quantities of data. What art forms do to respond to these
circumstances is thus an interesting question. What space literature makes here has
been, to date, however, perhaps more of a staking of territory in art discourse than any
continuation of something specifically literary.
An extended investigation of conceptual writing itself is not my main concern.
Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that conceptual writing’s attempt to recuperate
a supposedly radicalised Oulipism by recourse to its ‘conceptual’ (art) aspect, risks
missing the more distinctive work of Oulipian practice. This is perhaps clearest in
the conceptual writers’ attempt to oppose expression or at least what they see as the
literary establishment’s ideal of the writer as the authentic subject of literature (hence
the designation of ‘uncreative writing’, and the title of their anthology Against Expres-
sion). Dworkin asks, for example, ‘what would a non-expressive poetry look like? A
poetry of intellect rather than emotion? One in which the substitutions at the heart of
metaphor and image were replaced by the direct presentation of language itself, with
“spontaneous overflow” supplanted by meticulous procedure and exhaustively logical
process?’202 The question is of course (perhaps provocatively) crude in the lack of me-
diation in its terms—as Adorno says, ‘both aspects [the formal and the expressive] have
become inextricably mediated by each other. . . . Expression is a phenomenon of inter-
ference, a function of technical procedures no less than it is mimetic.’203 But similarly
202Craig Dworkin, Introduction to the UbuWeb Anthology of Conceptual Writing, http://www.
ubuweb.com/concept/ (accessed August 20, 2019).
203Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.156.
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the Oulipian project, in its most interesting critical aspects, is not about the suppression
of expression, but about a working of formal materials. It is of course not wholly unre-
alistic to see certain resonances of Oulipian practice in conceptual writing, particularly,
as James Kurt asserts, in the early years where the use of restrictive devices to produce
texts was not quite the definitive characteristic of Oulipian practice that it tends to be
now.204 While it is true that the early Oulipo did not focus on the idea of constraint
in quite the productive sense that the term later came to take on—specifically in what
Roubaud calls its ‘Perecquian’ period205—and works like Queneau’s CMMP, or the
S+7 method in themselves come closer to this model of textual reordering, Kurt’s as-
similation underplays the characteristic peculiarity of the introduction of mathematics
to literature, as itself a ‘modernist’ development in a broadly Adornian sense. For
even if the concept of constraint itself is variable across the group’s development, it
remains the case that the mathematical ‘translation’ introduced something formally
oppositional and new to the literary palette. That this demanded work means that it
was never simply the idea. Even in the CMMP—in many ways not a typical Oulipian
work since the focus in it is the work itself and it is less clearly a work arising from
mathematical interventions—its value is not simply in its idea. This is evident from the
discussions the group have, in their early meetings, of ways in which the CMMP can
be used, processed or worked with.206 In this sense, in fact, the CMMP itself becomes
more like material for literary composition.
Sol LeWitt asserts that ‘ideas alone can be works of art; they are in a chain of
development that may eventually find some form. All ideas need not be made physi-
204James Kurt, ‘The Beginning of Oulipo? An Attempt to Rediscover a Movement,’ Textual Practice
29, no. 5 (2015): 885–903.
205Roubaud, ‘Perecquian OULIPO.’
206Bens, Gene`se de L’Oulipo.
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cal.’207 The statement is paradigmatic of sixties conceptualism: the initial concept of
the work (or, in LeWitt’s outline, the ideas that are its components) is all that is of
artistic value. The physical working through of these ideas is of no consequence and
merely follows mechanically—indeed, as LeWitt also states, ‘the idea becomes a ma-
chine that makes the art.’208 That is, all that is important in an artwork is contained in
its concept. Inasmuch as the Oulipo concern themselves with potential literature, it
is perhaps easy to see why an assimilation would be made with conceptualism. But
where the similarity extends to the work as such not being the focal point of Oulip-
ian interest, it is simply not the case that everything that is of value is in an initial
idea. It is in any case arguable, that in LeWitt’s work, as opposed to his statements
about his work—consider the physicality (and indeed the labour in the production) of
his wall-drawings—this isolation of the ‘idea’ from the execution is not really sustain-
able. Unlike, say, LeWitt’s instructions, the constraint is not (or does not purport to be)
programmatic; it is instead a component of artistic material. As I described in chapter
4, the point where critical valency is most discoverable is the craft-like working with
these initial conditions—call some part of it ‘idea’ if you will. The idea is not the
work. The work is the work; even if, critically, the process of the work is the more in-
teresting part it still requires work and a work. It thus follows also that the alignment,
made by Dworkin and others, of Oulipism with conceptual writing’s attempt to refuse
‘expression’ is misguided. All the complex mediations of material and technique are
in place with the Oulipian work process. (In any case, the idea that LeWitt represents
a desubjectivised artistic production is misleading since in this case, as Peter Osborne
207Sol LeWitt, ‘Sentences on Conceptual Art,’ in Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: A
Sourcebook of Artists’ Writings, ed. Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996), p.827.
208Sol LeWitt, ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art,’ Artforum 5, no. 10 (June 1967): p.80.
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observes, ‘the productive infinity of the subject has merely been withdrawn from the
realisation of the work back into its idea.’209)
Is the Oulipo still critically viable? The question perhaps cannot be answered so
generally. The answer would depend on the terms in which it was appraised. What
can be said, however, is that the historical situation in which the Oulipo emerged is
just that, historical. Certainly if it is the case, then, that the Oulipo are now merely re-
peating the same set of gestures, this would appear to have limited capacity for critical
engagement over a longer period. This constitutes the danger that the group has fallen
into stasis, has itself become conventional. It has not been my intention in the pre-
ceding to offer a closed or total description of the Oulipo, only a critical interpretation
which necessarily focuses in on limited aspects connected to its original conditions of
emergence, and to its complex relations with other more or less contemporary devel-
opments in French modernist culture, including Surrealism and structuralism as well
as Bourbaki in mathematics. Nevertheless, in the terms of this thesis at least, even if it
may still be useful to address the tensions of freedom and constraint, literature and sci-
ence, tradition and the new, the critical moment of the Oulipo has likely passed. This
is not to say that the Oulipo has failed, only that, like any critical artistic response, they
have a historical specificity. Adorno writes: ‘once the new principles of construction
have crystallised out, they entail total and pure consequentiality.’210 It is arguable that
this consequentiality is, in the case of the Oulipo, directly connected to their effective
homogenisation in the cultural establishment. Where at one stage there could be found
a tension in the crossing of incongruous domains in their methods, this now appears
to be more like an acceptable eccentricity. Any remaining critical interest, therefore,
209Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, p.66.
210Adorno, ‘Vers une musique informelle,’ p.275.
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would need to be broached in terms different to those I have set out here.
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